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Summary
The central theme of this thesis is the role which the non* 
aggression pact played as an instrument of Soviet diplomacy in the 
period 1930*1933 and the consequences for Soviet foreign policy of 
the successful conclusion^ of five such pacts# It also seeks to cast 
light on the actual foreign policy techniques as utilised by the USSR 
in a detailed consideration of specific diplomatic situations.
In the opening chapter the factors which compelled the Soviet 
leadership to adopt a foawsign policy and the diplomatic instruments by 
which it was to be implemented are analysed. The non^aggression pact 
was chose^ by the Bolsheviks as a novel way of achieving the primary 
Soviet external goal • security* The early history of the pact is 
traced* its successes and failures in the twenties briefly analysed*
It is argued that Soviet foreign policy by the 1930*8 can be examined 
largely in isolation from Comintern history. The extent to which the 
outcast Bolshevik State of 1917 had been absorbed into the international 
community is examined end brief reference made to Soviet foreign policy 
decision-making*
The second chapter surveys the Soviet diplomatic position at the 
beginning of the thirties# the deterioration of Soviet-German relations 
and the attempts by France and the USSR to overcome the obstacles which 
had hitherto kept them inveterate enemies* Such a cautious diplomatic 
re-shuffling took place against the background of the massive internal 
Soviet economic-political transformations and the world economic crisis# 
which together with the growth of extremism in Germany# created a new 
international environment* The cautious Franco-Soviet rapprochement is 
pursued in the third chapter as far as the initialling of a non-aggression 
pact and the growing Soviet-German estrangement despite the prolongation 
of/
of the Berlin treaty related* It ia emphasised, however» that Soviet 
diplomacy did not simply abandon the Rapallo partnership but endeavoured 
to maintain its links with Berlin whilst pursuing a now course with 
France.
The fourth chapter departs faxjm this chronological sequence some­
what to examine Soviet relations with Poland, Rumania and the Baltic 
States in 1930-31 before relating them to the Franco-Soviet developments 
of Chapter 3. The negotiations between the USSR and its western 
neighbours for non-aggression pacts are examined and the former's 
successes analysed. Reference ie made to the Soviet's apprehension at 
Japanese activity in Manchuria and the former's attempts to becure a 
pact with the Nippon Empire but a more detailed survey lay outside the 
scope of this thesis.
Chapter S examines the reasons for the delay in the ratification 
of the negotiated pacts, the Rumanian obstacle and the eventual Soviet 
diplomatic successes. Germany's reaction is noted.
The last chapter seeks to emphasise the extent to which Hitler's 
advent to power in Germany was only the last stage, important as it was, 
in the destruction of the Rapallo partnership, and the emergence of a 
new balance of power on the European continent, for the Soviet Union 
epitomised by the Paris ratification of its non-aggression pact with 
the USSR and the letter's new oriehtaticn at Geneva, It is argued that 
the collective security era of the mid-thirties can only be understood 
in terms of the gradual destruction of Soviet-German ties in the early 
thirties and the readiness of hitherto inveterate enemies of Soviet 
Russia to begin a cautious rapprochement with Moscow even before Hitler 
had been appointed Chancellor* The period under review is seen as a 
bridge/
bridge between the near-isolotionist period for the Soviet Union of the 
twentiesi with Germany as its major international friend and the middle 
thirties whan the USSR had entered into the ranks of the statue quo 
powers, a member of the League and a signatory of a mutual assistance 
pact with the French republic.
Chapter 1; The Bmeraenoe of Soviet Foreign Policy.
1. The need for a foreign policy.
At the 3molny Institute in November 1917, a, new Russian Government 
was formed with Lenin at its head. The revolution idiich had proceeded its 
formation was expected to be merely the prelude to a series of similar 
risings in the rest of Europe which would establish a United Socialist 
Europe. Until this occurred, Russia would be the sole proletarian state.
Little thought had been given to the foreign policy of such an isolated 
entity, since the Bolsheviks saw their situation as being a temporary one. 
Regardless of its wishes, however, the Soviet Government was compelled to 
deal with capitalist states by its desperate need for immediate peace. The 
Russian state was incapable of further efforts on the war front, soldiers 
were deserting en masse and the Bolsheviks fully appreciated their urgent 
need for an armistice; as Trotsky said "since we could not engage in war, 
we had to conclude peace."
An appeal was made for all belligerent states to open negotiations 
immediately for a democratic peace. The Soviets hoped that it would be un­
animously accepted, but in this they were disappointed. The allies refused 
to participate and therefore the Bolsheviks were compelled to begin separ­
ate negotiations with Germany in December, 1917.
These negotiations at Brest-Litovsk marked a fundamental stage in the 
development of Soviet foreign policy. Despite the revolutionary approaches, 
the distribution of leaflets at the German front and Trotsky's claim that 
"although we are negotiating peace with Germany, we continue to speak our 
usual revolutionary tongue*,* * the final outcome after a heated debate
1* Quoted in L.Hscher, l|xo_Spyiets^in_WwldJ^^ 1930),
p.16.
2. Ibid.. p.32#
inside the Bolshevik ranks was a bilateral agreement with a capitalist 
country to safeguard the Russian state, or rather that part of it not 
already under German control.
Lenin was the leader of a government which controlled, or at any rate 
aspired to control, a land area with definite borders separating it from 
other states. This area formed a unit in the international system of states, 
regardless of the desires of its rulers. Their need for peace forced the 
Bolsheviks to participate actively in this system according to the rules of 
the capitalist states. This was essential if a base for the future expansion 
of revolution was to be safeguarded. It was this point which Lenin hammered 
home to his followers during the debates On the acceptance or rejection of 
the German peace proposals* In the circumstances, his view was the only 
tenable one, to make concessions to imperialist Germany and so win the opp- 
ortuniiy to consolidate Soviet rule ia Russia whilst awaiting further rev­
olutions.
The outcome of this settlement, however, was to establish the Russian 
state as a link in the chain leading to world revolution which must be def­
ended at all costs* The Bolsheviks now had a dual policy; "to attempt to 
hasten the downfall of the capitalist governments and to attempt to negot­
iate with them."
After Brest-Litovsk, Soviet foreign policy can be explained, by the 
development of these two policies; the initial successes but ultimate fail­
ure of revolutions outside Russia and the initial disasters but ultimate 
victory in the relations of the Soviet state with the outside world. By the 
end of 1922, the Soviet leaders were placing primary importance on Russia's 
need and ability to survive without aid from a second proletarian state* 
Diplomacy had achieved far more than revolution#
As the period of Soviet Russia's lone existence in a hostile environ­
ment was extended, the image of a uniformly unfriendly capitalist system
3.'''Ï.H.''"CaSr Bolshevik R e v o l u t i o n ' J  ' (Lmdon ), p.33* ' ' " ' '
gave way to a more sophistieated view, better suited to the survival of a
weak, isolated state. The divisions which were inevitable in the capitalist
world, as the Bolsheviks perceived it, could be utilised to their advantage*
Russia must seise every opportunity to secure agreement with amenable cap­
er
italist states; if necessary economic^ militaiy concessions could be offered 
as added inducements. Recent historical experience confirmed this view;
Germany was indeed alienated from the victor powers of 1918* Lenin in Nov­
ember 1920, emphasised the importance of this principle;
(T)he fundamental thing is the rule which we have not only 
adopted theoretically, but applied in practice, and which will 
be our rule Until the final victory of socialism throughout the 
world, that is t to exploit the contradictions and antagonisms 
between the two imperialisms, between the two systems of capit­
alist btates, inciting them one against the other*
Soviet foreign policy must have flexibility, be j^ady to forge temp**
orary alignments so long as these produced positive results for Russia* As
Lenin expressed its
To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, 
a war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and compli­
cated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states and to 
refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilise the cmflict of interests, 
even though temporary, among one's enemied, to refuse to temporise 
and compromise with possible, even though temporary# unstable, Vacill-„ 
ating mà. conditional, allies ** is this not ridiculous in the extreme?^*
The division between the victors and the vanquished of the First World 
War was fully exploited by the Soviet Government, a task much lightened by 
the pariah treatment of Germany by France and Britain which forced capitalist 
Germany and Bolshevik Russia into a "marriage of convenience" which produced 
considerable mutual benefits* By the winter of 1921-1922, political, economic 
and military contacts were developing between the two States, a factor of 
immense importance to Soviet foreign policy throughout the next decade* The 
Rapallo Agreement of 1922 drew together these two outcasts from international 
society; Russia would no longer be isolated and a possible capitalist united
4* Speech by Lenin to a Meeting of Moscow Communist Party Secretaries, 
November 27,1920* J.Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy Vol.l, 
(London 1951), p.221,
5* V.l.Lenin, Sochineniya Vol*41 (Moscow I963), p.54*
front against the Soviet state had been forestalled,* Lenin summed up the 
new situation in 1921, thus:
We have something more than a breathing-spaoe: we have entered 
a new period in which we have won the right to our fundamental 
international existence âh the network of capitalist states, *
2 f The non-aggression pact as an instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy*
The foreign policy of each state in the international system has at 
least one factor in common, a quest for security, a constant striving to 
ensure that the state will remain a viable entity despite any attempts made 
by other members Of the system to jeopardise the interests of that state by 
economic, military or political means.
The economic and military weakness of Russia;in the 1920's, in addition 
to the ideological antithesis of Bolshevism and capitalism which was percei­
ved by both camps, ensured that the Soviet leaders, once it became apparent 
that their state would have to survive alone in a hostile environment at 
least for some time, would neooessarily attach peihaps an unusual degree of 
importance to this foreign policy goal* The historical experience of allied 
intervention in 1918^19 gave tangible form to these fears for the security 
of the new Russian state and the frequent violent verbal attacks launched on 
it by the capitalist world left little to the imagination of the Bolshevik 
leaders. 3h the forefront of a future, may be imminent, anti-Soviet inter­
vention, stood Japan in the east, Britain and France with their "hirelings" 
Poland and Rumania in the west.
To counter the aggressive designs of these powers, the Soviet Govern­
ment sought to guarantee peace to its war-ravaged state by concluding a 
series of non-aggression pacts with the outside capitalist world and in 
particular, with those states which shared a common border with Russia. In 
this search for security the non-aggression pact became the moat popular 
instrument of Soviet diplomacy in its endeavours to acquire guarantees of 
the non-violability of its frontiers and neutrality in aiy future capitalist
é. sia., Vol.42 (Moscow X903), p.22.
wars* The Soviet Government considered that the non-aggression pact was a 
new type of diplomatic instrument to he differentiated sharpl^y from the 
imperialist instruments such as traditional alliances which merely fomented 
wars and the collective security concept which lay at the centre of the League 
of Nations, to the Soviets an organisation of capitalist states bent on 
aggression, not peace* At a reception given for the Turkish Premier and 
Foreign Minister in 1932 Molotov stated that "Soviet-Turkish collaboration 
in the sphere of political relations created a new type of political agree­
ment, the pact of non-aggression and neutrality, the first of which was that 
concluded between the Soviet Ihiion and Turkey Bn December 17, 1923*" It 
was important for the new Government in Russia to find such a method of con­
solidating its relations with capitalist states and increasing its security 
yet whioh was unlike those treaties which were considered to have been a 
contributory factor in causing the First World War* It must be able to give 
tangible form to the claim made later by Radek that "the foreign policy of 
the Soviet Government differs as much from the foreign policy of the other 
Great Powers as the domestic policy of this first socialist state differs 
from the domestic policy of the states belonging to the capitalist system"* 
The non-aggression pact was a guarantee of neutrality in conflicts whioh 
arose among the capitalist states, conceded In exchange for their under­
taking to refrain from attacking the Soviet Union or intervening in its 
domestic affairs* ’ Of course, the Bolsheviks did not think that the mere 
signature of suoh a pact with a capitalist state would gu^ B^ sntee peace; 
their assessment of suoh states was not so high as to expect their respect 
for a signature to be maintained if war seemed to offer more advantages* 
let the isolated revolutionary leaders of Russia, desperately in need of
7* Isvestiia. April 30, 1932*
8* K.Radek, "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs Vol*12,
J.2, January 1934, pps* 193, 202*
w*
security, were compelled by their oircumstaaoes to place a similar type 
of reliance on this new type of treaty as were their class enemies on the 
old-fashioned type* No matter how flimsy a paper guarantee is in itself, it 
normally reflects certain underlying interests to which it gives a more 
concrete form, especially to third powers* As the twenties passed into the 
new era of the thirties# the Soviet Government became increasingly aware of 
the benefits tdiioh accrued from such pacts and earnestly sou^t them with 
its neighbours* Naturally, it was reluctant to concede that its diplomatic 
methods were similar to those of the capitalists and used rather picturesque 
language to justify its conclusion of thèse pacts, at least to its own public* 
Thus an Isvestiia editorial stated that a pact did tell the popular masses of 
a given country that their govemmmt could and wanted to live in peace with 
the second country involved* War was therefore made more difficult since it 
involved that government in an open breaking of its pledge before these
Q
masses* * The non-aggression pact was not a new device in that it attempted 
to consolidate certain common interests between two states by the signature 
of a treaty with the aim of increasing security by an undertaking to refrain 
from aggressive actions against the other signatory and to maintain neutrality 
in the event of that other country being the victim of aggression from a third 
state* Its originality lay in the fact that it was strictly a defensive non- 
aggros sion and neutrality treaty containing no contingency plans or obligat­
ions relating to joint action against third states, even though the latter be 
the aggressors* In addition it contained various other obligations relating to 
economic non-aggression, propaganda, etc* and was usually linked with a con- 
oilliation convmtion for the peaceful settlement of disputed questions 
between the signatories* It was a useful contribution to international relat­
ions and enlightened in its respect for peace and the absence of aggressive 
intentions* That the Soviet Government found it a useful weapon in its diplo­
matic arsenal was proven the history of its foreign policy in the inter-war 
years and especially in the period under consideration in this thesis#
'§• 'im^ ai'iia,'' AprjL^ ^^  ' '.'...  ^....""".'
■ai.miii*»-f j»i.irvn -i-l n mi. i.nti nif ~
7.
The tton-aggroaaion pact was moat suoooaafully applied by the Soviet» 
in the 1920*» in relation to its oidaie-eastem border state» and Germany*
The early months of Bolshevik power saw Russian interest concentrated in the 
west; peace was the primary policy objective* The intense pressure on Russia 
in 1918-1919 as a result of the civil-revolutionaiy war, however, turned 
Soviet attention towards the east* Here, one powerful factor united the trad­
itional eastern rulers with the revolutionaries in Moscow, a dislike of imper­
ialism, especially British imperialism* A statement by the representative of 
the Afghanistan Emir expresses a general feeling of that times
I am neither a communist nor a socialist, but ay political programme 
entails the expulsion of the British from Asia, X am an implacable 
foe of the capitalisation of Asia by Europe, the principal represent­
atives of whioh are the British* Xn this I approximate to the Gomm- 
unists, and in this respect we are natural allies* iO*
As Soviet activity expanded in the middle-eastern states on its southern 
border, a difference arose between its two policy goals, world revolution 
and the development of normal diplomatic relations* Should it actively support 
local communist parties at the possible expense of good relations with the 
governments, or should the local parties be sacrificed, if need be? This 
problem became more acute, as in Europe, when revolution failed to material­
ise and the Bolsheviks were compelled to place their state interests above 
those of the local communist party*
Throughout 1925 growing Turkish-British tension forced the Turkish 
Government to strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union and despite 
Turkish suppression of its local communist party, negotiations between the
two countries were Initiated which resulted on December 17, 1925, in the
11
signature of a Soviet-Tujkish treaty of Friendship, and Neutrality* * Xn the 
event of a military attack against one of the parties by a third party, the 
other party undertook to observe neutrality. Each party also undertook to 
refrain from aggression against the other or to take part in any alliance or 
agreement of a political character with third states directed against the
16* ' Quotedl^ Ga:w,' ' The Bol3e3k'Revoluti
11* Dokumenti Vneshney mi1îiîa”"3SSrTd^^ 1963),pps.739-741*
(HereaftM^bW)"
8,
Other parly* This treaty reflected Soviet fears aroused by the
13Locarno negotiations and was hailed in Moscow as the foundation of a 
Soviet security system whioh was differentiated from the objectionable 
Locarno project* * A year later* Qhioherin, commenting on his meeting with 
the Turkish Foreign Minister* stated that "both the USSR and Turkey* engaged 
as they are in peaceful work within their own territories, have no intention 
of threatening any other country *,, (unlike the) world imperialists* irtio are 
always trying ti extend the frontiers of their rule. *. threatening both the 
USSR and Turkey."^^*
Thift treaty was followed on August 31, 1926, by a Soviet-Afghan treaty 
of Non-Aggression* based on the Soviet-Turkish model, but including a prov­
ision for mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of the contracting
I O:
17.
l6
states* * and a year later* on October 1* 1927* by the Soviet-Persian treaty
of Guarantee and Neutrality#
This system of pacts was supplemented by a series of pacts between these 
three middle-eastern states but the Russians refused to expand their bilateral 
agreements whioh would have involved them in a multilateral relationship* Thus 
Moscow valued its pacts with Turkey and Afghanistan but refused to sign a tri­
partite Soviet-Turkish-Afghan treaty* Soviet reluctance to enter multilateral 
agreements with the outside world was a common theme in its negotiations at 
this tiraC| prompted both by a reluotonce to become over-involved in the 
relations of a group of non-communist and therefore potentially hostile 
states and also by a conviction that the weight of Soviet Russia would be 
greater in a bilateral agreement, especially when the partner was a small 
power, than in a multilateral agreement which might include a second state
12* The treaty was concluded for three years and was renewed on December 17, 
1929*
13* Bee below*
14* E#H* Carr, Socialism in One Country Vol.3* Part 2 (London 1964)»p*642 
13# The Soviet Comilssar IfdFforeign AffSIrs, dKdherin, at his meeting with 
the Turkish Foreign Minister, November 1926. X.J. Eudin and R#C.North, 
Soviet Russia and the East 1920-192? (Stanford 1957), P#324# Chicherin,
1930*
16# DVF Vol.9# (Moscow 1964), pps.406-410* This treaty was renewed on June 24
1931*
17# DVF Vol*10*(Moscow 1965),pps*396-400# This treaty continues in operation 
' at the present time.
whose influence in the group, either alone or at least combined with the
third state or states, would be as powerful as Russia's itself,
Soviet interest in a series of non-aggression pacts onlts western
border also oame to the fore in 1925• The Locarno pact, whioh guaranteed the
frontiers of western Europe, coupled in 1926 with the German entry into the
League of Nations, that bete noir of Soviet diplomacy and the introduction
of the Dawes plan in 1924, radically altered Germany's international position
and was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as an attempt, especially on the
part of Britain, to split the Rapallo partnership, Russia's ace card in its
diplomatic intercourse with the non-communist world# In September 1924
Chicherin condemned the new German policy:
By entering the League of Nations Germany joimea definite coalition; 
Germany thus becomes a satellite#..German policy is thus brought into 
collision with the Rapallo policy# 3,8*
This Soviet fear was not entirely without substance, since the Weimar
Republic now began a balancing act between East and West, using the former
in order to secure concessions from the latter whilst striving to retain
good relations with Russia# The new international position of Germany could
not but affect its relations with the tJSSR since any improvement of Germany's
links with the west could only weaken its hitherto exclusive dependence on
19.Russia# The change in the Soviet-German relationship was subtle, yet a 
hint of uncertainty had been introduced into the Rapallo understanding, A 
lingering doubt müat have remained with the Soviet leaders that their relat- 
io nahip could deteriorate still further# This remained the case despite the 
conclusion of a Soviet-German non-aggression pact# In December 1924, Chicherin 
formally proposed to the German Ambassador in Moscow the conclusion of a pact 
of neutrality between the two states, an outcome of Soviet disconcertment 
concerning Germany's relations with the west# Stresemann, the German Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, was anxious not to jeopardise his delicate Locarno neg­
otiations with the western powers, however, and refused to be drawn into a
is'#''Quoted'to Socialism "ïa 'One'Fo ''Î# "'"p'.Sy»"
19# L#F# Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic ^ Cambridge 1954),p#120#
4LÜ#
positivé acoéptancQ of the Soviet proposal. He still valued highly relat­
ions with Russia, despite the abortive Sovlet-baoked communist revolution­
ary attempt in Germany of 1923, but his major aim was to preaeme Germany's 
freedom of manoeuvres
The question of a choice between Bast and V/est does not arise as the 
result of our joining the League# Such a choice can only be made when 
backed by military force. That, alas, we do not possess. We can neither 
become a continental spearhead for England, as some believe, nor can we 
involve ourselves in an alliance with Russia,
A commercial treaty was proposed, though, and after some disagreement was
signed in Moscow on October 12,1923, when Germany's Locarno negotiations were
almost completed* This treaty had political as well as economic significance
as it contained a declaration that the Rapallo treaty would continue as the
foundation of Soviet-German relations, but was no compensation in Moscow for
GormaiQr's new links with the west.
The formal signature of the Locarno agreements took place on December 1,
1925 and cleared the way for Stresemann to turn once again towards Russia,
negotiations for a political treaty being resumed in early December, the
treaty of Berlin finally being signed on Apri3^ 24, 1926, This treaty of non-
aggression and neutrality confirmed the Rapallo treaty as the basis of mutual
relations between the Soviet Union and Germany. Xn the event of one party
being attacked by a third power, the other party would observe neutrality and
neither party was to participate in any economic or financial boycott directed
21
against the other. The treaty was to be valid for five years, * Although it 
was seemingly a victory for Soviet diplomacy, it could not etirely restore 
the old relationship; Germany still retained its new ties with the west. This 
point requires stress as the downhill plunge of Soviet-German relations which 
occurred in the 1930’s had its initiation in this period, even though for some 
years to come Germany remained Russia's most important "friend" in the inter­
national system.
Having briefly surveyed Soviet-German relations at the time of Locarno,
20.'"'Quoted'"in'Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic,''' 'p7l03.'''    ......    '
21. DVP Voi.9, ppe, 230::2@g;^ -------- -— — -----
11.
thé close oonueotion between the latter and the Soviet negotiations with 
Poland, the Baltic states and France must now be examined# The important 
factor here is the eventual outcome of these diplomatic moves to contrast 
with the outcome of a new series of negotiations whioh were undertaken in 
1931^ 1932# In the investigation of the reasons for this disparity lies the 
major burden of this work#
Soviet relations with the 'Western border states tended to vary in 
inverse proportion to those with Germm^^# Foli^-German hatred as a result 
of the Polish territorial gains at 'bhe end of the First World War, seen in 
Bersjin as the most iniquitous clauses of the detested Versailles treaty, 
placed a premium on strained Soviet-Polish relations# Germany never renounced 
its desire to restore this "stolen" land to its bosom and such a rectific­
ation would be simplified if Poland were distracted by unsettled conditions 
on its eastern border with the USSR# Prior to 1925 Russia's relations with 
Germany had been voxy good and the need to placate Berlin by not adopting a 
friendly attitude towards Poland was strengthened by the latent hoatilty 
wliioh existed between the two Slav neighbours, regardless of Germany's wishes, 
as an outcome of thè Soviet-Polish war of 1920 and the following peace treaty 
together ivith more general historical and ideological factors# The small 
Baltic states were regarded in Moscow as artificial anti-Soviet bastions 
propped up by Anglo-French imperialism#
German accommodation with the western powers in 1925# however, compelled 
the Soviet Government to re-examine its policy towards these border states, 
partly as a re-insurance against the possible weakening of its Rapallo links 
and partly as a form of diplomatic blackmail, Poland being such a sensitive 
issue in Soviet-German relations that any sign of a Ruaaian-Polish rapproch­
ement might well have a positive effect on the Wü|hJmstra3se#^^*
The spring or summer of 1925 heralded the opening move in this cautious 
Soviet approach to the Polish Government when it seems likely that Moscow
22#"''in' factthe Poiish-So-viet to have had little influence
on German policy.
hinted at its willingness to conclude a pact guaranteeing the existing 
Soviet-Polish frontier#^^* This approach in the midst of the German neg­
otiations with the west was no coincidence# In August an agreement on the 
handling of frontier incidents, a; recurring source of friction between the 
two neighbours, was signed and at the end of September, Chicherin, on route 
to Berlin, deliberately visited Warsaw in an official capacity. On 
September 28, in a Warsaw press interview he spoke of Soviet-Poliah relations:
Our relations during the past few years have shown a gradual 
evolution in which those things which divided us have more and more 
given wsy to an ever increasing friendliness between our countries*.*
It is enough to look at the map of Europe to realise the enormous
importance in international affairs of the relations being established 
between our Union and Poland*..a firm rapprochement between us should 
have a profound influence on the whole international complex of forces 
and relations* ^5#
He also spoke of the importance of good economic relations and the desirab­
ility of a trade agreement. This was not all; Chicherin appears to have 
proposed a treaty of non-aggression which the Poles were not prepared to 
accept, m  offer whioh was repeated in the spring of 1926 with the sauae neg­
ative Polish response* â further attempt was made by the Soviet Government in
August, 1926, to persuade Poland to sign a non-aggression pact covering non- 
aggression, the joint renunciation of all aggressive actions, a mutual guar­
antee of neutrality in the event of an attack on either by a third power, non- 
participation in political and economic agreements directed against the other 
party and the settlement of disputed questions by a conoi3^iatlon commission?^* 
Beck, later to become Polish Foreign Minister, states that "while Pilsudski 
(the Polish leader) was quite prepared to eliminate 'trifling everday frict­
ions* and to settle at least some of the outstanding practical questions 
affecting Polish-Soviet relations, he did not believe in the possibility of 
a large-scale detente with Russie, at that time."^^* Desultory negotiations
24* J.Korbel, Poland Between East and West: Soviet and German Diplomacy
Toward PoiandTTmi:I%T~ ( m n o ^ ^  ---------------
23. Press totélnrisw’bÿ C M  in Warsaw, September 28,1923* Quoted in
J.Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol.2, 1923-1932 
(London 195^, pps. 33-56%
26. NKD Statement of August 28,1926. DVP Vol.9, p.404*
27* J.Beok, Final Report (New York 19577T P*3*
continued until the murder of the Soviet Ambassador in Poland, Voikov, in 
June 1927, created such bad feeling that ai^ lingering hopes for on agreement 
were dashed#
The stumbling blfok on the path to agreement between Poland and Soviet 
Russia, apart from the historical conflict between the two countries and 
peoples and the wide ideological rift between communiât Russia and the right- 
wing diotatorship in Poland, was the differing oonooptiona of an agreement 
held by the two states# Poland, regarding itself as the leader of the Baltic 
group of states and suspecting the Russians of attempting to split up this 
group by conducting negotiations with each member on a bilateral basis, 
desired a multilateral agreement with Russia which would include the Baltic 
states# The Soviet Union saw in this an atten^t by Poland to act as leader of
this group and iafluenoe the other members in an anti-Soviet direction and
28therefore strenuously opposed this scheme, favouring bilateral agreements#
As in the case of the middle eastern states referred to above, the Soviet
Union again demonstrated its reluctance to become involved in a multilateral
arrangement because of the complications which it envisaged as resulting from
such a move# In this instance, however, mutual suspicion of the other power's
motives was the principal reason why neither side would compromise# On April
24, 1926, Litvinov, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, addresed the
Central Executive Committee on this themes
Unfortunately, all bur efforts to reach lasting agreement with 
Poland have up to now been defeated by the Polish Government ' a 
anxiety to play the part, so to apeak, of the manager of external 
relations for all the Baltic states###We do not, and are not prepared 
to reoongnise Poland* s protectorate, open or concealed, over the 
Baltic# The stubborn reluctance of the Polish Government to speak 
only on behalf of its own statehas up to now brought to nothing all 
our attempts at rapprochement#
28* The Soviet fear of Polish schemes must have been accentuated by the con­
clusion in January 1925 of the treaty of Helsinld* between Poland, Finland, 
Estonia and Latvia# J.Duroaelle, Lea Frontieref europeenes d*l URSS 1917- 
a.9W (Paris 1957), P.72.
29# Report of the Deputy Commissar for Forign Affairs, Litvinov, to the CSC, 
April 24,1926. Degras, Sovi^ Dqgumanta__on^  #112#
14*
In accordance with its policy of bilateral approaches, the Soviet 
Government made advances to the Baltic states as well as to Poland in I925 
on the subject of a neutrality agreement, but received no reply*
On March 5, 1926, Moscow made fresh overtures to Finland and the three 
Baltic states, apparently waving its insistence on separate negotiations with 
each of the Baltics idiilst still refusing to include Poland, but achieving 
very little. The following year a new effort was made by Moscow but the neg­
otiations whioh were initiated made little headway except in the case of 
Lithuania. The Soviets absolutely rejected the concept of arbitration as a 
means of settling any future dispute between the signatories and refused to 
accept a proposal for a neutral chairman in the event of a conciliation comm­
ission being agreed upon. The Russians, comprehending the world in terms of 
capitalist or non-capitalist, saw no place for a neutral* Latvia did event­
ually initial a non-aggression pact with the U3SH in March 1927, largely 
because its social democratic government was anxious to reach agreement with 
its large neighbour on eoonomio grounds, but the victory, if so be it, was a 
hollow one for Moscow* The Latvian Government made its signature dependent on 
the simultaneous signature of a conciliation convention providing for a neutral
chairman and Soviet assent to a multilateral declaration of Latvia's fidelity
31
to its League Covenant obligations*
The only success for Soviet diplomacy on its western border was the 
signature of the Soviet-Lithuanian Neutrality pact on September 28, 1926, in 
which both parties undertook to respect the sovereignty and territorial int­
egrity of each other, to refrain from any aggressive action, financial or 
economic boycott against the other party and to observe neutrality in the 
case of an attack on the other by a third party* In the event of a conflict 
ai'ising between them which should prove impossible to solve by diplomatic 
moans,a conciliation commission would be appointed, to be defined in a sep-
jpr'SoyS tostitote'of totemationM
Latvia. Lithuania (London 1958), p#?l*
51* Ibid*.p*73* The pact was never signed.
arate agreement. The treaty was to operate for five years with an automatic 
extension unless one party gave notice of a desire for change.
These negotiations between the Soviet Ihiion, Poland and the Baltic 
states illustrate several important factors in the policies of these states 
whioh were maintained into the 1930* s# One oruèâsl factor was the key role 
played by Germany in the exteznal relations of all these states; a deterio­
ration of relations between Germany and one of them tended to force that 
state to turn more towards the others. A local balance of power operated in 
this region of eastern Europe. In this case the Soviet tkiion was the "victim" 
of a new German policy, later Poland (and Prance) as well as Russia would 
fed the current of change in the Germany of the 1930's and adjust accord­
ingly# The differing conceptions held by Poland and the USSR concerning bi­
lateral versus multilateral non-aggression pacts has already been mentioned 
and will be encountered again, as will be the position of Poland as a leader
in this area of Europe whose influence was critical in any negotiations in-
33.
volving the Baltic states.
Lithuania, the only state to accept the Soviet offer #f a pact, is an 
exception in that the Polish occupation of Vilna and the Lithuanian occup­
ation oft Kernel estranged Lithuania from Poland and Germany respectively and 
therefore complicated its relations with the other Baltic states. In addition, 
Lithuania had no common frontier with the Soviet Union and thus did not suffer 
from the txying frontier incidents which frequently disrupted the relations 
between the other Baltic states and the USSR. A further positive factor con­
tributing to the Lithuanian signature was a great victory of the "left" in
the elections of May 1926 and the formation of a government presided over by 
34.a social-democrat.
32. DVP Vol.9. PPS.
33* Durosdle states that Poland tried every means of preventing Finland, 
Estonia and Latvia from signing non-aggression pacts with the USSR. 
Durosdle, Les Frontières euroneenes d*l URSS 1917-1941. p.77*
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In the ease of Rumania, the Soviet Union'» aouth-weotem neighbour, 
the bitter territorial dispute oonoeming Bessarabia, seised by the former 
during the First World War but never recognised by the latter, prevented 
any attempt at an improvement in relations by the signature of a pact or 
otherwise. Rumania's role in the French alliance system, including its close 
ties with Poland, did nothing to improve its relations with the Soviet state.
The other arena in whioh repercussions from Locarno were experienced was 
that of Franco-Soviet relations. France, like Britain, had accorded de jure
recognition to Soviet Russia in 1924, yet this move had done little to advance
9
amicable relations between the two states. The seeminly intransigent debt 
problem still loomed at the forefront of the issues which prevented a mean­
ingful rapprochement. The unstable Soviet-German partnership in 1923, however, 
encouraged Moscow tentatively to take stops to improve its links with Paris.
The appointment of Rakovsky as Soviet Ambassador in Paris at the end of Oct­
ober, 1923, marked the beginning of an intensive Soviet canqpaign to improve 
55*
relations.In December conorersations took place between the two countries
in Paris. Chicherin, one of the Soviet representatives at these talks, gave
a press statement on December 17:
I think the present general situation most propitious for the devel­
opment of stable friendly relations between the Soviet Federation and 
France, I have noted, on the part of the French leaders, the existence 
of clear and undoubted good will, and of a really serious wish to 
reach a settlement, beneficial to both interested parties, of all the 
questions pending between our Governments. 36.
This statement proved to be too optimistic. The new year witnessed the 
renewal of debt negotiations but once again, as to the past, they broke down, 
in June 1926. The French ratification of the Locarno agreements in March 1926 
ended any Soviet hope that France might be detached from Britain so as to comp­
ensate for the new international situation. At the same time, Germany's new 
ties with the west seemed to be foundering, there was a set back in its attempt 
to join the League and negotiations between the Rapallo partners took a favour­
able turn. Although no tangible gains were secured by Soviet diplomacy, it is
55. Carr. Socialism ''inbountrv Voi.5. cart 1% 'c.Wir'"" ' '.... ".
36. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy Vol.2. p.67*
Of interest to note Soviet foreign policy's flexibility and its willing­
ness to utilise the fciotion between Germany, France and Britain to achieve 
its policy objectives.
The Soviets once again turned to France in 1927, a bleak year for 
Russia's external relations with the western powers, In an endeavour to 
counter their deteriorating international position following the break of 
diplomatic relations with Britain# The Russians, who constantly feared the 
formation of an international ,oombination to harass and possibly even attack 
their country, perceived this [threat looming over-closer during 1927* In the
autumn they offered France a non-aggression pact, agreed to resume debt neg- 
resume
otiations and to sprat talks with France's ally, Poland, which had been langui­
shing since the previous year, an offer renewed in February 1928.^^" The pact 
remained unformulated, however, a consequence of the oontinued refusal of 
Moscow to accept France's condition that a multilateral pact including Poland 
and the Baltic states be concluded.
The failure of these negotiations ended the brief and shallow rapproche­
ment between Paris and Moscow and their relations once again deteriorated to 
the old level. Mutual financial claims oontinued to balk Soviet efforts at 
improving this situation* In December, 1928, Litvinov expressed his countiy's 
desire to maintain good relations with all states, including France, but no 
response was elicited from Paris.
During the troubled year of 1927, Germany adopted a neutral position in 
the Anglo-Soviet dispute* Whilst Moscow was re-assured by Germany's refusal 
to be drawn into any British conspiracy, Berlin had shown that it would not go 
so far as to support Russia against the west* After 1927, Soviet-German rel­
ations in general deteriorated, despite intervals punctuated by temporary 
39.
improvements* A Wilhemstrasse note written at the time of the first session
37* Note of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky 
and the French Foreign Minister, Briand, February 10, 1928. DVP Vol.ll 
(Moscow 1966), p#79* V.S.Dovgalevsky, Soviet Ambassador in Sweden'^ '' 1^4- 
1927; Japan,1927; France, 1927 - 1934*
38. Report of the Deputy Commissar for Forign Affairs, Litvinov, to the #8, 
December 10, 1928. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy.Vol.2.0*349. 
39* Military relations, established in the early 20*s, continued much as 
before and provided a sphere of sound collaboration. See F.L.Carsten,
"The Reiohswehr and the Red Army," Survey N.44-45. pps. 114*132.
of the Propamtoïy Commission on Bissrmamont in November 1927 provides a
clear indication of the problems facing German deoision»makers in pursuing
their Rap#lo course* It urged that collaboration at Geneva "not be made too
evident outwardly•** Germax^ could not be too pro^Soviet for fear of
losing its newly^won position in the west. If the eastern oard was played too
heavily it ceased to be a means of extracting concessions from the west and
had the opposite effect*
Soviet**Geman relations deteriorated, however, for more positive reasons
than the desire of the latter not to alienate Britain, France and the îftiited
States* The Soviet^Frenoh talks concerning a non-aggression pact in the autumn
of 1927# whilst barren of results, had nevertheless alarmed Germany and in
September, Brookdorff#Hantsau, the German Ambassador in Moscow, held a heated
41*
discussion with Chioherin in which the Russian adopted a conciliatory attitude* 
The new left turn in Comintern policy which was adopted in 1926 alarmed 
Rantsau* Hitherto a stanch supporter of the Rap#lo line, he now began incr­
easingly to discern a new internal and external Soviet policy* At a time when, 
in fact, Soviet internal policy was becoming more inward-looking and the 
Comintern ceasing to be of importance except for its verbal outpourings, he 
became impressed with the contrary notion of a new revolutionary course, 
Germany* s strengthening external but weakening internal position made its 
government less anxious to overlook unorthodox Soviet interference in internal 
German affairs. IMfortunately for Russia, this occurred at a time #en 
Coraintemn declarations were becoming more extreme and it is not surprising 
that German officials took such declarations at their face value; they were 
not to know that Stalin had no intention of oount^ancing a revolutionary 
attempt in Germany*
The ’'ipeoial relationship” continued because it still benefited both
40*'''Hote8 'by'''the Germ^ tlxe.USSR, Dirksen,^"for' a con%rsatiZ'^"
of Stresemann with Litvinov, November 24, 1927* Quoted in H.L* Dyck,
Weimar Germany end Soviet Russia 1926-19^3 (London 1966), p.llO.
41* Korbel, Poland Between Hast and West. p*221*
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parties, but was weakened iy each new blow struck* The*'spirit of Rapallo” 
was struggling with the ” spirit of Locarno” and the odds on Rapallo* s ult­
imate victory were beginning to lengthen. The crisis of the last few years 
had not been the result of any positive Soviet decision# On the oontrary,
Moscow desired to maintain and strengthen the relationship. Problems were 
created partly by a Soviet desire to improve its relations with other countries 
#%ich on the economic plane, at least, could only adversely affect Germany, 
and partly by Soviet policies adopted for intemal purposes to which the German 
Government took exception* The years 1929^1930 produced little on the credit 
side and for the first time since 1925 a Soviet commentary spoke of a Happalo 
crisis. Dirksen, vdio had replaced Brookdorff-Rantsau at the German Embassy
in Moscow on the letter's death at the end of 1928 reported in February 1930
44*
that Litvinov was deeply depressed about the state of Soviet-German relations* 
The Soviet q,uest for security and the use of the non-aggression pact in 
this quest was not restricted to Europe and central Asia. In the east lay a 
further potential danger to the continued existence of the first socialist 
state. The Far Bast was never-far removed from the centre of Moscow's atten­
tion, Japanese expansionist plans and interests in northern China were no 
secret and gave scant cause for complacency within the Kremlin walls# On the 
initiative of the Soviet representatives in Tokyo, unofficial negotiations
for the conclusion of an agreement in defence of peaoe in the Far Bast were
45.begun in the middle twenties* The Japanese stated that in principle they
had no objection to a pact but insisted that its conclusion be postponed until
46*
**a situation of complete economic and political understanding” was reached.
m  June 1927, Dovgalevsky, Soviet Ambassador in Japan, stated the désire
of the Soviet Government to conclude a non-aggression pact but again the
42. Blows™Wch as the Hols Affair and the 'shaWity ' '
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gosudarstva sa rasvitie dobrososedskikh otnosheniy s Taponiey 1925-1936”, 
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Japanese refused, demanding as a pre-requisite a trade agreement* Similar 
Soviet proposals made in Deoomber 1927 and March 1928 met further negative 
responses* The failure to secure even a paper guarantee of Japan's future 
peaceful behaviour left another running sore for Soviet diplomacy which 
would plague it in the not-too-distant future.
3* The Comintern*
The relationship between the Comintern, the organisation whose aim was
to assist the spread of communist revolution to the rest of the world and
Soviet diplomacy in the period 1928-1935 is complex and by no means clear
from the evidence hitherto revealed by the Soviet authorities* The fact that
very early in its history it became a component part of the Russian state
machinery, however, warrents some examination of its role and significance in
Russia's external relations*
The Third World Congress of the Comintern met in June 1921 after the
revolutionary failures in Hungary, Poland and Germany. Both the internal and
external situation favoured a period of restraint in Soviet Russia; new
Comintern tactics were required.^^' Trotsky admitted;
Now for the first time we see and feel that we are not so immed­
iately near to the goal, to the conquest of power, to the world rev­
olution. *.in 1919, we said to ourselves; ”It is a question of months," 
Now we s^î "It is perhaps a question of years*"^°#
The Comintern would renounce attempts at revolution for the time being and
begin preparations for a future revolutionary period. These united front
tactics with the slogan, "to the masses," marked the first radical change of
direction. The Comintern was to undergo several more before its dissolution*
These new tactics, whilst ooi%)l#menting the new policies of the Soviet
state, raised doubts in the minds of some Comintern delegates. Was the world
revolution being subordinated to Russian state interests? Radek said that ary
measure "which Is a necessity from the stand point of Soviet Russia is also a
47T1^ JBP had^replaced War Communism in 1921 aid Inaugurated a new poxdod of 
moderation within Russia* Diplomatically contacts were being concluded 
with the capitalist world*
48. Quoted in Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution Vol.3. p*383*
necessity from the standpoint of the world revolution.The Soviet- 
German Eapallo eggeeraent intensified these doubts; what would the German 
Communist Party's tactics be towards its government, which was Russia's 
only important friend? No straightforward answer oan be given to the question 
as to whioh interest was upper most for the Soviet leaders, at least In the 
early iwenties. Events in Germany, and in Asia where the Comintern provided 
the Narkomindel with grave difficulties in its British relations, show that 
revolutionary interests were not necessarily subordinated to diplomatic rel­
ations in every case. As Carr says, only the vital decisions were taken by
the Politburo and Central Committee; lesser matters were handled by the ind-
50.
ividual organs and co-ordination was largely missing* Further, when a 
situation arose in whioh revolution seemed to have a good chance of success, 
the Soviet leadership would not always "play safe" with their diplomatic 
assets. In the early and middle twenties, they still, perhaps, remained rev- 
olutionaries at heart. * Yet Soviet prestige did. continue to grow whilst 
Coraintem failures in comparison appeared even more lamentable. At the Fourth
Congress in 1922 the world proletariat was urged to give all assistance to
52#
Russia's interests in all other countries. The Theses on Tactics said;
The mere existence of the Russian Soviet Republic represents a 
permanent element of weakness in bourgeois society; it is the most 
important factor in the world revolution.53#
Although Rapallo was not mentioned by name, Bukharin said;
X maintain that we have now grown so strong that we can conclude a 
military alliance with the bourgeoisie of another country in order 
to use it to smash another bourgeoisie.. .This is nothing but a 
question of pure strategic and tactical e3q?edlenoy*54.
49. Radek to the Third Com^tem Congress, June-July, 1921, J.Degras, The 
Communist International Vol.l (London 1956), p.225#
50, Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution Vol.3. pps, 330-331»
51, In the middle twenties not only revolutionary fervour but fractional 
struggles within the Soviet leadership, however, had a strong inflAenoe 
on Comintern policy*
52. E.F.MoKensie, Comintern and World Revolution 1928-1941 (New York 1964),p.54#
53# Begras, Comintern Vol.l. p.420.
54* Bukharin speaking to the Fourth Comintern Congress on the Programme of 
the Communist International, December 1922. Ibid.. p.445#
The German crisis induced by the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1925 
is an interesting case study in Coraintem-Narkomindel relations* Both the 
Soviet Government and the German Communist Party (KPD) opposed the occupat­
ion, hut with one important difference* The former opposed it heonnse it 
threatened the peaoe of Europe for the still-weak state and because it depl- 
eted Russia's only Important ally. The KPD not only opposed the French 
action, however, but treated the German and French Governments as equal enemies. 
It was utilising the crisis to attack a government which the Soviets could 
only look upon as being the best possible to prevent French influence in 
Germany expanding# This inconsistency continued for several months until 
August when the collapse of the German Government seemed to indicate that 
perhaps there was a revolutionary aituiation. The revolutionary attempt, 
supported by the Politburo, was a complete failure but luckily for the 
Russians it did not adversely affect the Rapallo partnership whioh was too 
beneficial to be jeopardised even by these unorthodox Soviet tactics* 
Brookdorff-Rantsau, the German Ambassador in Moscow, reported to his foreign 
office in May 1923;
We have been and shall continue to depend on (Soviet Russia) for a 
long time...This has nothing to do with t&K likes or dislikes, but 
only with the sober fact that we need Russia, and that every other 
(Russian) government must seek support among the Allies, and idiat 
that would mean for Germany is obvious*56*
The complexity of the relationship between the two strands of Soviet
policy is apparent. In this case a developing revolutionary situation, as
the Soviet leaders saw it, induced them to back the KPD at the risk of their
diplomatic relations with the German Government* Nevertheless,it is probable,
that this decision was swayed by the fear that Streaemann, the new Chaaoellor,
would adopt a pro-western rather than a Rapallo course* Would the Russian
leadership haye backed the revolutionary attempt if they had thought Strese-
mann to be pro-Soviet? It is impossible to say, but they would not have been
55#''^o~'SoîdS'GovemSnt'iS that the Red Army would cross its '
frontier if Poland attacked Germany* E.H.Carr, German-Soviet Relations 
between the Two World Wars. 1919-1939 (London 1952), p.70«
56. K*Eoaenbaum. S  Community of Fate (New York 1965), p.62^
inconsistent if they had put dipXonetio relations foremost# As the Comintern 
failed to aohieee suooess end Rossi# beoeme stronger, more importance was
attaobod to the latter and its well-being was leas likely to be jeopardised 
for tho sake of a doubtful revolutionary exercise#
The united Front tactics adopted at the Third Comintern congress by 
1927 were In ruin* In China and Britain, especially, the attmpts of the 
communist party to collaborate with other parties had ended in disaster#
These short-oomings were the «ore embarrasîng to the Soviet leadership in 
that the Left Opposition within Russia, and particularly Trotaîqjr, oonoentr» 
ated its attacks on those veiy failures* The cautious ri#it policy had be­
come almost impossible to maintain and # e  virtual oHidnatlon of the Left 
group in 1927 facilitated a change of front* The break with the Euomlnting, 
the futile fmton rising in December and the dissolution of the Anglo- 
Russian Trade Hnion Oommltte© marked a change in policy# At the Fifteenth 
Party Congress Stalin spoke in a very different vein from previous WLted 
Front cliches:
V&oreas a couple of years ago it was possible and neoessajy to 
•peak of the ebb of the revolutionary tide in Europe, to-day we 
have every ground for asserting that Europe is obviously entering 
a period of new revolutionary upsurge# 58*
The new policy was explicitly stated at the Ninth Plenum of the Comin­
tern Executive Committee (BCCI) in February 1928* Its slogan was "Class 
against Class" and implied the abandonment of tktited Front tactics* Ordinary 
trade union and parliamsntary activity were mded*
The Sixth Comintern Congress officially endorsed these new tactios in 
July# Sooial-demooraoy was attacked as being bankrupt# Bukharin expressed a 
very real Soviet oritioism of it when he said that social democracy now 
embodied the aggressive aspirationa of the capitalist fatherland; its chief 
task now was ideological preparation for wee against the Ü3B.R*
his prestige at the Party Congress, Sec L.Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese 
Revelutipn (New York 1932),p#291, B.SouvarMe, Stklm (London^ ^^  mdl, b,476# 
58# Stalin Works Vol.lO# (Moscow 1954), pps* 292-293*
59* EGGI Report presented by Bukharin to tho Sixth Oomintem Gmgress, July 
1928, The Gommunist Britomationol Vcl.R* (London 1960),p#4W*
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Though this tactical change was introduced in Britain, China and
Opposition
France in the last months Û f 1927 before the Right Wing Operation created 
hy the grain crisis in the Soviet IMion had developed, the latter did affect 
the new policy. By 1928 it was automatic that any purge within Russia should 
he extended to the foreign parties. At the Sixth World Congress Bukharin al­
ready was seriously involved in a factional struggle with Stalin and though 
he played a leading role at the Congress, I as Trotsky later said, the number 
of hours Bukharin spoke was in inverse proportion to his influence*^^’ The 
Left Opposition was still attacked, but to quote the Theses on the Inter­
national Situation, "Within the communist parties#.#the main deviation is to
6l
the right of the correct political line."
The impact of this new line on the foreign policy proper of the Soviet 
Union is an intriguing problem. Despite the revolutionary slogans and the on­
set of the world depression at the end of 1929, there is no evidence that 
plans were ever made for a revolutionary attempt in any western country
62#
during this phase* Further, Soviet diplomatic activity was engaged in a 
concentrated effort to conclude non-aggression pacts with the very states 
which were so vilified by Comintern propaganda. Simultaneously with Comintern 
instructions to its member parties to withdraw from political collaboration 
with other left-wing parties in their respective countries, the Narkomindel 
was engaged in negotiations with the leaders of these countries in an attempt 
to improve Russia's relations with them and thus bolster its security. No­
where was the contradiction between Comintemand Narkomindel policies to 
appear so striking as in Germaxy, Growing political instability, the growth 
of extreme right-wing nationalism and especially the Nasi party in the 
Weimar republic provoked grave doubts within the Narkomindel as to the wisdom 
of continuing Russia's hitherto almost exclusive reliance on Germany in the
So*. Begras, GoiZnteîm V o ï.2 . '"p . 4 5 2 " ''' •  -r i-t-tt
61. Theses of the Soxth Comintern Congress on the International Situtation 
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(Michigan 1962), p.34-0.
international ayatem* The decision to negotiate non-aggression pacts 
with France and Poland was taken despite the inevitable German hostile 
reaction because it was perceived that Germany's future developments promised 
to be threatening to Russia* Yet at this very time the Comintern was venting 
its fuiy principally at the German Social Democrats and not at the Nasi party# 
The "Class against Class" tactics continued until 1935 when they wore re­
placed by thèse of the popular front* Only at this point did Comintern policy 
move into line with Soviet diplomacy* Even the accession of Hitler to the 
German Chancellorship, the termination of Soviet-German military collaboration, 
Soviet support for the Versailles treaty and the status quo in general, which 
occurred in early 1933^^* did not produce any effect on the Comintern for two 
years* The reasons for this contradiction are still far from clear* It seems 
certain that foreign policy requirements did not motivate the change of tactics 
in the Comintern in 1928 nor their continuance for so many years .They wore 
initially introduced because the old united front policy had become unworkable* 
A communist party could only use such tactics if other parties were also 
willing to co-operate but by 1927 such a willingness had been exhausted* The 
"Class against Class" tactics wore continued and strengthened, but not init­
iated by the later need of the Stalinist leadership to eliminate the right 
wing opposition in the Comintern as well as in Russia, since to credit Stalin 
with the foresight of introducing in 1927 a left Comintern policy in order to 
destroy his future right opponents is to bestow him with psychic qualities 
he presumably did not possess*^^* Further, the old Comintern tactics would 
have made a strange bedfellow alongside the industrialisation and oollectivi* 
sation, the frantic search for saboteurs and the war-scares. Inertia also 
S37’*Seer"'Ch^ tS'Të* ' ..".. ....
64# Henri Barbe, a member of the French Communist Party and BCCX, was told by 
Jacques Dorict, who was well informed on the internal situation of the 
Russian party, that all the Comintern discussions were only a side product 
of the Russian situation and that all measures introduced were meant 
mainly to isolate Bukharin and strengthen Stalin. Henri Barbe, "Stalin 
and the Rebellion of Tasoa & Humbert-Dros", in ll.M.Drachkovitch and 
B.Lasitoh, The Comintem-Historloal Highlights (New York 1966), p*224*
probably played a part in the continuation of this policy* so ill-adjusted 
to the realities of the situation outside R u s s i a . i h  addition* it must 
be remembered that in Germany* where the contradiction between foreign policy 
considerations and Comintern policy was greatest, the communist attacks on the 
social-democrata were in a sense compatible with Soviet security requirements 
since the German sooial-demoorats were seen in Moscow as being pro-western and 
opposed to German collaboration with the USSR#^^* Their defeat would be advan­
tageous to Russia though* of cburse* if this defeat was sustained at the cost 
of a Nasi victory* the benefit which the USSR would reap seems much more prob­
lematical. The Comintern itself gave no convincing reason for its policy. Its 
theoretical justification for attacking the sooial-demoorats and thus possibly 
hastening a Nasi victory was that the fascist regime was not a new type of 
state but merely a form of the bourgeois dictatorship. Anyone who thought 
otherwise was a bourgeois liberal. The appearance of fascism showed that the
objective conditions for the transformation of society were present. It was a
67
stage towards a communist revolution. Sooial-demooraoy led the working class
astray and had to be smashed before the revolution could succeed. It would seem
that the Soviet decision makers* probaWy Stalin himself* failed to realise
fully the disastrous consequences for the Soviet t&iion were fascism to gain
control in Germany* By 1928 the Comintern's chief function was to aid the
ruling Soviet group in its factional fights within the Russian Communist party
rather than to operate as an instrument of external Soviet policy. As Degras
says, this period in its life could be regarded as being "positively injurious
68
to the Soviet IMion." * Either its value as a means of consolidating the
65. In July 1926 T^ "Aryme' who" merely repeats ' from year to year 
that 'the masses are becoming radicalised, the situation is revolutionary* 
is not a Bolshevik leader but a tub-thumping agitator. "L.Trotsky, "What 
Now" in The Third International After Lenin (New York 1957), p.26l.
66. For example* the resolution of the KPD Central Committee noted at a meeting 
of the Enlarged Presidium of EGCI in February 1930 that German social- 
fascism, (i.e. social-demooraoy) was the chief organiser of an anti-Soviet 
war. J.Degras, The Communist International Vol.3 (London 1965), p.100*
67# See the speech of Manuils&y to the Eleventh FOCI Plenum, April 1931#
Ibid.. pps. 151-152.
68. Ibid*. Preface, p.Vlll.
position of the ruling group in Moscow was perceived as being of more import­
ance than the harm done to Soviet security interests, or else the contradict- 
low between the latter and the Comintern's policy were not even perceived#
For the purpose of this thesis, the crucial point is that Soviet diplomacy 
worked independently of the Comintern and its history by I93O can be examined 
in isolation from that of the Comintern* Even in Germany, iriiere the Rapallo 
partnership was seriously strained after 1928 by the extreme slogans of the 
KPD and the Comintern officials in Russia, it is probable that German suscept­
ibilities were provoked as much by the growth of the powerful KPD at a time of 
worsening political conditions within the Republic as by the new Comintern 
tactics* The main influence of these tactics on Soviet diplomacy was that in 
so far as they added Hitler's rise to power they helped to create the envir­
onment in whioh Soviet foreign policy, alongside that of many capitalist 
countries, had to struggle in the years after 1933#
4* The Soviet Uhion and the International Community#
Soviet foreign policy from 1917 onwards attempted to gain acceptance in 
the international society of capitalist states, the existence of which it was 
compelled to recognise by the circumstances of a successful revolution in 
Russia and failures elsewhere* Eaqperience of the allied intervention had 
confirmed the Bolshevika* ideological belief in the hostility of the capit­
alist forld* Their state's existence could only be maintained by diplomatic 
efforts to utilise the inevitable cracks in the enemy camp and so avoid isol­
ation* In fact, Russian diplomatic activity shows that Russia was prepared to 
reach agreement with any and every capitalist state; it was the latter idiioh 
held the decisive card* Germany alone of the great pmwers accepted fully the 
proferred Soviet hand, a step necessitated by Its own isolated situation in 
the post-war world* Britain, Franco and the tMited States, whilst finding it 
impossible to ignore Soviet Russia's existence, were unwilling to accept that 
state as an equal*
£0«
The Russians constantly were aware of their isolated position and 
fearful of a hostile combination. Britain, for a time (1924-7) seemed to
iV\c4,jn
pCije the m g ^  threat, hut France and its allies were perceived as the really
great danger to the continued existence of the USSR:
All the blocs and alliances concluded by the rightist circles in 
France during the last thirteen years have had the aim of safeguard­
ing the military and political predominance of France in Europe, 
etruggling with the oommnist danger and most of all the struggle 
with the Soviet Union*
To counter this isolation and ensure a reasonable level of security for 
their state, the Soviet leaders attempted to negotiate a series of non­
aggression pacts with their neighbours. This was particularly stimulated by 
the feeling o:^  insecurity generated by the ambivalence shown in German foreign 
policy in 1925» Germany being the major Soviet "friend" amongst the great 
powers*
These negotiations had mixed success, as the proceeding pages have 
sought to outline. The outstanding failures were in relation to France, Roland 
and the Baltic states (with the exception of Lithuania) in the west and Japan 
in the east, failures whioh prolongued the nightmare of a new militazy inter­
vention*
These failures remained real despite the successful introduction of the 
"Litvinov Pact". In August, 1928, the Soviet tSxion had signed the Briand- 
Kellogg Pact which renounced war as an instrument of national policy and was 
the first state to ratify it. Whilst Soviet Scepticism concerning the pact 
was considerable, it might at least provide a minimum level of security in 
eastern Europe, althou^ by no means serving as a substitute for the favoured 
non-aggression pact* IMfortunately, the Kellogg pact would not be activated 
until all the original fourteen signatories had ratified it* Therefore in 
December, 1928, Litvinov proposed to.the Polish GoVemment that a protocol 
be signed which would bring that pact into force between them:
Since it regards the securing of peace in eastern Europe as a
‘"'691 "oo^otovke ' j^r^tsiev^ovni^rot^ S^R*^l^lshevik N Ï "".
15 January 1931, P.55.
matter of first-rate importanoe, and since, of the states on the 
western frontier of the Soviet thion, Poland has signed the (Kellogg 
Paot), the Soviet Government decided to propose to the Polish Govern­
ment the signature of the attached protocol, under which the#♦♦(Fact) 
would enter into force between the Soviet Tftiion and Poland immediately 
after its ratification hy these two states* 7^*
The protocol was open to any other state which signed the Kellogg Pact,
Lithuania also receiving a similar proposal as that made to Poland.
The Polish reply to the Soviet offer, on Januazy 10, 1929, accepted
Litvinov's proposal in principle, hut expressed astonishment that the Soviet
Government should have excluded Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Rumania# It
reminded Moscow that it had always insisted on the necessity for collective
action by all states concerned in the settling of the problem of security in 
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eastern Swrope# * It was agreed that the Baltic states and Rumania should bo
eligible to join the protocol and Eusso-Polish discussions began in Moscow on
72
the procedure to be followed# * The Soviets were anxious to secure Poland's 
signature as quickly as possible# On Januazy 22, 1929 the Soviet press 
announced that both governments had agreed to sign the protocol immediately# 
Then the Soviet Government would apply to the governments of Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia and Rumania, proposing that they join the protocol in so far as they 
considered themselves already joined to the Kellogg Paot#^^* The Russians
75continued to complain about Polish procrastination in signing the protocol,
the Polish delay being stimulated by the desire to postpone it until the
Baltic states and Rumania had completed the Kellogg Pact procedure, thus
'70jNoS'''from ' the Soviet 'ëovernmmt "to '-^he 'p6ïish'''Gover  ^ 29%i92@
DVP Fol.ll# p#6a.
71. Times. January 12, 1929#
72# Not© from the Depu^ Commissar for foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the
Polish Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, January 11, 1929» Degras, Soviet
Dociments on Foreign Policy Vol#2. pps#359-363*
73» Note of a conversation between the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Litvinov and the Polish Minister in the USSR, Patek, January 21,1929#
DVP. V0I.I2. (Moscow 1967), p»41#
74# Report of the Soviet press on a proposal by the Soviet Government to the
Polish GoVemment, January 22, 1929# Ibid# # p#42#
75* Note of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Franoe,DovgalovsîQr 
and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Briand and the General Secret­
ary of the French Foreign Ministry, Berthelot, January 25,1929# Ibid. »
P.47»
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permitting a multilateral signing of the Litvinov Protocol.
The protoool was eventually signed on February 9, 1929 by the UBBE,
76Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Rumania. ' Finland declined to adhere and 
Lithuania preferred to add its si@Eiature on April 1 to avoid a joint decl­
aration with Poland, its adversary in the Vilna dispute* Poland oould con­
sider it a victory for its multilateral rather than bilateral form which the 
Soviets had at first opposed but eventually accepted. Perhaps the Bolsheviks 
were prepared to concede ground because they viewed the protocol as of second­
ary importance, desirable mainly from a propagandistio angle. Certainly they 
maintained their demand for bilateral agreements in the case of the more 
important non-aggression pacta, whioh in Moscow's eyes at least were in no way 
substituted for by this latest protocol. The German Goveznment did not react 
favourably to this Soviet diplomatic move, Dirksen informing Litvinov of 
German doubts and criticisms, especially in the event of the Kellogg Pact
being brought into force by the protocol between the USSR and Poland before
77it entered into force between Germany and Poland. *
The diplomatic achievements which had been accorded the new Russian 
Government in the 1920* s, great as thqy were, atül left much to be desired 
in the Kremlin. The long Soviet frontiers were still seriously exposed on 
many sectors. Despite twelve years of diplomatic activity the Soviet Union 
was still a partial outcast from the international community whose actions 
wore distrusted by the capitalist states and whose widely differing ideology 
made mutual perception of the interests and intentions ly both aides sadly 
lacking in depth. The only outstanding gain for Soviet Russia in the external 
field remained its old relationship with Germany, yet even here the seeds of 
disenchantment were germinating at an increasingly fast,if irregular, rate.
The USSR, it is time, had finally entered the Geneva scene in 1927 with 
its participation in the World Economic Conference and the Preparatoiy
76. DVP Y0I.I2. poa. ■ '
77# Note of a conversation between the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Litvinov and the German Ambassador in the USSR, Dirksen, January 19,
1929. Ibid.. p.38#
Commission on Disamaaent» The former brought important économie gains to 
Russia and the latter, at any rate, helped to holster the sagging Rapallo 
relationship by uniting Russia and Germany in their minority vote* Yet the 
Soviet presence at the Preparatory Commission also served to convince the 
world leaders that they had no common view point with the Bolshevik leaders 
who sought to use the hallowed halls of the League to reveal the hypocrisy 
of western disarmament discussion and to propose "wild" schemes for general 
and total disarmament# Moreover, the Soviets still maintained their long- 
held disdain for the League of Nations itself*
The inadequacies of Soviet foreign policy became increasingly apparent 
in the 1930* s as Germany drifted away from tîie USSR and towards internal 
chaos and upheaval* The appréhension with wMoh this was peroeived in Moscow 
was not unique, however; in other capitals of Europe the situation in Germany 
was being followed with increasing alarm. Might not Soviet foreign policy 
find new hope in this common fear?
5# Decision-Making#
Although it is not the intention of this thesis to investigate decision­
making or power concentration in the Soviet governmental structure, it is 
advisable to comment briefly on the role of personalities in Soviet foreign 
policy.
The elimination of the last active opposition group in the Soviet Union 
left Stalin as virtual dictator by the spring of 1929* Both the Narkomindel 
and the Comintern were very closely integrated with the highest state decision" 
making organs and Stalin's control at that level presumably gave him an 
extremely powerful voice in foreign policy formulation* A more detailed 
analysis cannot here be attempted and in any case the dearth of information 
available reduces any comment on this subject to little more than speculat­
ion.
No matter how great the degree of governmental centralisation, however, 
there are limits to the capabilities of any one man; Stalin could at most
oonoom himself only with tho general line of policy or vital individual 
incidents; leaser matters must he delegated to subordinate officiais# It may 
be noted heia that a dictator's control over foreign policy la more restricted 
than in the case of internal policy since the polity decisions of
other states, so important to his own statèa reactions, are beyond his power* 
Inevitably, the foreign minister oannot be Ignored in the decision-making 
process, whether he acts as a top level or only an Intermediate level policy­
maker, or merely as a two-way communication channel between the foreign and 
diplomatic personnel and the centre* Many scholars have attempted to provide 
a much more detailed analysis of the Soviet foreign minister's precise sphere 
of activity, powers and limitations, without reaohing very satisfaotory oon- 
oluaions* Especially is this so in the period 1927-9 when the post of Gosmsissar 
for foreign Affairs changed hands, Litvinov replacing his superior effectively 
after 1927, though formally only in July 1930*
What effect, if aiy, did this replacement have on Soviet foreign polity? 
There is a certain amount of evidence that it Influenced some aspects of that 
policy* Barmine, one time secretaiy to Chioherin, says that the latter "had
no i^mpathy whatever for the League of Nations, which he regarded as a thinly
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disguised coalition of the victors against the vrnquished*" ^Litvinov, on 
the contrary, is reputed to have been a strong supporter of international
<• • Si >
collaboration* Talking of the Kellogg Pact, Pisoher says "Litvinov was a
4 w n c /J W"
prol^agonist of 'adhesion, and contributed much towards finally over- 
opming the cpposition of Chioherin and other prominent Soviet leaders idiose 
attitude towards it was either hostile or indifferent #"79# xt is also plain 
that Chioherin was a stronger supporter of Russo-Cerman collaboration than 
was Litvinov.
7B'r A#SiSn~© of a" Soviet 'DinioSt^London ' n#1537" M so "see^ '^
T.H.Von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G.V.Chioherin 1918-1930" in G#A#Craig 
and F.Gilbert, The Diolomata 1919-1939 (Princton 1953), P#278#
79. L.Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs Vol.2# p.761* Also, A#lF#Pope,
Maxim L i t v i n o v - --
80* Carr, Soviet-German Relations* pps.97-98.
Litvinov had Loth a higher rank in the party apparatus and a closer 
personal relationship with Stalin than did his predecessor, which may have 
gained him a wore independent decision-making role* Fischer, vAio knew both 
men, seys that Litvinov "is a lighter and several times refused to yield to 
Stalin*" He won his point against Stalin; "indeed Soviet foreign policy be­
tween 1929 and May, 1933# followed the pattern of Litvinov's mind more than 
of his ohiefs*^ #^ "^' Certainly, after 192? Soviet-German relations did worsen 
and participation in League affairs and the Kellogg Pact demonstrated an 
increasing willingness to co-operate in international movements# Whether 
this was connected with the change at the Narkomindel, idzether in fact 
Litvinov's appointment was wade because of the impending new policy, or 
whether it was a mere coincidence, it is impossible conolusively to answer# 
It is useful to note the re-organisation of personnel and to bear in mind 
its possible effects on policy, but the main factor is the policy itself 
rather than the hand which directed it.
81. I..Maoher. Uan and PoliUoB (tondon 19U). p.124.
Chapter 2î The Opening Move*
On April 20, 1951, Berthelot, General Seoretaiy of the French Foreign 
Ministry, during the course of an interview in Paris with the Soviet Ambass­
ador, Dovgalevsîy# intimated that the French Government was ready to give the 
Soviet Union proof of Its desire for peace and on its behalf proposed the 
oonoluslon of a non-aggression pact with conciliation procedure and a tempor­
ary trade agreement.^* This French initiative, the outcome of several months*
talks on this theme, was accepted by the Soviet Government in the person of
2.
Dovgalevsky on April 24#
Since 191? the Soviet Government had sought agreements with the European 
states in order that its security might be increased# France, the most stead­
fast Soviet opponent, had so far resisted all such approaches. The year 1951 
which had witnessed a reversal of this attitude marked a fundamental stage in 
Soviet foreign policy# The next two years were to bring a flood of pacts in­
spired by Moscow which paved the way for the new Soviet role of the middle 
thirties.
All was not daaaling success for Russia, however; these new victories 
were made possible only by the dark changes now in motion in the world and 
especially in Germany, which inspired fear in the west and Russia alike. The 
vext,'" contradictions between the capitalist states which Russia exploited and 
relied upon to gain acceptance in the international system were the insurm­
ountable obstacles to its policy of acquiring reliable non-aggression pacts
'ir"Welegrmrfrom"'#e"8o%Gt''5 to 'the'"ï®,''"
April 20,1951* DVP Vol.14 (Moscow 1968), p.252. Philippe Berthelot was 
the powerful permanent senior official in the Quai d* Orsay. For a shkort 
biographical essay see, E.D.Ghallener, "The French Foreign Office: The 
Era of Philippe Berthelot" in Oraig and Gilbert, The Diplomats, pps*65-85. 
2. Telegram from the Gommissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the Soviet 
Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky,April 22,1931* DVP Vol.14* p.266. Tele­
gram from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the NKD, April 
25, 1931. Ibid*. p.282* /
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with all its neighbours* No matter how much the Soviet Union might try, it 
could not utilise the opportunity afforded by France and Poland's new policy 
towards it without worsening its relations with Germany, sisoe it was the 
very oontrad3.otion between the two capitalist groups which now w^s making 
Russia an important factor in the European balance of power* Russia must 
ultimately choose one bloc, for to remain on good terms with both was imposs­
ible* This was only partially appreciated in Moscow and Soviet policy for the 
next few years attempted to promote its new-fomd relations whilst retaining 
its German partnership* This attempt was doomed in a Europe whioh was exper­
iencing a strengthening rather than a weakening of the old Versailles divis­
ions* The opening of negotiations between France and the Soviet Union in 
Spring, 1951# to all appearances marked a surprising change in their mutual 
relations which had previously been of a most hostile and uncompromising 
nature* To the security-conscious Soviet leaders, pondering on the possibil­
ities of a renewed intervention against their state, one country stood above 
all others as the major threat; this countiy was France*
1* The Anti-8Ovlet Bloc*
The reasons for the specially strong Soviet fear of France above any 
other capitalist states were many-fold; pezhaps the major one was the position 
whioh France inherited on the conclusion of war in I9IB* The defeat of Germany, 
the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the Tsarist Empire and the withdrawal, 
by varying degrees, of the United States and Britain from European affairs, 
left France as the major power on the continent*
The continual search for security which plagued the Government in Fazds, 
led France to insist that harsh terms be imposed on Weimar Germany, thus en­
suring its open hostility and doubting the long-term effect of even this
fh
stringent policy, ^ sought to erect a system of alliances with the states of 
central and eastern Europe* This French alliance system was feared not only 
by Germany, Its members were as hostile towards the new Bolshevik state in 
the east as towards defeated Gemany* France was suspected of striving for
hegemony in Europe, a policy whioh oould only alarm the weak, outoaot 
Russian state, the dearth of sympathy for whioh the French Government had 
amply demonstrated, along with the other great powers, in its intervention- 
ary attempt of 1918-1919 to neutralise the communist menace* The Soviet 
leaders feared France as the strongest and most active of the European states 
as they feared Japan in the east* Super-lmposed on this foundation were econ­
omic and ideological factors which further agrnvated Franco-Soviet relations 
at the beginning of the 1950's* In his political report to the Sixteenth 
Congress of the Communist Party on June 27, 1930, Stalin characterised France 
as "the most aggressive m,d militarist of all the aggressive and militarist 
countries in the world*"3*
The fact that France was allied with Folmid end Rumania was, perhaps, 
the most disconcerting element for the Kremlin leadership* Both these east 
European states were violently antè-Sovlet, Poland because of ideological 
and historical, Rumania because of ideological and territorial reasons 
Bessarabia had been siised by Rumania and incorporated into its territory, 
a fact whioh the Soviet Government refused to recognise* Soviet concern 
about these border states was frequently expressed* Isvoatiia, on May 1,
1930, writing of them said;
The major imperialist powers consider these» states as a futuire 
vanguard and a staging area for enti-Soviot intervention^^j,
Fascist Roland is undoubtedly the most important point for the 
application of forces acting against the UBSR#^*
?
On February 9,1931, an article| appeared in Isvostiia entitled "Polish
Sejm fotes for war" and two days later an editorial stated that the Polish
6
militarists continue»^  to put questions of war before all other policies *
Litvinov expressed the opinion to the British Ambassador in Moscow in March
that an attempt was being engineered in Europe to mobilise some form of
attack on the USSR and that in Poland, especially, there was a large body of
i. "J.V.' Stalin. Works Vofaa ''fMos'oow 1955). "p.gëî.
If. Igvaatlia. May 1, 1930.
5. I]^., fetruaxy 9, 1931.
6. Ibid.. Pebruaiy 11, 1931.
57*
7feeling anxious to seise any opportunity of attacking his country* * Spring
and summer of 1930 savr such a level of tension in Soviet-Polish relations
and the rumours of impending vmv became so wide-spread that gale ski, the
Polish Foreign Minister, was forced to deny them officially*^*
Soviet apprehension was not limited to Poland* For example, an article
in International Press Corx’ospondenoe in early 1931 claimed that "a glance at
the manoeuvres of Rumanian foreign policy during the past year and at the
military measures during the same period" sufficed to prove that the Rumanian
Government had taken part in preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union
in the summer of 1930.^* Soviet relations with Finland existed on a far from
asdoable level and attacks on anti-Soviet provocations frequently appeared on
10the pages of the Russian press* * The conclusion of a Latvian-Lithuanian 
trade pact stimulated an lavestiia editorial on Soviet fears of a Baltic bloc, 
an objective for which Poland had been striving for more than ten years in
11*
order to create a single anti-Soviet front from the Baltic to the Black seas#
Whilst these east European states were themselves feared by the Soviet
Union, this fear was multiplied by the belief that the major imperialist
states and especially France lay behind their efforts* Paris was suspected of
being the organising centra for anti-Soviet agitation in Poland and Rumania
and the financial pOT/er behind the strengthening of their armed forces#
Voroshilov, speoîcing at the Sixteenth Congress of the CP3U on the feverish
rate of armament in Poland and Rumania, mentioned their "historical mission"
assigned by world imperialism, to act as "a military vanguard of the bourgeois
7* The British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir B.Ovey, to the British Foreign 
Secretary, A.Henderson, March 10, 1930* Documenta on British Foreign 
Policy* 1919-1959. Second Series. Vol*7* Edited by E.L,Woodward and R, 
Butler (London 1958), p.ll5* BBFP)#
8# B#B*Buduroîyoa, Polish-Soviet Relations* 1932-1939 (New York 1963),p*8*
9* M*Kahana, "Rumania's role in the Preparation of Intervention", 
ional Press Correspondence Vol*ll.N,2# Januaiy 15,1931, p*38*
10*For example, lavestiia, Januaay 2, 1931? April 20,1931* 
ll.Ibid,. January 2, 1931*
12.world against the USSR." Kaganovich, member of the |Jolitburo, at the
December Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission
talked of the visits of French generals to Poland and Rumania, visits which
15
could only have as their raison d'etre, anti-Soviet plans* * A long lavestiia
article in March 1930 discussed Poliéi preparations for war and the close
links between this activity and v/orld imperialism:
All the .measures, of the internal, feverish work of the Polish 
militarlmts, whioh expreaa the interests of the bourgeoisie and 
its highest patrons, the imperialists, with whom Poland is linked 
by a series of military oonventions and treaties, are closely 
linked with external policy, the aim of whioh is the grouping to­
gether of a strong military bloo of all the western contiguous 
states under the leadership of f*oland# * .Poland lives and works in 
the interests of world imperial|aa*^^*
I
Hostility engendered by alliances w^s not confined to the French sec­
urity system. The relatively close and mutually beneficial Sovlet-Genaan 
collaboration could not but alarm the Paris Government which saw any incr­
ease in German strength or influence as a potential threat to the post- 
Versailles status quo* Similarly, Poland, wedged between a revengful Germany 
and Russia, viewed the rapprochement of these two states with apprehension; 
'inhere was an obvious need for Poland to maintain good relations with one of 
these neighbours, yet factors beyond the real# of the "balance of power" 
concept prevented, at the initiation of the thirties era, any such policy 
formulation by the Government in Warsaw*
If French hegemonical drives had been a constant factor in post World 
War One international relations, the opening years of the 1930's witnessed 
even stronger moves in this direction with the consequent results for Franco- 
Soviet relations. A new impetus to Soviet fears was provided by the French
12Z'''%j'*Eudin'md R.M.''SÏus8er*''"So^  v6l.l™'''''''^''''^'"
(Pennsylvania 1966), p. 285* K*E.Voroshilov, a leading supporter of Stalin* 
Military leader in civil war, member of the Central Committee, 1921; 
Comraissar for the Army and Navy, 1925; member of Politburo
from 1926; Commissar for Defence, 1934; first Marshal of the Soviet Union, 
1933; Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Chairman 
of the Committee of Defence, 1940; Deputy Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, 1946.
13* "The Results of the Joint December Plenum of the CG and CGC of the GPSU;
Report of Comrade Kaganovich", Imoreooor Vol. 11 N.I. January 8,1931, P*2. 
14# Isveatiia. March 11, 1930*
Foreign Minister's project for a Pan-European Union, first broached on
September 5, 1929, at the tenth session of the League of Nations Assembly
and inspired, at least in part, by a need to salvage Europe's predominant
role in world affairs, a role whioh was being jeopardised, it was thought,
by the grave situation created by the economic crisis just appearing on the
horizon. Briand told the League:
I th-ink that among peoples constituting geographical groups, like 
the peoples of Europe, there should be some kind of Federal bond; 
it should be possible for them to get in touch at any time, to Confer 
about their interests, to agree on joint resolutions and to establish 
among themselves a band of solidarity which ivill enable them, if need 
be, to meet any grave emergency that may arise. That is the link X 
want to forge.15*
The favourable response to this speech encouraged Briand to invite repres­
entatives of the other 26 European members of the League of Nations to discuss 
his project as a result of whioh $11 the representatives agreed to reoommmd 
a study of the project to their governments. It was proposed that the Union 
be founded on the principle of absolute sovereignty and be subordinated to 
the League of Nationïÿ<= On this account, Briand proposed that membership be 
confined to those European states which were League members, thus excluding 
the Soviet Union and Turkey, neither of them in the French camp and further­
more, each having good relations with a state, Germany in the case of the 
Soviet Union, Italy in the case of Turkey, which France considered as an 
enemy.
This inevitably baiaed doubts in certain states and especially in the 
Soviet Union as to the genuine French motives behind Briand*s plans. Moscow 
was always suspicious of international movements which sought to exclude its 
participation; when the instigator of the scheme was a French statesman, this 
suspicion was further magnified# The belief that any capitalist collaboration 
inevitably was directed ultimately against the Soviet tftiion pre-oocupied the 
Russian decision-makers throughout the inter-war period, often based on a 
misconception of Russia's importance as seen through western eyes. In fact, 
I'gr'Auzv^"of''"SiternationZ'Aff ) YLondon''Ï9^ ^
p.136.
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the main problem facing the USSR was rather a western undeivestimatioiz of
tho former's strength and importance in international society*
Litvinov, in a briefing letter to his ambassadors on June 7» 1930 
presented the Soviet reaction to the Pan-Europe Plan* The Soviet diplomatic 
representatives were to indicate the absolutely negative Soviet reaction to 
it, since it was mainly motivated T%r a French desire to increase its influ­
ence on the policy of European countries and even to establish its hegemony; 
"it is possible that the Briand Plan has as its basis the aim of a struggle 
against the IBSE*" Litvinov did add the proviso, however, that "if, unexpect­
edly, Briand decided to send an invitation to our Union, then it would not 
be difficult for us to give an ani^r in compliance with this invitation. * 
The Soviets did not in principle refuse to participate#
The question of the status of European non-League members was raised in 
Januaiy 1951 at the second session of the Commission of Inquiry for a Europe^ 
Union, whioh had been constituted in >Septemberl930 by the League Assembly to 
look into the French idea. The Soviet case for participation was sponsored %  
Germany and Italy, both with good cause to support any measure which would 
weaken the French position and also enhance their relations with the USSR.
In June 1930, the German Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
remarked to the British Ambassador in Berlin that the exclusion of Russia and
Turkey from Briands memorandum on the guropean Union seemed rather to vitiate
17
his proposals for an organisation to deal with European affairs* In July# the
same German official told journalists that "a European Union without Russia
18is inconceivable*" * On January 19, despite the resistance of France and its
allies, it was agreed that the Soviet Uhion, as well as Turk^ and Iceland,
16# "Letter ftS"''oommiM 'Foroi^^Affairs'i^tvinov'J''to ''the”So^
representatives in Austria, Britain, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Estonia, June 7» 1930*
DVP Vol.13 (Moscow 1967), pps. 316-317#
17* Sir H.Rumbold, British Ambassador in Germany, to A.Henderson, British 
Foreign Minister, June 13, 1930# Doouments on British Foreign Polio±.
1919-1939. Second Series. Vol.l. Sd.E.L.WoodwSd (London
-------------  1946), p# 334*
18, Quoted in A.E.Joffe, ‘Vheahnyava politika sovetskORO sousa 1928-1932 
(Moscow 1968), p. 189.
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also non-League members, should be invited to attend the Commission, but
only in its study of the world eoonoÿio crisis as it affected the European 
19
countries* * This decision was based on a desire to prevent the establish­
ment of a new international organisation controlled by France and its allies. * 
The Soviet reaction to this invitation oan be judged from a conversation 
between Krestinsky, the Soviet Deputy Oommissar i‘or Foreign Affairs and the 
Italian Ambassador in the USSR, on January 26, 1931» Krestinsky said that the 
result was not a victory for the supporters of a Soviet unconditional invit­
ation to the Pan-European Gonferenoe; it was more a semi-victory for Italy 
and Germany, Soviet enlistment only for the study of the economic situation
naturally, oould not be seen as an unconditional invitation and consequently
21was not a victory for the supporters of such a participation, * Nevertheless, 
in early February Litvinov replied in the affirmative to the League iuvitat- 
loxii) though his criticisms cf the Uhion*a aims and the difficulties encount­
ered in scouring Soviet participation left no doubt as to Moscow's far-from
22enthusiastic response.
This eventual invitation in no way erased the memory of the initial 
French desires to block Soviet entiy. The Russian press conducted a barrage 
against the scheme, seeing in it a further weapon in the imperialists' xmmzgc 
armoury held in readiness for an anti-Soviet Intervention, In February 1931, 
lavestiia carried the headline, "The Paris Conference is occupied not with 
economics but with politics - the preparation of a blockade of the USSR," *
In a March editorial the same paper commented:
l'9r''KrwTDavis'J 'The' 's'o^ets at'' Geneva' .Ï9%yr %l227
20, Survey of International Affairs. 1931. Ed*A,J,Toynbee (London 1932),p*35^
21, Note of a conversation between the Deputy Commissar for Fweign Affairs, 
Krestinsky and the Italian Ambassador in the USSR, Attolijfe, Januazy 26, 
1931. DVP Vol. 14, p,43. N.IfKrestinaky, Soviet ibabassador in Germany, 
1921-1930; First Deputy Gommissar for Foreign Affairs, 1930-1937Î 
executed, March 1938,
22, The Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the League of Nations, 
Februaiy 6, 1931# Degras, Soviet Doouments on Foreign Policy Vol,2.
pps, 470-472#
23, Isvestiia. February 25, 1931#
Prom the beginning it wae clear that Briand in proposing a Pan 
Europe, not only did not propose to invite the Soviet IMion to 
participate in the new international organisation, but on the 
contrary, looked on the Pan-European tkiion as a preliminary step 
towards the creation of an anti-Soviet bloo»^»
Molothv, in his report to the Sixth Soviet Congress on March 8, 1931, went
so far as to describe the European committee as the biggest factor in the
creation of an anti-Soviet front: "the stubborn opposition of Briand and the
representatives of the states dependent on France to the invitation of the
USSR, •« showed that the leaders of the European committee had the definite
desire to turn this organisation into the headquarters for the preparation
of an anti-Soviet attack*
Two Soviet authors have described the Soviet struggle against the creation
of the "so-called" Pan European Tkiion, "a bloc of imperialist powers directed
against the USSR," as one of the most important spheres of Soviet foreign
policy activity during the world economic crisis# * Only the imperialist
oontradiotions between the major capitalist powers gave Soviet diplomacy the
possibility of taking part in the commission and prevented its use in anti-
Soviet aims#^^*
If the anti-Soviet hand of French imperialism was at least suspected in 
the case of the Pan Europe scheme, in the economic sphere the events of 1930 
presented the Soviet leadership with clear evidence of the hostility evinced 
in France towards the first socialist state. From the summer of I930 a camp­
aign was initiated in the west against the dumping of Soviet goods on western 
markets at a price below the cost of production. It was claimed that this was 
a concerted effort by the Russians to undermine the capitalist economies al­
ready suffering under the strain of the world crisis, This crisis reached 
France later than most other industrialised countries and made it less
24, Isvestiia. March 29, 1931-
23# Report of the Soviet Government to the Sixth Congress of Soviets, March
8, 1931. DVP Vol,14. p.146,
26* M.E* Airmpetyan and G.A, Deborin, Etaoi vneshnev politiki SSSR (Moscow
196Ï), p. 185.
27» A.N. Krasilnikov,Politika An^ii v otnoshenil SSSH 1929-1932 (Moscow
1959), P.24-
dependent on Soviet orders end therefore hotter situated to give vent to the
growing anti-Soviet feeling occasioned hy the Soviet export policy.^®* On
Ootoher 3# 1930, the French Government imposed a series of restrictions on
Soviet exports on the ground that they were heing dumped on the market, so
undermining French home industries, an initiative which was copied hy a number
29
of other countries. * Although Soviet trade with France was not of primaiy
importanoG,^^* the need to expand economic intercourse with the capitalist
countries in view of the enormous reguiroraents of the First Five-Year Plan
as well as the underlying perceived anti-Soviet nature of the French act,
generated a strong response from Moscow. On Ootoher 14, Dovgalevsky handed
a memorandum to Berthelot protesting against the "dumping’» decree;
îPhe Soviet Government considers the decree of October 3 an act... 
which has created a general tension in the economic and political 
relations between both countries.,, (T )he measure taken by the French 
Government is motivated neither by the character of the economic 
exchange between France and the IJ3SR nor by the conditions in which 
this exchange takes place.
The memorandum presented evidence to show that the decree was not adopted 
on economic grounds and classified it as an unfriendly act. The Soviet Gov­
ernment desired to achieve a relaxation of tension in its relations with 
France, a result which could only be obtained by the ebrogation of the decree 
and the conclusion of a trade agreement,
The Soviet response was not confined to a diplomatic protest, however; 
on October 20 a Soviet counter measure was adopted relating to economic rel­
ations with countries which had imposed a special restrictive regime on trade 
the
with USSR, Orders and purchases in such countries were to be ended completely 
or at least reduced to a minimum, their shipping was not to be used and
28, See, for example, the anti-Soviet nature of an article by T.Aubert,
’*L*UH3S et la crise mondiale," Revue des Deux Mondes. February 13,1932,
PP«* 753-769.
29. Belgium, Rumania, Hungary, Luxembourg, Spain and Candda. Poland imposed 
a rail tariff on Soviet goods passing through Polish territory#
30, In 1928-1929 Soviet exports to France constituted only 3% of the total 
Soviet exports and 4.6^ in 1930#
31. Memorandum from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the 
General Sewretary of the French Foreign Ministry, Berthelot, October 14, 
1930. DVP Vol,13. pps, 566-569.
restrictions were to be placed on the transit of goods to or from those 
32,
oountries. RozengoXts, the Soviet Vice Commissar for Trade, explained
the motive behind this retaliation;
The Soviet Government cannot remain a passive spectator of the anti- 
Soviet actions with which this campaign (against Soviet exports) is 
accompanied.#,The French Government attempted to justify its decree 
by an utterly unfounded reference to reciprooily. The monopoly of 
foreign trade existing in the Soviet Uhion and the Soviet licence reg­
ulations apply equally to all oountries and we should have no ground 
for complaint if the French Government had issued similar regulations 
for all countries# We cannot, however, be reconciled with the passing 
of regulations applied exclusively to the USSR and it was against this 
that our protest was directed#33.
The Russians saw this French act not as an isolated economic response to the
difficult conditions of the world crisis, but as an integral part of the French
anti-Soviet provocations# Molotov, in his report to the Central Executive
Committee on January 4# 1931, speaking of the anti-dumping campaign said:
Clearly it is no accident that up to the present the group of states 
which have taken special steps against Soviet eaqports by and large co­
incide with the French railitaiy-politioal bloc#
it was but "one preparatory step for further and more aggressive action against
the USSR#"^^* Two months later the same speaker said that the only purpose
behind this aggressive French policy was tiie organisation of an economic block- 
35#ade of the USSR* Izvestiia, commenting on a French senator’s proposal for
a French monopoly to handle foreign trade with the USSR, said this "would only
be new proof of the non-desire of the leaders of French foreign policy to
bring Franco-Soviet relations to a normal position#
This Russian response was motivated by the genuine fear of a capitalist
economic blockade which might have disastrous effects on the Soviet economy#
It did not content itself with attacks on these French moves, however, but
endeavoured to reach an economic understanding with that country, an approach
'32r''peoree of 'Æe’'comofl '"of Commissars. October 20Jl93dr'B V P ^ ^    .. .
pps. 584-505#
33* Interview by the Deputy Commissar for Trade, Rozengolts, October 22,1950# 
Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy Vol#2# p# 461*
34# Ibid#. p,467*
35# Report of the Soviet Government to the Sixth Congress of Soviets, March 
8, 1931# DVF Vol.lA# p.145*
36. livestiia. April 25# 1931#
Khioh will be followed below# The immediate result of this anti-dumping 
campaign, however, together with the widespread western accusations of the 
use of forced labour in the Soviet Union, was to superimpose on the long­
standing debt problem a new source of friction between Paris and Moscow#
Two further sources of conflict between these states must be mentioned 
briefly, neither of them new-comers to the international arena* French compl­
aints about Soviet subversive propaganda were echoed by Russian protests at 
the activities of white guard!sts on French soÜ.^^* Mutual recriminations 
were exchanged on the hostile attitudes adopted by the press of each state. 
Between Poland end the USSR such reoriminatlons and accusations were even 
greater# In November, 1930# e Soviet diplomat made one of many similar compl-
■zO
aints about white emigre activity in Poland*"^  * The Polansky trial in April# 
1931, concerning an attempt by a Pole to murder a Soviet diplomat, created a 
violent response in the Soviet press# Isvestiia labelled the attempt as one
undertaken to aggravate Soviet-Polish relations and accused the Polish press
39*
of using the trial for anti-Soviet aims# A Pravda editorial blamed the 
affair on the anti-Soviet atmosphere existing in Poland which was a result 
of the aggressive Polish foreign policy in relation to the USSR, Poland was 
the most faithful al3ly of French imperialism and considered itself the van­
guard of world imperialism against the USSR, The Polansky business was "a 
link in the preparation of military intervention against the USSR."^^* Two 
days later, the paper in a long article spoke § t the serious and real threat
of an anti-Soviet intervention, "in the first place by French imperialism,
41,
with its faithful ally, Polish fascism,"
Whilst the use of newspaper articles for internal purposes in the USSR
37r"For" example,' "èie declaS^tion 'of the "soviet Ambassador''''in' France, Dovgüev-
aky, to the General Secretary of the French Foreign Ministry, Berthelot, 
September 15*1930# DVP Vol#13, p#509#
38, Note of a conversation between the Councillor of the Soviet Embassy in 
Poland, Brovkovich and the Deputy Head of the Eastern Department of the 
Polish Foreign Ministry, Raohinsky, November 6,1930# Ibid., p#623#
39# Isvestiia* April 10, 1931#
40# Pravda* April 10, 1931#
41. Ibid** April 12, 1931.
•rw#
th e ir eonaequmt twdwmy to exaggerate mctemal dwgera to e m # li# te  
the regime and htmû. m  tmitere mïÿr oppesitlen groupe Mwwid not be over- 
looked, neverthelee# # #  provide a ©lear iudloatlou of the state of relmt- 
ions between the Soviet Union on the one hand m d  Poland end Frmwe 0» the 
other# No doubt other positive factor# oould m m o w t  this Ideological die- 
truet but iu their abamoe thl# pres# war did mmm further to multiply die- 
trust ant breed enmity#
The other sphere of FranocHSovlet dispute mn loeated at Geneve in the 
prepmratoiy commiision on tlsmrmammt# The Soviet view that "Imetimt# total 
dleammmt i# the beet guermitee of ioeurity for all people#,"^* olaehet 
with the Frmoh desire for m  effeotive seouri# system before disarmsmmt 
could be undertaken* The Eussians were undoubtedly auspicious of the position 
adopted by Fraooe and It# allies#
No land in sig^ it* The Soviet Union is surrounded by a stormy sea 
of capitalist anarohy# The wave# of hatred for the Soviet state are 
ïdsing higher**##, in Geneva, are struggling for p#aoe#**.(but) the 
growing 6'#tivity of the #tervmtioni#ts and #@ir aooosyplio#»# reveal 
more oloarly every the predatory plans of the imperialists direoted 
against the U3SE*#*w*
In 193G-1951, dieamamnt was just one more issue on which Frenoe and its 
supporters adopted a position diametrioally opposW. to that of the îIBSB*
2* bipiomtio Moves*
Beapite this eatremely strained atmosphere which existed between Fmnce 
and the Soviot Union, diplomacy continued to function between them in an 
endeavour to clear the air# The goviot WLon, in its isolated position, had 
no intention of idly watching # e  growth of French hostility without making 
an attempt to ainiaise its cmse#moes* The breathing space had to b# e#md- 
ed#
42* Idtvlnov «peeking to the Rrepewktoiy 6o«ni«itilon in Nov«ah«r,19%7»
W ,  X»va«til«. Hovemher 19, 1950.
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The later the Imperialist front attacks the Soviet I&iion, the 
longer we can peacefully build our Soviet econony, the longer the 
oomraunist parties of the west will he able to close the ranks of 
the working class, the longer the national revolutionary movement 
will develop in the oriental states and the inevitable attack against 
the Soviet state on the part of the oapitalist encirclement will take 
place in better conditions for international sooiallam#44.
The old ideas for a non-aggression pact were never placed at the very back 
of the Kremlin attic and together with plans for the Improvement of trade 
relations, they once more appeared in the weaponry of the Soviet Embassy in 
Paris and also in that of Prance’s ally Poland*^^* Side by aide with the 
acrimonious diplomatic and press exchanges concerning dumping, forced labour, 
Fan Europe etc*, cautious diplomatic skirmishing began which had as its out­
come the agreement reached on April 24, 1951, to commence negotiations for a 
Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact and temporaiy trade agreement.
Since 1927 and early 1928 the idea of a non-aggression pact between 
these two countries had faded into the background but never been formally 
abandoned, at least on the Soviet side* The problem of a settlement on loans 
and debts and the possibility of a trade treaty were at a similar stage of 
development. Throughout 1930 conversations on the theme of an economic settle­
ment were held between Soviet and French diplomats until finally agreement was 
reached to negotiate*
The Russians considered that the French were to blame for the impasse in 
trade relations between the two states* They vfere anxious to consolidate their 
economic relations with the west whereas France, in early 193Q, was still not 
in the iron grip of the world economic crisis and therefore under less econ­
omic pressure to expand trade. Litvinov expressed Soviet exasperation at the 
French tactics on February 26,1930, in conversation with Herbette, the French 
Ambassador in Moscow:
I noted that relations between governments cannot be confined to
one-sided proposals and that the proposals are usually made in the
44# Izvestiia. Januaiy 22, 1929#
45. Soviet-Polish diplomatic exchanges will be examined in a later chapter.
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prooess of negotiations which, however, the French Government In 
fact have avoided. When negotiations were conducted. •• (in V ^ ÏÏl) we, 
of course, made the proposals to which, however, until now we have 
received no answer.^*
The tangible answer to this Soviet lament was provided by France in the 
form of an increased agitation in some circles against Soviet dumping, res­
ulting in the decree of October 3# Briand, however, was much more conciliat­
ory in his assessment of the French position vis-a-vis the USSR in a state­
ment meant for the personal attention of Litvinov given to Dovgalevsky on 
July 2. Briand, with satisfaction, stated the low tide of hostile will to­
wards the USSR in eminent French political and business circles. He himself 
was convinced of the necessity for a change to a practical policy in relation 
to the USSR. The time for a rapid elimination of the obstacles in the path of 
Franco-Soviet economic relations had arrived. Dovgalevsky was to tell Litvinov 
that the letter’s fears concerning Briand*s aggressive intentions towards the 
Soviet Union were absolutely unfounded* He specifically added that the idea of 
a European federation was not in the slightest degree directed against the 
USSE.^ *^ *
A less rosy picture of economic relations was painted for Litvinov 
several weeks later by Herbette. Whilst the Ambassador believed that the 
French were veiy willing to buy Soviet raw materials, he admitted that dis­
satisfaction existed at the disorepancy between Soviet exports to and imports 
from France. He also douched Soviet hopes regarding a trade treaty, raa^aining 
that it could not be considered without the sanction of parliament, a doubt­
ful measure prior to the regulation of loans, the ageing bogey of France-
48*
Soviet economic relations.
The increasing anti-Soviet mood in France and its paranoid reception in
iJg^rRote^of'a'o^onversation'between^~the D  Affairs,'
Litvinov and the French Ambassador in the USSR, Herbette, Februaiy 26,
1930. DVP Vol*13. 0*111.
47. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Bovgalevslty,to the NKB,
July 2, 1930. Ibid.. p. 373.
48. Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov 
and the French Ambassador in the USSR, Herbette, July 26,1930* Ibid..p.428,
*t>y*
the Soviet Union could do little to enhance the chances of auooeas for 
these tentative diplomatic probes. In France a legal case conoeming the 
claims of a Russian emigre against "Dobroflot" was disrupting the operations 
of the Soviet foreign trade organisations in Franco and creating concern in 
MoscowA^* Stomonyakov, a member of the collegium of the Narkoraindel told 
the French Ambassador in early August that in the present atmosphere "it is 
impossible to conduct any kind of normal trade relations." The French Govern­
ment must give the Soviet trade agency the opportunity to work and expand 
trade between the two countries or else ansvær for the conseq,uencea. Despite 
this strong protest, the Soviet Government did not threaten to terminate trade 
operations in France; economic links were too valuable. Herbette, in reply, 
adopting a oonciliatory attitude, said that the French Government was jmter- 
ested in the development of trade relations with the USSR and was prepared to 
do everything possible in order to protect and facilitate their further devel­
opment.
Despite this assurance, on October j, the French Government introduced
the anti-dumping decree aimed at Soviet exports, plunging economic relations
between the two countries to an even lower level. Perhaps by an unfortunate
coinoidenoe, a Soviet expression of the desirability of the rélaxation in
tension between the states had been made the day previous to the French prom-
ulgation,*" a fact which the Russians chose to interpret as the French answer
to their appeal* On October 5i the French Government, through Herbette,
officially answered this appeal, considering it interesting and worthy of
^gr^'Por''a brief ' account'''aee^ DVP ^'Vbï.ï^ T^  41. '........ '
50* Note of a conversation between a member of the collegium of the NKD, 
Gtomonyakov and the French Ambassador in the USSR, Herbette, August 8, 
1930* Ibid.> pps.450-451* B.S.Stomonyakov, from 1926 collegium member,
NKD; Head of the Dept# of Central and Fast European Countries, NKD;
Soviet Second Deputy iKommissar for Foreign Affairs, 1934-1938#
51. Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov 
and the French Ambassador in the USSR, Herbette, October 2,1930. Ibid.* 
p.527* Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the 
NKD, December 5, 1930. Ibid«*pps#696-697. The French Government maintained 
that it was coincidence.
attention but adding that this desire could not be fulfilled before the 
liquidation of the existing economic tension created by the sale of Soviet 
exports in France at dumping prices which was creating pressure on the French 
Government from the side of French industrialists*^^*
The effect of this decree, together with the Soviet retaliatory measure 
of October 20, on Franco-Soviet relations has already been examined* French 
diplomacy attempted to persuade the Ruasi£ms that the decree should not hinder 
the development of trade between the two states but with litt3*e success* In 
fact the conciliatory line of French diplomacy in contrast with the harsh 
reality of the decree led Krestinsly to think it "highly probable that, esp­
ecially on the eve of the opening of the Geneva debates on disarmament, the 
Quai d’Orsey is interested in some mollifioation (snyagchenie) of mutual rel­
ations with us and hopes thereby to avert an anti-French clash with our del­
egation at Geneva*
The cause of the discrepancy between certain diplomatic statements by 
the French Foreign Ministry and the actions taken by the French Government 
and press in relation to the USSE may well lie in the conflict of interests 
within France* The Soviet Union in communications with foreign governments 
generally spoke with one voice (excepting the Soviet-controlled Comiatem 
revolutionary statements)* The French side was not so monolithic. Political 
and industrial circles were divided as to the gains and losses from trade with 
oommunist Russia and this was reflected in French policy*
A move forward was made on November 22 when Berthelot informed the Soviet 
Government that "the French Government...is ready to enter into negotiations 
with the Soviet Government with the aim of finding a practical means of ach­
ieving a satisfactory equilibrium in the trade between both countries.
52.' Telegram 'from %he' "c ommi sSr'Tor''"For ei^ 'Affairs J ''Lit%nov, to ' tJÎe’Soviot 
Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, October 5,1930* DVP Vol*13.0*545*
53* Letter from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Krestinsky, to the 
Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, November 6,1930. Ibid*.o*620.
54* Memorandtua from the French Government, November 22, 1930* Ibid*. p,5?0*
51.
He explained, however, that the abrogation of the Soviet counter-measure
could not result in the abrogation of the French decree in view of the legal
status and validity of the latter. He added that a proposal to abrogate the
Soviet decree could not be seen as a measure which would call forth trade
negotiations#^^* Such was the state of eoonomio relations at the close of
1930# After much diplomatic activity, the question of future negotiations
was finally being raised, if not yet finalised; the French decree still -
remained a big obstacle to any further progress.
Economic relations between the two oountries had a close bearing on the
more purely political theme of a non-aggression pact. The slow progress being
made in economic relations was inauspicious for any startling advance in the
potentially more delicate realm of politics. Nevertheless, the question of
such a pact did not lie dormant during 1930. A recent Soviet book states that
on March 10, Litvinov made it clear to the French Ambassador in Moscow that
the Soviet Union was prepared to sign a pact with France but this sounding
56.produced no results. Dovgalevsky, in a conversation with Berthelot in April, 
1931, mentioned that Litvinov had proposed a non-aggression pact to the French 
Ambassador at the beginning of October 1930*^^*
The first document in the recently published Soviet collection which 
refers directly to such a pact is dated December 3,1930, and is a telegram 
from Dovgalevsky to the Narkomindel concerning a conversation held with 
Berthelot. In reply to Litvinov’s statement of December 1 in which he said 
that "the Soviet Government will welcome any practical proposals of the French
Government which could lead to the establishment of really normal and
58
correct relations," * Berthelot after assuring the Soviet Ambassador of his
55. Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgulevslîy, to the Deputy 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Krestinsky, November 25.1930.DVF.Yol.13.
pps,681-682.
56. History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1945.Ed.B.Ponomaryov. A.Gromyko, 
V*ffivostov"'f^  ^ 7'Quotes USSR Foreign Policy Archives.
57. Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the Deputy 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Krestinsky,April 21.1931 .DVP Vol.14.P»255#
58. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the Soviet 
Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, December 1,1930. DVP Vol^l3.P#692.
belief that the French Government sincerely sought to establish normal and 
calm relations between the two countries, raised the issue of a non-aggression 
pact;
He (Berthelot) again repeated his past statement In relation to a 
pact, emphasising that a non-aggression pact without conciliation 
procedure has no significance for it is completely covered by the 
Kellogg Pact# 59*
The Kellogg Pact, of which both France and the USSR were signatories,
required states to renounce war as a means of policy. In this respect it could 
be likened to a non-aggression pact, yet for the USSR,although a parly to it, | 
the pact was little more than a piece of paper. The Russians had never consid­
ered this somewhat vague, multilateral agreement an effective substitute for 
the bilateral non-aggression pact* In his report to the Central Executive 
Committee on December 10, 1928, Litvinov emphasised this points
Our Government regarded (the Kellogg Pact) critically, noting its in­
adequacy and limitations. The principle of renouncing war was included 
in the drafts for a non-aggression pact which we proposed to a number 
of states# But our proposals were of wider scope, including questions 
of non-aggression, and left no room for equivocation. The pacts we 
proposed also included the undertaking to remain neutral and not to 
take part in any hostile association or alliance,,,Nevertheless, con­
sidering that the states signing the Kellogg Pact undertake certain 
moral obligations regarding non-aggression, and that the pact has a 
certain though limited significance, our Government did not hesitate 
to adhere to it, 60*
In other words, the Russians did not share the French view that a non-aggression
pact would be nothing more than a second Kellogg Pact without some form of
conciliation procedure#
On the actual question of conciliation procedure, the Russians had no
strong objections; only arbitration ms opposed on the grounds that a "neutral"
imaginary
chairman could only be ar|. igan&ary figure who in fact would be either sooial-
[
ist or capitalist and thds biased against either the capitalist state or the 
Soviet tSaion, The Russian Government was not in fact an enthusiastic supporter 
of conciliation procedure but was prepared to accept it as "a sort of ornmpen- 
sation for the conclusion of a paotîî^ *^ Thus if France was prepared to accept
59# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsly, to the NKD 
December 3,1930# DVP Vol.13, p,697.
60# Degras, Soviet Documents on Forei/m Policy Vol.2.p p s, 345-346#
61. Letter from a Member of the Collegium of the NKD, Stomonyakov, to the Soviet 
Ambassador in Norway,Kollontai,August 22,1930. DVP Vol. 13, p,463*
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a non-aggression paot which also included a conciliation agreement, the 
Soviets were prepared to tolerate the latter so long as it brought them a 
non-aggression agreement*
As in économie relations, the political sphere of contact between France 
and the USSR by the end of 1930 seemed somewhat improved* The Italian Ambass­
ador in Moscow confidentially told Litvinov on December 19 that his French 
counterpart was in a veay peace-loving mood and was saying the very opposite 
to his comments only a week previously* The Italian formed the impression that 
he had received new instructions from Paris. In reply Litvinov confirmed that
62"the French Government has never been so friendly with us as now#" '
A few days later, Dovgalevsky expressed to Briand dissatisfaction at 
"the present unsatisfactory state"of Soviet-French relations and enumerated 
a number of complaints against hostile statements made by members of the French 
Government and against overt emigre aotivily within France. He ended by express­
ing a plea for better relations;
The need is for the establishment of really normal relations between 
both countries, to which the Soviet Government, for its part, has al­
ways unfailingly sought and seeks, having made in this direction not 
a little effort, which up until now, unfortunately, has remained with­
out success. In these efforts my Government always was and is led ly 
the interests of the preservation of general peace, which in consider­
able degree depends on the state of Soviet-French relations*^ 3#
The spring of 1931 witnessed a new setting on the course of Soviet-
French relations. They did asot improve overnight, of course, and Soviet
comments, especially public declarations, remained hostile, yet not without
holding out some hope for the future and eagres sing a Soviet readiness to
respond to any French desire for better relations. Such were Molotov’s
comments on France in his report to the Sixth Soviet in March;
IMfortunatdy, it must be recognised that in the sphere of Soviet- 
French relations is concealed an extremely serious and grave danger 
to general peace. It is not for nothing that the French Government 
has persistently rejected our proposal for the conclusion of a pact
62 * Note of a conversation betweœiî the Commissar fo^ Affairs,Litvinov
and the Italian Ambassador in the USSR, Attoljj^o,December 19, 1938,
DVP Vol.13. p. 744.
63. Statement by the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the French 
Foreign Minister, Briand, December 24,1930, Ibid., p.759*
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of non-aggression, as If the elimination of the danger of a violation 
of peaoe were not in the French Government’s field of interests# None 
the less, we are prepared to continue our efforts to strengthen our 
relations if we see that the French side is also sincerely prepared to 
improve Franco-Soviet relations
The diplomatic intercourse was of a more restrained and hopeful tone#
On March 10, Litvinov held an important conversation with Herbette in Moscow, 
in which the question of economic and political negotiations was advanced a 
stage further towards their initiation# Litvinov began by enumerating the 
standard Soviet complaints - the anti-dumping decree, white guardlst activity, 
etc# - and pointed out that these tactics had not and would not take Franco 
any nearer to either financial compensation for its creditors or political 
concessions:
If these facts are leading the French Government to a belief in the 
necessity of another policy towards the USSE, then we shall willingly 
go to meet it. The military alliances of France remain a hindrance, but 
apart from this X cannot see any objective causes which could prevent 
the establishment of normal and even close relations between France and 
ourselves#
Herbette enquired as to whether the Russians wanted to begin negotiations 
on political or economic questions to which Litvinov expressed indifference, 
adding that in relations with France eoonomio questions acquired a definite 
political character. On the economic plane, Litvinov noted two questions on 
which the countries radically diverged; the French Government wanted to impose 
the principle of mutuality on the Soviet Union and on this principle justified 
its decree on the licensing of Soviet exports# * France also desired to apply
the principle of net-bai}anoe to international trade between itself and the USSR,
8 Î
Herbette then ra^e^ the issue of a conciliation commission, a non-aggress­
ion pact, an agreement cn disarmament and a settlement of loans# He pointed to 
Briand* s breadth of view and the possibility iMch this gave to deal with the 
whole perspective of relations; Uhilst Litvinov did not oppose a wide agreement 
%'#Report ' "of' 'the Soviet Government to the''8i:^'c March 8;..
^  1931* F* 155#
65*The French Government claimed that Soviet external trade was controlled by 
the Central authoxdties and that the French therefore ought to be allowed to 
reciprocate by controlling French trade wijfti the USSR# The Soviets argued 
that their control applied to all states whereas the French measure was 
directed Only against them and was therefore anti-Soviet in nature#
55#
he felt that it was unwise to «eize auoh big and complex questions àt the 
outset; "a conciliation commission on its own has no significance and is un­
acceptable for us; we have proposed a non-aggression pact and are always ready
to sign it." Ho was not opposed in prinoipl© to a settlement of Franco-Soviet 
claims but thought that if this was introduced at the beginning it would delay 
the settlement of more urgent matters. Litvinov favoured negotiations for a 
trade paot as a beginning, Herbette correcting him, "a temporary trade 
agreement." The question of Moscow or Paris as the venue of the negotiations 
was briefly raised, Litvinov favouring Paris where the Soviet trade agency was 
fully-aware of the problems involved, Herbette suggesting Moscow.
The scene was now almost set for the opming of negotiations and on April
20, Berthelot inquired of Dovgalevsky as to how the Soviet Goveimaent would 
receive the readiness of the French Government to conclude a non-aggression 
pact with conciliation procedure and simultaneously a trade pact on the princ­
iple of equality and specifically equilibrium of balance and the regulation 
of the question of claims. Dovgalevsky ignored the last issue and objected to 
the connection of a trade agreement with the non-aggression pact negotiations^ 
Since they were not only heterogeneous but both parties must sincerely desire 
the rapid conclusion of the pact whilst the conclusion of a trade agreement 
might well be a lengthy business. He refused to be drawn into the question of 
balance between Soviet imports and exports vis-a-vis France. Berthelot, after 
some thought, then put the following proposal to the Soviet Government; to 
open negotiations for a non-aggression paot vdth conciliation procedure and 
for a temporaiy trade agreement which could be activated by a decreed order, 
that is without parliaroentaiy confirmation. The simultaeous negotiation of 
both questions would not signify either the co-ordination of one to the other
'8d»r Note ' of a 'conversation ' between 'the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinow 
and the French Ambassador in the U83R, Herbette, Tteoh 10, 1951 .DVP Vol.14. 
pps. 172-175. It is probable that perbette favoured Moscow so that he 
could play a leading rôle in the negotiations and Litvinov aopposed this 
on the same grounds; the Russians liad a very low opinion of the French 
Ambassador.
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or the necesaily for a slmultajieous signing; Negotiations for a trade treaty 
oould he started after the oonoluslon of a temporaiy trade agreement# 
Dorfgaievfidsy expressed doubt as to the possibility of beginning trade negot­
iations before the abrogation of the October 5 decree whereupon Berthelot 
suggested a fitting oompromise might be arranged#^^*
This French proposal met most of the soviet Government’s requirements. 
Litvinov was in faot prepared to accept the annulment of the French decree at 
a definite stage of the negotiations# On Aprü 22, Povgalevsiy was instructed 
to inform Berthelot of the Soviet Government’s acceptance of the French prop*^  
oaal and promlae^l to deliver a project of a pact and a trade agreement in the 
near future,. The Russians considered it desirable that the French decree and 
the Soviet countermeasure be amulled after the beginning of the negotiations#^* 
This answer was oommunioated to the French Government on April 24# 1931.
3# The New World Environment#
This was not# of course# the first time that France and the Soviet Union 
had assembled delegates to negotiate on the complex questions of a political - 
and economic treaty# though previous attempts had only been of a cursoiy nat­
ure and success had eluded all efforts*^^’ The Soviets# pursuing their quest 
for security# had alweya expressed the desire to conclude non-aggression 
treaties with all oapitalist states m d  in this number France was naturally 
included# the more so given its hostility and its great potential threat to 
Russia* Previous efforts at agreement had ended in failure because of a French
reluctance# founded on a general disinclination of powerful sectors of French
]
society to deal with the communist state and on Ijhe particular problem of 
Soviet Russia’s relations with France’s east EmWpean allies.
To explain the opening of negotiations in 1931 by a constant Soviet
8f^'T«degS«î'frS"the3ôviet''AjiSss»adôr
April 20# 1931* 3>VP Vol.l4. pps. 292-253*
68. Telegram from the OoBmissar for Foreign Affairs# Litvinov# to the Soviet 
Ambassador in France# Doggalevsky# April 22#1931%.% . '
69.se. Chapter 1.
desire for agreement meeting a new and positive French response la to simplify, 
however* The world of 1930-1931 was not that of the 1920’s and to understand 
this change it is necessary briefly to plunge into the realm of business and 
finance, for in 1929 the capitalist world vms shaken at its very foundations 
by an economic crisis which spread Its tentacles from Wall Street to the rest 
of the developed world, creating despair and exacerbating relations in the 
capitalist world*
Any lingering hopes for a new world following the end of the First World 
War were shattered by the slump which hit the industrial countries and threat­
ened to destroy the veiy bases of their societies. During 1929-1932, industr­
ial production was reduced by 16.5^ in England, 31*9^ in France, 46.7^ in 
Germany, 32.41^  in Japan and 46*20 in the USA. In 1933 international trade was 
only 560 of the 1929 figure. The consequent unemployment provided ample fuel 
for extremist views. This state of affairs was hardly an omen for increased 
international solidarity, much as it was needed. The sober Survey of Inter­
national Affairs in its 1931 volume opens with the words:
The year 1931 was distinguished from previous years...by one outstand­
ing feature. Ih 1931, men and women all over the world were seriously 
contemplating and frankly discussing the possibility that the western 
system of society might break down and cease to work. 70.
1931 was not isolated in its black colour. The Surv^ describes the situation
in 1931 os being substantially that of 1930 "and perhaps no single statement
could go further than this towards accounting for the acuteness of the world
crisis; for in 1930 the state of tension in Europe had been extreme.
Although the economic crisis reached France later than most oountries, by 
1931 its effect was crushing. Furthermore, its consequences for that country 
did not ehd with its direct economic impingement. '* France’s previously
70. ' 'BUrVe^ ''0f "Ste ' m S S s ." 193^ m i ■ "'n <
71. ïbidl.' 0.28.  ... ..........
72. In conversation with a British diplomat Besrthelot attempted to justify his 
countsey’a negotiations with the ÎI3SR for a non-aggression pact by the irre- 
si stable pressure within France for an improvement in Franco-soviet econ­
omic relations, those negotiations merely being a bate to entice the 
Russians into commercial negotiations. The British Charge d’Affaires in 
France, Campbell, to the Foreign Office, September 5,1931* Public Record 
Office. Unpublished document Foreign Office file (Hereafter Fd)No077/43V38. 
imalat France was anxious to improve commercial relations, it being the 
prime sufferer in the "economic war", political considerations were of 
great importance in the French decision.
mentioned almost pathological concern for accurity and the maintenance of 
the status quo in Europe made it unusually oonacloua of any increased tension 
on the Continent. The haok-lash from the economic chaos in Europe and espec­
ially in Germany, France’s major source of woriy, seemed to undermine yet 
further its precarious hold on its existence. The withdrawal of allied troops 
from the Rhineland in July 1938 served to increase rather than decrease Franco- 
German tension, heightened hy the Nazi and oommunist victories in the Reichstag 
elections of September. This new state of tension in Germary was transferred to 
the Preparatoiy Commission on Disarmament where the German stance became more 
rigid. The tendency for Germany and the USSR to vote together in a minority was 
now given a more disconcerting turn by Italy’ s adherence to this grOup, a state 
with whom France’ s relations were becoming increasingly strained. Paris viewed 
with alarm this new Intemational combination at Geneva; at present it was oon^ 
fiaed to casting votes, but what of the future?
In this situation, France was that much more willing to seek m  agreement 
with the Soviet Union, even if its results would be minimal. In pre-war days 
Russia had been France’s ally against a resurgent German state. Ideological 
barriers had severed this link in the 1920’s but as the international threat 
grew, ideology might have to adopt a subordinate role to that of security, es­
pecially since the world crisis was having a serious effect on the capability 
of France’s, major ally, Roland.
The news in March 1931 of the plan for a German-Auatrian customs union 
provoked a strong reaction in France and was perhaps the last push needed by 
Paris to send it in the direction of the Soviet Union. Faith in the Locarno 
policy was deeply shaken and the concept of a rapprochement wi# Russia no 
longer was considered with indifference or hostility. A revanchist Germany must 
be countered, no matter how* It was feared that such a union was merely a first 
step towards the anachluss of Austria and Germany* Briand, the French Foreign 
Minister, was angered by this surprise move. On March 28, he answered it in the 
Senate:
I repeat to you, in this affair the position of France la unequivocal ; 
what has been done has been done contrary to treaties and conventions.
We shall do everything possible to oppose the realisation of this 
enterprise,73*
Dovgalevsky thought that the French decision to open negotiations was 
linked with the French presidential elections, taking place on May 13* Berthelot 
hinted to him at the personal interest of Briand, who intended to stand, in 
the opening of negotiations for a pact and a trade agreement before that date;
The other cause, needless to say, lies in the foreign policy 
situation; deadlock in the Franoo-Italian naval negotiations* * ,and 
the Austro-German customs union,,,Thus May is fraught with big events 
for France as well as Briand himself and in this, evidently, can be 
seen the cause of the haste with which Briand wants to turn the Russian 
card into a trump,74,
If the Soviet îftiion was to gain concessions from Paris’s hitherto rigid 
stance, now might be the opportunity.
The decision of April, 1931, concerning a non-aggression pact and trade 
agreement was not an outcome merely of this new French position, however, 
important as it was, for the USSR was also facing a now external and internal 
environment at the turn of the 1920’s.
The world economic crisis, though appearing as a horrendous shock to the 
oapitalist world, was not unexpected in Moscow, Stalin, presenting the polit­
ical report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Party Congress in Decem­
ber 1927» discussed the imminent crisis of capitalism;
(T)his very stabilisation, the fact that production is growing, that 
trade is growing, that technical progress and production potentialities 
are increasing, whereas the world market, the limits of that market, 
and the spheres of influence of the individual imperialist groups, remain 
more Or less stable - precisely this is giving rise to a most profound 
and acute crisis of world capitallBm,73*
Whether such a conclusion could be deduced from the contemporary situat­
ion in 1927 is doubtful I on the other hand, the communist did believe that 
such capitalist crises were inevitable and through his Marxist-Leninist 
spectacles would perceive factors pointing towards this oonolusion which to
75,'" Quoted' !^  ’Alliance'‘Ag’i^ s t  Killer''"(Purham^ '^
74. Letter from the soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the Deputy 
Oommissar for Foreign Affairs, Krestinsky, April 21,1931* DVP Vol. 14* p*256. 
73* Stalin, Works Vol.lO. p.280.
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the western bourgeois eoonomist, would not exist* Be iMs as it any, in
autumn 1929# no one, Marxist nor conservative, could deiy the reality of the
oapitalist economic crisis*
This crisis raised conflicting issues for the Russians* On the one hand,
it confimed the analysis made at the Fifteenth Party and the Sixth Oomintem
Congresses (192? and 1928 respectively), that a world crisis was imminent* It
justified the expectations of a revolutionary situation and an^ly displayed
the weaknesses of their arch-rivals. Molotdv, in his report to the Sixteenth
Parly Congress in July 1930» emphasised the correctness of the party line* He
stressed the contradictions within the capitalist world, especially "the
etruggle for world hegemony between the TJSA and Great Britain* * * Again,
Kaganovich, at the Joint December 1930 Plenum of the Central Committee and the
Central Control Commission, said;
As a result of the crisis the antagonisms betwewx the capitalist 
countries are growing; the contradictions between the capitalists and 
the workers are increasing as well at (sic) the antagonisms between 
the capitalist powers and their colonies# At the same time there is to 
be observed a growth of the revolutionary movement.77*
Capitalist stabilisation was breaking down, though "whether the present
economic crisis will grow into a general political crisis depends on a number
of contributing factors, and primarily on a subjective factor, the power and
fighting readiness of the communist parties*"78*
tet the economic crisis which was besetting the capitalist world was by
no means an unqualified blessing; "from the increased acuteness of internat-
in the menace
ional contradictions follows the increase^of a new imperialist war and an
attack on the USSR." As the wozld crisis increased tensions both within
the capitalist societies and between them, there would develop a tendency to
overcome the contradictions at the expense of the USSR, a oomm«i eneuy against
'tS 7 v3l&olo%)vI ' Tlie ' bev^Qpina "crisis WoiSd’ ' (Ewdon 1930^ ^^  
Report to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU, p*17*
77* "The Results of the Joint December Plenum of the CC and CCC of the CPStj..."
International Press Correspondence Vol.ll* n.l. p*2#
78* Manuüsky to the Enlarged Presidium of the Comintern, February 1930;
Budin and Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy Vol.l# p*242*
79# Molotov, The Developing Crisis of World Capitalism* p. 19*
which capitalism could unite to aave itself * This posed a grave danger to 
the Russian state and one which could only he circumnavigated ly the Leninist 
policy of exploiting these contradictions in order to secure advantageous 
results for the USSR. The negotiation of further non-aggression pacts# if the 
opportunity arose, would he one way of achieving this aim.
As with all Soviet statements of this period concerning threats ffom 
external and internal enemies, a certain discretion must he exercised, since 
the requirements of propaganda were not necessarily host served hy the truth. 
It must always he remembered, however, that the environment as perceived hy 
an observer is dependent not only on the objective situation, but on the 
individual concerned. Thus "truth" for the Soviet decision-maker may not 
correspond with "truth" for the western politician, diplomat or scholar# To 
say that the frequent war fears were absolutely genuine is to overstate, but 
the deliberate tendency to exaggerate should not be allowed to obscure the 
real fears which were held by the Soviet leadership at this time#
4# The Internal Soviet "Revolution"#
This sense of isolation in an increasingly hostile world was made the 
more disconcerting for the Russians as a result of the immense internal pol­
itical and economic changes which were set in motion at the end of the 1920’s 
and which transformed the shape of Soviet society. The ending of the Sew 
Economic Policy and the adoption of the First Five Year Plan and maas-oollect- 
ivisation were a consequence of the problem of industrial development, the 
desire to build up rapidly industry and especially heavy industry, in the 
framework of "socialism in one country," the desire of Stalin and many other 
party members to eliminate the individual peasant and solve the growing prob­
lem of grain procurement for the cities. Aooompanying and related to “ttieae 
economic transformations was the consolidation of political power by Stalin 
with the virtual elii^ation of both Üie "left" and "right" oppositions#
The impact of th#e events on the Soviet Biion cannot be under*estimated
yet their effect on Soviet foreign policy* though important, was perhaps
QO
not so great as is often claimed. * Foreign policy, it is true, is only one 
facet of the total policy of the state. For the communist, this is an axiom:
"It is fundamentally wrong, un-Marxist and unscientific to single out foreign 
policy from policy in general, let alone counterpoise foreign policy to
Q«|
domestic policy." * It must he noted, however, that foreign policy has to 
take into consideration factors outside the state and therefore to a large 
extent h^ond the control of the state’s decision-makers - especially the 
foreign policies of other states. This gives it a certain detachment from 
domestic policy since it can respmd only partially to the pulls from within 
the state.
The early chaos created hy collectivisation left the country ill-prepared 
to resist attack and required the Soviet state to avoid conflict at almost any 
price. Yet the extent to which this imbued Soviet foreign policy with a new 
element should not be exaggerated. A genuine desire for peace had always been 
an important objective of its foreign policy; for such a weak, isolated state 
there was no rational alternative* Thus to say that the new internal develop­
ments necessitated a great concentration on peace is true only in so far as 
peace did indeed remain a foremost objective. As Molotov stated in his con­
cluding rwoarks to the Sixth Congress of Soviets, "our slogan remains, the
struggle for the strengthening of universal peace and the strengthening of
82
peaceful relations with other states." *
The industrialisation plan had considerable effect on the outside world’s 
perception of the USSR » To some observers* it provided a striking positive 
contrast to the foundering capitalist system, to others* including many eminent
80. For esosmple. Max Bel6%''o6n%&rs"'#at''the "provides.
the master-key to every aspect of Russian policy in the years immediately 
following 1929," M.Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929-1941 
vol.].. 1929-1936 (lonaon 1%.7), p.27.
81. Lenin, Sooh. Vol.jO* (Moscow 1962), p.93*
82. Xgyeatiiitr'MSohTK* 1931. Emphasis added.
western politicians, it emphasised either the growing threat of the oommuhist 
menace or the opposite view of the long-awaited collapse of the communist
system*
Soviet industrialisation had a more Important effect on its economic 
relations with the outside world. Large quantities of machinery and skilled 
labour were required which could only be obtained from the capitalist states.
To pay for these in the absence of sizeable long-term loans, which the western 
business community was reluctant to provide, called for large Soviet exports. * 
Trade played a greater role in foreign policy in the late twenties and early 
thirties than before* There was also a reverse feedback between foreign and 
domestic policy in that the internal economic changes were probably, at least 
to a degree, introduced because of foreign policy considerations, the urgent 
need to forge a modem and effective military arm which could only be provided 
by a powerful and modem industriel base*
The fundamental impact of the internal developments was to direct Soviet 
attention inwards. Diplomacy still had the important task of maintaining sec­
urity and promoting economic intercourse, but certainly the aynamic sphere of 
activiiy was now to be found within Russia itself. The tremendous steps being 
undertaken which involved the whole population, together with the dominant 
theory of "socialism in one country" had the effect of concentrating Soviet 
hopes for the future on its own achievements.
5. The Erosion of Rapallo.
To the Soviet observer the world economic crisis increased the threat 
from the capitalist world yet provided the opportunily for the USSR to utilise
83. The situation^^aggravated for the USSR by the world economic crisis. The 
prices of Russia’s main ejiports, timber, oil, furs, grain and other food 
products, fell heavily throughout the world. See the report by the British 
Charge d’Affaires in Moscow, Strang, to the foreign office, September 8, 
1950. DBgP vol.7. p. 161,
the inherent contradictions to advantage. The eoonomio upheaval inside 
Russia increased its short-term vulnerability but provided on expanding 
market in which the growing surplus of goods in the capitalist states ooUld
be profitably sold. Alongside the capitalist propensity for adventurist attacks 
on the Soviet Union was their fear of defeat at that country’s hands or by 
their own workers. The growing eoonomio and political strength of the USSR 
would encourage a tendency towards peaceful relations between the two blocs* 
Stalin* in June 1938* said that the conflict between this aggressive tendency 
and peaceful tendency would determine the USSR’s external situation#^’ It 
must do everything possible to encourage the latter. Litvinov* on his appoint­
ment to the post of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs* stated this view 
point:
We are building socialism in one country surrounded by capitalist 
oountries* occupying 5/6 of the land surfaee of the globe# We cannot 
and will not ignore this faot and therefore aspire to the finding and
putting into practice of the means Of peaceful co-existence of both 
social systems.^5#
Soviet Russia’s efforts in this direction durâng the first ten years of
its existance had been most successful in relations with Germany. The links
forged at Rapallo had helped the new state to charter its course through the
vicissitudes of international society despite numerous setbacks* Nevertheless*
since Germany’s signature of the Loosmo treaty and its entry into the League
of Nations the "special relationship" had gradually and unevenly experienced
86a deterioration* reaching a hitherto unknown nadir in early 1938* *
The motivating force in this deterioration was mainly supplied by Germany# 
Its gradual incorporation into the international communiiy reduced its need 
for Russia as a bargaining point in dealings with the west and could even be­
come a handicap. The ratification of the Young Plan by the Reichstag in March 
1930 and the allied evacuation of the Rhineland three months later marked a 
ël^r^St^in.' Works Voï'#''Ï2l'''oo%
85# Press interview by Litv^ov, July 26*1930* DMJrol*13. p.425*
$6. See Chapter 1#
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new phase in Germany’s relations with its oonquorerg of 1918. Koohan quotes
//
an article from Der Boraenkurier which is indicative of the new mood within 
German 
influential^ciroles :
We now settle our relations with Russia independently of all 
tactical considerations. The time is past when there existed friend­
ship for Russia* when Moscow was the only active post in the foreign 
policy of the Reich* The Rhini^and is evacuated and there is no long­
er any need to fear complications in the Vest* • .Russia must ask her- 
self if she is willing to do all that is necessary in order that our 
position in regard to her may remain the same as before*87#
Germany was no longer prepared to tolerate the eccentrlcitlea of Russia’s 
external policy and especially Gomintesm interference in the affairs of the 
KFD. Such interfeï»ence was the more unwelcome in that the internal position 
of the Weimar Republic was rapidly deteriorating* Extremism of both the right 
and left was mushrooming and the activities of the German Communist Party 
could no longer be indulgently overlooked* In Februaiy 1930, Krestinsky, the 
Soviet Ambassador in Germany, met Schubert, the German State Seoretaiy of the 
Foreign Ministiy, who complained of Soviet interference in German affairs, 
referring to the activities of the KED*^^* He asked for a Soviet assurance 
that such interference would end. The usual Russian denial of any oonnection 
between the Gomintem and the Soviet Government enunciated by Krestinsky could 
have given little encouragement to the German Government, especially since it 
was under heavy pressure from within Germary to control Soviet-sponsored 
communist activity* ThePiussian Prime Minister remarked to the British 
Ambassador in Berlin that the Russian trade delegation in that city was 
directly concerned in stirring up trouble amongst the communists there* He 
stated that the German Foreign Office was always concerned "to shield or 
exculpate the Russians," but that if these subversive Russian activities con­
tinued, the Prussian Govomment"would take action against the Russians con- 
oeraed in them without regard for the reactions that this might have on
Wr'L'r"lSohan.'‘ Russia ^ &d"the'%Imar'%...................' ' ' " '' ' ' ..... '
88* Note of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Krs8tinsky 
and the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, aWwhmetGohubert, 
Februaiy 19, 1930. DVP Vol. 13. p.lGO*
Ruaso-German r e l a t i o n s I n  March 1930 the German press was replete with 
complaints about Comintern activity in the Republic,
Vociferous anti-Soviet comment in the German press called forth repeated 
diplomatic complaints' from the Russian side. In a telegram from Litvinov to 
Brodovsky, the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Berlin, sent on January 28,1930, 
the latter was instructed "to emphasise the organised and systematic character 
of the (anti-Soviet) oampaign in the press" and to tell the German Government 
that the Soviets "link this with the ending of the reparation question and 
with the new moves in German foreign policy#"
The Soviet Government was fully aware of the dangers for the old Rapallo 
course inherent in Germary’s strengthened diplomatic position vis-a-vis the 
west and feared a further German turn in this direction,To counter this 
tendency and to improve economic relations which were important for both 
countries, especially in the period of the world crisis and the Five Year
92
Han, an attempt was made to settle the Outstanding problems between them# *
At a meeting with Krestinsky in Berlin on March 6, 1930, Curtius, the German
Foreign Minister, declared his desire not only to preserve but to eicpand and
deepen the existing friendly relations between the USSR and Germany and for
this puipose suggested diplomatic talks in Berlin and Moscow, He ended his
talk by raising the issue of the Comintern and received the reply he presum- 
93,ably expected# Litvinov sent Krestinsïy m  angry reply to these proposals 
which he ohamcterised as "nothing more than red tape," The Deputy Commissar
89* The British Ambassador in Berlin, Rumbold, to the Foreign Seoretaiy, 
Henderson, January 31,1930# DBEF Vol#7, p#89*
90, Telegram from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the 
Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Germany, Brodovsky, January 26#1930#BYP Yol#13#
p.52#
91, For exmgple, à letter from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Litvinov to the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Germany^; Brodovsky,February 7, 
1930. DVF Vol,13# p.8X,
92# Schlosinger, the leading eapert at the German Ministiy of Foreign Affairs 
on Russia, told the British Ambassador in Germany that,the Qoviet-Genaan 
economic treaty, even after its partial revision in 1928, was proving veiy 
unaatisfactojey from the German point of view and while he hoped that it 
might be possible to improve it without giving notice of termination, he 
was doubtful whether that would be possible.Memorandum from the British 
Ambassador in Berlin,Rumbold, to the British Foreign Secretary, Henderson, 
February 4, 1930* DBFF Vol#17# p#96*
93# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Krestinsky,to the NKD,
March 6,1930# DVF Vol,l3* pps# 129-130,
/e me^nt
claimed that for more than a year the-deciflion- of a whole complex of Soviet- 
German questions had been postponed under the pretext of the necessity for a 
preliminary settlement of the reparations question and in awaiting the end of 
the Hague conference work on this topic, the agreement of which was signed on 
January 20* Then Gurtius had further stalled ty referring to the necessity for 
the conducting of the Hague decisions through the Reichstag, Now, when this 
had been completed, Curtius was searching for a new pretext to postpone talks 
by suggesting the need for a pr^iminaiy settlement of current conflicts.^* 
The Soviet view was that only by clearing the generally bad atmosphere
wh3.oh was polluting Soviet-German relations could the settlement of specific
S i b & n q n
matters be reached, such as the dispute over German conoessions, 'German-
d'P (se iv)<3 r>
peasants reoidmW arztheJE^ B, etc. In particular, the Russian Government 
demanded a public statement %  the Berlin Government disassociating itself 
from the virulent anti-Soviet campaign being conducted in the German press and 
by influential German individuals and re-affirming its stand on the ground of 
the Rapallo treaty# A refusal to comply would signify that "Soviet-German 
relations really have suffered serious changes, that the previous basis of 
these relations has Vanished and that it is neoeSsaiy to review them all over 
again"^^*
March 1930 was a most tense period in Soviet-German relations. Press
attacks in Isvestiia answered those of the German papers,^* The Russian
Government was anxious that the public manifestations of anti-Soviet feeling
in the Weimar Republic should be countered by the Government lest the world
assumed that Germany was seeking a new orientation in its foreign policy with
the resulting damage to the Soviet position. As Litvinov e:^ressed its
At one of the most critical moments for Soviet-German relations, when 
the German press, party and industrial circles have given sufficient 
cause for the whole world to ânolude Germany in the number of states 
hostile to the Union, the German Government declines to answer our
"1ST'LettSf'S’S 'ï$e'Depuÿ'''G'6imiasZ''fw ' LitvïnovJ'^to
Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Krestin»ky,Maroh 7.1930,DVP Vol.l3* p,132#
95* Letter from the Deputy Oommissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the 
Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Krestinsky, March 17,1930. Ibid.. p.l45*
96* for example, Isvestiia March 11, March 17, 1930.
question on its relation to this evaluation of Germany's role.
Such a public declaration was especially requested on March 31 by 
Krestinslty in view of th'^  installation of a new German Government* Whüst 
Ourtius confidentially informed him that he had discussed the basic quest­
ions of foreign policy and specifically of relations with the USSE, with 
Bruning, the new Ghanqellor, and received a guarantee of an unchanged policy* 
he did not think a public declaration expedient* presumably because of the 
general anti*Soviet feeling within Germany.
Soviet disappointment at this non-committal attitude was expressed at
length by Krestinsl^ in a statement to Curtius on April 11*1930*
ïhe policy of the Soviet bhion in relation to Germany in the whole 
of the post^Versailles period has remained clear and unchanged*,, 
Throughout the whole time of the existence of*..(the Rapallo end 
Berlin treaties) the Soviet Government in its foreign policy did not 
take a single step Wiich could be seen as being directed against the 
interests of Germary. At the same time* our state leaders did not miss 
a single opportunity before the Soviet, German and world public opin­
ions, to emphasise the friendly relations of the Soviet Government 
and people towards Germany*
In contrast with this Soviet position Krestinsky then described German
policy in this periods
For the past eight years since Rapallo the German Government has 
been compelled to conclude a series of agreements with the western 
powers which produced a severe struggle in Germany, which part of the 
German press saw as a change of German policy in relation to the Soviet 
Union ihich could not but result in definite alarm on our part* * *
At the present time German foreign policy has reached a very import- 
and stage* 1 have in view the conclusion of the Hague reparation agree­
ments and in connection with these various liquidation agreements and 
especially the liquidation agreement with Poland* This agreement sign­
ifies the beginning of a new era in the policy of rapprochement wi#% 
Poland# The objective development of this policy can inflict a blow 
on relations with the Soviet Union, independently of the wish to - the 
subjective factor*
Krestinsky ended this examination of the current situation by asking
whether the German Government wanted to maintain its previous policy of friend-
99#
ship in relation to the USSR or whether it wished to revise it.
97." 'ïetter 'from "tSe Bepuiy" ComSsS*'" %ffai%%hI&inov, " to the
Soviet Ambassador in Germany,hre8tinsky*March 17.1930#DVP yol.l^* p.1^6, 
98# Telegram from the Boviet Ambassador in Germany,Krestinsky to the M3>,
March 31*19)0» Ibid*, pps* 182-183 
99* Statement by the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Krestinsky, to the German 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ourtius, April 11,1930* Ibid»# pps* 204.-208»
îsvestiia, on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the treaty of 
Berlin, carried a violent attack on Germany, accusing its press of shattering 
the Rapallo policy and the Gorman Government of implying its agreement with 
this view. The article argued against those Germans who maintained that Rapallo 
had meaning for their country only when it had contradictions with the western 
states; Only people with an inability to understand can affirm that a weaken­
ing of the Rapallo policy can strengthen and not weaken Germany's position 
before the face of Anglo**Frenoh imperialism," The USSR, as before, continued 
to support the Rapallo and Berlin treaties, but in order that this should 
have meaning, the German Government must also operate from such political 
pre-c onditions *
Alcmgside these diplomatic and newspaper broadsides, hurled by each side 
against the other, talks were proceeding èn the questions in dispute, but with 
no great succOas, The Russians continued to assert that only a general settle­
ment of the major lines of their respective foreign policies in relation to 
each other could produce positive results* Apart from growing general mistrust, 
the main concrete problem was that of a declining international trade between 
the two states, Many German industrialists expected the imminent collapse of 
Soviet rule and therefore were unwilling to strengthen their ties with Russia# 
Despite this deterioration in the Rapallo partnership, neither side was 
prepared to end abruptly the mutually-bmeficial co-operation. Both continued 
to reap advantages from military collaboration and, not withstanding present 
economic difficulties, the needs of the Soviet economy complemented the require­
ments of the flagging German industry* Germany's position in international 
society, though much stronger than in the early days of Rapallo, still was 
not such that it could alienate the USSR needlessly, Although the benefit 
to be gained from playing the Russian card in dealings with the west was much 
reduced, it would have been short-sighted to throw this card awgy*
From the Soviet view-point, good political relations were still a desir­
able asset. The USSR was in no position to reject its German connections in 
îoSr'lîiiv e s iï 1950»
fW» .
the face of continuing hoatlli-^ from the other great powers* It was anxious 
to demonstrate to the world that its links with Germany were substantially 
undamaged despite the attitude adopted by the German press and certain sections 
of the public#
The diplomatic conversations settled most of the outstanding problems 
and the remaining issues were submitted to the conciliation commission prov­
ided for in the treaty of lanuaiy, 1929* On lune 14, 1930, both governments 
issued a joint communique stating that the spirit of the Rapallo treaty rem­
ained the basis for their relations which they would continue to follow for 
many years to come* In addition, they agreed to refrain from any attempts at 
actively influencing the internal affairs of the o th e rl av e st l i a ,  comment­
ing on this communique, said that its very publication was evidence that both 
sides considered it possible to find "a mutually acceptable evaluation of the 
nature of Soviet-German relations and their prospects,"And in the future 
friendly relations between the two states would continue even in a changing 
international situation#^^^*
This Soviet reception was peihaps more an optimistic hope than a calcul­
ated conclusion* Military oollaborationw was never closer thw% in the second 
half of 1930 and economic trade again expanded; even political relations 
seemed to have surfaced from the recent trough of fôul weather. On July 3, 
Litvinov congratulated the German Government on the allied evacuation of the
1Q7J
Rhineland, ^ but this veiy act, whilst harking baok to the good old days of 
the lone Soviet-German stand against the entente powers, signified that 
Germany, at least, was no longer in quite its old, isolated and weak position 
imposed by the Versailles treaty, Furthermore, the atmosphere between the two 
states & d  not been completely purified by the conciliation commission and the 
diplomatic meetings# In August, Stomonyakov expressed to Dlrksen Soviet disat- 
isfaotion at the one-sided information appearing in the German press ion the
10l7"'so^ et'' GeïmZ'''Oomm n'#354.Z
102. lavestiia* dune 14, 1930•
103. Telegram from Litvinov to the German Foreign Minister, July 3,1930.
Begras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. Vol.2. p.447.
results of the work of the conciliation c o m m i s s i o n # A n  Isvestlia article
in September 1930 revealed Soviet concern that the Nasis might enter a govern­
ment coalition which "would necessarily result in a worsening of German-Soviet 
relations»^^^* Even in the sphere of economics, Soviet discontentment ccontin­
ued to be voiced, especially as regards the insufficient development of Soviet 
exports to Germany and the letter's credit polioy»^^^* t&ileas these points 
were satisfactorily cleared up, the USSR cOuld not expand its imports from 
Germany* To this end, economic negotiations were planned in early 1931 end as 
a preliminary the kussians desired a group of "responsible German industrial 
leaders "to visit Moscow for talks on t r a d e , w h i c h  took place in February# 
%  March 10 a communique stated that these negotiations had satisfactorily 
eliminated the obstacles in the path of economic relations and had included 
discussion on the question of expanding them.^^^* This was followed on April 
14 by a credit agreement by which the USSR placed orders up to 300 million 
marks in addition to normal Soviet-German business, between April and August 
1931#^^^* This was received in Russia as a successful political as wWi, as 
economic achievement. Xsvestiia commented that although the enphasis in 
Germany was on the economic and not the political aspects, "the conclusion 
of the agreement has great political significance," showing that the USSR was
economically inq»ortant and credit-worthy. It would help to counter the pro-
110
western tendency in German foreign policy.
In March 1931, Molotov, reporting to the Sixth Soviet Congress, whilst
-th-e.
being unable to "pass over in silence the fact that^German Government and 
public opinion, to our most profound regret,... (at the end of 1929 and early
an
1930) appeared to be carried away by the waves of^anti-Soviet 'crusade*, which
104. Note of a conversation between a Member of the Collegium of the NKD, 
Stomonyakov and the German Ambassador in the USSR, Pirksen, August 12, 
1930. DVP Vol.15. p. 434.
105. Xsvestiia. September 19, 1930#
106. For example, letter from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Krestinsky to the Soviet Charge d*Affaires in Germany, Brodovsky, 
November 12,1930. DVP Vol.13. pps. 641-642.
107# Letter from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Krestinsky, to the 
Soviet Ambassador in Germ%y,Rhinchuk,January 8.1931.DVP Vo1.14>p#16#
108. Ibid.. p.172. Tass Report, March 10, 1931.
109# Ibid., pps. 246-248. Agreement between the USSR and Representatives of 
German Industrialists, April 14, 1931#
110. Xsvestiia. April 21, 1931#
for a time threatened the consolidation and development of Soviet-German
relations," welcomed the visit of the German industrealists as evidence of
German appreciation of Soviet-German economic collahoration#
The basic ingredient of German foreign policy in relation to the 
USSR has of late been one of friendly collaboration and of the 
further consolidation of relations vfhloh have come successfully 
through a number of A # # s  in the last nine years and which, we 
are deeply convinced, can and should be developed further to the 
mutual advantage of both countries and In the Interests of general 
peace* 1&1*
Xsvestiia, commenting on this speech, said that already a few d^s later 
"it is possible to state a strengthening of the favourable factors in the 
mutual relations between the USSR and Geraaiy*." But there was a warning note 
in the question posed; "can this change be considered accidental or is there 
reason to consider it a genuine strengthening of the base on which the mutual 
relations between the USSR and Germany can be built?" * Only the passing 
of time would answer.
Collaboration took place between the two states in relation to their 
common distrust of Brland's Pan Rurope Scheme and, as we have seen above, 
Germany in fact supported Soviet inclusion in the discussions on this scheme. 
The disarmament talks at Geneva provided another forum of common action* On 
March 23,1931, Dirksen informed Litvinov that his Government had agreed to 
prolong unchanged the Treaty of Berlin, though there was a difference of 
opinion on its length of duration, the German Government desiring an unspec­
ified span with the right of abrogation after six or twenty months* The 
Russians preferred each side to have the right of denouncing the pact with 
one years notice but only after five years. They were anxious to sign this
114.
prolongation protocol, however, and to this effect Litvinov informed Khinohuk 
that if the Germans rejected this proposal Moscow would be vdlling to reduce
îïir'Report'’of '''ihe' sov^  ^ Sixth 'G6ngi%ss"of''8 March 8,
1931* DVP Vol.14. p.131*
112. Xsveatlia. March 13, 1931*
113. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the Soviet 
Ambassador in Germany,Khinohuk,March 23.1951.DVP Vol.14. p.218.
114. Appointed Soviet Ambassador to Gexmany in December 1930, a post which he 
held until 1934* Replaced Krestinsky who was promoted to Deputy Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs when Litvinov became Commissar.
the period from five to three years and in the extreme event, to accept the 
German proposal
This Soviet anxiety to secure agreement was stimulated hy fears concerning 
a possible rapprochement between Germany and France, especially on the basis of 
common anti-dumping measures against the USSR. French feelers were extended to 
Berlin throughout 19)0 and early 1931 on this theme. In February 1931 the 
French Ambassador in Germany confessed French anxiety at the improvement in 
Soviet-German relations and admitted that "at present France feared the dangers 
of Germany going-together with Russia despite the opposition to such a policy 
that was being raised in Germany i t s e l f . T h e  Russian perspective was 
somewhat different; Xsvestiia stated that "the supporters of a western orient­
ation (in Germany) still have not lost hope of achieving important German aims,
117.
including the problem of the (Polish) corridor, with French and English help."
A month later the same paper contained n report on the secret journey of German
a. rhc(c
political leaders to Paris and a third -v&ieh^spoke of preparations for a German-
118
French bloc against the USSR. * Pravda, in a long article, discussed the plans
of world imperialism for such an anti-Soviet intervention:
Part of the German bourgeoisie and social democracy has been tirelessly 
conducting work for a rapprochement of bourgeois Germany with French 
imperialism and Polish fascism which represents the most important link 
in the preparation of an anti-Soviet war, for only the friendly neutr­
ality of Germany (if it does not succeed in achieving direct assistance) 
will give Polish fascism the possibility of flinging all its amy at 
the Ukraine and Belorussia without worrying about its rear.
The Soviet Union* s confidence in German friendship had been shaken by the 
events of 1930 which the partial improvement towards the end of that year could 
not entirely compensate for. The growing instability within Germany increased 
Russian concern about the future direction of German policy. Two German tend­
encies in relation to the USSR were discerned in Moscow, one favouring
113. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the Soviet 
Ambassador in Germany,Khinohuk, March 23,1931* DVP Vol.14. p.222.
116. Unpublished German Foreign Policy Documents. Quoted Dyck, Weimar Germany 
and Soviet Russia, p.213.
117# Xsvestiia. Januoiy 6, 1931.
118. Izvestila. Februaiy 26, March 2, 1931*
119. Pravda. April 12, 1931.
anti-Soviet Intervention and the other favouring the preservation of 
120.
normal relations. * How could the Russian leadership construct # solid 
foreign policy on such an unstable foundation? The fear of. German connivance 
at Polish aggressive moves against them was always a matter of great oonoem 
to Moscow- Dirksen, in April 1931, reported to his Foreign Ministiy that 
Moscow saw France as a stable power with definite goals whilst Germany and 
Italy were increasingly becoming /changeable and unpredictable factors in the 
great European balance*" Was it not a wise policy to insure against 
future changes by improving relations with France. The i#ortant point is that 
the decision to begin negotiations for a non-aggression pact with France was 
not merely a negative acceptance of the French willingness to negotiate. Such 
a pact with France could not but further weaken Soviet-German relations, yet 
the Soviet leaders were prepared to jeopardise these relations because they 
realised that to rely m  Germany alone was to buiy their heads in the sand. 
Russia certainly desired to maintain good relations with that state, but was 
not prepared to seek this at the cost of rejecting French overtures* The world 
environment created by the economic crisis had increased instability; state 
leaders were compelled to re-examine their foreign policies in the light of 
the new oonditions. France, the major threat to the Soviet state since 1917, 
was now ready to negotiate a non-aggression pact. This opportunity could not 
be missed. A cautious rapprochement with the west could only strengthen 
Russia's international position and if handled well, any damage to the Soviet- 
German partnership might be reduced to a minimum.
Yet this was not the first occasion on which Franco-Soviet negotiations 
had begun; what would be their eventual outcome?
120.’' L.Ga&gorev 'md S.Olenev. Dorba SSSR ga Z r  i begopasnost v Eu^pe 
1925-1955 (Moaeow 1956), p.U4.
121. Report by the German Ambassador in the USSR, Dirksen, to the Foreign 
Ministry,Aprü 13,1931» German archives quoted in lyck, Weimar Germany 
and Soviet Russia, p.23-*
Chmtef 3:.. Th* Dual Coursg.
During the summer of 1931 the key factor in Soviet diplomacy was the 
duality of its course# The new prospect of improved relations with the do»- 
inemt continental European power. Franco, was exploited In negotiations for 
a non-aggression pact and a temporary trade agreement# Simultaneously the 
recent improvement of relations between the USSR and the German Republic 
provided Moscow with an opportunity to bolster its crumbling Rapallo partner^ 
ship# The successful pursuit of these two diplomatic lines would further en­
hance the security of the Russian state, thereby fulfilling the major object­
ive of Soviet foreign policy# Unfortunately, neither course was free from 
doubt and tlie chances of success problematical: could the French negotiations 
be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, given the history of antipathy and 
the record of failure between France and Soviet Russia; could the recent im­
provement in relations with Germany be maintained and even deepened in the 
face of powerful opposition from the German pro-western camp vdiioh saw a red­
uction of its state's commitments to Russia as the key to the further essent­
ial German absorption into the west European "community?" Further, were these 
twin heads of Soviet diplomacy compatible or were they in reality not merely 
dual but contradictoiy? Any contradiction in Soviet foreign policy during 
this summer arose not from the Soviet objectives v/hioh were to extend relat­
ions with as many capitalist states as possible, an integrated programme# To 
maintain the long-standing relationship with Germany whilst developing a new 
one with France was, in Soviet eyes, two aspects of the one policy# The dual 
and possibly contradictory character of the policy arose because of the
external factor of Franco-German rivalry which of necessity complicated Russia's
1#
attempt to promote good relations with them both# * Specifically^ would
1 r'M'So%h'MstOfic  parSlels ^ 'SvSd Gerawny ‘ was
placed in a similar position to the USSR in the nineteenth century when 
Bismaà attempted to maintain good relations with the rival Russian and 
Austro-Hungarian empires, an attempt which was eventually abandonned in  
favour of a dual alliance with the latter#
75.
/o#
progreia in PamW îniader Bpvlet-Geman relatloas? Givm the deterioration 
the Rapallo partnerAip, deepite a pertWL reeeir«*y et the oloee of 1930,
«ad the opportunities whioh improved relation» with Franoe would afford the 
USSBj Soviet diplomacy chose to- gwmhle,. at the same time seeking to miniiâise 
the odd» on Germany*'» aliénation by a oautiout approaoh to both states#
1. '#K$ Prolongation of the Berlin Treaty*
The particular need for Soviet diplomatie activity in Berlin in the % n o g  
and summer of 1951 arose as a result of the expiration on June 29,1951»of the
g
Berlin tre-aty# ' Aeoordlng to it# provision». It would operate for five year» 
and "both eontraoting parties would agree between themselves the future of 
their political relation» in good time before the expiration of this period*"^ * 
In March, Bidceen had informed the soviet Government that Genmny had agreed 
to prolong the treaty and the Buatlaas w&m anxious to finnll»# this step a# 
quickly as possible,^*
The Soviet Government was ready to renew the existing treaty or negotiate 
a stronger one, depending on German proferenoes, #n indioation that Moscow 
desired to continue in earnest the Rapallo line. Birknon informed Litvinov 
that the German Government had not yet examined the question In detail but he 
thought that It would prefer a simple renewal.^* the German reasons for the 
eontinuatlom of the Rapallo policy were well-stated by Ourtius, the Foreign 
Minister, to Dirksen Ina longthT policy directive quoted from the German 
archive# by Dyck# The diplomatie and trade advantages from the Russian link 
were stressed, "eapwiclly &t the present moment of tensions with France and 
the disappointment of our Loeamo hopes, the policy of the Rapallo treaty and 
the Berlin treaty is a oompelling foreign policy necessity," Germany must 
omtlnue to balance between east and west; no advantage wm# likely to be 
2* See Chapter 1# p»10#
5* treaty of Bon-j%grc»alm end Neutrality between the UB8E and Germany,
Apr# 24,1926* thus unlike the later soviet pacts it contained no provision 
for nutomatlo extension If neither party denounced It.fflP yol*9^pos.2S0-252»
4, See chapter 2, pps# f3-73«
5, Dirksen to the Germm Foreign Ministiy, February 6,1951* German Document», 
quoted in %ck, Weia^r ^Gcj^ any. ,and Soviet .Russia. p#229*
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elicited from the weat in retuxn for the abandonment of relations with the
TJBSR* The main stress in the directive, however, was on the need to renew the
Berlin treaty in order to prolong the Russian ^mtl-Polish attitude;
At a time when the German-Polish relationship is more strained than 
it has been for a long time, we have a twofold reason not to give up 
our relationship with Russia; Russia f@mms the natural counterweight 
against Poland, and Russia would be in a position to veer towards a 
pro-Polish course if she were not tied to us politically.6.
The object of recovering the territory lost to Poland by the Versailles treaty
remained paramount for German foreign policy and therefore the need for an anti-
Polish Russia. Despite the crumbling of Soviet-German relations this Polish
card remained Moscow's aoe in its dealings with Berlin.^*
From the Russian angle, only advantages could be reaped from the renewal
of the treaty. It would not weaken the hand of the Soviet negotiatW^a in Paris,
the problem there being the legacy of anti-Soviet feeling in Franco rather than
the existence of the Rapallo partnership. In fact, a strengthened Russian-
German relationship might increase the Soviet bargaining position; an isolated
state normally finds it more difficult to secure a friend in the international
system than does a state with a ready-made diplomatic standing in that system.
Trade and military advantages continued to accrue to Russia as an additional
incentive to maintain links with Berlin. Germany was no longer so reliable an
associate nor the only possible contender for this position amongst the great
powers but Moscow had little to lose and still something to gain by preventing
the demise of the long-standing partnership. Whether the dual diplomatic
course could be successfully maintained remained to be seen but that the attempt
should be made never seems to have been in rdal question,
Negotiations for the renewal of the Berlin treaty began between the two
states on March 24 and a Prolongation protocol was signed in Moscow on June
24, 1931. The 1926 treaty was extmded indefinitely but each of the
 —         -------------------------------------- ---------------, •■JV -------------- --------------- ------------------------------------------------------- - ---------------------- -  
6. Curtius to Dirksen, March 16,1931* German Embassy in the Soviet Union 
files, quoted in Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, pps. 252-233*
7. This fact throws into shapp relief the real change in Soviet foreign policy 
which the negotiation of a non-aggression pact with Poland, if not Prance, 
brought about. See Chapter 4*
contracting parties had the right at m y time hut not before June 30^ . 1933
8with notice of one year, to denounce it. * In other words, the treaty had a 
minimum life of three years, a compromise between the Soviet desire for a 
minimum period of six years, the German for six months.^* The Russians were 
anxious to receive a guarmitee of Germany's intensions at a time of ever- 
increasing fluctuations in its internal policy which could well have reperc­
ussions on foreign policy. Germany preferred a flexible arrangement "because 
we must he in a position to break off this relationship when the tendencies in 
Russia directed toward world revolution become more active or when the danger- 
ou» strengthening of our own revolutionary energies force us to take counter- 
measures.
lavestiia greeted the renewal with enthusiasms
In the signing of the protocol both governments expressed their 
intention by means of the prolonging of the treaty to continue the 
friendly relations which exist between the USSR and Germany, to 
promote the further development of mutual collaboration which answers 
the interests of both countries and simultaneously to promote the 
strengthening of general peaoe.^^*
The following day an editorial in the same paper spoke in even more glowing
terms of the protocols
This is a great political event which has enormous significance for 
both countries...The renewal of the Berlin treaty is proof that the 
sensible elements of German capitalism understood the unflinching and 
growing strength of the Soviet Uhion.. .This treaty strengthens the 
position of the Soviet Union in Its struggle for peace. It also 
strengthens Germany's position in Its struggle against thosegrlevous 
consequences of war which prevent the German people f m m  developing 
their technical, economic and cultural possibilities.^^*
The signature of the protocol was the result of a struggle within Gemany bet­
ween the "easterners" and the "westerners",in which the latter claimed Germany's 
links with the USSR hindered its acceptance by the western powers. The false­
ness of this thesis was proved by the western reaction, to the Austro-German
'0%''''pî%"t666î'''for 'piSlongation' of the 'Ï926’%eat^ betwe^ ''the''u^ ^
Germany, June 24,19)1* B W  Vol.14. pps.395-596.
9. See chapter 2, pps. 72-73•
10.Curtius to Dirksen, March 16,1931 .German Embassy in the Soviet Union 
files; quoted in Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia. pp».235-236.
ll.lBvestiia, June 25, 1931*
12.Ibid.. June 26,1951*
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customs union and the scenes at the European committee.Taken together
with the growing economic and political strength of the USSR, the German 
bourgeoisie realised that their best interest was served by the prolongation 
of the treaty* Such was Pravda* s editorial comment v;hich arrived at the con­
clusion that this was "a success for the peace policy of the Soviet Govern­
ment."^^*
From the German side, the official paper "Deutsche Diplomatiaoh 
Politische Korrespoiiden»" interpreted the protocol as signifying "the contin­
uation in a completely unchanged way of German policy in relation to the USSR,
that is the retention of all the political and economic relations with the
15
Soviet Union in the spirit of the previous years.
This enthusiastic reception for the protocol given by the Soviet press 
seemed to mark the restoration of Soviet-German relations to their high-water 
mark of the early twenties. Yet one wonders if the Soviet foreign ministry 
genuinely shared this exhileration* It is true that the renewal again demon­
strated that Germany still needed the Soviet card in its diplomatic equipment, 
but could this signature really halt the decline in the Rapallo partnership 
which must have been so apparent to the masters of Soviet policy. A glance 
into the future would show only too well that the protocol in fact marked the 
end of the brief phriod of improvement in Soviet-German relations and heralded 
the opening of a deterioration that would not stop with the demise of the 
Weimar Republic. Only the historian^ con claim the advantages of such hind­
sight in assessing any situation but even without this aid Soviet diplomacy 
mid-way through 19)1 must have been relieved that it had more than the German 
string to its bow. In Paris other negotiations were being conducted.
2. The initialling of the Franco-Soviet non-aggro a sion pact.
A new phase in Soviet Russia's relations with western Europe was initiat­
ed in April 19)1 when the long-standing distrust which had permeated Franco-
13. See below.
14* Pravda. June 26, 19)1*
15. Quoted in Izvestiia. July 1, 1931.
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Soviet relations for ao long was fractured by the agreement to commence
negotiations for a non-aggression pact and temporary trade agreement# Yet
this transformation only contained the potential for a new direction in
Soviet foreign policy# Important as was the decision to begin negotiations,
of far more consequence was their successful conclusion or otherwise and the
effect which the signature of these agreements would have on France and its
east-European allies#
The Russian Government was eager to consolidate its diplomatic achieve-
16
ments and sewure a French signature at the earliest possible date# *In this
hope it was to be disappointed; the French Government saw no cause for haste.
A recent Soviet author has noted the occurrence of a reappraisal by the Quai
d'Orsiy of its foreign policy; "the French initiative (to open negotiations)
was clear evidence that the anti-Soviet policy was bankrupt and that the
Soviet Union was recognised as a great industrial power with a strong defence 
lY
gystem." There is much truth in this comment but nevertheless France could 
not ignore its domestic opposition to the development of relations with the 
USSR any more than it could forget its alliance system with the countries on 
the eastern border of Germany and their anti-Soviet sentiments# The path to­
wards a reconciliation of the dominant continental state and the communist 
giant in the east would neither be short nor easy.
Diplomatic manoeuverlng by the end of April on the part of French and 
Soviet representatives had reached the stage of agreement to begin simultan­
eous negotiations for a pact with conciliation procedure and a trade agree- 
18
ment. * This was confirmed in a memorandum from the Soviet to the French
Government handed by Dovgalevsky to Berthelot on May 1,19)1# Further, the
Russians stated that the decrees which were restricting trade between the two
states should be annuled after the opening two or three meetings devoted to
l^r^Refer^oe was made for ' the sepataBon'''of
the non-aggression pact from the trade agreement negotiations in order that 
the former should not be delayed#
17# Y#Borisov "USSR-Franoeî 45 years of Diplomatic Relations," mtemational 
Affairs (Moscow) N.IO. 1969» p.75#
18. See chapter 2, ppi .  $"s~'S'c.
the negotiation of the pact, a oomproiaise agreed upon by both parties.
Following this annulment, the Soviet Government agreed to hold negotiations 
with the representatives of French industrial and governmental circles relat­
ive to orders and credits similar to those held with Germany* Lastly, it agreed 
to enter into negotiations for a trade pact and the discussion of the question 
of loans following the conclusion of the non-aggression pact and the temporary 
trade agreement#^^*
Berthelot was unfavourable to the suggestion that the exact number of
meetings after which the decrees would be annulfed should be rigidly fixed.
 ^ n
After some discussion he finally agreed to the Soviet proposal that the anul-«
ment take place after the second or third meeting but of the temporary trade
agreement and not the non-aggression pact negotiations, to which Litvinov 
20
agreed on May 3* The Soviets wore adamant tiiat the decrees must be annuied 
at an early date in the negotiations and on this point overcame French oppos­
ition which favoured postponing this step until the signature of the trade 
agreement.
The French diplomat also thought it necessary to begin and end the 
negotiations on the question of the trade agreement and the agreement on orders 
simultaneously* His reasoning was that the final trade agreement should deal 
with Soviet exports to and imports from France and therefore the agreement on 
orders must be a natural supplement to the trade agreement which would have as 
its result the facilitation of Soviet exports to France* Dovgalevsky strenuous­
ly opposed this interpretation and especially the view that the agreement would
21.
provide one-sided advantages to the USSR alone.
At the meeting of Msy 1, Dovgalevslsy presented Berthelot with a Soviet 
project for a non-aggression pact. According to this scheme, each of the con­
tracting parties was to refrain from aiy attack on the territory of the
19. Memorendcua'from the'Soviet to & e 'Fz^nch'’Goveznment,' May 1,1931." ' " ’...
DVP Vol.14. pps* 298-299#
20. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Franoe,Dovgalevsky,to the Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs, Mey 1, 1931# Ibid»., pps.299-300
21* Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky, to the Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, May 3,1951# Ibid.. p.507#
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other, {Article l) Each contracting party was not to undertake any hostile acts 
directed against the other and not to participate in such acts if undertaken ty 
a third power or powers nor to encourage any third power(s) to undertake such 
acts, (Article 2), Neither party was to participate in any agreement of an econ­
omic character having the aim of inflicting a blow on the other (Article 3) nor 
to allow on its territory the existence and activity of military organisations 
having the aim of the preparation of an attack on the other, or a group or 
individual illegally acting as an official representative for the people on 
territory of the contracting pariy. (Article 4), These last two articles 
obviously reflected Soviet concern at the French anti-dumping campaign and the 
activities of white-guardist groups in that country. The settlement of disagr­
eements which might arise between the two contracting parties must be settled 
only by peaceful means and for this purpose a convention on conciliation proc­
edure would be concluded,(Article g). Each party would have the right to den­
ounce the pact after five years, one year's notice being required,(Article 6)1^* 
This was a very comprehensive project and included all the major points 
of concern to the Soviet Uaion, Berthelot *s initial reaction was to inform 
Dovgalevsky that Briand wanted the non-connection of the pact with each of 
the contracting parties' earlier-condluded pacts with third countries incorp-
ox
orated into the non-aggression pact, France could not forget its other
treaties which could forseeably clash with a Soviet pact.
Dovgalevalty, the chief Soviet diplomat involved in the complex wranglings
with the French representatives, was far from confident about the passage
which the negotiation would encounter:
As concerns the forthcoming negotiations I am under no illusion on 
their account: they will be very difficult even if the French Govern­
ment also sincerely desires to reach a favourable completion. The
22, Soviet pro ject ' pat^ ' lof non-aggression 'and between the USSR and
France. DVP Vol,14, p,794, Note 105,
25, Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevaky, to the Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, Mey 3»1931# Ibid,, pps, 307-308*
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French will oscillate all the time*^^*
He expected that the French would find the project pact unacceptable, 
especially the articles on economic aggression, white guard!st military 
organisations and the Georgian missio#,^^* The French Government would simply 
reject them on the grounds that they were not directly related to the object 
of the negotiations, which it would restrict to the elimination of the danger 
of a military collision, a "simplified edition of the Kellogg Pact," as Dovgal­
evsky expressed it#
This pessimistic picture, if transposed into reality by French intransig­
ence, would somewhat reduce the advantages apertaining from the pact to the 
Soviet side but would leave intact the main articles relating to the obligat­
ions of each party to refrain from any attack on the other's territory or to
participate in such acts# In fact, the future of the negotiations would prove
Dovgalevsky unduly pessimistic on this aspect of the French reaction to them#
If his expectations of the non-aggression pact negotiations were low, 
Dovgalevslsy saw little to raise hi a hopes as regards the economic aspect of 
the transactions# In Briand*a idea that the trade agreement must contain 
nothing of a general nature but only concrete points directed to the regulat­
ion and development of Franco-Soviet trade, specifically Soviet imports from 
France, he saw the negotiations as promising Russia "little comfort." In his 
view, "the French are thinking of the agreement only in so far as it looks at 
the development of their exports to the ÎISSR and the reduction of trade 
passivity to a minimum? "Dovgalevsky thought that the negotiations on orders 
and credits would also be a far from easy task. These difficulties, in his 
view, would only be increased by the position of Laval, the French prime 
minister, who although seeking to build a bridge between the right and the 
left, was severely restricted in his freedom of manoeuvre by his dependence
24# Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, May 3*1951 • DVP Vol. 14. p. 308.
25. The reference to a group illegally acting as an official representative 
for the people or territory of one of the contracting parties (Article 4) 
in the Soviet project had in mind specifically the Georgian mission in
France.
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on the right majority* "
This pessimism was at least justified as regards doubts qonoeming a
French desire to reach a quick and simple agreement* May slipped away vfith
very little advancement of the negotiations* In conversation with Litvinov,
Briand did speak of his constant aspiration to establish good relations with
the Soviet Union and his hopes that the non-aggression pact would not meet
any difficulties, but he had not yet studied the Soviet project pact and was
27
about to relinquish his cabinet post* * Despite Harriot's comments in the
French press that "the present moment is a sufficiently favourable time to
advance an acceptable'modus vivendi^ * again to bring into life a non-aggression
pact*.*to advance the question of the regulo,tion of economic difficulties and
28
in this perspective***the regulation of loans," * little tangible progress 
was in fact being made*
The delay was a product of the French rather than the Soviet side* On 
June 1, Dovgalevsky reported to the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Krestinsky, that "for the last ten days there has been no movement of the 
water in the negotiations with France*" Thus far» no official invitation had 
been received concerning the meeting of experts on the temporary trade agree­
ment, though Dovgalevsky thought that such an invitation could be imminent* 
This letter sheds light on Soviet tactics as regarda the non-aggression pact 
negotiations which also were still not underway* Dovgalevsky recommended that 
the Russians on the one hand must bo ready* to begin them at m y moment, but 
on the other hand must not show themselves to be in a greater hurry than the 
French, so as not to weaken their bargaining positions "we must*.*show the 
French that we are by no means in a feverish rush and that the establishment 
of good relations is as much in the French interest as in ours." Dovgalevsky
% ' Letter ’from'the in Fr^ce^ D to the ^
for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, May 3,1931* DVP Vq1*14* pps*308-309*
27* Report on conversation of Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, with 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Briand, May 22,1931* Ibid**
pps*350-351.
28. Quoted in Pravda* M%r 8, 1931*
Introduced one disconcerting element into the situation for the Soviet 
Goveiwaent when he reported information reoeived from a "oompletoly trust­
worthy sou3?ce’* that Briand had told another French deputy that work on the 
political agreement had been delayed because the French Government wanted to
attract Poland to it, proposing an agreement between France and Poland on the
29one side, Russia on the other#
The inclusion of Poland in a multilateral agreement had been the veiy 
cause of the breakdown of the non-aggression pact negotiations between France 
and the USSR in 1927-1928#^^* In the preliminary negotiations between Dovgal- 
evakv and Berthelot only a bilateral Franco-Soviet pact had been mentioned*
y
If this, new information were true, it might damage ireperably any future
prospects for the negotiations#
Despite this somewhat alarming note, the situation at the beginning of
June 1931 took a more favourable turn* On June 4, a delegation of Soviet
51economic experts headed by Dvoylatshy arrived in Paris and the following
day negotiations began with officials from the French ministries of commerce,
52 33*agriculture and foreign affairs, idiich were of a proliminaiy character.
Political negotiations for a non-aggression pact between Dovgalevsky and
Berthelot presumably began at around the same time*^*
On June 15, the political negotiations advanced whan Berthelot handed .
project
Dovgalevsky the French text of a non-aggression pact in answer to the Soviet
of May 1* Its first article was similar to the first two articles of the Soviet
pmject in its obligation not to resort to war or to undertake either in
29* Letter ’from the’’s6%et'Ambassade in 'Frmoe7''Do^sSS 'to the DepuV
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Krestinsky, June 1*1931*DVP Vol*14*
pps* 358-360.
30. The Soviet refusal to countenance multilateral non-aggression pacts has 
been examined in chapter 1*
31* Deputy Commissar for foreign trade.
32* Scott, Alliance Against Hitler.p.ll*
33. Havas Agmoy %F%nch) report ; quoted in Pravda. June 7, 1931*
34* The political negotiations probably began shortly after the economic
negotiations* Krestinsky told the German Charge d*Affaires in Moscow that 
trade negotiations had begun on June 5 but that talks on the pact still 
had not opened* Note of a conversation between the Deputy Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, Krestinsky, and the German Charge d*Affaires in Moscow, 
Tvardovsky, June 3, 1931* D W  Vol.14. p*368.
isolation or in omrneotion with o##r power# m y  aggroasion iii iwy ovoat, 
thou# it (witted the Soviet phrase oonoom## the obligation not to oacowrsg© 
any third power* to undsrtake such sots and more olossly defined frmoh territ­
ory ss inoluding its oolmias, protectorates and territories imder French 
emdate* It added the i#ortmt proviso that if one of the contracting parties 
resorted to *a* of cosmitted acts of aggression agaiast any third power, the 
o#er contracting par%r would be released frm the obligations of the present 
pact and would again receive collate freedom of action within fhe limits of 
intemational law and in partlo%&ar- the pacts in #ioh it participated# Obviou* 
sly France had in mind a Soviet attack on one or wore of its east Burkean 
allies in Which case Fmnoe would be pemltted to Mlfll it# trea^ obligat­
ions toward# them and if necessaiy be free to act against Russia# The Soviet 
third, article on eomomio agression had no c^terpart in the French teaet, 
iherea# # «  Soviet project in article 4 contained the obligation not to allow 
on the territory of either pariy military organisation# having the aim of the 
preparation of an attack on the other, the french seomd article bound both 
parties not to encourage and in any event to suppress any agitation vhioh 
comiBg from the territory of one of them would be aimed at the forceful change 
of the political mû  social regis# of # e  other, including, as far a# France 
was concerned, the regime of Its ocdonies, protectorates and mandated territ­
ories# France, not having argr interest In such military organisation# on 
Soviet territory as the white-guardist groups wWLoh operated on french soü 
and so worried the Russian», iWoured a restriction m  agitation obviously 
directed against # #  activities of the Oomlntem* Under this article ihe 
Soviet Government would be called u p m  to suppress any calls for revolution 
emanating from the Gomintem. headquarter# in Moscow and directed at the 
french oowmmist parly# Like the Soviet project, the french third article 
proposed the settlement of diaputes by peaceful mean# and to this end favour­
ed a conciliation procedure# Finally the ïkench agreed with the Russian# on 
the dumtiw of the pact - five years#
o r*
The actual text of the non-aggreaslon pact was supplemented hy a proto­
col In Tdiich the French added that "each of the contracting parties retains 
complote freedom of action in the region of its relations with third powers," 
so long as the undertakings of the present pact and the League Charter were 
not infringed.Again, they were anxious to impress on both the USSR and 
other Interested states that the eventual signature of a Franco-Soviet pact 
would not decisively change previous French commitments.
Tills formulation hy both parties of project paota was an important step 
towards the final conclusion of the negotiations. The projects were not ident­
ical, indeed the above outline of their contents has revealed a considerable 
divergence of alms, each state including in its text the points which were of 
most concern to itself. Nevertheless, a basis for further negotiation had now 
been laid dmm and at least there was common ground on the fundamental aim of 
a non-aggression pact - the undertaking by each partyto refrain from attack on 
the territoiy of the other.
Negotiation on the major area of divergence between the two texts, that 
of neutrality, began on July 1 when Dovgalevsky handed Berthelot a new Soviet 
draft on this article. It accepted the French thesis relating to the right of 
either party to terminate the pact immediately if the other party attacked a 
third power but added a provision that "if one of the contracting parties, 
despite its peace-loving actions, is subjected to attack by a third power or 
powers, the other contracting party \7ill observe neutrality during the course 
of the whole c o n f l i c t . T h e  adoption of this article would leave France free
to aid its allies If the Soviet Uhion attacked them but bound it to neutrality
37
in the fase of , for example, a Polisîi attack on the USSR. * The difficult
35r.Frmoh a non-ag^ression^oactT'^bno'1
pps. 802-803Note 136.
36. Soviet article on neutrality handed by the Soviet Ambassador in France, 
BovgaXevsïgr, to Berthelot, the Seoretaiy General of the French Miniatiy 
of Foreign Affairs, July 1,1931. BVP Vol.14. p.803. Note 137.
37. The point that a non-aggression pact would prevent France from interven­
ing if Poland attacked Russia was made by Litvinov in conversation with 
the British Ambassador in Moscow. The British Ambassador in Moscow, Ovey 
to Henderson, Foreign Secretary, July 28,1931* DBFP Vol.7. p.217*
oo*
problem of defining the aggressor was left unresolved*
Meanwhile, negotiations on the trade agreement were progressing satis­
factorily. Briand informed Dovgalevsjky on July 10, that jja the French Govern­
ment's opinion they were sufficiently advanced to permit the opening of 
parallel negotiations on the question of the placing of orders by both states. 
Since the Russians made this step conditional on the abrogation of the French 
restrictive decrees, Briand proposed a simultaneous mutual abrogation of both
the French and Soviet d e c r e e I n  reply, the Soviet Government confirmed its
39.
readiness to tolm this measure and to begin negotiations on orders and credits. 
The abrogations by both states took place on July 15 thereby removing a consid­
erable obstacle in the path of a Franco-Soviet rapprochement.^^*
How the ground was cleared and the experts of both delegations could 
begin in earnest the tasic of expanding trade between their two countries. The 
Frenoh side offered, lower customs duties on Soviet goods on condition that 
Soviet orders were greatly increased.^* From the Russian side, the problem of 
expanding orders was intimately linked with the granting of credits by France 
which would enable Russia to purchase the large quantities of goods it required 
for the successful fulfilment of its five-year plan. In turn, this raised the 
old problem of the Russian debt to French creditors. In August, during a con­
versation with Litvinov, the French Charge d'Affaires in Moscow expressed the 
opinion that it would be impossible for the French Government to give the USSR 
credits without the regulation of the debt problem, especially in view of the 
proximity of the French parliamentary elections. French public opinion would 
not tolerate such a concession by its government. Litvinov, in reply, oatagor- 
ically stated that if this was the case then there was no point in beginning 
negotiations On Orders; the French Government knew that without credits there
3&r'%'ote 'frôm'’Bria0!%'’t % e % m o ^  ' tfee '
Ambassador in Frmoe,Dovgalevslgr, July 10,1931# DVR Ÿol.14. p*428. For 
the history of the French and Soviet decrees see chapter 2.
39* Hot# from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Briand, July 15,19)1* SMÀ»* P*427*
40. Pravda. July 17,1931. Isveatiia. July 17,1951.
oould be no talk of the development of trade and that the question of debts 
must be excluded from the present negotiations»*^^* Here was a seeain^y im­
penetrable obstacle to any worthwhile settlement of Franco-Soviet economic
relations* Without credits the Soviet Government could not increase its orders; 
settlement
without a debt «ettiÉement the French Government would not provide credits and 
French Industry ooitld not give credit without government assistance* The French 
Minister of Commerce on two occasions stated the refusal of the Government to 
consider the granting of state-guaranteed credits until the debt question had 
been resolved
The economic negotiations were broken off in practice in September 1931^*
The Soviets blamed the French for this result, accusing them of delaying the
proceedings, of refusing to grant government credits and introducing the
question of the, Tsarist debt and of at least tacitly condoning onti-Uoviet
propaganda in thé French press aimed at wrecking m y  eoonomio collaboration^ *
Dovgalevsky, referring to these negotiations, told Berthelot "in plain terms
that I consider the direction given to these negotiations from the beginning
false and dangerous for their successful outcome*"^* Both sides desired a
settlement yet the oredit-debt problem proved too great an obstacle* The legacy
of history was not on the negotiators' side* On October 16 the Director of the
Trade Department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs told MezhXauk, the
Soviet representative at the negotiations on orders and credits, that it was
extremely important to end the negotiations successfully as soon as possible
because of a hostile French press campaign and problems in parliament. He
re-stated, however, the French position that credits could not be given before
42 r '5onversatim%Wwe0ii the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, and the 
French Charge d*Affaires in Moscow, Payait August 22.1931,:^ yp ^ ^1 *14#D#482. 
43# Semi-official communique in Le Temps, October 1,1931; Statement by M.Hellin 
Debats November 24,1931, Quoted in Scott, Allimce.. ^gainst. Hitler,P.13.
44* Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in France to the French 'Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, December 22,1931# SgJ^bSà* P-734#
45, Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in France to the French Ministiy of 
• Foreign Affairs, December 22,1931# SâSk» 730-734*
46. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevslg, to the NKD, 
September 23,1931. p,336.
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the regulation of the debt question*^^*
Almost a month later Dovgalevsky was complaining that the negotiations 
on the trade agreement had not moved forward because of their co-ordination 
with the negotiations on orders. Such a connection of the two questions, 
whilst logical in that they were inter-related, was not to Soviet liking*
As Dovgalevsky pointed out, the April proposal of the French Government stated 
that although the negotiations on various objectives would begin simultaneous­
ly, a junction between them would not be established* He also expressed dis­
satisfaction at the position adopted hy France on the credits i s s u e O n  
September 26, the Vice President of the French Senate was quoted as stating 
that "in relation to the USSR we must establish an economic modus vivendi 
#)ich excludes any kind of hostile operation against the regime which the 
Russian people created for i t s e l f * T h e  restrictive decrees had been abrog­
ated and this was at least a step in the right direction* Yet overall the neg­
otiations could only be labelled a failure; the aim of establishing a temporary 
trade agreement had not been accomplished* The weight of historical distrust 
and the hostility of powerful sections of French society to the strengthening 
of the Bolshevik Russian economy proved too strong for the diplomatic efforts* 
To return to the political negotiations on a non-aggression pact, the 
article concerning neutrality remained at the centre of dispute and to its 
resolution was being concentrated the diplomatic activity of both parties* In 
answer to the Soviet text given to the French on July 1,^^ the French negot- 
iatofs'on July 16 pro;^osed the following formula;
If one of the {contracting parties, despite its peace-loving actions, 
is subjected t|o attack by a third power or several #ird powers, then 
the otber contracting party is bound not to render direct or indirect 
help and support to the attacker during the conflict*
If one of the contracting parties itself resorts to an attack on a 
third power or if it threatens ty forcible and constant violation the
47* Conversation between Soviet represntative at negotiations with France on 
orders and credits, Meahlauk, and %he Director of the Trade Department of 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Coulondre,October 16,19)1*
DVP Vcl*14. p*573
48* Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the NKD 
November 13,1931* Ibid*. p*825* Note 233#
49* Quoted in Izvestiia. September 29, 1931*
50* See above, #7.
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political independence or territorial integrity of any third power, 
the other contracting party can deaounoo the treaty without notice,^^*
This article differed from the Soviet formula in its second part* Vdiereas 
the Soviet project gave the right of termination without notice only when on© 
of the contracting parties itself resorted to an attack on any third state, 
tlie French formula included also threatening by forcible and constant violat­
ion of the political independence or territorial integrity of the third state* 
This section of the neutrality article was principally of benefit to France 
and was aimed at the possibility of Soviet aggression against its neighbours 
in eastern Europe. The Russians presumably objected to this new French defin­
ition in that It widened the category of action after which the non-aggression 
pact could be denounced* ?/hat was meant by a "forcible and constant violation 
of the political or territorial integrity?" To leave the interpretation open 
to the whim of the French Government would be to weaken the effect of the 
pact. On July 17, Dovgalevsky rejected this French proposal*^^* The French 
then proposed to accept the Boviat project on neutrality (July l) with the 
addition of a supplementary paragraph which defined the aggressive side. This 
definition included the participation of one of the contracting parties in any 
militaiy conflict which it refused to transfer to a peaceful examination in 
conformity with the Kellogg Pact and also the refusal to evacuate territoiy 
which its forces had penetrated.Krestinsky informed Dovgalevsky on July
jucfÿ men i-
19 that this proposal, referring to the Kellogg Pact and therefore the weurto
by
## the USA, a countiy with which the USSR had no diplomatic relations, was 
"completely unacceptable."^*
Despite these disagreements the negotiations were progressing satisfact- 
orlly. On August 5, Dovgalevaly discussed the pact with Berthelot. The
5ir''FrenS'?oS^ for a'lticl©''on'''neS3?ajït^
p.806. Note 145•
52* |bid.
53. Proposal of France for text of neutrality article, lbld».p.806.Note 145»
54. Telegram from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Krestinsky, to the 
Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky,July 19,1931» Ibid.. p.434
55. It should be noted that a new French Ambassador in Moscow was appointed
at the end of July, replacing Herbette who had always been strong opposed 
by the Russians, Pravda. August 1,1931. Dejean, the new Ambassador, arrived 
in Moscow on November 20.1931.Izvestiia.Nov*2l. 1931 *Bee-Gha#%e#*a.
9%, •
French and in particular Briand, according to Berthelot*e comments, oateg^ 
gorically opposed signing the non-aggression pact before the fate of the trade 
negotiations had been settled and insisted on the simultaneous signing of the 
pact and the agreement on conciliation procedure, for them an important aspect 
of the total agreement.^^* Dovgalevsky persistently opposed both these demands 
and in addition opposed the introduction of new changes into the articles of 
the pact. In this he had considerable success# Berthelot agreed that the pact 
would be initialled immediately on all its agreed articles and that article 5 
would read, "the agreement on conciliation procedure will be added to the 
present treaty." The pact would be initialled and signed separately from the 
agreement on conciliation procedure but the initialling would be accompanied 
ly an exchange of letters stating that the ratification of the pact would 
take place simultaneously with that of the conciliation agreement. This comp­
romise satisfied the Soviet desire for a rapid signature of the non-aggression 
57pact as well as the French insistance that it should only come into force 
as a part of a wider agreement including a conciliation procedure. Berthelot 
insisted that the eventual exchange of ratification instruments should take 
place in Paris.
By this time agreement had been reached between both countries on all 
the articles of the pact, save for article 2 referring to neutrality* The 
French stubbornly held to the July proposal in which the aggressor was defined 
with reference to the Kellogg Pact and a refusal to evacuate occupied territ­
ory.^^'
This last obstacle was quickly overcome in favour of the wording of the 
second article in both the French text of June 15 and the Soviet text of July
1. On August 10,1931, the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact was initialled in 
P a r i s . T h e  French asked that it be kept secret from the press to avoid any 
hostile campaign which would both place the French Government in a difficult
.-,^ r...........
57*. Ih which Russia was to be disappointed.
58. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in $'rance,Dovgalevsky,to the WED, 
August 5,1931. DVP Vol.14. pps.447^448.
59. Ibid.
60. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky, to the NKD, 
August 10, 1951. Ibid.. p.452.
position m d  threaten the aetual signature of the pact# Povgalevsky expressed
doubt at the possibillly of suooessfuily preserving such secrecy hut promised
6l
to consult his 9Upeïi.ors on this matter# * îhis French request is an indic­
ation of the lack of support v/lthin France for its new foreign policy venture 
and an ominous warning for the future course of Pranoo-Soviet negotiations#
The final text of the non'^ 'aggression pact was a mixture of the texts of 
both sides* Its basic provision was oonta*ined in the first article* an oblig­
ation by each party not to undertake aggression nor resort to war against the 
other* the fundamental ingredient of a Soviet non-aggression pact* France 
succeeded in defining its territory as including that for which it was the 
external representative and controller of the administration, that la, its 
colonies, etc#, and also in eliminating the phrase that each contracting party 
"will not encourage any third powers to undertake such aots"of aggression 
against the other party, #ich was included in the first Soviet draft of May 1# 
The protracted negotiations on the neutrality article were finally resol­
ved by accepting the Soviet text of duly 1* The French dropped their demand 
for a more exhaustive definition of aggression and the final second part of 
this article read "if one of the high contracting parties undertakes aggress­
ion against a third power the other high contracting party can without notice 
denounce the present treaty#" This was in fact a compromise agreement in order 
that the actual wording of the text could bo agreed upon by both sides* In a 
note from Briand to Dovgalevsky, the former stated that the French Government, 
in order to establish without ambiguity vhich of two powers was the aggressor 
and which the victim in any conflict, continued to hold firm on its position
thai the aggressor would be that state which refused to transfer the dispute
t
to one of the methods of peaceful settlement envisaged by the Kellogg Pact or
which refused to evacuate its forces from foreign occupied territory:
Confident that the above event will remain theoretical, none the less 
the French Government has considered for a long time that in order to 
avoid any dispute in the future, it must bring to the attention of the 
Soviet Government now the method which it maintains the right to use in 
such an event, this statement not pre-determining either the joining to 
it of the Government of the USSR or its selection in any case of such
'éié"îiVP'Voi.iù o. ".......
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a method*
In reply, the Soviet Ambassador noted Briand* s statement that the Soviet 
Government was not hound hy this French decision*
The resolution of the problem appertaining to the neutrality article is 
interesting in its illustration of the interplay between Soviet and French 
diplomacy, yet perhaps too much stress should not be laid on it. Ambiguity 
remained in the definition of"the aggressor," yet without good faith among 
the interested states no definition can be perfect and agreement on the def­
inition in theory does not automatically signify agreement in a particular 
practical case, The essential article of the non-aggression pact, in any case, 
was the first one, This neutrality clause, in effect, meant that if the Soviet 
Union was attacked by Poland or Rumania, France would remain neutral; if the 
USSR attacked its western neighbours, France could renounce the non-aggression 
pact and would be free to aid its eastern allies*
Article 3, concerning the obligation not to take economic measures dir­
ected against the other party was a victory for the Soviet Union qnd closely 
followed its text of May 1* It was obviously prompted by Soviet experience of 
the French anti-dumping decree and appeared in the final text of the pact even 
though the French project of June 13 contained no such provision.
The pact contained a long article dealing with non-interference by 
either party in the internal affairs of the other and its provisions were a 
combination of the Soviet scheme of May 1 and the French scheme of June 15* It 
reflected both French fears of communist agitation and propaganda aimed at the 
forceful change of the political or social regime and Soviet apprehension at 
the activities of whlte-guardist military organisations and groups which 
claimed to represent areas of Soviet territory, operating on French soil*
32 r'' letterTîSîr'th  ^ 'Foreign âff Srs ' Bri'and,'' to'^ 6ie ' ''^ ''
Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky* DVP Vol,l^.
63* Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Uovgalevsky, to the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Briand. Ibid.* XwWc p. 435*
The pact was to remain in force until the elapse of one year from the 
day when one of the contracting parties notified the other of its intention 
to terminate the agreement, hut such a notification could not take place prior 
to the expiry of two years from the day of its entiy into force* This was a 
revised article of both the earlier French and Soviet drafts which stipulated 
that the pact should remain in force for five years after which each side had 
the right to denounce it after one year* s notice# Judging from the usual Soviet 
desire to fix a relatively long minimum life to their non-aggression pacts 
given the instability and oscillating nature of capitalist states * foreign 
policy together with Dovgalevsky*» comment that "the denunciation of the pact 
not before two years has been achieved," it would appear that the French 
were the motivating force in reducing this minimum period and the Russians 
pleased to fix at least a two year minimum*
Minor differences still existed, principally concerning the release of 
the news of the initialling. Reference has already been made to the reluct­
ance of the French Government to publish information on this subject because 
of its possible repercussions on the internal French situation. The Russians, 
on the contraiy, were anxious to release the news, partly because such secrecy 
was very difficult to maintain and wild rumours likely to be more damaging 
than the truth, partly, one suspects, because they were anxious to demon­
strate to the world their peace-lovingness, ability to negotiate political 
agreements even with old enemies and their newly-won diplomatic position on 
the European continent*^^‘ On August 28, the French Charge d* Affaires told
Krestins% that "the French Government considers it undesirable to publish
66 «
the foot of the initiating of the treaty." The French remained vezy cautious
64#'''Tei%ram " f t h e '  Soviet Ambassador in 'Franco,Dovgalevs the MD,
August 5,1931. D #  Vol.14* p.448.
65* See conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,and 
the French Charge d*.Affaires in Mo scow, Pay arfAuguat 22.1931 .Ibid.* p.482. 
Also the Russians desired to keep their friends informed of the negotiat­
ions.%r this date the German, Turkish, Lithuanian and Italian Governments 
had already been informed of the initialling .Litvinov confidentially in­
formed the British Embassy in Moscow on August 13,Mr. Strang,British 
Charge d*Affaires in Moscow, to Mr.A.Renderson,Foreign Secretary,August
13,1931. PBFF vol.7. p# 218,
66. Conversation between Daptly Commissar for Foreign Mf*&rs,Kr@Btlns&y,and 
the French Charge d*Affaires in Moscow,Fayai^August 28.1931.BVP Vol.34.
p,811.Note 168,
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in their statemwte relating to the non-aggroseioa poot* The Quoi â*Oro^ 
was oompolloâ to admit the oxistenoo of the negotiation# in late August hut 
stated #mt nothing definite oould he eaipeoted for several months# refolding 
to the eventual signature of the paot#^ *^ * Aooordlng to a Branch forel# of fit# 
memorandum# Berthelot toM Bovgalevsky on the oeoaaion of the initialling that 
the text had onSy been agreed between the negotiator# and that ^ the French 
Government had not approved It# It would îmve to wait for a Polish-Soviet
ga
non-aggression pact before agreeing to a Franco-Soviet pact.
At this stage in the history of the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact it 
was still realiy too mrly for either state to evaluate its sigïiificsace for 
their respective foreign policies, That the negotiation# had arrived at a text 
which both parties had initialled was undeniably someWng of an achievmmt 
when their past relation# were taken into account. Two countries# ' the dominant 
European status quo power and the new revolutionary state# which previously had 
adopted diametrically opposed positions On practically all international Msucm# 
now could look on m  Initialled text of non-aggression pact.
An Wltialled pact is not to be equated with a signed pact# however# and 
this was the crucial factor for the future# mbm would the signature and ox4- 
change of rati^cation instruments take place? Qhtil this time#, the pact was- 
merely a piece of paper# This was appreciated by Moscow. In August #Karskhm#^^ * 
in conversation with the istonisn Ambassador in Moscow# spoke of the Soviet- 
French negotiators# "if we speak in mathematical formulae# it c m  be said 
that at the present time relation# with France have been raised, from minus" up 
to nought# #ether #sy wiH rise higher then nought it is still difficult
$$» French Fc#0h "qffic»llcte#Jcly 2til93E#Bocp|<ents .l>ip^ j^ tisueS'..,^ yr^
■ p»118# ( # r # K e r  referred to as French bees Vel.l* ) '
69. L.i.Karakhan# from lfl0#i)eputy dcmmissar for Foreign Affairs#-Soviet ■ 
Ambassador in Foland|1921-1922$Second beiRity OCmmisssr for Foreign Affairs 
1922|â»ba#sador In 0Mna#1923-l###Third Deputy Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs#1925|S«cond- Deputy Commissar for Foroi^ Affairs#1950-l934S- 
Ambassador in Turkey 1934-^ 1937. #ecuted December 193?-
#70to aay*. * The French reluctance to announce officially the initialling plus
rumours already heard by Soviet diplomats oonceming a Polish involvement in 
71
üxe affair 'oould not have encouraged the Russians. Moscow desired a quick 
end to the proceedings and therefore favoured the signing of the pact without 
further delay. In Paris the view-point was somewhat different. Domestio oppos­
ition was considerable but the future of the pact would now be decided in Warsaw 
as much as in Paris or Moscow* French m&eVruet insistence on a multilateral 
pact including Poland had been the cause of failure in 1927-1928; it remained 
to be seen whether the new international situation would provide a different 
ending to these negotiations of 1931*
3* Germany appeased.
The negotiations in Paris between representatives of the Soviet and French 
Governments did not signify a reversal of "traddltional" Soviet foreign policy 
aims or means. Security remained the major goal and as comprehensive a system 
of non-aggression pacts as possible, the means# Thus the negotiation of the 
Berlin treaty’s renewal in Soviet eyes was quite compatible with the negotiat­
ion of a non-aggression pact with France, though the Russians perceived the 
danger of complications arising with these two capitalist states because of 
the parallel negotiations. Ostensibly, Russian foreign policy remained true 
to its Rapallo course in that Germany continued to receive Soviet support in 
matters of European and world concern and given the fact that France and 
Germany on most questions occupied widely different positions, inevitably the 
Soviet stance clashed with that of France# This continued support for 
Weimar Republic was determined by a sense of caution. Respite the deterior­
ation of Soviet-German relations and the new possibilities opening out as a  
result of the negotiations in Paris, the fact remained that the USSR had 
behind it a number of years of successful collaboration, military, economic
70. Korakhan, the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Estonian 
Ambassador in Moscow, August 24,1931# The Central State Archive of the y  
Estonian SSSR, quoted in Joffe, Vheshnyova Polltika SovetskOAb 8oma.
pps. 232-235# ^
71. See above.
and political, with Germany which might still reap further harvests# #@reas 
doubts oonoeming the outcome of the French negotiations were considérable.
The Soviet Government was prepared to risk alienating Germany by opening non- 
agression pact talks with France# since the opportunity of a French diplomatic 
ohange of heart could not be ignored# yet it would not place all its foreign 
policy eggs in the new French basket. A sounder policy was to take reasonable 
steps tmwrds the appeasement of Germany, especially since a sudden transfer 
of allegie^oe from Berlin to Faria would run the risk of completely destroying 
the waning support fer Russia in the former whilst benefiting little the new 
policy of the latter vdiere Soviet hostility was accepted as the nona.
Soviet press reaction to the Auatro-German customs imion scheme is indie-
o (■
ative of its eountiy^s foreign policy line during the spring and summezxl951. 
Despite intense French opposition to this scheme and its coincidence with the 
Soviet-Frenoh political and economic negotiations,^^ Russian comment was 
markedly pro-German and anti-Franch*
On May 12, Isveatiia commented on the French "anti-German" plans, assert­
ing that recently France had placed itself ao^ sross the path of German aspirat­
ions and was seeking to disrupt the customs union p r o p o s a l . A  Fravda head­
line in July was quite explicit on the aims of French policy; "France insists 
on the complete economic and political subordination of Germany."
Soviet press quoted extensively French speeches directed against the customs 
union which exhibited the anti-German nature of French policy.^^* It was 
stressed that this French opposition was only one more illustration of the
fact that it was useless for Germany to consider itself accepted by the 
76
Versailles powers* * The obvious conclusion which the German Government mid
public were supposed to deduce was that Gemany still had a real need of its
ilnd "mncmcSSit '^ f''"'S plm 'was ' "cne of
the factors involved in the French d&yision to begin non-aggression pact 
negotiations with Russia.
73, Xavestiia, May 12,1931,
74, Fravda. July 20, 1931,
73. Isvestiia. May 10, 1931.
76# For example, Isvestiia* March 27,1931# May 11, 1931#
partnership with the Soviet Union» French hostility was the Soviet answer
to those Germans who expressed the view that their state no longer needed the 
77
Russian link* The Soviet press strove to convince its readership that al­
though Briand might appear to use more peaceful tactics tomrds Germany than 
the French "right", in reality his policy nevertheless was basically pro- 
Versailles and anti-German.^^*
Following the eventual decision to invite the USSR to attend the European 
Commission, established to look into the causes of the world economic orlsisj^* 
the Soviet delegation arrived in Geneva on May 13.^^* It was quite active 
its attempts to explain the capitalist catastrophe ahd bolstered its propa­
ganda efforts by a proposal for an economic non-aggression pact, in the hope
of internationally outlawing any ûxture economic moves against it, remembering
81
well the recent anti-dumping campaign# * The Soviet press, however, continued
to criticise the Commission and especially the dominant state at the gathering, 
82*
Frwice# The reKL outcome was seen as a "victory of French imperialism over 
Germany." Quoting a Gorman papqr which had spo#n of a friendly talk between 
Briand and Curtius, Isvostiia sarcastically commented that "if a friendly 
talk between monsieurs Briand and Curtius could be sufficient to reconcile 
Franco-German contradictions, then the creation of a pan-European organisat­
ion would be child’s play#"^^*
Soviet diplomacy vmt further than merely in#oating the contlnuixXg anti- 
Gorman character of the Versailles powers* foreign policies in its efforts to
77. Koohan states that "in all probability" it was the Austro-German customs 
union scheme which demonstrated to the Russians the need to seek relnsur- 
anoe elsewhere (meaning in France)* He thinks that the Soviet press, whilst 
not actually attaolcing the scheme, was very cautious in its handling.
Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Renublic.nos.152-155. 3a fact, it seems more 
probable that whilst it was important in so far as the French reconsider­
ation of its foreign policy in favour of the trSBR was ooncemed, the Russ­
ians used the scheme rather as a last attempt to prove to the Germans the 
political advantages which they could secure from continued Soviet friexid-
sMp.
78.1zvestiia. May 13, 1931.
79*Sea Chapter 2.
BO.Fravda, Hay 17, 1931.
81 .Soviet project for a protocol on economic non-aggression,Hay 18,1931* 
m e  Toi.14, pps. 342-343*
82.For example, Fravda editorial, May 21, 1931.
83.Xavestiia, Mi^2471931*
educate Germany in its continued need for Soviet Russia# Moscow appreciated 
that the non-aggression pact negotiations with France would provoke a negat­
ive reaction in Berlin which Soviet press attacks against French foreign 
policy and support for Germany could not alone assuage# By a frank exposition 
of the policy in Paris# it was optimistic enough to hope that it would he able 
to secure the French pact whilst retaining its German card# In the circumstan­
ces# this was perhaps the wisest policy#
In May, Litvinov admitted to Biïksen that the French Foreign Ministry 
had suggested the idea of signing a non-aggression pact the previous month# 
hut he stressed that the initiative hod come from Paris, that great difficult­
ies were expected and reassured the German Ambassador that there were no 
parallel negotiations with Poland.^" This did not succeed in reassuring the
n/
Germans and in June Tvardoil^ skV was accosting Krestinsky on the same subject.
He told Krestinsky that Berthelot had given the German Ambassador in Paris
information which differed from that given by Litvinov to Dirksen# namely,
Berthelot alleged that the initiative for the negotiations in general end the
conclusion of a pact in particular had come from the Soviet side# Krestinsky
was explicitely asked idiether in fact this was the case# which he denied# the
history of the negotiations being given to the Germans
From what I have said, Mr# TvardovsKy must see that to speak of our 
initiative in these negotiations is impossible# We# of course# willingly 
accepted the French proposal as we stand for the regulation of our 
relations with all countries#°5*
German fear was not so much concentrated on the outcome of the Franco-
Soviet negotiations# though this created considerable anxiety, but on fdiat
this might lead to and specifically the danger of an eventual non-aggression
pact between Russia and Poland# Tvardovaky expressed this fear, stating that
in German political circles there was anxiety because it was said that France
had made the proposal to the USSR after a preliminary agreement with Poland#
Further# it was known that the latter had asked Finland whether it would agree
àk# German BQctSStay'''ouo^ ^ PoïZd be^een"'&s^' "^ d'..West,^p
83# Note of a conversation between the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Krestinsky, and the German Charge d*Affaires in  Moscow# Tvardovsky# June
3,1931. DVP Vol.14. pps# 367-368.
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to conclude a pact jointly with the Soviet Iftiion# Krestinsky implied that 
in the pr^iminary talks between Bovgalevsky and Berthelot from which resulted 
the opening of the negotiations, neither side had mentioned either Finland or 
Poland.^*
In their desire to dispel these German fears the Russians repeated this
information in Berlin* Khinchuk, the Soviet Ambassador in Germany# spoke to
the State Secretary of the German foreign Ministry on this themes
The reports in the German press about Soviet-french relations contain 
exaggerations and false guesswork* Besides this# in our relations with 
France there has occurred nothing idiioh has not already been told by 
Litvinov to Dirksen.
The State Secretary answered that the German foreign Ministiy had said
nothing against the conclusion of a trade treaty between the USSR and France*
The non-aggression pact only interested him in that recently the Poles had
taken meuy liberties in the eastern provinces and wore referring to the Franco-
Soviet pact, Khinchuk again confirmed that France had never discussed any
87
questions concerning Poland or Rumania*
On August 12# the German Government was informed through Dirksen that
the negotiations with France had led to the initialling of a non-aggression
pact with France, Litvinov read him parts of the text and strove to allay his
fears by stressing that the pact would weaken the Franoo-Polish alliance and
88
therefore benefit Germany* *
The threat of an eventual Soviet Polish non-aggression pact continued to 
haunt Germany, despite these Soviet denials* An article in "Germania" illustr­
ate# the German reaction, if in an extreme forms
Is Russia required to give guarantees that the talks with France wiH 
not lead to a basis for further, more comprehensive conversations in 
the East, under franco-Folish auspices, which would then inevitably 
lead to the Eastern Locarno desired by Poland without Poland fulfilling 
Germany*3 conditions for such an Eastern Locarno,!*e, the return of 
Upper Silesia and the Corridor?
ë6,"Sote of a' converS the Depuÿ" ComSssar 'f5  Foreign Affairs,
Krestinsky, and the German Charge d*Affaires in Mosoow,Tvardovsky mmSt 
June 3,1931* D W  Vol.l4. p*3&8.
87* Note of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinchuk, 
and the State .Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry,Bulow, June 3,1931* 
Ibid. , pps* 370-371. L,M, Khinchuk,Soviet Ambassador in Germany,1930-1934* 
88, German documents, quoted in Korbel,Poland between Bast and, Wes^,p*268 
89* Germania,June 18,1931, quoted in KochZ*ms8ia ^ d . the Weimar Republic*
pps, 133-130*
France was not obverse to Increasing German suspicions at a time when
negotiations between the latter and the tBSE were being conducted for the
prolonging of the Berlin treaty# If these negotiations could be sabotaged#
France would not be too displeased#
Despite these German suspicions and worries# the Berlin treaty was prol- 
90.
ongedi Germany could not prevent the Franco-Soviet rapprochement and still 
desired to maintain links with Russia# Ih the past, Germany had been in a 
strong position because of the USSR’s isolation# Now the situation was being
It &
reversed# The Kolnitsche Zeltung adopted an optimistic view of the changes 
which were tsiting place in the foreign policy oriontation of its eastern 
partner:
Although final judgement will be possible only after we have become 
acquainted with the contents of the (Franco-Soviet non-aggression) 
pact# it is possible to say that we have no grounds for anxiety as 
the pact, evidently# neither in letter nor spirit# contradicts the 
recently renewed Berlin treaty# In principle, Germany even welcomes 
the conclusion of this pact as an important step on the path to the 
further rapprochement of the Soviet Union with the rest of Europe*91#
This was not the unanimous reaction of Germany, however; others saw the
pact as a real turning point in the Rapallo course# as the prelude to a new
Soviet political alignment which would isolate Germany once more. Russia’s
dual policy was not an easy one# yet whilst it was confined to France and
Germany it might have success# In the late summer of 1931 a spanner was thrown
into this delicate diplomatic mechanism# however; a Polish re-assessm^t of
its foreign policy in the light of the changing international situation raised
the real posaibüiiy of a Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact* If Germany was
sensitive to a Soviet rapprochement with France, it was much more concerned
about this letter eventuality# Here was a real test for Russian diplomacy#
90,“'See'™S6ver "ït™SoiSïbe’™notS7'ho^^
ratify the Extension Protocol until 1933 # See chapter 6*
91* Quoted in Isvestiia, August 22, 1931#
Chapter 4: Security on the Western Border.
The Soviet #tate in at least one respect was linked to all the other 
states of the international system by a common denominator, the pursuit of 
security# Indeed, its ideological isolation necessitated a particularly ener­
getic devotion to this concept of wM.oh its leaders were not unaware. In any 
consideration of security, the state must psy paramount importance to those
countries with which it shares a oommon frontier, since it is from that guar-
heartland i
ter that it can e^ect an attack upon its headland to be mounted. *
For several reasons, the Soviet state was compelled to concentrate con­
siderable attention on its western frontier and those states which were adjac­
ent to it* The isolation of the Bolshevik regime amongst hostile capitalist 
states alone would have recommended such a policy; the sheer length of this 
frontier and the proven active and not merely passive aggressiveness of its 
neighbours added further incentive for its adoption# In the very early years 
of its existence, Communist Russia had actually been attacked by Poland and 
the peace eventually restored between the states did little to invoke a spirit 
of complacency in the Soviet leadership. Soviet-Rumanian relations were be­
devilled by a territorial dispute conoeming the seizure of Bessarabia by the 
latter and were, if aiything, more bitter than those between Moscow and Warsaw# 
Russian relations with its other western neighbours, Finland, Estonia and 
Latvia, if not quite at such an uncompromisingljü hostile level, certainly were 
far from amicable and the suspicion that these states were manipulated by the 
Polish Government did little to enhance their reputations with Moscow#
Despite the ideological, historical and territorial obstacles to good
relations, the struggling communist state’s urgent security requirements
forced its leadership to undertake the distasteful task of alleviating the
situation, especially since these western neighbours were closely linked with
1 #'''""TKia'concept 'has"'bem'''oon " '^e'iiîÿortZ ' "aiSS' "
and especially missile strategy in the last thirty years but certainly 
held true in the early 1930*s#
103.
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imperialist France and might well play the role of an advance guard in a 
renewed western intervention* The new Soviet foreign policy tool# the non- 
aggression pact# was invoked in the 1920* s as a means of providing such sec­
urity with regard to Poland# Latvia# Estonia^ Finland and Lithuania# hut only
o
in the letter’s case was a successful conclusion reached. *
Russian relations with its western neighbours continued to oscillate 
between indifferent and bad* The key to this western border region lay in 
Poland# the dominant state and it was to Warsaw that the Soviet ühion princ­
ipally looked in both its anger and its diplomatic activity.
1. Poland.
Reference has already been made to the tens© state of Soviet-Polish 
relations in chapter two. The tentative attempts to thaw the freeze were al­
ways halted by incidents such as a narrowly averted explosion in the Soviet 
Embassy in Poland which occurred in April# 1930 and called forth a strong 
protest. The Soviet Government maintained that such terrorist acts were inten­
ded to complicate relations betwem the two states and could only take place
in an atmosphere of hostility which certain Polish circles and part of the
Polish press wasc- creating:
The Soviet Government# which steadfastly endeavours to develop and 
strengthen good-neighbourly relations with Poland# is compelled to
state that the said activities# which are undoubtedly connected also
with the acts of certain international elements, represent a great 
danger not only to the relations between the USSR and Poland# but to 
the whole world*3*
One year later# in April 1931# an attempt by a Pole to murder a Soviet
diplomat created a violent Soviet press reaponae.^* Any attempt by Poland to
act as a leader for the east-European countries was immediately seized upon
by the Russian press as an indication of that country’s anti-Soviet plans.
Thus a series of conferences between agrarian countries to help combat the
economic crisis, proposed by Poland and to which the USSR was not invited was
2» See Chapter 1* Rumania was considered too much beyond the pale to make such 
an attempt worthwhile.
3* Note from the Soviet to the Polish Government# April 2 8 , 1 9 3 0 13#P#24L. 
4. See Chapter 2, p.45*
"by no means an instrument of peace, but, on the contrary, created the
preconditions for a militaiy-politioal bloc against the Soviet îtiion*"^ *
Pravda stated that "the feveriah preparation of Poland for war against the
Soviet Union is shown in all regions of activity of the fascist government -
in its foreign and internal policy, in its economic, agrarian, national
polioyÿi etc, * Behind these preparations was seen the guiding hand of French
imperialism* On the same day that paper also included an article entitled,
"Bstonian-Polish collaboration on the basis of intervention*"^* An article in
"International Press Correspondence," the Comintern journal, claimed that
"Poland* a feverish preparations for war against the Soviet Union are to be
seen in all spheres of activity of the fascist government#"^* Reports of visits
between military leaders of Russia's western neighbours were widely reported
in the Soviet press*
Against this background of poor relations, as in the case of France, the
year 1930 witnessed a real diplomatic effort at a rapprochement by both count- 
10ries, * Since Poland was the dominant area state, any improvement of its 
relations with the USSR would have a considerable influence on the attitude of 
the other border states to their gigantio eastern neighbour* To achieve succ­
ess as regards Poland was therefore the major Soviet objective,
Poland posed considerable problems for Soviet diplomacy during this per­
iod, The conscious desire of the Soviet leadership to extend the circle of 
states with which it had successfully concluded non-aggression pacts has al­
ready been referred to in the preceding chapters. Such pacts Moscow inter­
preted as at least a limiting factor on the capitalist states* ability to 
resort to war against the first socialist country, Poland* s known hostility.
3# Izvestiia. January 13# 1931*
6* PravS, May 6, 1931*
7* Ibid* '
8, J.Bratkovski, "The Polish Armaments against the Soviet Uoion," International 
Press Correspondence, Vol.ll, N.25# May 13,1931# P*465*
9* For,example, the visit of the Rumanian Navy Chief to Poland, Izyeatlia,
âuguh^ 13,1931*
lO.At this stage the improvement in Franco-Soviet relations was too little 
developed to have influenced the Soviet-Polish moves.
AU0#
Its position as a hireXiiig of Fraaoh iapeiialism and its proximity to 
Soviet territory indicated a profound need for such a pact in its case# The 
oompiicating factors w#re Polish intransigence in its desire to lead the 
Baltic bloo and the Rapallo partnership#
By 1930 the international situation had wrought changes on Polish fo^ 
eign policy as it had on that of many other states# Poland was particularly 
h#aiy hit by the world économie crisis# experiencing a slump in industrial 
output and a sharp rise in unemployment* During 1930-1931 a re-assessment of 
French authority in Europe was undertaken by Warsaw; doubt began to accumul­
ate as to the future ability of France to guarantee Poland's security# prec­
ariously wedged as it was between two great hostile neighbours# Germany and 
the USSR# The inoreasing uncertainty and growing extremism within the Weimar 
Republic provoked serious thought in Warsaw# as in Paris# as to whether for­
eign policy could sàfely continue on its old route or whether pexhaps a new 
course should be chd%^ered# one which would lead to Moscow* In conversation 
with the Soviet Ambassador in Poland, Antonov-Ovseenko# in October, 1930# 
Zalesld., the Polish Mjnibter of Foreign Affairs# noted that the basic factor 
in the international situation was the indeterainedness of Germany’s positions
Although Gurtius was restrained and extraordinarily cautious at 
Geneva# giving the impression that the basic line of conduct as 
practised by Stresemana remained unchanged# the extraordinary strength 
of the extreme nationalists’ position, who have expanded their activity 
in Germany# compels us closely to observe the situation which recently 
has arisen*ll‘
The appointment of Colonel Beck to the position of Polish Deputy Foreign 
Minister in 1930# where he almost overshadowed Zaleski# further strengthened
the tendency towards the adoption of a foreign policy line independent of
1?France yet still maintaining the appearonoe of alliance* Of course# Poland
did not undertake a reorientation in its foreign policy in favour of the USSR
ovemi^t* Great problems in the development of Soviet-Polish relations
11. Note of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Poland,Antonov- 
Ovseenko and the Polish Minister of Foreign ,âffairs#Zàleaki#Ootober 11# 
1930* DVP 13.0*558. V*A.Antonov-Ovseenko#Soviet Ambassador in Czeohoslo- 
vakla,1924-192B; Lithuania#1928-1930îPoland#1930-1934|Boviet Consul- 
general in Baroelona#193B* Executed at the end of 1938 or early 1939*
12* Korbel# Poland between East and West. p#272*
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remained# yet the possibility of a rapprochement was at least improved by 
these international adjustments.
If the Soviet negotiations with France had alarmed many influential 
Germans and to an extent# jeopardised Soviet-German relations# this was much 
more so in the ease of any improvement of Soviet#Polish relations. Perhaps the 
key factor in the German decision to renew the Berlin treaty was the desire to 
prolong Soviet-Polish hostility and prevent any rapprochemmt. This was eert- 
ainiy a major German foreign policy objective,If Soviet diplomacy was 
risking severe damage in its German ties by the development of new relations 
?dth France# it was increasing tills risk considerably by any approach towards 
Poland. The dominant theme in Soviet foreign policy as regards Poland in late 
1930 and early 1931 was therefore caution. Growing disillusionment with Germany 
must have tempted Moscow to probe the possibilities which Polarid's new attit­
ude might reveal# but this called for delicate handling if Germany was not to 
be totally alienated.
In March# 1930# Izveatiia contained a long editorial on Polish anti- 
Soviet campaigns euid the long-standing hostili%r between the two countries.
It then went on to say;
To the adventurist policy of the Polish militarists# the Soviet 
tkiion counters with its policy - a policy of peace. We proposed the 
conclusion of a non-aggression pact to Poland and this proposal 
remains in force# despite the fact that in the last few years the 
Polish Government has refused to take on Itself an obligation of 
non-aggression in relation to the UBSE*^*
Again# Litvinov# in an interview with representatives of the foreign
press given on his appointment to the post of Oommissar for Foreign Affairs#
in July# 1930# spoke of Soviet policy towards these frontier states:
We shall with particular attention follow the policy of our nearest 
neighbours# where a strengthening of aggressive and chauvinistic move­
ments has recently become discernable# representing a serious threat 
to peace; now as before we are of the opinion that one of the most 
important tasks of our diplomacy is to strengthen peaceful good-neigh­
bourly relations with these countries in/^spirit of the pacific prop­
osals we have repeatedly made and the Moscow protoool.lD*
13 # ''See'Ghap^  '  for 'eSra|S ' Mr8C&%'#'p^^^
14* Isvestiia. March 18# 1930#
15. Presslnterview by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov,July 25# 
1930. DTP 13. p.W#427#
Statements of good-vdll also emanated from the Polish side, Zaleskl# in
an interview with the Polish paper# "Gazeta Polska", was quoted as saying that
Poland wanted a peaceful policy and would not take part in any military adren- 
16
ture# * On June 13# Patek# the Polish Minister in Moscow, told a Soviet diplo­
mat that no one in Poland wanted war and that there would he no war* The Soviet 
reply was less optiiaistloj it oonoeded that the Polish people did not want war 
but the same could not be said for some influential Polish oircless "under the 
influence of these circles our relations have worsened recently and especially 
worsened under the present government#" Patek denied thia"but weakly and un­
certainly*" * In September Patek spoke to Litvinov about the need to improve 
relations and for this purpose he proposed the conclusion of a oonoiliation 
convention# a postal convention conoeming which negotiations had been conduct-
aviaf loy)
ed over a long period, an arbitration and a frontier convention* The poles had 
substituted oonoiliation for arbitration because of the known Soviet opposit­
ion to the latter, Litvinov commented that arbitration had always been spoken 
of in connection with a non-aggression pact and asked Patek whether he had in 
mind the substitution of a conciliation commission for arbitration in the event 
of the signing of a pact. The Polish minister replied evasively that his 
country had objected to the conclusion of a paot,^^*
The next stop iU'these complex diplomatic moves, according to the recently 
published Soviet documents# was a cautious approach made by the Polish Ambaaa-
TO
ador in Turkey to his Soviet counterpart* On November 19, the Pole spoke to
l6r"ÿ8Sëiêiëoïl(kalli'''ApSrTffrï9¥£’"liuoted'’'’in"'¥oto
Polskikh Otnoshenii Toi.5 (Moscow i967)#pps»45'S439* W  Sov-Pol
Docs)
17* Note of a conversation between StOmonyakov#member of the Oollegitna of the
NKD and Patek#the Polish Minister in the msR,June 13,1930*DVP Vol*l3,D*347.
18. Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs#Litvinov 
and the Polish Minister in the tlBSR#Patek,SeptOmber 27#1930,Xbid*#pps.§23-
524.
19. Laroche says that the Soviet Minister in Poland proposed to reopen negot­
iations for a non-aggression pact in October 1930 but Zaleski expressed the 
fear that it would weaken the value of the Kellogg Fact. J.A.Laroche, La 
Pologne de Filaudski:Souvauirs d’m e  Ambassade,1926-1935 (Paris 1953) #P*104# 
No other reference to suoh a proposal has been found, m  the light of 
Petek’s evasive answer to Litvinov on September 27#it is possible that the 
Soviet Minister was instructed to clari^r the Polish position* Also see 
Zaleski’s letter to î^tek of December 23 in which he speaks of the Soviet 
Minister*s proposal for a pact* Sov. toi. p.4va.
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Burits on the question of the normalisation of Polish-Soviet and 
Rumanian-Soviet relations* He outlined roughly a plan whereby a bilateral 
neutrality pact would he concluded immediately, a policy for the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between Rumania and the USSR initiated and an agree­
ment whereby the Bumanian-Polish agreement would not be renewed* The Polish 
diplomat expressed interest as to whether diplomatic relations could be establ­
ished with Rumania leaving the Bessarabian question open# each aide remaining 
on its adopted position, though the considered the immediate conclusion of & 
bilateral pact desirable independently of the course of Soviet-Rumanian
t go
relatione*
On November 21, no lesser figure than Joseph Stalin replied to Burits’s
telegram stating that "the Polish Ambassador’s proposal deserves attention*"
Surits was instructed to continue the conversation with his Polii^ counterpart
and to state that he would be able to put the question of a bilateral pact of
neutrality before the Soviet Government if it could be guaranteed that the
Polish Government was really prepared to take such a step* Further# he was to
hint "gently and vaguely" that the presence of such a pact could create the
pre-conditions for the favourable settlement of the other questions wiiioh
interested the Polish Ambassador# * A further convoraatim between the two
Ambassadors revealed that, according to the Pole# he had conducted the previous
meeting ad referendum without the authorisation of his Government, but would be
leaving for Warsaw within the next few days and there would "openly express
his opinion to Zdeski*" Surits reported that the Polish diplomat was much
more restrained; "I do not know whether he was rebuffed by Warsaw# whether the
election results in Poland or the new phase of the aggravation of our relations
Sor' soÆet Seputy'''lSaaSor '''ïn'Be
1919-1921sNori?ay 1922-1923|Turkey,1923-1934|Germany,1934*1937;Fran0e# 
1937**1940. Member of Soviet delàgatë# at League of Nations,1937-1939# 
Councelior#Nl0)#194O-1945# Ambassador in Brazil, 1945*1947*
21. Military defence agreement*
22# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey# Surits# to the NKD,
November 19#1930# BVP Vol*13* p*663#
23" Telegram from Stalin to the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey# Surits# November 
21, 1930* Ibid** p*669*
with France have influenced him#"^*
Here the documents let the matter rest, except for a telegram from 
Surits on December 22 saying that the Polish Charge d’AfTaires had informed 
him that according to Patek "the question of a pact between us has come to a
Ok
standstill," and asking whether this was correct* Two deys later, Litvinov
replied that "we have not received any new proposals from the Poles, but Zaleski 
made ambiguous hints in Warsaw*" * It is unlikely that the Polish Ambassador 
in Turkey would have made such proposals without authorisation from Warsaw, yet 
this indirect mode of approach to the Soviet Government is indicative of the 
delicate nature of Soviet-Polish relations*
On December 25 the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Patek in 
Moscow that Pilsudski had decided "to accept in prinoiple Ovseenko's proposal 
for the realisation of the never-interrupted negotiations for the conclusion 
of a political agreement and for the opening of negotiations on a trade treaty." 
Zaleski stated that he would give Ovseenko a concrete answer after the Hew 
Year as a text must first be worked out preserving the basic Polish postulates 
and taking into account treaties and allies* Special emphasis would be laid on 
the problem of conciliation* He said that telegrams had been sent to the Polish 
Ambassador in Bucharest, Riga, Talin and H<^sinkl with information on Ovseenko’s 
proposal and the Polish position on this question, including the intention to 
safeguard for the Baltic states and Rumania the possibility of starting simul­
taneously the negotiation of identical agreements* As regards the trade pact, 
the Polish Government, in so far as the Soviet Government proposed a wide 
agreement, could not reject this proposal straight away but expected many 
disputed questions and considered such a wide agreement to be impossible. The
Poles, however,would be favourable to the conclusion of a series of treaties
27
on separate questions*
'%T'%legrS'3r^^ ' the Soviet Ambassador'S  the HKD, H ovSer
27,1950. DVF Yol.15* p*686*
25* Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey,Surits,to the HKD,December 
22,1930* JEbiâ*, p.756.
26. Telegram from the Commissar of Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the Soviet 
Ambassador in Tuxkey, Surits, December 24,1930, D W  Yol*13* p.758*
27* Letter from the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs,Zaleaki,to the Polish 
Minister in Moscow,Patek,December 23,1930* Sov-Pol Docs, p.473*
On Jenuaiy 3» Litvinov complained to Patek about rumours in the Polish 
press conoeming Boviet-Folish negotiations for a non-aggression pact and trade 
treaty, proposals about which Litvinov denied the Soviets had either made to or 
received from Poland* Patek, apparently in some oojn^ usion, answered that a long 
time ago he had spoken' of the necessity for thé conclusion of some conventions 
including one on conciliation procedure to Litvinov, Stomonyakov and Krestinsky. 
Litvinov commented that these talks had taken place many months ago, that the 
press had not been infomed of them, at least by the Soviet side and that it 
was a long haul from a conciliation procedure to a non-aggression pact* He
explained that such a conciliation procedure could only be accepted as a part
28
of a general pact* *
Presumably by this date Patek had received no instructions to reveal the 
contents of his communication from Zaleski* Later, when the Polish minister did 
assert that .Antonov-Ovseenko had made official proposals to Zaleski, Litvinov 
denied this, also denying that the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw might have done 
so whilst acting beyond his instructions# The Soviet view was that proposals 
had been made in 1926 which were rejected by the Poles, who advanced unaccept­
able counter-proposals* Until one side changed its position there could be no 
agreement and the Soviets certainly had not introduced any new proposals and 
as far as they knew, neither had the Poles* Litvinov agreed that Patek had 
proposed a conciliation agreement in 1930,^^^but the Russian Government believ­
ed that in the absence of the necessary friendly atmosphere it would not give 
the desired results. M  fact, it was only a feasible proposition after the 
signature of a non-aggression pact. Therefore, the Soviets were surprised when 
they saw in the foreign press reports that they had apparently made new non- 
aggression pact proposals* Litvinov adamently refused to accept Patek* s point
that a conciliation agreement could be signed as a continuation of the Kellogg
30.
Pact or the Litvinov protocol, without the need for a non-aggression pact*
28. Note of a conversation^ W  the Com^ssar for Pox^ign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the Polish Minister in Mosoow,Patek,January 5*1931* o^vrPfil
29. See page 108.
30. Note of ft conversation between the Commissar for foreign Affairs,Litvinov, 
and the Polish Minister in the USSR,Patek,January 29*1931 .DVP Vol.14.
pps. 48-51"
It dOô» seem certain that at this time, although talks conoeming a pact 
were vaguely being held between Polish and Soviet diplomats, no actual negot­
iations were taking place on this subject nor had any definite proposals been 
sdvanced#'^ *^
Zaleski, reporting to a meeting of the Sejm Commission on foreign affairs, 
said that in foreign policy Poland constantly desired the development of mutual 
links in the political and economic spheres with the USSR and that any Soviet 
initiative in the past had always met with a warm readiness to collaborate and 
implement by the Polish Govemmmt»^^* The official Polish paper, "Polska 
Gazeta", in a leading article commenting on this speech, said that it now 
depended on the Soviet Union to draw the corresponding conclusions if it
33
desired peace with Poland*
Despite these obvious signs that some progress was being made in Soviet- 
Polish relations, there was still little indication of imminent negotiations* 
Neither side had moved from its previously held position; Poland was still 
reluctant to sign a non-aggression pact, preferring a oonoiliation agreement 
by which any dispute between itself and the USSR could be settled by peaceful 
means* If a pact was to be signed, it should be concluded simultaneously with 
those of Rumania and the Baltic states on the one hand, the Soviet t&iion on 
the o t h e r * I n  fact, at this stage the Poles were seeking to make capital 
out of the slight diplomatic advances with Russia by informing the Germans of 
Russian initiative on the subject of a non-aggression pact with Poland, presum­
ably in the hope of aggravating relations between Moscow and Berlin* Dirksen, 
at least, does not seem to have fallen for this Polish "intrigue" and chose to
31. In conversation wiüi the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow on January 19,1951, 
Litvinov declared Idiiat the UBSR had not conducted any negotiations relative 
to a pact of non-aggression with Poland for some months* DVP Vol.14* p*19*
32. Report by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zaleski, to a meeting of 
the Sejm Commission on Foreign Affairs,January 10,1931* Soy-Fol Mo,s*P*47?*
33* Quoted in Isvestlia. January 16, 1931*
34. See speech of a leading Polish politician,Goluvko, in the Sejm in February 
1931* Quoted in Isvestiia. February 25,1931*
believe the Huesian deniala of pact negotiation»*^^•
Polish-Soviet relatione, on the surface# remained as had as ever during
1930 end early 1931# punctuated hy frequent press campaigns against each other*
The tentative diplomatic feelers hy both sides had produced nothing of note,
as indeed th<%r could not so long as neither state would tolerate the omcept
of a compromise agreement* In his report to the Sixth Soviet Congress in March,
1931# Molotov adopted a pessimistic tone:
Relations between the USSR and Poland, unfortunate2y, still leave 
much to be desired# Despite Poland’s acceptance of our proposal on the 
signing of the well-known Moscow protocol, the repeated attempts which 
have been made by the Soviet Government to consolidate Soviet-Polish 
relations have not received the required response* On the other hand, 
as its adjacent neighbour, we cannot but turn our attention to the foot 
that at the last three sessions of the Preparatory Disarmament Commiss­
ion, Poland lias taken a determined and active part in tumiuig down all 
Soviet and other proposals for a genuine reduction of armaments#36#
2# The Baltic States and Rumania*
Scviet relations with its other western neighbours, as might be expected,
differed little from those with Poland# There is little of note conoeming
Soviet relations with either Latvia or Estonia in late 1930 and spring 1931 in
either the published Soviet documents or the Soviet press, an indication of the
generally indifferent state of affairs between them and their large eastern
neighbour# Molotov, in his March survey of Soviet foreign relations, briefly
touohed-m #ia area: .
In our relations with the Baltic states - Latvia, Estonia and Finland, 
little has changed since the last time# It can only be said that the 
hostile influences of foreign great powers directed against the Soviet 
Union continue to exert considerable pressure on the policy of these 
states*37#
35* Report of the German Ambassador in the UBBR, Dirksen, to the German Ministiy 
of Foreign Affairs,Januaiy 27,1931* Bov-Pol Docs.ooa.480-481. Budurowyoz 
quotes eertsdn authors who have stated that the Polish Government was inein# 
cere in concludihg the non-aggression pact with the USSR end intended it 
merely to strengthen the Polish bargaining position in future negotiations 
with Germany# Budurowycz, Polish-Soviet Relations. p.lO, footnote 24#
36# Molotov’s Report to the Sixth Soviet Congress.March 8.1951* DVP 14.P.15B#
37# I M 4f* p.136#
114*
The one point which did catch the attention of the Soviet press was a naval 
gathering of several fleets on the June anniversary of the tenth jubilee of 
the Latvian navy to which the Russians were not invited, only one example of 
"the general anti-Soviet policy in L a t v i a # T h e  regatta could only be seen 
as "a political demonstration against the Soviet IMion, especially since suoh 
’naval powers’ as Estonia and Poland" had been invited#The foreign policy 
of these small now-oomers to the international system was very much influenced 
by Poland and no real change was to be expected here until a reassessment 
occurred in Warsaw#
Soviet-Pinnish relations received more limelight in this period in that 
Finland was more aggressively hostile to the USSR# Throughout 1930 a very tense 
state of affairs existed between these two states, frequent frontier and other 
incidents occurring# The Finnish press was especially active in  its attacks on 
the Soviet collectivisation prcgrwme#^" The Soviet Government expressed its 
concern at the activities of Pinàish citizens who were systematically violat­
ing the Soviet-Finniah frontier and which the Finnish Government seemed reluct­
ant to control#^* During 1931 this tension increased rather then decreased.
The Finnish Government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
not only have not taken any measures to curb the high-handedness of 
the Finriiah soldiers In their anti-Soviet fawnsy, but, on the contrary, 
encourage and develop this provooatoiy witches’ sabbath##.It is clear 
that the influence of extra Finnish forces, relying on the adventurists 
in the Finnish general headquarters, are attempting to hasten the 
attraction of Finland to an anti-Soviet adventure and to shatter the 
peace in eastern Europe...The Finnish soldiers in fact Imprudently 
direct Finland’s policy in relation to the Soviet Uhion and continue 
to test the peace-lovingness and self control of the Soviet country.42#
Such articles permeated the Soviet press in May 1931* On May 13,Maisky, the
Soviet Ambassador in Finland, made a resolute protest against demonstrations
43.
by fascist students outside the Soviet embassy# A few days later, Krestinsky
38. Isvestiia editorial. May 11, 1931#
39* Pravda# May 11, 1931*
40. For example, quote in Isvestiia April 26, 1931*
41. See, for example,Note of the Soviet Ambassador in Finland,Maisky to the 
Finnish Foreign Minister,July 16.1930.A.V.Sabmin.Neshdmarodnaygk Politika 
dogcovorv# deklarataii i diplomatioheakava cereciska#Volume 3 (Moscow 1932}
pps.232-233
42. Isvestiia May 7# 1931*
43* J.M.Maisky Head of NKD press department,1922;Soviet Counoellor in Britain, 
1925-1927;Japan,1927-1929;Ambassador in Finland,1929-1932|Britain,1932-19431 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs,1943-1946. Isvestiia, May 15,1951*
addressed a not® to the Finnisîi Charge d*.4ffaires in Moscow complaining that 
"despite frequent warnings by representatives of the Soviet Government both 
in Helsinki and Moscow, the campaign of enmity and hatred against the Soviet 
Union in Finland which began last summer is continuing and growing stronger*"
The note went on to criticise the tacit agreement and encouragement of the 
Finnish Government in the hostile acts directed against the Soviet Embassy in 
Helsinki*^* The following day a note from the Narkomindel to the Finnish 
Mission in the U3SE complained of the fortification of certain Finnish islands 
which, according to the Russians, violated the 1920 Soviet-Finnish peace 
t r e a t y , a  charge which the Finns denied.^^*
The relationship of these small states to Poland and each other is illus­
trated by the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affair’s comment to Litvinov during 
a meeting at Geneva# The former stated that his Government was interested in 
a non-aggression pact with the Soviet IMion if Poland had or would in the future 
propose such a pact to the USSR# Litvinov replied that "we, as always, were 
ready to sign a pact with Finland independently of Poland and the Baltic statMz 
Following up this conversation, the Finnish foreign minister told the Soviet 
Ambassador in Helsinki that Finland would be prepared to conclude a non-aggress­
ion pact with the USSR separately from the other Baltic states but that such 
pacts must be concluded by the Soviet Government with the other border states 
also, a step which, according to the Finn, these states were prepared to take*
To emphasise this point, any pact signed by Finland must include a provision 
that the Finnish-Soviet pact would become invalid in the event of the abrogat­
ion of the pacts between the USSR and the Baltic states* Maisky replied that 
such a condition was impossible* In any case, in his report to the HKD he
44* Note from the Depu'fy Commissar for Foreign Affair a,Krestinsky, to the Finnish 
Charge d’Affaires in the USSR,¥esterlundi,May 17*1931 *1 ^  yoi* 14*'P0s♦
327-329*
45# Note from the HKD to the Finnish Mission in the USSR,May 18,1931* Ibid#.
P#344-*
46# Reply of the Finnish Misaion,May 21,1931* p>|d*«P»796 NotellS*
47# Telegram from the Commissar of Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,conoeming his
meeting with the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs in Geneva,May 19,1931* 
Ibid#. p#798# Note 123,
considered that the paramount factor at the present time was the improvement 
of relations with Finland in general as a preliminary to any non-aggression 
pact negotiations* Maisky, in this conversation, gained the impression that 
the Foreign Minister had discussed this theme with representatives of the o#icr 
border states whilst in Geneva*^^* It was this veiy joint action by its western 
border states d^iich Russia wanted to break down in order that strictly bilat­
eral non-aggression pacts could be concluded, since it was in such joint co­
operation by these states that Russia saw the danger to it.
These diplomatic probings did not terminate the press war between both 
s t a t e s , A  note of caution may perhaps be added that to a degree such hostile 
press campaigns in the Soviet Uhion catered for the internal readership and 
sought to create an impression of external danger against which unity and vig­
ilance at home were essential* Nevertheless, they remain clear evidence of the 
bad relations existing between Finland and the
Soviet relations with Rumania were the least amicable of all this group, 
largely owing to the Bessarabian dispute* Together with Poland, it was seen as
the major staging point for a western imperialist intervention against the 
80.
USSR* Even in this case, however, as with Poland, the spring of 1931 wit­
nessed a cautious diplomatic probing of the situation by both Governments, 
though the absence of diplomatic relations compelled the delicate talks to be 
hold between the respective members of the Rumanian and Soviet diplomatic 
delegations in London# On March 20, a British journalist acted as the link in 
bringing the Soviet Counsellor and the Rumanian Counsellor in London together. 
Bogomolov, the Russian, informed his Rumanian counterpart that he understood 
that the Rumanian Government desired to send a representative to Moscow for 
negotiations on all unsettled questions* He was prepared to forward Moscow any
48. Note of a conversation between the Soviet ""Zbassa^ "in' 'Finland^ Maisky, 
and the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ire-Koakinen,June 1,1931» 
m p Vol. 14. p.363.
49* For example, Isyestiia. June 24,1931; Fravda.June 28,1931; Isvestiia.
August 13, 1931*
50* See, for example, a long article on the Rumanian economy and its plans for 
intervention, Isvestiia. June 11,1931*
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proposals from the Rumanian Government. Chiotori, the Rumanian, said that 
he wanted to visit Moscow as a delegate of his government, ostensibly to 
settle some seoondaiy question, such as the position of the archives of the 
former Rumanian Embassy in Bt.Peteraburg. Simultaneously he would be authorised 
to negotiate on all questions. A Soviet agreement to this proposal would allow 
the Rumanian Government to put this into effect. Bogomolov agreed to report the 
contents of the talk to Mo scow.
Litvinov’s comments were not encouraging. He objected to the need for the
soviet Government to agree on the ijhoposal prior to its acceptance by Rumania 
since this would provide the possibility of labelling the talks as undertaken 
on Soviet initiative. Neither did the idea of masking the real reason for the 
visit by a secondary one appeal to him. Ohiotorl must visit Moscow coa^letely 
officially with official proposals from the Rumanian Government
Bogomolov informed Ghiotori that "we shall not object if officially it is 
announced in the press that (Chiotori) is coming to us for negotiations on the 
question of the archives, but we shall give a visa only if he has official 
authorisation from the Rumanian Government to negotiate on all questions*^^* 
Chiotori agreed to inform his government of this proposal, which presumably 
was rejected since this theme was not again resumed.^*
d
The major reason for this failure was the previous aoption of rigid 
positions by both governments. It is likely that the Rumanian Govemmmt had 
some knowledge, at least, of the Polish-Soviet contacta and was anmious not 
to be left in the cold by future developments. The lack of progress between
51. Note of a conversation between the Soviet Gounfillor of -Wie Embassy in 
Britain, Bogomolov and counsellor of the Rumanian Mission in Britain, 
Chiotori,Maroh 20,1931. BVF Vol.14. p*208. Deputy Representative of the 
Far Eastern Republic with the RSFSR Government,1922jSoviet Charge d*Affaires 
in Britain,1925*1926 5 ^4î|bA»sador in Poland,1927*1929;GounseHor of Soviet 
Embassy in Britain,1924|lmbassador in China,1933**1937. Executed, 1938.
52# Letter from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to the Counsellor of 
the Soviet Embassy in Britain,Bogomolov, April 6,1931# Ibid#.cos.232-233.
53* Note of a conversation between the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in 
Britain, Ghiotori, April 23,1931# Ibid., ppa.272-273#
54. See DVF Vol.14. p.792. Note 96.
Waraaw and Moeoow by the early summer of 1931 did not encourage the Rumanian 
(government to retreat from Its stance on the Bessarabian issue* Mx official 
representation to Moscow on this subject would Imply that this region was not 
a completely Integral part of Rumanian territory, an implication which Bucharest 
refused to concede* Conversely, only such an official act would satisfy the 
Russian contention that Bessarabia’s fate was by no means beyond legal doubt* 
Despite a Soviet desire to negotiate non-aggression pacts it was not prepared 
to concede ground on this affair in the same way as it stood firm on its ref­
usal to negotiate multilateral pacts with Poland and the Baltic states* This 
is not too surprising; if the Soviet Government had adopted this position in 
its far-weaker diplomatic situation of the 1920* s, it was unlikely to be more 
yielding at a time when the balance of power seemed to b© gradually swinging 
in its favour* This is by no means the last word on the Bessarabian issuei it 
win be encountered further in later pages when it will become a central issue 
in the whole series of Soviet non-aggression pact negotiations.
At this point, a few words may usefully be inserted on the remaining 
Baltic state# Lithuania* Reference has been made in the first chapter to the 
absence of a common frontier with the USSR and thus it was not strictly one of 
Russia’s western neighbours* Also, unlike the other Baltic states it was invol­
ved in territorial disputes vfith both Poland and Germany; accordingly it tended 
to seek support in the international system from the other great power of 
eastern Europe, Russia* During the inter-war period Eoviet-Bithuanian relations 
were cordial, a state of affairs encouraged, it has been suggested, by the
absence in the latter countzy of any movement of importance advocating either
55*communism or incorporation into the IÎSSR* Here was Üie one positive achiev­
ement in eastern Europe for Soviet diplomacy’s attempts at securing non- 
aggression pacts in the twenties. On May 6,1931 the Soviet-Bithuanian non­
aggression pact of 1926 was prolonged for five years, thereafter being auto­
matically extended each year unless one of the parties gave notice six months 
before hand of its desire to open negotiations for a further fom of political
5S.G* ' W* Keeton"'and'% rM ohLea&f:er*''''Russi^^ lyesteS '' E e i& 'bour
(Bondon 1942), p.44*
relations between both states* * lavesiiia devoted an editorial to the
importance of Lithuanian friendship on the Russian western frontier and the
failure of the western powers to entice it into an anit-Soviet frontt
At a moment when the danger of new military shocks in Europe and the 
threat of an armed attack on the Ü3SH are looming larger and larger, 
the Soviet Halon and Lithuania have demonstrated by the signing of 
the protocol their interest in the preservation of peace*#?*
The danger to the USSR in Europe was not enlarged upon; non-aggresaion 
pact negotiations were beginning with Eranoe, negotiations for the renewal of 
the Berlin treaty with germany and even with Poland; something seemed to be in 
the air* But Soviet propagandists were not to be side-tracked by the achieve­
ments of their fellow diplomats*
3* Towards negotiations*
The summer of 1931 introduced important changes into the Soviet-Folish
relationship which were to have significant consequences for the fortunes of 
a whole series of non^aggression pacts* Polish distrust of its ally, Pranoe, 
was not ameliorated by the Auatro-German customs union affair and Isvestiia 
noted, not without satisfaction, that "Polish leading articles circles do not 
thoroughly trust France and are greatly alarmed by Briand’s policy*^ Poland* s 
position became yet more problematic^ îdth the onset of Franco-Soviet non­
aggression pact negotiations and the renewal of the Berlin treaty, both of 
which were knoim to Warsaw. Commenting on the former, a Polish paper consid­
ered that Polish foreign policy must loam as qulelciy as possible from the re­
grouping of Prance, adding thqt Poland had neither a trade treaty nor a non­
aggression pact with the On the latter the "Gaseta Warsm#Fska" in a
leading artiolo reacted almost hysterioallys
The treaty of Berlin undoubtedly represents a serious danger for 
Poland* It is clear that Germway will tiy to use this treaty so as
to achieve a constant, close collaboration with Russia on questions
'5^ %'''protoo3'''%^  of ' t &  ' 8ovï%-&tW oÿ'%tuaî'
non-aggression and neutrality. May 6,1931* SEJÜSiâM;» pps*318*#19*
57* lavestiia. May 7» 1931*
38* Ibid*, May 11, 1931*
59# quoted in Ibid.. June 22, 1931*
whiqh oônoem Poland In an effort to ro&urreot the Bisaa^cian 
tradition. Therefore Poland must attentively follow the manoeuvres 
of the Berlin dipXomeoy and must counter German policy by its own 
policy in relation to Russia# The fact that we are involved in a 
struggle with oommmism at home must not change the wide perspectives 
of our relations with Russia which independently of the system which 
exists^in Russia represents for Poland immense political and economic
value#wO#
This article, if in an extreme form, represents a definite view shared 
in leading circles that Poland must at least consider the possibilities of a 
re-orientation in fomign polioy# Of oourse, the motivating factor was more 
deep-rooted than this leading article would suggest* Soviet-Geman relations 
had been close and based in part, at least, on a common anti-Polish policy, 
since 1922# The renewal of the Berlin treaty merely demonstrated a German desire 
and a Soviet readiness to acquiesce in this long-standing policy* The more 
basic reason for Poland's apprehension was to be found in the international 
system itself , which threatened to expose Poland* a weak position by its inner 
rumblii)tgs of power shifts. If Pmnoe was becoming a less reliable ally against 
an increasingly unstable and extreme Germany and at the same time was abandon­
ing its long-hdd policy of total hostility towards the Soviet Bhion, could
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Poland afford to stand aside and trust to its old policy* *
During May a breakthrough in Soviet-Polish economic relations had occurred 
with the visit of a Polish industrialists* delegation to the USSR* * On the 
political front, contacts seem to have lagged during the early summer but on 
August k Patek held an interesting conversation with Karakhan. He began by 
stating that eoonomio relations between the two countries were developing 
satisfactorily* Then he passed on to political matters, promising that before 
his departure for Warsaw in the near future he would give Karakhan a proposal
do* "SuOteË ''in' 'îsv^ m,,,mjAriirrnrnrv,u:.,aO,m,: n iirm  nn :i,,T ,rriii^
61* The Counsellor of the Polish legation told Sir Esmond Ovey in June that 
during the last month there had been a considerable detente in Polish- 
Soviet relations* The Bifd-tish Ambassador in the USSR, Ovey, to the foreign 
Office, June 8,1931, Public Record Office, F#0* H4209/2627/55^
62* Report of the Polish MSistsriZ^^ to the Polish Minister of
Foreign Affaire, Zaleski, May 18,1931* Sov-P<>l .Doo^. pps*482-484#
for a non-aggresaion pact# The Polish diplomat claimed that since 1926 he 
had been conducting negotiations with Stomonyakov, a high official of the 
Narkomindel on this theme, which although failing to produce a signed pact, 
had in practice provided good results, the proof of which lay in the absence 
of aggression by either side during this period. At this juncture, Karakhan 
expressed the Soviet view that no such negotiations had taken place since the 
summer of 1927 and if this topic had been broached in passing with Stomonyakov 
this could not be classified as negotiations*
When asked if the Polish Government in those supposed conversations had 
moved towards the Soviet position, Patek replied that there remained four 
points of disagreement; the question of the western border states, "fâiat is, 
the Soviet demand for strictly bilateral agreements with all these states; the 
question of Rumania; the question of the League of Mations and Poland's oblig­
ations to that organisation and the question of good offices and arbitration, 
referring to the Soviet preference for conciliation. Only on the third point 
would Patek concede that a common settlement could be found, to which Karakhan 
replied that from this it appeared evident that the Polish Government did not 
intend to take any new steps nor make any now proposals. In particular, he 
criticised the Polish attitude towards the Baltic states, asserting that it 
raised serious doubts as to Poland's sincerity, Patek replied that he had on 
many occasions striven to secure a change of positions in Warsaw on this ques­
tion but the answers he received compelled him to think that Poland had given 
promises to these states on the subjeetf^ Karakhan thought that such a prom­
ise was hardly a genuine obstacle which could not be overcome when considering 
such an important matter as a non-aggression pact between Poland and the tJSSE. 
Patek, however, seemed oonvinced that Poland would not abandon this position. 
Karakhan's final conclusion in his note of this conversation was that
0 Zlsvesiiia "denied FrenoirSmou'rs^^.....the'Soviet G6vernmSt''‘Ss''obndu^
non-aggression pact negotiations vdth Poland. lavestiia, July 27,1931*
64. Presumably the promise was that Poland would stand firm against the 
Russian demand that each of these states should negotiate an individual
non-aggression pact.
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"evidently thia new Polish proposal was only made in the possibility of 
shouting to all the world that Poland has made a new proposal for a pact to
the Soviet Govemaent*"^^*
The promised meeting between these two diplomats before Patek's depart­
ure for Warsaw took place on August 23, Patek laid great emphasis on a non­
aggression pact and handed the Soviet Deputy Commissar a review of the negot­
iations thus far, summarising the earlier proposals but presenting no new ones. 
The latter again confirmed that, having especially acquainted himself with the 
situation as regards pact negotiations, Patek's information advanced at their 
previous meeting was incorrect and that these negotiations had indeed ended in
1927# Once again, Patek claimed that Antonov-Ovseenko and Ealeski had held such 
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negotiations * which Karakhan denied. Patek expressed the hope that on his 
return from holiday the business could be pushed f o r w a r d , t o  which Karakhan 
noted pessimistically that "it is impossible to move the business forward s5noe 
he (patek) has not given me anything new but only stated that to which we could 
not agree'I^ *^
The project pact, based on the old series of negotiations, which Patek
handed Karakhan. at this meeting did not in fact mark any progress, retaining
the four major points of dispute. The first two articles, the basic ones, stated
that both contracting parties rejected war as an instrument of national policy
69in their mutual relations and undertook to abstain from any aggressive actions
or attacks on the other. Such actions would include any act of force which
'65. Note 3 'a conversation'be%een'%E for Foz^ eign Affairs,
Karakhan,and the Polish Minister in the USSR, Patek,August 4,1931*
DVP Vol. 14. pps* 441^444.
66. See conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, and the 
Polish Minister in the USSR,Patek,January 29,1931,so© above, p.111.
67. According to this Soviet report of the conversation Patek* s expressed hope 
was not quite a proposal that formal negotiations should begin as Scott 
states from Patek* s statement in the French Journal des Debats,August 28,
1931* Scott, Alliance against Hitler.pps*15-16 » I would be inclined to
follow the Soviet version, at least as far os the Russian understanding of 
the talk is concerned. It may be that Patek genuinely believed thathhe had 
formally proposed that negotiations should begin.
68. Note of a conversation between the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Karakhan and the Polish Minister in # e  USSR, Patek, August 25,1931*
DVP Vol.14. pps* 484-486.
69. Based on the Kellogg Pact.
violated the integrity and inviolability of the territory or political 
independence of the other eontraoting party even if carried out without the 
declaration of war. If one of the parties, despite its peaceful oonduot, was 
subjected to attack by a third state or group of states, the other party under­
took not to render help or support to the attacking side during the conflict*
The controversial issues arose in relation to the later articles. The 
third article emphasised that the above obligations could not in any event 
restrict or modify the rights and obligations fdiioh arose for Poland from its 
participation in the League of Nations as well as Polish obligations arising 
from its defensive pacts concluded in oonneotion ivith the League Covenant. 
Article four conoezned the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means but 
left open the question of arbitration versus conciliation* This implies a 
Polish willingness to compromise at least on this point by eventually accepting 
the Soviet preference for the latter. The major obstacles to agreement arose in 
the fifth and sixth articles of the Polish project;
Both contracting parties agree that the other governments which 
signed the Moscow Protocol of February 9,1928 70. be invited to 
conclude analogous treaties with the USSR.
(The pact) will enter into force thirty days after the ratification 
by the ministries of foreign affairs (of Poland and the USSR) that 
analogous treaties between the USSR on the one side and Estonia,
Finland, Latvia and Rumania on the other, have been ratifi.ed.
The Soviet Government was adamant that the Soviet-Polioh non-aggression 
pact must be a strictly bilateral and isolated event, having no bearing on
Soviet relations with third states. Polish insistence on these articles threat­
ened any negotiations with a similar fate to those of the twenties. The pact, 
according to this project, was to be concluded for three years, to be prolonged 
for a further two years if not denounced three months before the expiry of the 
first period*^*
The Soviet Government was anxious to repudiate all rumours of non-aggress­
ion pact negotiations with Poland during the summer of 1931* The very precise
70. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Persia, Rumania and Turkey signed.
71. Project non-aggression pact handed by the Polish îlinister in the USSR, 
Patek, to the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Karakhan, August 25, 
1951. DYP Vol. 14. pps. 487-488*
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définition of "negotiations" used by the Russians led to disagreement vfith 
Poland as to whether such negotiations had in fact taken place# The reason for 
this Soviet attitude was simples Soviet diplomacy was already persuading the 
German Government that it had nothing to fear from the non-aggression pact neg­
otiations in progress in Paris# If the Germans believed that a further series 
of negotiations was being held in Warsaw, this Russian task would be greatly 
complicated and the risk of German alienation much too hig, at least while 
such dialogues as were being held with Poland, whether "negotiations" or other­
wise, wore so unproductive#
Towards the end of August a Tass report officially denied an article in 
the "Chicago Tribune", stating that "no negotiations between Moscow and Warsaw 
were being conducted for a pact of non-aggression#" The Paris negotiations did 
not in any v^ray affect the relations of either party with third states and in
72,
this number was included Poland# ' Despite this Soviet denial, the French 
news agency "Hava»" on August 26 stated that Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact 
negotiations had been underway since October 1930 when the latter received a 
Soviet proposal# The report continued that only this knowledge of Soviet-Pollsh 
negotiations induced the French Govemment to accept for examination a Soviet 
pact p r o p o s a l T h i s  statement was false as regards both the Soviet negot­
iations with Poland and France^* and on August 28 it was officially denied 
by Tass#^^'
During August such rumours abounded# On August 25 the Polish press 
announced that "as a result of the exchange of views between the Polish and 
Soviet Governments on the question of a non-aggression pact which occurred in 
1926, the Polish minister in Moscow, M# Patek, hwded a Polish project for a
72. lisyestiia# August 23, 1931*
73. Quoted in Sov-Pôl Doc»# p. 497* 
74# See above and chapters 2 and 3* 
75# Isvestiia# August 28, 1931#
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non-aggression pact to the Narkomlndel on August 23," * Two days later, Tasa
officially answered this opinion*
The new document now presented by M,Patek,,.(on August 23) repeats 
the same conditions, and adds one more vdiioh has not heretofore 
figured in the negotiations,.,(it) is not a step forward in Polish- 
Soviet negotiations but a step backward. Moreover M.Pateky in delivering 
the dooument, made no proposal for the resumption of negotiations and 
himself desoribed the document merely as a summary of the negotiations 
of 1926-1927*7/#
This, in fact, correctly stated the position as revealed in Karakhan*s 
note of his conversation with Patek* In order to add emphasis, Litvinov himself 
delivered a statement in Berlin to representatives of the foreign press concern# 
ing rumours in the press that the Soviet and Polish Governments were beginning, 
conducting or resuming negotiations on the conclusion of a non-aggression pacts 
"no negotiations have been nor are being conducted* * .because the Polish Govern­
ment has given no occasion to think that it has changed its relation to the 
Soviet proposals "since 1927, He then went on to speak of Soviet foreign 
policy aims:
The Soviet Government continues to regard as desirable the conclusion 
of non-aggression pacts with all countries v/ith which it is in direct 
contact and it has made corresponding proposals to all these countries 
in its time*78,
Litvinov had arrived in Berlin that day to discuss with Gurtius the 
Soviet negotiations in Paris and Warsaw. The need to placate Germany was 
now becoming vital | the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact had been initialled 
on August 10 and the constant rumours of Soviet-Polish negotiations could not 
be ignored* Vtet would be the German response? The previous chapter made ref­
erence to Poland as the major concern of German foreign policy. Of course, un­
improved
animity within Germany on the danger of imposed 8oviet-Polish relations did 
not exist, Dirksen, for example, had written in January that "even if the 
Russians do intend to resume negotiations with the aim of oonc$.dding a non­
aggression pact,;*"* .this is no basis for us to see in this a danger to Germany
 i ,.
77. Taas atatement#Augu#t"^7$1931, Begras.Soviet Document^ on foreign Policy
Vol. 2* p#505*
70, Statement by the Oommissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to representatives 
of the foreign press,August 28,1931* SHEJÈiaJà» PP®* 499*501,
79# Isvestiia, August 28, 1951,
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ej^lain the intentions of the Soviet Government and to exhort him to exert 
the ut^ moflt pressure on the Narkomindel*^^* Polish fears were intensified by 
the January 1931 decision of the League of Natic^ s Oounoil to convene a dis­
armament oonfereno© in February 1932 at which Gemany threatened to insist on 
©quality of armaments against a weakened frenoh opposition.^*
Regardless of German apprehension and possible repercussions on the 
-ï^palô-coursep the Soviet Union by August 1931 n e e m to have determined on a 
non-aggression pact with Poland so long as Polish intransigence regarding the 
Baltic states was modified# The Russians were not prepared to chance a final 
sacrifice of German links unless they secured their main terms from Poland but 
if this could be achieved then Soviet diplomacy would forge ahead on its new 
Warsaw course, Litvinov, in September 1931# informed Massigli, the French ex­
pert at the fourth session of the Commission on European mion in Geneva, in 
reply to the latter's reply remark about French interest in the improvement of 
Soviet-Polish relations, that "the Soviet Government always has been prepared 
to conclude a non-aggression pact with Poland on the same basis as that with 
France and that the affair lies with Warsaw, not with ua#"^^*
The international situation was definitely beginning to readjust* Of 
course, Comintern statements continued to label all capitalist states with the 
most heinous crimes as, for example, an article on Interventionary preparat­
ions:
The group of small capitalist countries bordering on the USSR on 
the western frontier and forming part of the so-called Little Entente 
or of the Baltic bloc which Poland is busily knocking together, is 
engaged in feverish preparation for intervention#
Yet, in fact, Russia's relations with the outside world were beginning
to take a turn for the better* Reporting on the fourth session of the
'MosG6w'~'Tokvo 
84* Korbel, Polmd b^ Eastland .West, p*264*
85# Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the French Representative at 
the Disarmament Oonferenoe, Massigli, September 1951,B W  Vol.14. p.817
Note 195.
86. Rudolph, "Western Neighbours of the USSR Are Preparing for Intervention," 
International Press Correspondence. Vol.11. No.47. September 3,1931 ,p.868#
CoMoission on the stuây of the European Union in September, Litvinov was able
to state that France had wade some attacks on the USSR but in general was
friendly* He noted "in general a further reduotion of foreign hostility to- 
8?
wards us." * During the same month the foreign Minister of that hitherto most 
anti-Soviet state, Rumania, was quoted as saying that although security could 
only be the result of general mutual confidence, he admitted that non-aggress­
ion paots have some value and that Rmumia was ready as before to conclude 
such pacts with all countries without any exceptions.In these internation­
al adjustments no state could afford to be left out in the cold.
4# A Far Eastern Digression*
Signs of a relaxation of the Russian diplomatic position in the west were 
abruptly overcast by an event which occurred on a remote railway line on Sept­
ember 18, 1931# when an explosion near Mukden proved to be the signal for a 
Japanese occupation of Manchuria* It is not the intention of this thesis,which 
deals with the cautious re-orientation of Soviet foreign policy and the part 
which the series of European non^aggresslon pacts played in it, to examine the 
Soviet reaction to the Japanese action in detail. Soviet diplomatic activity, 
however, cannot be appreciated unless it is constantly recalled that the 
decision-makers in Moscow were faced with a tremendously long far eastern 
frontier which posed enormous security problms, especially after the Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria*
The decision to negotiate non-aggression pacts with Franco and the western 
border states had been taken long before this Japanese actionf indeed, the 
Franco-Soviet pact had already been initialled and tentative talks with Poland 
begun before September. Yet even before that date, Moscow's desire to consolid­
ate its position in the west was by no means divorced from eastern consider­
ations* Russia, as much as Germany, was plagued with the nightmare of a war on 
two fronts* The real,rather than potential, threat which Japan posed for the
dy^'rZegrml'from' the 'OhaSman'^'of ''the Soviet 'Deïegation the Commia'sion "on"
European Union, Litvinov, to the NKD, September 6.1951 »DW ¥ol .14. nos »516-517< 
88* Quoted in iBvestiia* September 11, 1931#
USSR by the end of 1931# enhanced the connection between east and west and 
gave further impetus to the negotiations in the latter. As Bhtein# a high- 
ranking member of the Narkoraindel# admitted to Dlrksen# events in Manohuzla 
had been instrumental in the Soviet Government's decision to hasten a rappr­
ochement with Poland#though not the cause# since this had been slowly 
developing throughout 1931* It was that much more essential to secure the 
western frontier when Soviet troops in the east faced advancing Japanese 
forces.
This desire to conclude pacts in the west was not reduced by the fact 
that in the early months following the Manchurian incident the major Soviet 
target was not Japan itself but the western imperialist powers and their tool, 
the League of Nations. Isvestiia# only three days after the Mukden incident# 
suggested that the Japanese move was well prepared by an agreement with other 
imperialist states. Particularly poisonous vemm was aimed at the League of 
Nations, that "Geneva talking-shop. " *  At the bottom of this imperialist 
activity was the desire to obtain a new division of the world. It was 
thought that imperialist contradictions# ©specially in the Far Bast# would 
inevitably be deepened by this incident and this in turn would encourage the 
western imperialist powers to direct Japanese attention northwards towards the 
Soviet border and away from China proper where Japanese competition would not 
be welcomed; the seizure of Manchuria would be the point of departure for a
89. Mémorandum by thé German Ambassador in the !JS8R#Dirkaen#to the German 
Foreign Ministry,January 6#1932*German Archives, quoted in Lyok# W e ^ r  
Germany and Soviet Russia. p.243*Tho Soviet Government was probably anxious = 
to us© the Manchurian events as an excuse for its Polish rapprochement when 
dealing with the German Government. B.Y.Shtein; from 1920, head of the trade 
and political section, assistant head of the economic law dept.,head of the 
dept, of Poland and tbe Baltic countries,head of the centml European Dept.# 
#%en head of the dept# of international affairs,in the Nïü>. Soviet Minister 
in Finland#1932-1934S Ambassador in Italy,1933^1939î Coimaellor# KKD,
1945-1952.
90. Isvestiia. September 21,1931* See also# for example, an article entitled 
"League of Nations openly supports Japanese intervention in Manchuria," 
Ibid.. September 28# 1931'
91# Pravda. November 5# 1931 <
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3#*
world anti-Soviet adventure#^^* Japan, however, was far from being guarant­
eed against a situation in which its imperialist enemies would support the 
Chinese movement directed against it when it entered Manchuria and this ought 
to warn Japan against creating a tense situation with regard to the USSR,"the 
only country which really pursued a policy of peace,
The Russians can be excused for suspecting that the west would not be 
reluctant to see Japanese activity directed northwards, especially given the 
Soviet ideological analysis of imperialism. The League powers and the United 
States had reacted to the Manchurian incident somewhat half-heartedly; th^ 
were in the throes of a world economic crisis which was sapping their strength 
and oertainlj* not conducive to collective security operations in the Far Bast 
when their vital interest» were not at stoke, Soviet distrust of France was 
especially strong since the latter had refused to sign its initialled non- 
aggression pact with the tBSH* The French press was accused of openly support­
ing Japan and the French Government of encouraging Japan's anti-Soviet plans 
Soviet suspicion was not confined to France alone and, amongst others, Poland 
also was accused of exploiting Japan's invasion of Manchuria for its anti- 
Soviet objectives# According to Pravda, immediately after the Japanese action 
in September Pilsudski left for Rumania in order to define more precisely with 
the Rumanian general staff the plans for a joint attack against the USSR.^^* 
The Soviet press also noted an article in the Polish paper "Kurjer Poranni" 
which complained that the Polish Embassy in Toîyo was too weak and needed to 
be strengthened since "in the near future events will take place which will 
have enormous importance for the whole world and will closely concern us." In 
the present situation, the article noted, Polish-Japaneae friendship should be
92* Terentev#^ "Rorba imiperialistov sa Manohshurii" in Mif, lolk and Yoitineky, 
Oktoipatsiia ^ anchshurii,p#69# Quoted in j.Hodorawis. "Soviet Reaction to the 
Manchurian Incident 1931-1932".Gertificate essay, Russian Institute, 
Columbia University, 1958, p. 30.
93* Izveatiia. November 22, 1931*
94* The Japanese move had been timed to coincide with the economic depression 
which it was hoped would nullify any western desire to intervene.
93* Ibid. .November 1?,November 24,1931*Pravda«November 29,1931.Franco-Soviet 
hostility was to grow more bitter in the spring of 1932#See chapter 5*
96. Ibid#. December 3, 1931*
fundamentally strengthened and deepened* The Soviet Government could have 
harboured few doubts as to the common link between Poland and Japan.
The Soviet reaction to the Japanese action itself was one of alarm. Any 
belligerent move close to its frontier was a security threat* The Soviet Gover­
nment could not but be worried by the seriousness of the events in Mukden and 
the threat they posed both to the frontier and to the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
a line which was jointly owned by Russia and China and ran through Manchuria?^* 
Soviet polioy from the outset vigorously opposed Japanese actions in Manchuria 
in verbal and written communications but avoided any moves which might provoke 
an actual conflict. As Litvinov said, "we are doing nothing which would compl­
icate the situation." The Commissar assured the Japanese Ambassador that his 
government wanted to preserve good relations with Japan. Yet as it became 
clear to Japan that the Russians would not effectively resist its operations, 
it modified its initially restrained polioy in Northern Manchuria and became 
bolder.
At a time when the Soviet Government was about to enter into intensive 
negotiations with the states on its western border for the conclusion of non­
aggression pacts, its attention was chiefly concentrated thousands of miles 
away in the east. Molotov, in his report to the Central Executive Committee at
the end of December recognised Manchuria as being the most important question
100
for Soviet foreign polioy. *
It must be noted that in the east as well as in the west the Soviet Gov­
ernment attempted to negotiate a non-aggression pact at the end of 1931. Not-
97. Quoted' in' 28IÏ951*'"" ' "
98. Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, 
and the British Charge d'Affaires in the U33R,Strang,September 24,1931* 
DVP_m.l4. PP8.537-538.
99* Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the Japanese Ambassador in the ÜS3R,Hirota,October 2.1931.Ibid. .p.560» 
Hata has stated that during the earlier period of the Manchurian incident 
certain elements in the Soviet Government wanted to make a sortie into 
Northern Manchuria but they were reportedly overruled by others, including 
Stalin and Molotov. I. Hat a, Reality and Illusion .The Hidden Crisis Between 
Japan and the USSR. 1932-1934.Occasional papers of the East Asian Institute, 
Golumbia^  ^#  (New Yor^ k 1967),p.4*See also J.Eriokson.The Soyiet
High Command (London 1962), p.336. 
lOO.Molotov's report to the CEC,December 22,1931* Degras.Soviet Documents on 
Foreign Policy Vol.2. p.519.
withstanding the refusal of Japan to conclude such a pact in the twenties, at
this very oritiool time in their relations, the Soviets once again proposed
such a pact in December. The offer was made by Litvinov to the newly-appointed
Japanese Foreign Minister who had called in Moscow on route from Paris to
Tokyo to take up his post. Litvinov himself noted;that the Japanese Minister
was clearly caught unprepared by the proposal. The Commissar made the point
that Japan was the only Soviet neighbour with which it had no non-aggression
pact nor was negotiating such a pact. He considered it necessary to fill this
gap, especially at a time when the future of Soviet-Japanese relations was the
101object of speculation in western Europe and America. ‘ The Japanese response 
to this proposal was not encouraging and in fact no reply wa% given to Moscow 
for almost a year despite frequent Soviet reference to the subject in conver­
sation with Japanese diplomats. Only on December 13, 1932 did the Japanese 
Government reject it on the grounds that conditions were still not ripe for 
such a pact, the settlement of possible causes of disputes such as local agree­
ments to avert difficulties which arose from the contiguity of Japanese and
102Soviet forces being desirable as a preliminary. * The Soviet reaction to this 
was somewhat barbed. Izvestiia commented that "the Japanese Government appar­
ently oonnsiders the conclusion of non-aggression pacts appropriate only bet­
ween those governments which have no questions at issue between them, but with 
the present economic and political inter-dependenca of states such a situation 
hardly exists and is scarcely possible, particularly as between states which 
are more or less close neighbours," * The reasons for the Japanese refusal 
were probably a desire to secure a more favourable fishing treaty and more 
extensive cool, oil and timber concessions in North Sakhalin and the resist­
ance of some Japanese military leaders who were beginning to advocate
1 0 1 'Note ''of 'a ''oonversaMonb ' Commissar for Foreign Aff^ ,LÏtvïnov
and the Japanese Foreign Minister,loaidzava,December 31,1931* DVP Vol.14% 
pps. 746-747*
102. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Japan,Troyanovsky,to the MB, 
December 13,1932. DVP Vol.15, (Moscow 1969), p.683. A.A,Troyanovsky,
Soviet Ambassador in Japan,l927-1933 5Ambassador in the USA,1933-193B.
103. Izvestiia. January 17,1933*
Bearing in mind this Soviet pro-oooupation with its far eastern frontier, 
attention must now be returned to the negotiations of late 1931 in Europe;
perhaps the USSR would have greater success with those paot negotiations.
5. Paris, Moscow and Warsaw.
The initialling of the Franco-Soviet non-aggrossion pact on August 10 
marked the completion of the first stage of the negotiations but still fell 
far short of their final conclusion* The next stage, the signature, was urgently 
desired by the Soviets in order to translate a politioal-diplomatio gain into 
a tangible achievement. Throughout August and September conversations continued 
in Paris on this theme. On September 23, during one of the regular meetings 
which were held between Dovgalevsky and Berthelot the Soviet Ambassador demand­
ed a clarification of the position prior to Berthelot'a visit to Berlin which 
would create a temporary break in the meetings. During this conversation the 
French official dropped abbombsheli on Dovgalevsky when he stated that Briand 
considered the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet pact must follow or accompany the 
conclusion of a Polish-Soviet paot*
I expressed amazement at this new demand and resolutely opposed the 
establishment of any dependence or connection between these two acts, 
having made the reservation that the Soviet Government, as it has said 
many times before, is prepared to conclude a pact with the Poles,103#
Dovgalevsky' a amazement may well have been genuine since the Russians had
steadfastly opposed any such connection. Yet they had been given sufficient
warning in the past months of this French attitude* The "Bulletin du J<^r" of
"Le Temps", often inspired by the Quai d’Orsay, had stated in August that "it
is quite clear that such a pact of non-aggression (the Franco-Soviet pact) can
only be concluded.. .within the framework of the obligations which link France
ÏÔ4. See, for Sample, conversation of troa^ovs^ with 'the" Jap^ese "Forei^” 
Minister. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Japan,Troyanovsky, to 
the KKD, February 29,1932. BVP Vol.lS. p.l49*
105. Telegram from the Soviet iimbassador in France,Dovgalevaîy, to the NKD, 
September 23,1931. DVP Vol.14. pps.533-336#
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to Poland and to Rumania. Dovgalevsky himself had heard at the end of 
May that Briand was delaying work on the paot because the French Government 
wanted tO include Poland in a multilateral agreement with the USSR.^^^*
At any rata, Berthelot adopted a oonciliatozy attitude in so far as he 
promised that the French Government would propose to the Poles that they cease 
forwarding unacceptable proposals to the Soviet Government and agree approxim­
ately to the text of the Franco-Soviet paot.^^^* Dovgalevsky replied that the 
eventual withdrawal of the unacceptable Polish proposals and an agreement to 
that text would of course eliminate the obstacles to the conclusion of a Soviet- 
Polish paot and that his government would be the first to welcome such a change 
of mood in Warsaw but that this did not signify Soviet agreement to the connect­
ing of the Franco-Soviet and Polish-Soviet pacts
This delay in signing was not at all to the liking of the Soviet Govern­
ment* On October 1, Litvinov telegraphed Dovgalevslgr, urging him to see 
Berthelot as soon as possible in order to ask him directly "whether and #ien 
the French Government intends to sign the paot of non-aggression." The initial­
ling of the pact and yet its non signature had created a "completely unusual 
situation" since the signature normally followed the initialling after several
deys or at least a short period of time and certainly not v/ith a delay of 
110#
several months. * Dovgalevsky carried out these instructions on October 5 
when Berthelot Once again stated that it was desirable for a Soviet-Poliah 
pact to be concluded before the signature of the Franco-Soviet pact# The French 
diplomat added that both Briand and himself had Impressed on Zaleski the desir- 
abiliiy of the conclusion of a Polish-Soviet pact with a similar wording to 
ïd6'.''''%e''TemDslAugust '25.193Ï.'''Quoted' &''Sco^
107* See above, pps. 84-85* Also reputedly Berthelot had stressed this condit­
ion to Dovgalevsky at the time when the pact was initialled. See above
P#96.
108. As a compromise,Berthelot also spoke of the French signature of the pact 
before the completion of the Polish-Soviet negotiations if the French 
Government was oonvinced of their favourable completion in the near 
future. See telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Franoe#Dovgalevsky, to 
the mCD, October 9,,1931. DVP Vol.14. p*566.
109* Telegram from the B'oviet Ambassador in France,Dovgelevsky,to the HKD, 
September 23,1931* Ibid.. p.536.
110. Telegrma from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the Soviet 
Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsl<y,October 1,1931# Ibid.. p.552#
that In the Franco-Soviet pact, to which Edeski had replied that this wording
seemed acceptable. Dovgaievolgr also reported that Franco-Soviet discussiona on
111
a conciliation procedure were to start that imek.
The question of the relationship between the Soviet negotiations with
France end Poland might usefully be mentioned at this juncture. The latter two
states were closely linked and must have exchanged information on their respect*
112ive discussions and negotiations with the tîSSR, * yet it does seem unlikely 
that Boviet-Polish negotiations on the theme of a non-aggression paot began be­
cause of French pressure. It is also clear that at least some influential circ­
les, at a veiy early stage in the negotiations ?dth Russia already opposed the 
signature of the non-aggression paot before a similar step had been taken by 
Poland and that this was made the official reason for the delay in signature by 
the French on September 23. Nevertheless, the Polish décision to begin probes 
in Moscow's direction concerning the possibility of a pact appears to have been 
an independent one, prompted by the deterioration of relations with Germany and 
France. Soviet willingness to accept any genuine Polish decision to abandon 
its position of 1926-1927 and open fresh negotiations was prompted by a desire 
to strengthen the western frontier, utilise any such reversal of attitude with­
in Poland and counteract its deteriorating relations with Germany. Soviet- 
Polish diplomatic probings began some time before the Franco-Soviet negotiat­
ions had achieved any results, bhdoubtedly the refusal of the French to sign 
the non-aggression pact before the conclusion of a Soviet-Polish paot gave 
added weight to the arguments in favour of such a paot expounded In Moscow, as 
did the Japanese invasion of fcïanohuria, but a definite resolution to follow 
this couz’se had been taken before tînese new factors could exert their
111. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Franoe,Dovgalevsky,to the Oommissar 
for Foreign Affa4rs,Litvinov, October 6.1931.DVF Vol*14. pps *562-563*
112# At any rate on August 20,Ealeski, after visiting the Quai d* Orsay, stated 
that Poland fully approved the French notion and had similar goid,s* 
Bulletin du Jour,Be Temps, August 38,1931* Quoted in Soott.Alliance 
Against Hitler. p.l5.
113* In 1932 Berthelot told Dovgalevsky that Poland had not objected to the 
signing of the Franoo-Soviet pact before the preliminary eonoluslon of a 
Polish-Soviet pact but that the French Government had insisted on having
its own way# J'f /rjr%H/, Arm™ Scv^ ieh Av' ^ D f J  / As
th. b l/p Vc/./r; f/ii. I'Xo /'Xf,
influence* fact, Soviet policy may well be underatood better if seen as a 
utilisation of French pressure on Poland to facilitate the signature of a 
Soviet-Palish non-aggression pact rather than as an attempt to negotiate such 
a paot with Poland as a reaction to French blackmail in order to s ecurpa sig­
nature in Paris* This was in fact Dovgalevsky* s advice:
It will follow to utilise French pressure on Poland in order to obtain 
a pact with the latter; this on its own would be a good thing as w:^l 
as depriving the French of this occasion to deprive delay the signing 
of the pact with
The crucial fact remains, however, that from the middle of September
Soviet negotiations with Paris and Warsaw were closely linked. Berthelot*»
assertion to Dovgalevsky on October 5 that Ealeski had found the wording of the
Franco-Soviet non-aggression paot "acceptable" for a Polish pact with the USSR
raised Soviet hopes for a rapid tenaination of both seta of negotiations. On
October 14, Litvinov saw the Polish Charge d*Affaires in Moscow and handed him
a supplement in which it was stated that according to Berthelot* s remarks
Ealeski approved a text for a Boviet-Folish pact and therefore "it can be
thought that all obstacles to the signing of a non-aggression pact with Poland
to which the Soviet Government has aspired for a long time will be eliminated
If the Polish Government officially confirms M.Berthelot*s statement." The
Polish diplomat was asked to consult Warsaw as to whether the Polish Government
was in fact prepared to sign such a pact#^^^*
On the same day, Litvinov also telegraphed Dovgalevsky, proposing that he
see Berthelot and secure confirmation that the Polish Government had finally
116
agreed to sign a pact with the USSR on the basis of the French text* *It
appears from the text of Ihis telegram that the Russians were anxious to use
French pressure on Poland to hasten the signature of a Soviet-Polish pact.
Dovgalevslg was instructed to explain to Berthelot that this same question had
also been submitted to the Poles through Eelesinski, their Oharge d'Affaires in
. 'jMbasmdS^^^ ' the ' CiSSsSr
' for Foreign Affairs,Litvlnov,October 6,1931. DVP Vol.14# p.564#
115. Supplement handed by the Gommissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the 
Polish Charge d'Mfaires in the USSR,Eelezinsl^ y, October 14,1931.
Ibid.. p.571.
116. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the Soviet 
Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky,October 14.1931 .Ibid..n.572»
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Moscow, but "that in view of the interest shown by the French Government and 
in the interest of a quick settlement of the question, you are turning for 
assistance to Berthelot. "^17#
In his reply a few days later, Berthelot was very frank with Dovgalevslgr#
The French Charge d*Affaires in Warsaw had spoken both with Patek, in Ealeski’s 
110
absence, and with a member of the Polish Poreigp Ministry# Prom the report, 
Berthelot gained the impression that the Poles were inclined to drag out the 
paot negotiations and that it was necessary to exert pressure on them, instr­
uctions for which he promised to send immediately to the French Embassy in 
Warsaw. In addition, that Embassy wotld ingress on the Poles Üio fact that the 
Franco-Soviet paot was independent of the Polish-Soviet paot. Patek had told 
the French Charge d*Affaires that he must see Pilsudski before his return to
Moscow but that the paot negotiations would probably begin with the oonfirm-
119#
ation by the Polish Government of its old counter-proposals#
The new angles which Soviet foreign policy was pursuing in Paris and
Warsaw were highlighted by Molotov in his report to the memorial meeting of the
Moscow Soviet on the fourteenth anniversary of the October revolution# He noted
Eoleski’s report that the Polish Government was ready to sign a non-aggression
paot with the and Only hoped "that these words do not remain just
words*" Because France had only initialled but not signed the non-aggression
paot with Russia,
for the time being we cannot help being sceptical*
In any event our hope is that a non-aggression paot between the 
USSR and Poland, like the paot of non-aggression between the USSR 
and France, will be realised in the very near future.1^1*
ïl7I^T©îegrS*Spï 'lho GomÏÏôaar ''^^  Soviet
Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky,October 14,193i* BVP Vol.14. p*572*
118é The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs was ill at the time#
119* That is,those himded to the Soviet Government on August 23,1931*See above# 
Telegram from thé Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky,to the Oommissar 
for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,October i9,193i* DVP Vol#li|.. p.gSl#
120* Probably referring to Ealeskl*» October 30 report to i K  Sejm Commission 
on Foreign Affairs in which he stated that the Polish Government was feaUy 
to sign a non-aggression paot with the tBSR since it considered this to be 
a further Step forward on the path towards the strengthehing of peace#
Bee Izvestiia* November 3, 1931*
121* Report of Molotov* s speech bn November 6,1931* Ibid** November 12,1931*
The official Polish "Gazeta Polska", noting Molotov's speech, wrote that
it created the impression that the Soviet position on the non-aggression peict
question had ehanged in a positive direotion from the negative position at the
end of August and to this extent Molotov's words were greeted favourably* If a
Soviet desire to preserve peaceful relations with Poland really existed, "there
is no obstacle to the conclusion of a non-aggression paot between Poland and
really
the USSR*" If ihe USSR attached signlfioanoe to such a paot, "the road for the
^ 122Soviet Government*##is open." * Izvestiia commented that the Soviet position
on this question had been unchanged since 1926 and that it was not the Soviet
Government #tlch was holding up the proceedings *
Molotov's hope was not to be fulfilled, however, despite continued efforts
by Soviet diplomacy to urge France and Poland on the path tpwards signature.
Dovgalevsky expressed Soviet dissatisfaction at the delay in signature by France
French
because of the unexpeoted^^desire to co-ordinate their future steps with those
of Soviet-Polish relations to both Berthelo%^&nd Briand.^^^*
Russian optimism regarding the eventual signature of the non-aggression
paot by France was not encouraged by Litvinov's conversation with Patek on
November 14# Patek had promised that on his return to Moscow he wouldiapswer
126
the Gommiss&en's proposal made to the Polish Charge d'Affaires oh OOtober 14# *:
He now proceeded to cast a dark shadow on previous Polish statements to the
effect that Poland found acceptable for its own non-aggression pact with the
USSR the text of the Franco-Soviet paot* Patek claimed that although this text
had been read to Ealeskl in Warsaw by the French Ambassador the Poles had never
actually received a copy* It was true that Ealeski had told Berthelot that he
found nothing in the Franco-Soviet pact which contradicted Poland's interests,
but "this was not quite the same as s^ing that Poland would sign a non-
SaT'GZeta'Pofak Wovenb'er''Ï4#Ï9311'Q wteS'''S''''lzve^ ^
123* Ibid*
124* Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky,to the NKB, 
November 13,1931* DF? Vol.14^  p.825* Note 233*
123* Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky,to the NKD, 
November 14,1931* Ibid.. p*633*
126* See above, p* 156.
aggression paot on the Frenoh model*" Patek denied that Berthelot and
Ealeski had disouesed a Sovlet-Polish paot and claimed that the former had
confirmed to the Polish Charge d’affaires in Paris that the Soviet belief that
Ealeski would actually sign a paot with the TJBSE on the same wording as the
Franoo-Soviet paot was based upon a mi sunderstanding * Litvinov refused to accept
this explanation and further demanded an answer to his proposal of October 14#
Patek then replied that his government did not consider the Soviet-French paot
as suitable for Poland; much of it was superflous to Polish interests and much
12?
that was especially interesting was missing# * Therefore, Patek proposed to 
retum^îhe 1926 project paot with the additions made in conversation with 
Karakhan on August 23, which, he claimed, differed from the 1926 Soviet project 
paot only by its mentioning of the Kellogg phot and the Moscow Protocol,
Litvinov expressed agreement at the return to the old project, only noting 
that in the pa<st this project had provoked Polish disagreement which five years 
of sporadic negotiating had failed to remove* Patek explained that the concl­
usion of the Riga peace treaty, the Kellogg Pact and the Moscow Protocol suff­
iciently safeguarded peace between the two states and he did not see a special 
need for a fourth pact which would cover the same ground but nevertheless, 
would consider a non-aggression pact useful, especially if it included new 
points.
Patek then raised the spectre of the Polish allies and associates udilch
hitherto had bedevilled Soriet-Polish negotiations# He stated that the Polish
Government was interested in the Soviet Union concluding pacts with all the
countries from Finland down to Rumania* His government was not so much inter*
-ested in the t o m  of such pacts as in their actual signature, this being meant
as a re-assurance that Poland did not desire to impose a protectorate over
127*'''Budu%i^cm,''probably'correctiy%'''#inks
Article 5 of the Franco-Soviet pact which dealt with the abstinence from 
propaganda and the creation or supply of military organisations aimed at 
the other party* He omsiders this provision unacceptable to Poland whioh 
wanted to prevent Soviet interference in its internal affairs and was rel­
uctant to end the activities of emigre groups such as the Ukrainian Government- 
in-exile. Buduroi'^ c», Foliah**>SQviet Relations. p#H* footnote 50.
- .............. 4
X28*them# * Litvinov was not reassured, hoivever, and replied with the standard
oomment that negotiations with Poland on the suhjeot of Soviet relations with
third countries were tuiaoceptahle and especially so was their mentioning In a
Soviet-Polish document:
(l)f the Baltic oountries will not sign a pact I can see no reason 
why Poland should not sign a paot tomorrow. I am convinced that on
the following day all the Baltic countries would follow Poland’s 
example#
He stressed that the Soviets had always been ready to sign non-aggression pacts 
with the Baltic states end the guilt for their non-realisation lay with ihe 
latter# The Commissar ended by saying that if the Poles accepted conciliation 
procedure instead of arbitration, as France had done, and made no more of the 
League of Nations than had France, two obstacles to the signature of a pact 
would be removed#^^^*
The following day, Patek once again spoke to Litvinov on the importance 
of the Russians mentioning a non-aggression pact to the Baltic states, to which 
he gave great significance#^"'^* Hi#1"strictly secret" report on these two con­
versations sent to Ealeski is of.some interest. He noted Litvinov’s statement
that Russia was prepared to inform the Baltic states that its proposal
. ■ 1 - 
remained in force and was ready to begin pact negotiations with these states
immediately if they «so desired. Patek interestingly admitted that he was un­
informed on Polish-Baltic relations at the present time and therefore did not 
know whether the Russians should be encouraged to make such an approach but "it 
seems to me that if we could assure the Soviets that such an approach would 
have positive results, that la, those states would answer such a call by app­
earing at a conference on the question of a non-aggression pact, thai Litvinov 
would decide to take the first step." He also thought Poland must decide
. Mtonov-Ovseenko, Patek had denied that a Soviet-Rumanian non-aggression 
pact would necessitate concessions on Bessarabiaîhe said that the Bessar­
abian question could remain on one side as it had in the Litvinov protocol* 
DVP Vol. 1^1.. pps# 643’^644*
129# Note of a conversation between the Oommissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, 
and the Polish Minister in the USSR,Patek,Novembar 14,1931*%t&§&,pps*
^ 647-650.
150# Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the Polish Minister in the USSR, Patek,November 15.1931,Ibid# *p*657.
*44.#
whether it wanted Rumania to sign a non-aggression paot with the ÎÎBSR and if 
so, whether it would he able to influence Bucharest to take the initiative in 
such a move*
As concerns the Baltics and Rumania, it would he better not to display 
our participation and mediation in the oonductilng of this business since 
the Soviets support the point of view that the USSR waiîts to conduct 
negotiations directly with each of these states##*The USSR cannot off­
icially recognise Polish mediation or, as it was said before, "protect­
orate," in relation to thesb states therefore Poland cannot take on 
any official responsibilities in rela|,on to these states*131#
Xt was suoh a Polish propensity* to interfere in these relations which the 
Russians suspected and so strongly opposed#
Despite considerable obstacles to the conclusion of a Soviet-Polish non­
aggression pact and therefore to the signing of the Franco-Soviet pact, progr- 
ess was being made and was seen to be made, especially by the interested on­
lookers in Berlin# Only a few months had elapsed since the continuance of 
Soviet-German friendship had been defined by Berlin in terms of a shared anti- 
Polish attitude, Despite some reassuring statements, the German Government was 
undoub'bodly agitated by the new direction of Soviet Foreign Policy. Dirksen was
recalled to Berlin several times in order to explain the Soviet Government's 
132
intentions. * He told Krostinsty and Voroshilov that "in the interests of
German-Soviet relations, the non-conclu sion of the Polish-Soviet treaty was the 
only possible and desirable course." let how could Germany enforce such a 
demand? #ie rupturing of GermonGSoviet relations, the only way, was a step which 
Berlin was reluctant to take. Therefore Germany adopted a more tenable posit­
ion and sought to safeguard its interests as much as possible by seeking to 
obtain a promise that the UBSE would not guarantee the Polish frontier. Dirkaen 
spoke with Krestinsky on November 10 concerning Germany's position on the 
Soviet negotiations. He withdrew Germany's objections to a sinmle non-
agression pact containing only a prohibition on aggressive wars but added that
151.'''Repo^  '^ îë'p S iS ' ®   'S*S’ito”Se^ Minister of
Foreign Affairs,Eol©ski,Novefber l6,1931«Bov-Pol Dpcs,ous.506-*507*
152. Dirkson. Mo so ow^  Tokyo .London. pps.115-116*
133. Memorandum by Biiksen,November 12,1931.German Archives. Quoted in Dyck,
Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, p.243#
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a "direct or indirect guarantee of Polish territory" would violate German
interests and endanger the bases of the Berlin treaty.^ ^^ * Krestinaky, in
reply, promised that a 3oviet-Polish non#-aggreseion treaty would not alter 
German-Soviet relations either in form or content.Xn conversation with 
Litvinov on November 16, Dirkson again stressed this point. H© told the Sommissoî 
that the German Government, from the view-point of general peace, could not 
oppose a Boviet-Poliah non^ aggression paot but all the same this could not but 
exert m  influence on German society. It was common knowledge that the negot­
iations with Poland had been resumed under French pressure and the fear had ar­
isen in Germany that this pressure would restrict the USSR’s manoeuverability. 
More specifioally, Dirksen expressed German concern at the possibility of 
"territorial integrity*' being mentioned in the pact. In fact Germany could not 
understand why a supplementary paot to the Kellogg Fact was necessary*
Litvinov rejected the opinion that a non-aggression pact was irr^evant 
in view of the Kellogg Fact alace the multilateral oharacte& of the latter 
restricted its uaefulness as contrasted with a bilateral agreement* It was on 
opinion whioh the Polish Govenmmt did hold but idiich the Soviets steadfastly 
rejected. As oonoemed Polish territorial integrity, Litvinov assured Dirkson 
that Russia had spoken only of its non*violation bf forceful acts but had not 
recognised the legality and justice of its frontiers. Further, he acquainted 
the German Ambassador with the present state of Polish-Soviet negotiations,
This answer could have satisfied neither Dirksen nor his government.
If ihe German Government was becoming apprehensive about the new trends 
in Soviet foreign policy, the Russian Government was not entirely complacent
ÎS*''r'M©m6rÏÏâS'"liy' DirîC8en',SovembS 'Quoted'ir^ ^
Weimar Germany and ^ oviet Russia, p.244*
135* ,> .
136* Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the German Ambassador in the IBSE,Dirksen,Nov6^ ber 16,1931* ï^ yP Vol*14. 
p.658. Dirksen some years later did recognise Litvinov's amenability, 
stating that "he loyally kept me informed about the course of the negot^  
dations and even showed me the drafts of the clauses under consideration,
X was thus able to raise objections and to suggest counter-proposals i#lch, 
to some extent, were accepted." Dirksen, Mcsoow Tokyo London.u.116*
Germm internal âevelopmente# Soviet complaints continued to be lodged 
oonoemtng articles in the German press and serious attention was paid to 
the increasing Influenoe of the national Socialist Party within the Weimar 
EepuWio,^^®*
A further cause for Soviet concern was provided by the visit of the French 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to Berlin in September. This close contact 
was provoked by Germany* s desperate economic situation which seemed to require 
the suspension of reparation pevents if the position was to be controlled. 
These Franco-Gensaan negotiations were alarming to the Soviet IMion, however# 
despite their ostensible economic nature. The Russians# being persuaded that a 
common front between two such antagonistic capitalist states could only be 
cemented on the basis of a common anti*.Soviet policy# naturally saw in these 
conversations deeper motives and potential results. This apprehension was ia*" 
creased by the continued refusal of Franoe to sign its negotiated non-aggress­
ion pact and the deterioration in relations with Germany# especially as cone* 
emed the Soviet-Poliah talks. I&vestiia thought that the French visit "repres­
ents a link in the development of highly far-reaching tendencies in internat* 
ional relations which demand great attention In Hovember Xsvestlia quoted
an article from the organ of the German Centre Party# "Germania"# which pointed 
out that Franco-Germn collaboration must be directed' against the Soviet
There was some justification for tills Russian view insofar as France would
m
agree to economic and financial accomodations only at the price of political 
agreements which amounted to the abandonment by Germany of its revisionist 
plans. Scott even suggests that France-proposed secretly a non-aggression pact
Ï37* 'For'’eîai5 ï^e7''"®î'^ ï3-'^ 6f^ ®
Hrestins^i to the Soviet Ambassador in Germany# Khinohuk# October 23#
1931. hVF Vol.lA. p.389.
138* See for example Imvestiia. editorial# October lA#1931fDecember 8,1931.
139. Ibid.. September 28,1931.
140. ibi^.. November g, 1931.
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with Germany* * The Soviet Government was aware of these French designs# 
Xsvestiia printed an article on this subject in December which reported that 
France demanded from Germany an undertaking not to taice any steps connected 
with the revision of the Versailles treaty and recognised the inviolability 
of the Polish-German frontier# so insistrlng on Germany’s entry into the French 
system# * Khlnohuk asked Bmming# the German Ghancellor# about Franoo-German 
relations to which the latter replied that he could categorically confirm that 
in the economic negotiations which were being conducted there would be "no 
scorpions directed at third powers
Undoubtedly on® of the French objectives was to disrupt Russo-German 
relations end a successful Franco-German rapprochement could well have isolated 
the Soviet IMion at the Very time when it seemed to be strengthening its inter­
national position. The failure of these talks between France and Germany, how*
ever, removed any such danger to the Soviet ïïniçn but the talks did for a time
I
postpone Paris’s Interest In its initial;;non-aggression pact with Russia.
Soviet-German economic relations rose to the diplomatic surface in the 
autumn with regard to the recurring problem of expanding Soviet exports to 
Germany which alone "will create a strong base for our payments to Germany", 
as Khlnohuk informed Bruning’^ ^  and later the former German foreign Minister, 
Curtius, who replied that Bruning continued, as before, the orieptdtion in 
support of Soviet-German relations and resolutely stood for the osqpansion of 
credits On November 14, Soviet-German economic negotiations b©gan^^*with
propose financH aid to Germany on the condition, qmong other things, that
the latter renounce all new economic rapprochements with Russia, hoping 
that this would out or reduo® existing ties between Moscow and Berlin.
. M.Mourin '^Des relations Franoo-Sovietiques 1917*196.7 (Paris 19^7),p.171#
142. IsvGstiit^. Deoember 17, 1951#
143. better from the Boviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinohuk, to the Deputy 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Kreatinsly, November 3.1931.DTP yol»14.
p*&57#
144# lbi|*.. ppa* 636-637#
143# Note of a conversation betvfcen the Soviet Ambaesador in Germany, Khlnohuk 
and the former German Foreign Minister, Gurtlus, November 9,1931# Ib^d##
p.641*
146# layestiia. November 16, 1931#
the aim of creating a stronger basis for and the possibility of a further 
development of mutual économie relations. In fact, the major object was m
expansion of Soviet exports to Germany to counter the considerable growth in 
German exports to the The talks ended on December 22 with the signing
of a protocol which, according to Pravda, served the aim of eliminating diffic­
ulties which had arisen because of the economic crisis in all markets and there­
fore in Soviet-German trade; "the chursa of the negotiations*..gives occasion 
to expect that the desired aim of the negotiations will be a c h i e v e d * I t  is 
interesting to note that Khlnohuk considered that Germany’s developing polit­
ical interest in the tïBBR in connection with the Franco-Soviet and Polish- 
Soviet non*aggression pact negotiations had created a favourable climate for 
such economic negotiations* Soviet-German relations primarily would hinge 
on developments in Warsaw end Paris*
To return to the Soviet-Polish negotiations, it will be recalled that on 
November 14 Patek had denied that the Polish Government or Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had been shown the text of the Franco-Soviet hon-aggression pact, but 
from its reading to ^ aleski the Polish Government could not accept it as the 
basis for a Soviet-Polish pact and preferred a return to the Soviet project of 
1926 with certain amendments made by Patek In conversation with Krestinsîîy*
Ydion Dovgalevs%r informed Berthelot of Patek’s conversation with Mtvinov the 
French official again confirmed that Polish representatives had seen the text 
and termed Patek* s statement on this point a flagrant lie. He was less perturbed 
by the Polish rejection of the Franco-Soviet wording as a basis for negotiat­
ions, however, saying that if the Poles preferred to return to the old Soviet 
proposal no-one could forbid it* Berthelot sought to impress upon the Soviet 
Ambassador the fact that Fmnce was doing all in its power to spur on the Poles 
in the negotiations and read him a report of a conversation between the French
147* Protocol of the Plenary meeting of the Soviet and German economic delegat­
ions, December 22,1951* DVP #1*14. pps.728-750.
148, Pravda. December 24, 1951*
149* Rëport of the Soviet Ambassador in Germany, IÜiinohuk,to the NKD,Aprü 7, 
1952* DTP Vol.14. p. 750.
Ambassador in Tfarsaw and Kaieski in which the former insisted on the rapid 
introduction of negotiations and the rejection of counter-proposal s which were 
unacceptable to the Soviet Government. According to French sources, Piliudskl 
was supposed to have instructed Patek to hasten the negotiations and withdraw 
the unacceptable proposals# Dovgalevs&y replied that the motive behind the use 
of the Soviet-French pact’s wording was a desire to speed up proceedings and hf 
returning to the old project the Poles had demonstrated that they were not 
interested in the rapid termination of negotiations'
As he had promised on November 17, Berthelot saw Bale ski three days later 
before once again speaking with Dovgalevsky# The French diplomat also saw the 
Polish Charge d*Affaires in Paris who oonfimed that he had received the text 
of the Franco-Soviet pact from Berthelot which he had forwarded to the Polish 
foreign Ministiy and to Patek personally# Berthelot expressed considerable dis­
satisfaction to Bovgalevsky that the Polish-Soviet negotiatims should be cond­
ucted on the Polish side by Patek who clearly was hostile to the conclusion of 
a pact but that he hoped by preseuro to compel him to change his line# On the 
crucial question of the Polish attitude towards the inclusion of the other 
border states in the negotiations with the USSR, however, Berthelot refused to 
reply when Dovgalevsïgr suggested that France should tiy to persuade the Poles 
to drop this condition#^^^'
It would appear that Patek *s dupliciiy in this affair was motivated by his 
Government’s reluctance to accept the Franco-Soviet text as a basis for negot­
iations and perhaps by his own inclinations rather than as an excuse to postpone 
the openios of formal negotiations, since Tass announced on November 21 that 
Litvinov had proposed to Patek the resumption of negotiations for the conclusion 
of a non-aggression pact on the basis of the 1926 draft#^^^* These negotiations 
officially began on November 23, Litvinov and Stomonyakov representing the IBSH,
A&b'as^ ^
for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov,November 17,1931* P W  Vol*14#nns.660-66l*
131# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Ffanoe,Dovgalcvsky,to the NKD, 
November 20,1951. Ibid#. pps.666-667*
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Patek the Polish Government, *  It may he,however, that the Polish refused 
to accept the French wording was in part prompted by a desire to prolong these 
negotiations In order that there should be time to involve the other border 
states.
é• Hegotiations underway#
The introduotion of officiel Polish-Soviet negotiations, as in the oase 
of the earlier negotiations with France, did not signify that diplomatic activ­
ity was drawing to a close, but rather its intensification. These negotiations 
were to be dominated on the Polish side by an insistence that the Soviet tftiion 
begin simultaneous negotiations with Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Rumania and 
on the Soviet side by a desire to placate Germany by limiting its commitments 
to Poland.
Polish intransigence surfaced only one week after the commencement of the 
negotiations when Patek insisted on the simultaneous conclusion of a Soviet- 
Rumania non-aggression pact to which Litvinov replied that If Rumania made suoha 
proposal then the Soviet Government would examine it favourably but that it 
could not conduct negotiations with Poland about third countries. This inform­
ation was telegraphed to the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey with instructions to 
notify the Turkish Foreign M i n i s t e r . O n  contacting the latter, Surits was 
informed that the previous day the Rumanian Minister had visited the Foreign 
Minister and requested advice as to h©w best to advance the question of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the 0SSE and where to begin negot- 
isitions. Surits instructed the Turkish Foreign Minister to tell the Rumanian 
representative that he should make an official proposal concerning non-
154. According to Beok, the negotiations were slowed down by Poland at the 
beginning to allow the Baltic states to keep in line and make use of the 
precedents established in the Soviet-Polish negotiations. Bock, FinWl 
Reporti p.9.
135# Telegram from the Gomraiasar for Foreign Affair a,Litvinov, to the Soviet 
Ambassador in Turkey, Surits, December 1,1931# D'VP Fol.lA. p*830, Note 
230. In the absence of Soviet-Rumanian diplomatic relations negotiations 
were initially conducted through the respective embassies in Ankara*
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aggression pact negotiations to
The Soviet Ambassador drew soma interesting oonolusions from this 
sequsnoo of events* Sinoe the Poles were hardly likely to welcome direct and 
Independent negotiations in Bucharest without Polish involvment, it was improb­
able that the action of the local Rumanian Minister in Turkey was undertaken on 
Polish advice even though it coincided in time with the conversation between 
Litvinov end Patek and the former’s rejection of Polish mediation* Therefore 
Surits posited that the action was an independent step of the Rumanian Govern­
ment though prompted, of course, by the Soviet pact negotiations with Poland
157.and possibly by a distrust of Poland* * These comments seem at least a prob­
able explanation of the events which appear to have been intended seriously 
since the Rumanian Ministei* in Warsavf also made an official proposal to the 
Soviet Ambassador for the conclusion of a non-aggrasslon pact* The Russians 
naturally preferred the negotiations to be conducted in a place less susceptible 
to Polish influence than Warsaw and chose Ankara for this purpose, Surits being 
ordered to see the Rumanian Minister as quickly as possible and obtAin from him 
any proposal which he might mak©#^^^* The meeting took place the following day 
and on December 7 Litvinov telegraphed Surits that the Soviet Government accept­
ed the Rumanian proposal for negotiations and authorised him to conduct them in
159
Ankara, of which the Rumanian Minister was informed on December 8. * The
seemingly intraotible problem of Soviet-Bumanian relations was thus surmounted 
relatively easily or so it appeared* Agreement was reached that non-aggression 
pact negotiations should begin, the only obstacle being the venue, Rumania 
rejecting first Aikara and then Moscow, itself suggesting Warsaw*^^^* A compro­
mise agreement was eventually reached on December 26 when Riga was accepted as
ïB6''r*’TS'egSm'''from''thé S0fi!ïS'ei^ feSSiS?eè*'gï^
in TurkeyySurits, to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,December 2,
Z951* HSJaitik, F#688*
137* a&d*
138# Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov#t0 the Soviet 
Ambassador in Turkay,Surits,December 3#1951# Ibid*. p.830, Note 231*
159* Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to the Soviet 
.Ambassador in Turkey,Surits,December 7,1931# Ijbld*
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249.
X6X*
the centre in which the negotiations should he conducted*
These Polish and Rumanian developments were quickly followed hy activity 
on the part of the Estonian Government which through its diplomatic represent­
ative in Moscow expressed its readiness to resume the non-aggression pact 
negotiations with the Soviet Government which were interrupted in 1927# Litvinov
162.agreed, suggesting Moscow as the venue* Initially the Estonian Government 
suggested that the negotiations he based on the Polish pact hut on being in­
formed that as yet no such pact existed it was then agreed that the 1926-1927 
negotiations should provide the starting point or, if preferable, the Franco- 
Soviet pact, "but independently of one or another basis we are ready to start 
negotiations at any date, or even now," as Litvinov said* The Estonian Minister 
in Moscow replied that he was not authorised to begin negotiations immediate^^I 
On December 23 the head of the eastern department of the Latvian Foreign 
Ministry in a private conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, Svidersky, said 
that in the very near future he was thinking of beginning negotiations with the 
Ü8SE on the basis of the 1927 trealy^^^' and that he would prefer the negotiat­
ions to be conducted in Riga but would not object to Moscow. Svideraky replied 
that the Soviet Union would welcome any sincere steps directed at the strength­
ening of peace. In his telegram to the Narkoraindil he noted that no mention was 
made in the conversation of either Estonia or Poland.^^^ * Isvestiia carried an 
article on December 27, however, reporting that the Estonian and Latvian Govern­
ments had been conducting negotiations and informed Latvian political circles 
considered agreement had been reached that the Soviet-Latvian non-aggression
l6iT^T3Legram ' fi^ lm the Soviet Ambassador S  Turk<ÿ,8u]^ the NKD, December 
26,1931* DVP Vol.14. p.739. According to Berthelot he had advised the 
Rumanians not to insist on Warsaw but to be guided by Litvinov’s statement 
on the Soviet readiness to conduct negotiations directly with Rumania in 
Moscow, following the precedent of the Moscow protocol negotiations* 
Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky,to the NKD, 
December 18,1931* Ibid. « p.713* If this is so, the Rumanians did not heed 
Berthelot * s words.
162. Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the Estonian Minister in the USSR, 3elyaiaaa,December 8,1931* Ibid#.
p.698#
163* Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the Estonian Minister in the USSR, Selyamaa,December 14,1931* Ibid.,
P*710.
164# See above, p.14#
163# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Latvia,Svidersky,to the NKD, 
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pact text of 1927 would aerve aa the basia for both oountriea* future negot-
*ï
dation a with the USSR* * Two âay a later the Latvian Minister in Moaoow
officially proposed to resume negotlatlona on this basis which Litvinov welcomed
and expressed readiness to begin them in Moscow on any day to idiioh the Latvian 
16 7.
did not object. * The Soviet Government would not favour a simultaneous sign­
ing of the two pacts ?/lth these Baltic states, %m?ever, ostensibly on the ground 
that this would create difficulties and delays, in fact because of its long­
standing hostility to such an intimate linking of two independent pacts
The fifth Soviet western border state, Finland, proposed to resume non­
aggression pact negotiations which had been interrupted in 1927 on December 19 
and hoped that they would get under way and be brought to a successful conclusion
169quickly. * An indication of the changed international situation, especially 
in this region of eastern 3§urope, is the fact that after the elapse of five years 
since such negotiations were last conducted between Finland and the USSR, a 
period interspersed with violent press and diplomatic outbursts, this Finnish 
proposal was delivered to the Soviet Ambassador in Helsinki during a conversat­
ion which lasted no more than fifteen minutes. The Finnish Charge d’Affaires in 
Moscow handed the Narkomindel a statement indicating Finland’s readiness to 
negotiate a non-aggression pact with the USSR "in continuation and on the basis 
of the 1926-1927 negotiations, talcing into account the results and achievements
of the negotiations between the tISSH and France and the Ï3BSR and Poland." The
170
Soviet Government expressed a readiness to resume them, repeated on December 
22 in Helsinld. by Maisky to the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet 
Ikiion accepted Helsinki as the venue and noted with pleasure the fact that the 
Finnish project pact, based on the French and Polish texts with the IÎSSH as well 
166, Isvestiia, December 27, 1931.
167* Note of a conversation between the Coimoissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the Latvian Minister in the USSR,Beskia,December 29.1931.1)VP V|ol.l4.
p.743.
168# See the telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Latvia,Svidersky,to the 
MD, December 30,1931. Ibid.. p.746,
169. Note of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Finland,Maisky and 
the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs,lre*Coskinen,December 19,1931# 
Ibid.. pps. 714-715#
170. Note of a conversation between a member of the NKD, Stomonyakov and the 
Finnish Charge d’Affaires in the #8R,Decomber 19.1931.Ibid.#n.718.
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as the 1926-1927 negotiations excluded two disputed points from the latter 
negotiations, namely, the League of Nations and arbitration* To Maisky* s 
question as to whether the Finnish Government appreciated that the non-aggress­
ion pact must he a completely independent treaty between the two countries, the 
Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative but added that he hoped the Soviet 
Union would also conclude pacts with the other border states. Maisky formed the
opinion that the Finn had not fully abandoned the idea of establishing some kind
171of link between the Baltic and Polish pacts and perhaps even that of Rumania.
Meanwhile the Polish-Soviet negotiations, the only set actually under way
by the end of 1931, were proceeding "normally" according to the Polish Foreign
172Minister’s statement in the Sejm Commission on foreign affairs. * At the first
r
four meetings in November and ea^y December individual articles of the Soviet
and Polish projects were examined and at the fifth meeting on December 21 it was
173
agreed to publish the text of an agreed project pact. The preamble spoke of
the desire to preserve peaceful relations and to develop and supplement the
Kellogg Pact and the Moscow Protocol. Both contracting parties, rejecting war
as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, were bound to
refrain from any aggressive actions or attacks both individually and jointly
with other powers against each other* By actions were meant any acts of force
which violated the integrity and inviolability of the territory or political
independence of the other contracting party even if without a declaration of
war. (Article l) This basic article remained identical to that handed by Patek
to Karakhan on August 23, baaed on the 1926-1927 negotiations* The second
article by which an attack on one of the parties by a third power must not be
directly or indirectly helped and supported during the conflict by the other
party also followed the August project# Article 3 had been modified during the
Note of a conversation betwe^i' '-Ùie ' Soviet Ambassador in Finland, 'llalsky 
and the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ire-Keskinen, December 22,
1931* DVP Vol. pp»* 735-736.
172. Quoted in Fravda. December 19, 1931*
173. DVP Vol. 14. p.832. Note
course of the negotiations. The August text dealt with Poland’s rights and 
obligations arising from its participation in the League of Nations and defen­
sive pacts concluded in connection with the League Covenant. This was object- 
ionabl© to the Soviet Union and the December text merely stated that articles 
1 and 2 would not restrict the international rights and obligations which 
issued from agreements concluded before the treaty’s entry into force ixi so 
far as these agreements were not aggressive, .ârtiole 4 dealt with conciliation 
procedure as a means of peaceful settlement of disputes incapable of solution 
by diplomatic means, Poland giving way to the Soviet preference for conciliation 
rather than arbitration* The December protocol, like the August project, 
imposed an identical duration of* three years for the pact vfith automatic re­
newal for two years if not denounced six months before its expiry.
Gertain points of disagreement still existed between the two sides yet 
overall this was a solid achievement in a relatively short spar© of time. The 
Soviet Union insisted on the inclusion in article 3 of the phrase, "each of the 
contracting parties is bound not to take part in any agreements which are clear-: 
ly hostile to the other party and also which contradict formally or substant­
ially the present pact," to which Patek reserved his opinion. The Russians also . 
desired that a supplementary protocol should be signed by vhich both Governments 
undertook to ratify the pact as quickly as possible, Patek again reserving his 
o p i n i o n . T h e  fundamental difference between the project of August and that 
of December was the absence in the latter of the former’s fifth article; "both 
contracting parties agree that the other governments wMoh signed the Moscow 
Protocol of February 9, 1928, wiH be invited to conclude analogous treaties 
with the This article had been the major stumbling block to an agree#
ment, representing the Polish desire for a connection between the Soviet non- 
aggression pacts with its western border states and the Russian opposition to 
such a connection. The Polish concession on this point made agreement possible
174. Protocol of the Soviet-Polish negotiations on the conclusion of a non­
aggression pact, December 21,1931 • DVP Vol.14. pps#719#*721.
175* iSââ** P-4BB.
and, on the other hand, the wÜllngneas of these other state» now to negotiate
similar pacts and a Soviet readiness to follow suit, allowed Poland to make 
such a concession. Nevertheless It was a conaiderahl© adjustment of Polish
foreign policy and one which underlines the increased desire in Warsaw to secure 
a non-aggression pact vdth its eastern neighbour, a desire which was absent in 
1926.
On the crucial question of Germany’s relations to the Soviet-Poliah negot­
iations, this protocol was not of an encouraging nature# it was true that a 
Polish attack on Germany would leave Russia a free-hand, though not a German 
attack on Foland.^^^* The major German objection, however, was to the indirect 
guaranteeing of Polish territory by the USSR. This protocol stated that any act 
of force which violated the integrity and inviolability of Polish territory 
would be interpreted as an act of aggression and this was seen in Berlin as 
indirectly guaranteeing or at least legitimising the Polish-German frontier;
"the persistance with which the Poles cling to ClauseTwp, Article On els the best
evidence that they do not regard it as something self-evident, but that th^ are
177using it to pursue far-reaching goals." ' The Germans warned Russia that the
publication of this clause risked creating such a reaction in Germany as to make
178
further collaboration psychologically impossible. *
This German response was produced despite energetic efforts on the part of 
Soviet diplomacy to dispel all fears. Perhaps the most remarkable example is 
Stalin’s interview to the German author, Emil Ludwig, a most unusual occurrence 
at that time*
I know that a certain dissatisfaction and alarm is noticeable among
certain German statesmen, who fear ihat the Soviet Ikilon, in its negot­
iations, or in any treaty that may be concluded with Poland, may take 
some step that would imply that the Soviet Ifeion gives its sanction to,
1 % . The Soviet Charged d’%fai  in Paris, Ros^b^g,even
Ambassador that in case of such a German attack on Poland the Soviet Union 
need not remain neutral since only the Soviet Government could "decide 
about the existence of an attack and it would itself interpret the meaning 
of this highly dubious and unclear term." Ambassador Hoosch’s report, 
Januaiy 5,1932. German Archives.Quoted in Korbel.Poland Between East and 
West, p.271, footnote 16.
177. Meyer to Dirksen, December 9,1931. German Archives. Quoted in Dyck,
Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, p.245.
178. Ibid.
m .
or guarantees, the poiiessions and frontiers of Poland# In my opinion 
suoh fears are groundless • We have always declared our willingness to 
conclude pacta of non-aggression vrith any government# # *We have openly 
declared our desire to sign a pact of non-aggression with Poland###As 
soon as the Poles declared their willingness to start negotiations with 
us regarding a pact of non-aggression, we naturally consented and began 
negotiations,
Vdiat, from the point of view of the Germans is the most dangerous 
thing that might happen? A change of attitude towards the Germans for 
the worse^ But there is no foundation for that. We, lilce the Poles, must 
declare in the pact that we shall not resort to force, or aggression, in 
order to change the frontiers of Poland bordering the ÎBSE, or to viol­
ate their independmoe#. .IVithout that, a pact would be out of the quest­
ion,,.Does that mean recognition of the Versailles system? It does not. 
Does it mean guaranteeing frontiers? It does not# •• Our friendly relat­
ions with Germany will remain what they have been hitherto.179,
Sobiet diplomatic activity seems to have had some success in mollifying 
German opinion, at least to the extent that much press comment was reasonable 
in tone, postponing a final opinion until the precise terms of the pact were 
known# Thus the German "Ost Express” agency reported that "Germany never laid 
claim to an economic or political monopoly on tiie Soviet Union and will not 
create any kind of obstacle to a peaceful policy in eastern Europe, end 
the "Kolnitsohe îSeitung", close to the German foreign Ministry, considered 
German fears unfounded and rejected the idea that the Soviet Government inten­
ded to abandon the tested line of Soviet-German friendship reinforced by the 
renewal of the Berlin treaiy# * The official German foreign Office paper, 
"Deutsche Dlplomatiaoh-Folitiache Korrespondens", gave a positive evaluation 
of the proposed Soviet non*#aggraasion pacts with its neighbours which were 
"unoonditional3y welcomed as are any other efforts which promote the strength­
ening of general peace" ; that is, of course, so long as tlaey were not directed
against Germany, Final judgement must be reserved until after an acquaintance -
182.
ship with the texts of the pacts# Nevertheless, # e  fact of on imminent 
Polish-Soviet pact remained to plague the Wilhemstrasse,
The opening weeks of 1952 witnessed the beginning of non-aggression pact
I
negotiations between the Soviet IMion and Finland, January 5; * Rumania,
179r'''lnterview"^'%Gin%o Em&l%udw^
Documents on Foreign Policy Vol#2. p,5l8#
180# QuotS‘"S'" lave^ 2.1932,
181. Quoted Ibid,. January 4, 1952#
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Jaauaty sf®*" latiria, ffanuaiy 7 and Batonia, somtndiat later, on January
186
20, * The negotiations in lielsinki wore the first to reach a successful con­
clusion and on January 21, a little more than two weeks after their initiation,
187*
a Boviet-Fimiish pact of non-aggression was signed*
Since this model was closely folloy/ed in the other pacts, its main prov­
isions win he outlined. In the first article, the contracting parties guaran­
teed the inviolability of the frontiers which existed between the ÜBSR and 
Finland and undertook to refrain from m y  attack one on the other* By an attack 
was defined any forceful act which violated the integrity and inviolability of 
the territory or the political independence of the other party, even if without 
any declaration of war* The second article contained the neutrality clause and 
the right of either party to denounce the pact if the other party undertook 
aggression against a third power, laoh party undertook not to participate in 
any treaties, agreements or conventions which were clearly hostile to the other 
par# or which contradicted formally or in essence the present paot (article 5)* 
The above pledges could not in any event violate the international rights and 
obligations of either party ensuing from previous agreements in so far as they 
did not contain elements of aggression (article 4)» The pact provided for a 
conciliation commission and was to remain in force for three years, to be auto­
matically prolonged for a further two years if not denounced within six months
of its expiry by one of the contracting parties. Both states, in a supplementaiy
188
protocol, undertook to ratify the pact as quickly as possible, *
lavestiia, commenting on the newly-signed paot, stressed the Soviet
iSr''" lavestisr ^  "’^r"'l9g2 *r ..
185# M â *
186. Joffe, Vneshnyaya politika SBSli, p.308.
187# Economic as well as political considerations motivated this small Russian 
neighbour. The British Minister in Finland considered that the Finnish 
signature was due to pressure exercised on the feilewing Foreign Minister 
by commercial and particularly by agricultural Interests which hoped to 
find an outlet in Russia for some of the Finnish exports recently excluded
from Germany,The British Minister in Finland,Sperling,to the Foreign Office
March 31,1932,Fublio Record Qffice.F,0*H2115/25/63*
188, Soviet-Finnish Pact of Non-Aggression and the Peaceful Settlement of 
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struggle for the preservation of peaq© in the face of the worsening economic 
crisis which many inq^erialist circles saw as being circumvented only by means 
of war. This recent paot, concluded with a state irtiich in rec^t times had 
figured large in provooatory anti-Soviet acts, gave reason to hope that "%ie 
leading circles of Finland have really experienced a change of heart and now 
recognise how senseless it is to exacerbate relations with the USSR,"The article 
ended with a call for vigilance on the part of Soviet workers and peasants, how­
ever, in view of the limited significance of a H  peace treaties
The Soviet press, despite its nation’s diplomatic successes, continued to 
concentrât© on the disastrous capitalist economic crisis and the threats which 
this held for the Soviet state, seeking to fulfil the First Five Year Plan. An 
Izvestiia editorial in the new year spoke of the capitalist world’s energetic 
and persistent search for a way out of the crisis at the expense of the Soviet 
tfiiion and its increasing preparations for intervention.^^^* The series of non- 
nggression pacts being negotiated by the Harkomindel did not inhibit contrib­
utors to journals such as International Press Correspondence from launching 
frenzied attacks against western imperialism;
The danger of a war against the Soviet Ikiion is increasing every day*
At present this danger is most threatening in the Far East. At the same 
time, however, eager preparations for attack are also being made in the 
West, in the East European countries, the vassal states of France. To 
let loose war against the Soviet Union in the Far East and then to drive 
forward the attack on the European frontier,5 o.C the Soviet Ikiion, that is 
the plan of the Imperialists, especially of French imperialism. 191 •
The Finnish Government, for its part, considered the pact of great signif­
icance as proving to the Soviet Union that "Finland, like the other western
neighbours of the USSR, has not the slightest intention of violating the peace
192
in eastern Europe." *
The rapid signature of this non**aggression pact did not signify the 
complete abandonment by this small Baltic state of its other neighbours* The
1 0 T "lgVe8tiia.^ J^..... .-n - n 'lm —
190. Ibid.. January 1,1932*
191. M, "The War Provocations of the Imperialists in the Far East."
Impreooor. Vq1*12.N*2. January 14,1932, p.24#
192. Speech of the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the local press. 
Quoted in IzveatiAa. January 26, 1932.
Soviets had succeeded in establishing bilateral negotiations with the border 
states, despite objections not only from Poland, but from a H  these states, 
yet this was not a complete victory for Russia* Finland, for example, ostens­
ibly on the ground that peace in eastern Europe could not be safeguarded the 
Finnish-Soviet paot alone, made it olear that it would only ratify the paot 
following the conclusion of similar pacts between the USSR and its other western 
neighbours *^^^"
These other negotiations proceeded at a slightly more sedate pace than 
those in Helsinki* The Riga negotiations between representatives of the Soviet 
and Latvian Governments centred on the Soviet project pact of 1927, Latvia’s 
counter-project containing differences but not of an insuperable oharaoter*^^^* 
Soviet negotiations with both Latvia and Estonia advanced slowly, in Litvinov’s 
opinion, a result of their marïdng time, waiting for the results of the Polish- 
Soviet negotiations. He considered that the conclusion of the latter would 
probably lead to the same result in the case of the two small Baltic atateb*^^" 
It will be recalled that the negotiations with Poland had proceeded 
normally in November and December 1931# a joint protocol having been agreed 
upon which left only one or two points in dispute* They were resumed in January 
on Patek’s return from Warsaw* The Polish Minister remained adamant that his 
Government would not agree to the addition in article 3 of the undertaking by 
both parties "not to take part in any agreements which are clearly hostile to 
the other party and also which contra^ot formally or substantially the present 
pact", but was prepared to mdertake in a protocol of signature the ratific­
ation and ihe exchange of ratification instruments "in the shortest possible 
period" without actually determining the length of this period*^^^* Litvinov 
insisted that this must be fixed precisely and repeated the Soviet Government’s
194. January 14, 1932.
195* Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the Soviet 
Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky,January 18.1932»DVP Voi* 15.P*37*
196. The Rumanian Foreign Minister gained the impression from Pilsudski at the 
begitming of January that the latter was not enthusiastic about the 
planned pact# He had talked with irony of "all these useless, valueless, 
transitortypaots*" Laroche, La Pologne de Pilsudski* p*106.
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determination that the above addition to article 3 must he included. He asked 
rhetorioelly how it was possible to speak of peaceful relations if one party 
consciously retained for itself the right of participation in hostile agree­
ments against the other party. Further, the Soviet Government was reluctant 
to omit this clause for fear that it would thereby establish a dangerous prece- 
dent for future pacts. Despite Litvinov’s eloquence, Patek stood firm, stating 
that his Government objected to the clause on the grounds that it would permit 
outside interference in its relations with third states. Litvinov formed the 
impression at this meeting that Patek might agree to transfer this obnoxious 
phrase to a special protocol supplementary to the pact.^^^*
This disputed clause was central to the Soviet concept of a non-aggression 
pact, its insertion acting as an impediment to Polish foreign policy in any 
attempt to negotiate anti-Soviet agreements or alliances vdiioh the Russians so 
feared.^^^* For Moscow it was essential on practical grounds rather than being 
a theoretical debating issue. As Litvinov said, & non-aggression paot had in 
essence three obligations; non-aggression, neutrality and non-participation in 
hostile agreements. In his opinion Poland had reduced the neutrality point to 
nothing; if it rejected non participation this merely left non-aggression which 
was already provided for in the Kellogg Faot.^^^* This is an Interesting comment 
on the Soviet appreciation of the non-aggression pact instrument and suggests 
that a simple non-aggression pledge was not the only or perhaps in some cases 
even the main objective* This explains the wrangling which continued in the 
negotiation of the various Soviet pacts after agreement had been reached on the 
first article. The Franco-Soviet pact contained the important clauses on propa­
ganda,. military organisations and economic aggression, absent in the Polish 
pact where instead this article 3 assumed paramount importance. It is to be 
assumed that these contents of the French pact were totally unacceptable to the
197# Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affalrs,Litviaov 
and the Polish Minister in the USSR, Patek, January 13,1932. DVP Vol.15#
pps.25-25.
198* Though not included in the Franco-Soviet pact.
199# Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the Soviet 
Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, Januaiy 18,1932. Ibid.. p.37#
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Polish side, a fact which the Soviet Government appreciated at a very early 
date in its plana for a paot with that state and therefore did not push in the 
actual negotiations#
The Polish negotiations took a turn for the worse on Januaiy 19 idien 
Litvinov once again met Patek. The latter explained that Warsaw had agreed long 
ago to withdraw its fifth article concerning the simultaneous ratification of 
all the border state pacts on condition that the Soviet Iftiion in turn withdrew 
its third article on non-participation in hostile agreements. Since Moscow In­
sisted on the latter, Warsaw must return to this fifth a r t i c l e . T h i s  of 
course had been the major obstacle on the path of a non-aggression paot between 
the states and the very reason for the barrenness of the mid-twenties* negot­
iations. Unless at least one government was prepared to compromise, these new 
negotiations would meet a similar fate. Litvinov replied that the rejection of 
article 5 was a pre-condition## of these negotiations and that its elimination 
would destroy all that had been so far agreed. Patek asked whether the Russians 
would agree that the third article should mention only an undertaking not to 
conclude agreements which contradicted the present pact, a compromise which 
Litvinov initially refused to accept, but after persistence on "Who part of the 
Polish Minister, he agreed to inform the Soviet Government of the new proposal. 
Litvinov now raised the issue as to whether Poland would sign or merely initial 
the pact if the text was agreed upon which led Patek to enquire as to whether 
the Russians would accept his wording of the article if he promised to sign. 
Litvinov repeated that he could only put this new suggestion to his Govemmmll 
The penultimate stage of these negotiations took place a few days later 
when the two diplomats once again met. The Finnish pact having been mean-time 
signed, Litvinov said that the Finns had been somewhat more compliant than 
Patek and had accepted the very article which had been the object of suoh dis­
agreement with Poland. After further proposal and counter-proposal agreement
gOoY' Note" of "aloonversation''between ' the Commissar for Forei^ Affairs,Litvinov 
and the Polish Minister in the USSR, Patek,Januaiy 19,1932. DVP Vol.15.
p.jsl
201. IMd.. pf8.38-39.
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was finally reached on the text. Beak, the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, 
reports in his hook that after all the essential questions had, been agreed 
upon he instructed the Polish delegates "to out short the talks even at t$e 
expense of abandoning some trifling point of law or some detail of wording?
Patek refused to sign the paot, however, "mumbling" several words about oblig­
ations-to Rumania, but finally said that 25aleaki, ^Ao had more authority, could 
sign the paot in Geneva where Litvinov would also bo present at the disarmament 
O o n f e r e n o e *
The long road of 8oviet*-Polish relations by January 25 had at last reached 
the point of initialling, though not signing, a non-aggression paot*^^" It 
broadly followed the December 21 protocol* The compromise agreement on article 
3 now read that "each of the contracting parties undertook not to take part in 
any agreements openly hostile to t&ie other party from the point of view of 
aggression," a diluted version of the fioviet demand which called for the words 
"and also which oontamdict formally or substantially the present paot" in place 
of the inserted "from the point of view of aggression#"^^^* The required compr­
omise had been made by both states in the Interest of agreement. A protocol was 
added which stated that the denunciation of the pact or its e^ cpiiy would not 
affect any obligations resulting from the Kellogg Pact.^^^* Soviet-Polish 
relations had now arrived at the position of Soviet-French relations. In a press 
statement the following day Litvinov discussed these Soviet non-aggression 
pacts:
The contents of the pacts proposed by the Soviet Government are 
very simple and consist in un&rtaking obligations not to enter upon 
aggressive action and to eliminate so far as possible causes which 
might lead to infringement of the peaceful relations existing between
202. Beck, Final Report, p.10. Zaleski told the British Ambassador in early 
January that the pact had been agreed upon but for four quite unimportant 
points on which he was quite prepared, if necessary, to give way. The 
British Ambassador in Poland, Krskine,to the Foreign Office, January 5* 
1932. Public Record Office, fô N140/25/63.
203* Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
end the Polish Minister in the UBSR, Patek,January 23,1932.MI DVP Yol.15. 
ppa* 51*52.
204. DVP Vol.lA. p.832,N.255*
205. This third article of the December protocol became article 4 in the 
actual paot.
2@6. Soviet-Polish non-aggression paot, initialled Januaiy 25.1952.DVP Vol.19.
pps .436-439.
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the government^ ooncXuc^ng such tre&tles* If, In negotiating such pacts, 
the contracting parties are really animated by the desire to strengthen 
peaceful relations and pursue no indirect aims, then it is possible to 
complete the negotiations very rapidly#207#
Unfortunately the pact remained unsigned, Patek’s reference to Baleski’s 
signature in Geneva proving to be so much hot air# The reason for this mere 
initialling was not hard to discover# The official "Gaseta Polska", whilst 
welcoming it as "a favourable step forward in the direction of fulfilling the 
presently conducted peace policy in eastern Europe," explained that "the activ- 
ieation of the pact is linked with the conclusion of anc4ogous pacts by all the 
states with frontiers on the Soviet western border* ^aleski also greeted 
the pact as "a step forward on the path towards the pacification of eastern ■
Europe" and again emphasised that its %%tifioation would depend on the si^ature 
of the other pacts being negotiated,^^^*
The Polish paper "ÎCurjer Warsaawaki" well illustrates its country’s 
positions
It would be pointless to conceal the fact that we are sincerely grat­
ified. * #It is, for the moment, of no interest to us what considerations 
prompted the Moscow government to this step# ' As far as Poland is ooficer- 
ned, the essence of the whole issue consists in the fact that Moscow 
desires peace on its western frontier# Is it oompolled by economic reas­
ons to seek an agreement with France, or is it simply safeguarding its 
position in Europe because of its preoccupation with the Far East? has 
it some plans to submit to the disarmament conference at Geneva, or is 
it afraid that the advance of Hitlerism might jeopardise the fruits of 
Rapallo? One can indulge in the most diversified speculations concerning 
this vast topic, but the fact remains the same: Soviet policy in Europe 
desires peace* Since Poland, too, wants peace and must wage a policy of 
peace, since she has no aggressive designs against Soviet Russia, the 
non-aggression pact recently initialled has all the features of a really 
valuable agreement
207# Degras, Soviet looiMehts on foreign Policy, Vola» n#522# '
208* Quoted in Pi^yda. JanuEUv 27.^9^
209* Quoted in Izyesti^a. Januaiy 28,1932# EalesM. told the British Ambassador 
that these Soviet non-aggression pacts had a certain moral value going 
further and being more definite than the Kellogg Paot# But he did add that 
neither Poland nor Russia believed in the good faith of the other and he 
was quite certain that if circumstances should arise in which the Soviet 
Government thought that aggression would serve the aim of world revolut­
ion it would not hesitate to attack Poland, pact or no pact. The British 
Ambassador in Polemd, Erskine, to the Foreign Office, January 5,1932#
Public Record Office. P.O. HI4O/25/63*
210. Bwjer WarazawsWL, January 27,1932.Quoted in Buduroinroz.Poliah-Soviet 
Relations. p#14»
The Soviet reaction was less enthusiastic, espeoially since the pacta
still remined unsigned yet nevertheless it was a worthwhile achievement. Now
the Polish paot depended on the fate of the Rumanian, Latvian and Estonian
pacts and the French and Sirniish pacts on the Polish one* The two Baltic states
provided little trouble after Poland’s accommodation* The Soviet-Latvian non-
211aggression paot was signed on Fehruaiy 5 * and after a little more diffloiAty
212*
the iSovietGEstonian paot was eventually signed on May 4* * Both closely
followed the Soviet-Finnish version, the former two both containing explicit
undertdîings not to take part in any agreements aimed at eoonomic or financial
boycott of the other party. There is an interesting omission in these two pacts
of the obligation to remain neutral in case of an armed attack by a third power
on the other contracting party and the right to denounce the pact If the other
launches an aggressive move against the third power* The reason was that this
eventuality ?/as covered in the goviet-Latvian peace treaty of August H,1920
and the Sovlet-Estonian peace treaty of February 2, 1920* Izvestlia greeted the
Latvian pact as "anotlier step in the peaceful policy of the Soviet Government*"
Yet it was not overwhelmingly enthusiastic;
(T)he treaty serves as one of the factors in favour of a true strength­
ening of security which, as la known, is a "matter of concern" to the 
group of states which is included in the system of French influence and 
which displays particular resistance to actual disarmament*
It should be noted that the Soviet-Latvian treaty was the result of 
fairly lengthy negotiations between the fovemments of the USSR and 
Latvia and that it was necessary to overcome mcny diffioultiea before the 
treaty was signed*
Izvestiia claimed that the Latvian Government was subject "to very serious 
pressure on the part of certain foreign forces" whi.oh attempted to delay and
SrZ'"8oS5;3aSlanlZ-a% Kres% on
212* Soviet-Estonian non-aggression pact,May 4,1932* Ibid* * ppa*29o-298*
Litvinov told the British Ambassador in Moscow that the Estonian negotiat­
ions wore delayed because of the Estonian argument that its existing treaty 
with the D33R sufficiently covered the neutrality article, thereby render­
ing it unnecessary in the non-aggression paot. The British Ambassador in 
Moscow, Ovey, to the Foreign Office, March 28,1932# DBFR Vol*l*p«237*
prevent if possible the conclusion of the trealy*^^^* On the other hand, the 
British representative in Latvia heard through Estonian Government channels 
that the Soviet Government had induced the Latvian Government to sign a treaty 
without Estonia by offering favourable terms for the renewal of the Soviet- 
Latvian commercial agreement which expired in the following November.
The course of the Soviet non-oggressionpact negotiations with France, 
Poland, Finland, Latvia and Estonia had not proved easy; much hard bargaining 
was required before Moscow could see its securiiy policy at least partially 
completed with the initialling or signature of these treaties. The Soviet- 
Rumanian negotiations at Riga were to surpass all these previous examples in 
their length and obduranoy. It is unlikely that this came as €uiy profound shock 
to the Soviet Government since its Bessarabian dispute with Rumania placed an 
obstacle on the path of successful completion which the other negotiations, 
despite all their pitfalls, never had to encounter.
Stomonyakov, the Soviet negotiator in Riga, first exchanged project pacts 
with the Rumanian representative on January 6, the latter* s project beigg based 
on the original Polish scheme together with Patek* s amendments * Its only 
difference, a significant one, was in the first article of the Polish text def­
ining an act of aggression as any act of force which violated the integrity and
inviolability of the territory, to which was added "which at the present time
2l6
is situated under the sovereignty of the other contracting party." * This
referred to Bessarabia which the USSR refused to recognise as being a legal
part of Rumania. Throughout the whole series of negotiations the Soviets were
determined to deny Rumania any direct or tacit recognition of this absorption
8lfr'’ïzveaffia7'‘¥êbSSr"'9l” 952S"o'‘Æ  press to
the Sovlet-Eotonlon pact other than a brief mentioning of the signature.
214. It seems probable that Latvia, like the other Baltic states, was at least 
strongly influenced by economic factors in those negotiations, being very 
dependent on the Russian market. British Minister in Latvia,Knatohbull- 
Hugesaon. to the Foreign Office, March 2.1952.Public Record Offioe.FO
215. Project handed to Karakhan by Patek, August 23,1931 *See above pps.122-123* 
Telegram from the Soviet representative at the negotiations with Rumania, 
Stomonyakov, to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,Januaiy 6,1932. 
DVP V0I.I5. p.14.
216. Ibid., p.720, M.3.
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of what they oonaldered to he Russian territory# The Rumanian Government was 
equally determined explioltly to include Bessarabia in the terms of the paot, 
both to seoure an implied recognition and also because it vms the most probable 
objective of future Soviet aggressive actions against that s t a t e . T h e  init­
ial Soviet project included in its preamble the phrase "the establishment of 
such relations infliotsno blow at the territorial conflict which exists between 
the contracting parties over Bessarabia and is not settled by the present^plot." 
This disagreement was to bedevil and ultimately wreck the negotiations despite 
all attempts by the two involved parties as well as interested third powers to 
reconcile the positions*
The following day Rumania made its position perfectly olear by issuing 
t?m final statements: it did not desire to achieve recognition of the Bessar­
abian annexation in these negotiations but it could not sign a paot in which
219
this question would be openly declared either directly or indirectly*
Litvinov stated that "we shall avoid any formulation under which it would be
possible to interpret even the most remote recognition of the annexation of
B e s s ar a b i a. * On Januaiy 10 Litvinov instructed Stomonyakov to stand fimly
on this position and not be frightened by Rumanian threats of a break in the 
221*
negotiations* Against this background the Bumaalan Foreign Minister’s press
statement on January 9 whilst visiting Warsaw though guarded, was optimistics
I am reluctant to make any premature statements about the fate of these 
negotiations: taking into account the interest which the tBSE is manif­
esting in the conclusion of a series of pacts of non-aggression with 
individual states and the contact established in Riga, it is possible 
that concrete results will be produced.^^^*
Despite almost daily meetings no progress in the negotiations was registered
217. A further motive of at least some Rumanian politicians was the improbab­
ility of the negotiations succeeding if Rumania insisted on Soviet recog­
nition of its sovereignty in Bessarabia. See chapter 5#
218. DVP Vol.l^. p.720, Note 3#
219* Telegram from the Soviet Representative at the negotiations with Rumania, 
Stomonyakov, to the NKD, January 7,1932* Ibid.. p.lg.
220. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the Soviet 
Representative at the negotiations with Rumania, Stomonyakov,January 7,
1932.
221. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to the Soviet 
Representative at the Rumanian negotiations, Stomonyakov, January 10,1932. 
% i d .. pp3.18-19*
222. Quoted in Xavestiia. January 14, 1932#
and the likelihood of a Soviet compromise was remote* Litvinov one© again 
told Stomoï^akov that the Soviet Government would not make any conce»«iona 
and added that "Rumania needs the pact more than us." The Russians considered 
that Rumania would obtain solid advantages from any non-aggression paot even 
if it did mention Bessarabia* They b©iieve<^that their readiness to negotiate 
a bilateral paot, despite Rumania’s illegal occupation of Bessarabia, a great 
concession and one which could not be further extended by a Soviet agreement 
to refrain from mentioning even that the question remained a disputed one, 
especially since that territory would continue to remain a part of Rumania even 
after the conclusion of suoh a pact*^^^*
This dispute raged interminably throughout January and can be followed 
particularly w<^l in the Soviet documents* Suffice to say that the Russians 
showed no sign of giving ground on their fundamental position but did neverthe­
less appear to have exercised a certain diplomatic flexibility within it. They 
proposed the following text for the second paragraph of the first article which 
was proving so difficult : "by m  action which contradicts the undertakings etc. 
will be considered any attempt by one party to settle by forceful means territ­
orial or other disputes vdilch exist between the parties." The Soviet Government 
was prepared to undertake the non-incursion into Bessarabia but without the
opt
recognition of present Rumania’s frontiers, integrity and sovereignty. *This
proposal the Rumanian representative in Riga r e j e c t e d * T h e  ironic aspect
was that agreement on all the articles of the pact excepting the second parag-
raph of the first article was reached by Januasiy HO* *
Stomonyakov reported widely-spread rumours in Riga that Rumania had broken
'â'^T'lSegram '%0 G o % S s a r ' f o r A f f a i r
Representative at the Rumanian negotiations, Stomonyakov, January 12,1932* 
DVP Vol.15. p.Hl.
224* Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign .Affairs,Litvinov, to the Soviet 
Representative at the Rumanian negotiations, Stomonyakov,Jonuary 19,1932. 
Ibid.. p.726, % t e  26*
225. Telegram from the Soviet Representative at the Rumanian negotiations, 
Stomonyakov,to the Commissar for Foreign A f f a i r s , Litvinov,January 20,1952* 
.Ibid*. P»43*
226. Letter from the Soviet Representative at the Rumanian negotiations, 
Stomonyakov, to the Rumanian delegate, Sturdza, January 20.1932.Ibid..
pps.44-45.
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off the negotiations and was warned by the Finnish Minister in Riga on January
227.
23 that a break would ooour. It seems probable that this did indeed happen 
on or shortly after that date. It is interesting to note that this break, which 
must have been knovm in Warsaw, did not prevent the initialling of the Polish- 
Soviet paot on January According to Scott, it was agreed that Soviet-
Rumanian contact should be resumed either directly at the disarmament talks in 
Geneva or through friendly mediation.Perhaps the basic problem in these 
negotiations which were to drag on throughout 1932 was that neither side earn­
estly desired agreement and certainly not strongly enough to comjpromise. For 
the Î.ÎSSE, a Rumanian pact was advantageous mainly because it woiüLd complete its 
series of pacts and remove any excuse for further delay by those states which 
had already negotiated pacts rather than for its intrinsic value. The Rumanian 
Government was persuaded against its will by France and Poland to negotiate a 
separate paot with the UBSR. The Rumanian Foreign Minister disliked and dis- 
trused the Soviets and had seriously considered refusing to comply with the 
wishes of the French and Polish Governments to negotiate but had finally decided 
that such a refusal would place Rumania in an invidious position of isolation?^* 
In these circumstances it is not too surprising that an easy success did not 
grace the negotiations.
This failure did not greatly detract from the undoubted successes which 
had accrued to Soviet foreign policy in the winter and spring of 1931*1932»
Now that non-aggression pacts had been initialled or signed between the USSR 
on the one hand and Poland, Finland, Latvia and Estonia on the other, it might 
be thought that the delay in Paris as regards the initialled Franco-Soviet paot
227. Telegram from the Soviet Representative at the Rumanian negotiations, 
Stomonyakov, to the NKD,Januaiy 23,1932. DVP Vol. 15,003.52-53.
228. Patek in conversation with Litvinov/on January 23 privately offered to 
mediate between the USSR and Rumania, an offer which the latter rejected 
on the grounds that direct contact had been established. Ibid..p#52.
229. Scott, Alliance Against Hitler, p.33»
230. The British Minister in Rumania, Paloirot, to the Foreign Office, January 
6,1932. Public Record Office. FO N267/25^63* A little earlier, Palairet 
had reported hia impression Üiat Rumania had been persuaded to negotiate 
bilaterally with the USSR by the French Government. The British iîinister 
in Rumania, Palairet, to the Foreign Office, December 23,1931* Ibid..
FO N8227/6122/38.
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was now tinnecessaiy. This was indeed thd prevalènt view in Moscow. Thé ...
Russians continuouitfly expressed dissatisfaction at the Paris results and sought
to forge ahead with the negotiations in order that a signed end ratified paot
might he safely lodged in the Harkomindel files* On January 18 Dovgalevsky was
instructed to "demand" from Berthelot and Laval an explanation as to the fate
of the paot, specifically, whether France was prepared to sign it given the
251
fairly advanced stage of the Soviet-Polish negotiations. * Dovgalevsky carried 
out his chief’s instructions and met Berthelot on January 25# The latter compl­
ained of Laval’s irresoluteness under pressure from the "right" which was att­
empting to convince him of the undeslrahility of ooncluding the Franco-Soviet 
pact. Further, Laval was dissatisfied by the state of the trade negotiations 
and doubted the expediency of concluding a political pact in isolation from the 
regulation of trade relations. Dovgalevsky retorted that the stagnation in the 
trade negotiations was the fault of the French. Berthelot finally stated that 
the non-aggression pact would be signed, he hoped, when the pacts with Poland 
and Rumania were signed. Given the stage of the Rumanian negotiations, on which 
both the Polish and the French pacts now depended, this was not good news for
Moscow. The most he could promise was to speak with the Rumanian Foreign Minist-
252or on the desirability of a non-aggression paot with the TBSH. * A few days
later Laval himself assured Dovgalevsky of the serious contribution which the
pacts between the USSR, France and the western border states would make to
European peace but again emphasised that the conclusion of a Rumanian as vrell
as a Polish paot with the Soviet Union must be a condition of French sig n aid lo .
The Russians naturally were angered by this new French condition which had
been introduced and considered that the French Government’s position hindered
r
the signature of the Polish-Soviet paot and, in ^ stinskjr’s words, "raises
231. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to tho Soviet 
Ambassador in Franc#, Dovgalevsky,January 18,1932# DVP V0I.15. p,37#
Laval, French Premier and Foreign Minister,January 14*Februaiy 16,1932. 
Succeeded in both posts by Tardieu.
252. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsly,to the NKD, 
January 25,1932. Ibid.. pps.55*57"
233* Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky, to the NKD, 
January 29,1932. Ibid.. pps. 68869#
doubts as to the sâ^eerity of its desires for a rapid, positive oompletion 
of the negotiations with Doubts concerning French sincerity
persisted despite Berthelot*s offer to instruct the French delegation at 
Geneva to help^ if necessary* in arranging a meeting between Ditvinov and the 
Rumanian Foreign Minister.
3he Gonseçtuenoes for Soviet foreign policy as a result of these last six 
months ♦activities were far*-r©aching if still somewhat hanging in the air. from 
the early days of its existence the communist regime in Moscow had been comp^ 
oiled to rely upon its political* economic and military links with Weimar 
Germany in order to reap some measure of security for its vulnerable sts.te, 
threatened by the great Imperialist powers with France and its east European 
'^minions'* in the vanguard. This Soviet partnership with Germany was cemented 
by the common distrust* even hatred, which both shared of France and Poland.
As late as summer 1931 the German Government had renewed this partnership 
mainly on the basis of the continued animosity towards the Polish state. Yet 
by the spring of 1932 the Soviet ÏÏnion had initialled pacts of non-aggression 
with franco and Poland as well as having signed pacts with several of their 
" satellites''. The European balance of power was in a state of flux. True, the 
Soviet position was far from representing a new alignment with these states, 
haggling being still very much to the fore^front in Warsaw and Paris, not to 
mention Bucharest. Honethe less* the most superficial observer co^d not but . 
perceive a profound change in Russia's international situation. If its depend­
ence on the French alliance system was as yet by no means a completed fact, 
its growing divergence from Germany could not be denied, a divergence which ran 
against the grain of ten years fruitful co^opera%ion, The Soviet state had not 
inadvertently drifted away from Berlin, furthermore; although it had endeavoured 
by diplomatic activity to oOlm German fears which were multiplying as a result 
of Moscow's new foreign ventures, the fact remains that the Soviet tMion had
T e l e g r a m O o m m i s s a r  'for Foz^iSTASa^
the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsî^y,February 2,1932. D¥P Vol. 15.
p.76.
235# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the RKD,
February 1,1932# Ibid.. p.74#
taken a positive aeoision to negotiate these non-^aggresslon pacts in the full 
kaovÆeage of their almost certain oonseg,uenoes for Soviet-German relations.
Officially Germany accepted the initialling of the Soviot-Folish pact 
W,th some optimism. For example, the ’’Deutsche Algemeine geitung” thought that 
’’the text of the pact is evidence that Poland* s hopes to deprive the Bapallo 
pact of meaning have not been fulfilled” and the ’’Berliner Tagehlatt” thought 
that the pact signified a victory for the Soviet view over the Franco-Folisfe 
one in that there was no guarantee of the Polish frontier.^^^* It was emphasised 
that the Soviet Government had retained its freedom of action in the event of a 
Polish attack on Germany. It was true that under Soviet pressure the Polish 
pact was significantly different from those with Estonia and Finland in that 
it only hound the two states to refrain from any aggressive action against or 
from invading the territory of the other party whereas the latter two pacts. 
contained explicit guarantees of the inviolability of the existing frontlers*^^* 
As Dyck comments, however, this German response was little more than a ration- 
alisation of the events, * Eo amount of self-congratulation in Germany could 
alter the facts of Russia's new position, one which was begirming to range it 
with the Versailles powers. Hitherto Germany and Soviet Russia the two outcasts 
from the new Europe re-built iîi 1919, had vehemently attacked this iniquitous 
treaty and the results which flowed from it, How the Soviet Bhion could hardly 
maintain this attitude and indeed showed little sign of doing so. As Koohan has 
remarked, Stalin in his interview with hudwig in December 1931 stated only that 
Russia was not recognising the Versailles system; a few months before any such 
statement would have contained an explicit opposition to it.^^^’Xt remained to 
be seen what the future would unfold,
236^ ''Quoted^ '"in'''ls%sti:^aJ'''2'8.l932%''''' ' ' ' ' ' ' '  ^
237* The Boviet-h&tvian pact contained a slightly milder undertaking to refrain 
from any acts of violence directed against the territorial integjdly and 
inviolability or political independence of the other party,without actually 
using the phrase, "existing frontiers,”
23B* Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Et^ fssia, p,2W#
239. Koohan, Russia and the Weimar Republic, p,159* Stalinas interview, above
pps,153-154#
Chapter 5ÿ The Beaaarabian Impasse#
1# The attempt to breach the iiapaea©#
The Soviet Government in the spring of 1932 could note with satief action 
its diplomatic successes of the preceecting months; non-aggression pacts init­
ialled with Poland and France, similar pacts signed with Estonia, Finland and 
Latvia* Yet this satisfaction was marred by the realisation that in an inter­
national situation still fraught with perils for Soviet Russia, with the cont­
inued Japanese threat in the east and the growth of extremism and instability 
in Germany, this new diplomatic sortie had not yet reached its logical conclus­
ion# These non-aggression pacts still had not been ratified* The apparent cause 
of this state of affairs was the failure of Soviet diplomacy to conclude a pact 
with one state* a state with which it had a common, but disputed border,Humania* 
The break down of the Riga non-aggression pact negotiations with that oouatiy 
had not only left this Bessarabian frontier exposed but had provided an argument 
by which the other western border states and France resisted their ratification 
of the negotiated pacts.
In these Riga negotiations agreement had been reached between the Soviet 
and Rumanian Governments on a H  the articles of the proposed non-aggression 
pact save for that concerning the limits of Rumanian sovereignty, the Soviet 
Government refusing to recognise either openly or tacitly the Rumanian occup­
ation of Bessarabia* Althou^ this impasse seemed insurmountable, given the 
opposite and steadfast positions occupied by both parties, the idea of future 
negotiations certainly was not abandoned with the departure of the respective 
representatives from the Latvian capital at the end of January,1932, Throughout 
the spring and summer attempts were made to continue the negotiations with the
assistance of Polish and French mediation, though the endeavours of the mediat-
1ors were not of a constant nature.
Certainly by the middle of February, Dovgalevsky in Paris was discussing 
ï.'lfoffêT'^ ^ e S i K v a’pPlï^ iS ' ' '' ' ' ' '" ".
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the Rumanian negotiations with representatives of the French Foreign 
Ministry #ilat simultaneously maintaing the Soviet position that the Franco- 
Soviet pact was unconnected with those negotiations# As Dovgalevsky recalled,
"for the tenth time X emj^asised that if I touched on the theme of the Soviet- 
Rumanian pact several times in conversation with Berthelot, this is not at all 
because I see any connection between the Soviet-Humanian negotiations and the '
Franco-Soviet pact, but only in view of the great interest which Berthelot sho?/o i 
in the conclusion of a pact between the USSR and Rumania and also because the
«
adoption of such a pact corresponds to the peaceful policy line of my Governmoit.
At this meeting with Berthelot, in fact, Dovgalevsky emphasised that if the
French Government genuinely desired the rapid conclusion of the Soviet-Polish
and Soviet-Huaanian pacts, it would be well-advised to sign the Franco-Soviet î
pact immediately# Side-stepping this advice, Berthelot informed the Soviet
Ambassador that the French representative at the Geneva Disarmament Conf^ erence,
Massigli, had spOken with Ghika, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, who expressed
a readiness to meet Litvinov only if the initiative came from the latter. Since
the Soviet Government considered Rumania responsible for the Riga negotiations'
breakdown, it was not prepared to accept this condition, Dovgalevsîîy* indeed,
interpreting Ghika*s statement as indicating the absence of a sincere desire on
Rumania's part to hold a further meeting. * From the Soviet side there was no
indication of a willingness to compromise on the tliomy issue of Bessarabia# Xn
an interview given by Litvinov to a Polish paper, the Ooiandssar reiterated his
Government's conditions?
We find It possible and are prepared to sign such a pact which would 
not be interpreted as our rejection of Bessarabia, which would remain 
a disputed territorial question with both sides openly preserving their 
positions and which would include the obligation of non-aggression...
The broken-off negotiations can always be resumed from the Rumanian side 
if it wants a treaty in which it will clearly be stated that the disputed 
territorial question will not be affected by the pact either directly or 
indirectly. 3#
That the Rumanian Government was likely to accept this condition, which
2. ''felegi%%'''f^  ^ ''Bovü't' 'Ambasaador'^  K^ HKD, ' ".
February 18,1932# DVP Vol.15. pps. 120-121.
3. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to a member of the 
Collegium of the HKD,Stomonyakov, March 7*1932. DVP Vol.15. p*172*
it had rejected in the Riga talks, seemed to he, at the least, a matter of 
some conjecture, even supposing that Franco-Polish pressure Were to he exerted 
in this direction# In March Ghika informed the British Minister In Bucharest 
that no progress as regards a Rumanian-Soviet non-aggression pact had been 
made either at Geneva or elseWkere and that both France and Poland had with­
drawn their pressure for such a pact on Rumania*^* In a similar vein, Litvinov 
expressed the opinion that the pact negotiations with Rumania were practically 
dead, placing little hope in Tardieu* s promise, given at Geneva, that the French 
premier would again raise the question with the Rumanian Government#
Despite such pessimistic assessments by the foreign ministers of the two 
involved countries, the question of a Soviet-Ruraanian pact of non-aggression 
was not abandoned* In April the French Government expressed its desire to 
promote the successful conclusion of such a pact and proposed that it help 
Russia in searching for a formula mors acceptable to the Rumanian Government, 
thus removing the last obstacle to the signing of the Franco-Soviet pact*^" 
Roland also remained crucially involved in the affair, "IMited Press” reporting 
from Warsaw at the beginning of May and re-printed in the Soviet press, forth­
coming negotiations between the USSR On the one side, Rumania and Poland on the * 
other, adding that Patek had been ordered to return immediately to Moscow where 
he must act as a mediator between Rumania and the USSR* * The Soviet Government
was ready to accept Polish mediation if the Rumanians followed suit and the
8
scene was set for now negotiations. * The Polish Foreign Minister gave Litvinov : 
a number of proposals which he hoped the Soviet Government would consider, pres­
umably intending lUcevdLse to inform tlie Rumanian Government* He proposed that 
the impasse over the recognition of the Bessarabian territory should be
4*' The^  British Mj%ïsterlüi'" Rumnïa^Raïai^ ' "
1932# Public Record Qffice.FO NI83V 25/63* See below*
5* The British Ambassador in Russia,Ovey,to the Foreign Office, March 28,1932* 
m m i , P*237.
6. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Franoe,Dovgalevsly, to the Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, April 19,1932* PVP.Vq1«15> p*2g6*
7# Igvestiia. May 4*1932.
8* Telegram from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Kreatinsky,to the
Commissar for Foreign Affaira, Litvinov, May 23,1932. DTP Vol. 15. p.329* '
surmomitod by replacing in the first article of the Rumanian project pact the 
words, "under the sovereignty” (pod suverenitetoy), by the words, "under the 
authoriiy”, (pod vlastu) and in the introduetoxy paragraph to mention that 
disputed questions between both sides remain on one side, the signature of the 
pact not damaging the position of either country on auoh disputed questions#
This proposal did not satisfy Litvinov who still objected to the Rumanian 
first article* It is interesting to note that according to ^aloski, the Poles 
hsr no means approved of Bumania's position although they were to maintain their 
mediately efforts for a further two months before unilaterlly try&w# signing 
the Bolish-Soviet non-aggression pact regardless of Bumanian susceptibilities *
To this end, Saleski, o&nsidered making an attempt to arrange a meeting at 
Geneva between Litvinov and Titulesou, the Eumanian representative at the Dis­
armament Conference, but on after-thought rejected this, considering Titulesou* s
9
difficult personality, favouring as a prelimlnaiy an approach through the new 
Huraaniaa Minster in Warsaw who was highly favourable to the conclusion of a 
pact, with the aim of formally resuming Soviet-Humanian negotiations at Geneva 
around June 15# Litvinov agreed with this proposal, stating that he intended 
taking a short holiday but that if the Rumanians were prepared to start negot­
iations immediately then he would cancel his holid^r and remain in Geneva, but 
that in any event he would be there on June 15* 2aleski believed that^the 
Rumanian King and Foreign Minister were now more favourably inclined towards 
the conclusion of a pact than previously and that Rllsudski had threatened
Rumania with a unilateral signature of the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact in
IG
the event of further procrastination#
Litvinov presumably was able to take this holiday since the British 
Minister in Bucharest reported on June 21, following a conversation with the 
Rumanian Minister of Forèlgn Affairs, that although the Polish Government was
'"in'cl'inaSons'S deeïsil% W  If'oveËb'er. 'See
below, p#2l5.
10. Litvinov remarked that the actual signing of the pact would be a better 
means of pressure than a threat# Note of a conversation between the Commis­
sar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, and the Polish Foreign Minister,%@le8ki, 
May % ,  1932# pyp Vol.l## pps* 33Ô-331*
tïying to find a formula for a pact satisfactory both to the Soviet and
Rumanian Governments, the latter were not in communication with each other* '
By June 23, however, aaleski was able to inform Litvinov at Geneva that the
Rumanian Government was ready to resume negotiations and as a preliminaty,
Saleski gave both the Soviet Commissar and Titulesou his project pact which
the latter had already approved* Litvinov characterised it as being almost on
exact copy of the Polish-Soviet pact, its only difference being that in the
first article it included Zaleski's formula of May 24# He agreed to study the
project but pointed out the unacceptability of the first article and the absence
of any mmtlon of disputed questions,Rumanian persistance On the latter effect-
12*
ually ruling out success#
The Soviet Government officially gave its support to these private comments 
of Litvinov, instructing him to reject this formula though at the same time 
authorising him to accept Titulesou* s proposal that pact negotiations should be 
resumed# Further, he was warned to take measures in order to ensure that the 
consequent delay in the conclusion of a pact with Rumania should not cause a 
delay in the signature of the pact with Poland# * Throu^out the long negot­
iations with the Bucharest Government, the Soviets were much more concerned 
about the hold-up in Vfarsaw and Paris than about the lack of success in the 
actual negotiations in hand# A pact with Rumania would not be scomed, of 
course, but the Russian Government, whilst evincing its willingness to negot­
iate, showed little desire to compromise, an attitude equally matched bv 
Rumania# It probably understood that both France and Poland, given a sufficient 
threat to their seourUy, would not let Rumanian obdurance prevent their sig­
nature of the initialled pacts with the USSR# Whilst the smoothing of the inter­
nal path towards signature in Paris and Yfarsaw by a demonstration of willin^ess 
to negotiate was a course Soviet diplomacy could and did pursue this was in
ÎI#''TKe''S8&sh^ïSs%'''S'Rw^ ' t&e ' Offi^ 21,
1932# Public Record Office M  N3859/25/63#
12# Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the RKD, June
23,1932# H E * Ma2â» P*380.
13#Telegram from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affair8,Kreatlnsky, to the
Commissar for forei^ Affairs, Litvinov,June 28,1932* P#392#
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faot only a side-show as compared with the major aim of realising the French 
and Polish pacts* Acting on his government's instruotions, Litvinov informed 
Zaleski that his fomula was unacceptable, advising that if the Polish Govern­
ment really desired a positive termination of the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations, 
then it should rapidly sign its pact with the tJSBE, "after which the Rumanian 
Government will become more reasonable*"^*
In the changing international situation, Poland was becoming increasingly 
reluotmit to maintain its policy of supporting Rumanian by postponing its own 
signature of the non-aggression pact with the Soviet %ion, for reasons which 
will be examined below* A Sovlet-Rumanian pact seemed no closer now than in 
January# Zaleski, reflecting this changing mood, promised Litvinov that he 
would telegraph the Russian proposal vis-a-vis a Polish signature to Pilsudski 
and forward his answer In the next few days* This answer was given to Litvinov 
on Ju3y 5; Poland was ready to&gn*^^*
This Polish decision did not, however, completely remove the Bessarabian 
obstacle from Soviet-Polish relations since Zaleski warned that the pact would 
not be ratified until a Soviet pact wi# Rumania had been concluded and, of 
course, France continued to resist any pressure to follow Poland*» lead* The 
Soviet-Rumanian pact saga continued to drag out its monotonous*^ story 5 indeed, 
this Polish step seemed, as if to confirm Soviet predictions, to instill a new 
life, almost vigour, to it. When Litvinov met Zaleski on July 5 he handed the 
Pole his latest Soviet-Rumanian project pact* The preamble and first article 
were the contentious ones* The preamble stated that "the conclusion of the 
present pact will not damage the position of either parly in territorial and 
other disputes which exist» between them and that these disputes remain to one 
side and in no degree will be affected by the present pact*" The first article, 
after binding each party to abstain from aggressive acts, defined such an act
14*"'Tel%r8m'''''%om' tKe 'OoiHssar^r'"ÿoreïgn Affâ5s%%Bvïn'^'%o^
June 30,1952# BVF Vel#15* p#393#
15* Telegram from the Gommisaar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov to the NïOû,
July 5,1932* Ibid#* p*396*
-fw*
a» "any act of force directed against the integrity and inviolability of the 
territory or political Independmce of the other contracting party and also ary 
attempt to settle by force territorial or other disputes between both contract­
ing parties." The remaining articles concerned neutrality, hostile organisations 
on the territory of either party directed against the other party and an under­
taking that no future obligations aocepted iy either party would contradict the
present paot which was to last for three years, to be prolonged automatically
16
for two years if not denounced six months before its expiry* * The inclusion 
of the preamble did not èlicit an optimistic reaction from the Polish Minister > 
who noted that it would hardly be acceptable to Rumania* In reply Litvinov con­
firmed that reference tw the Bessarqblan dispute was the basic Soviet demand 
and that it was inqjossible to agree on any recognition of the Rumanian right 
to that territory; he had made the maximum possible attempt to meet the Rumanian 
side* Zaleski promised to discuss this project with Titulesou,
Until this stage, Poland had played the leading role as mediator in the 
Soviet-Rumanian negotiations and France a minor role, largely as a result of 
Tardieu* s premiership, lasting from Februajy until June. When Herriot succeeded 
to this office France gradually became involved again in the erstwhile negot­
iations, especially in view of the imminent Polish signature of its pact. On 
July 10 Massigli, one of the French representatives at the Geneva disarmament 
talks, met Litvinov on Harriot's behalf and at Titulesou*s request. He said 
that it had been Herriot*s intention to meet the Commissar personally but he ;
had been delayed by the reparations negotiations in Lausanne* According to 
Massigli, Herriot was very concerned about the fate of the Franco-Soviet pact 
but affirmed once again that Soviet disagreements with Rumania stood in the way 
of a favourable settlement* He, Massigli, had been Instructed to elucidate the 
chances of their elimination which had not been increased by the most recent I
Soviet project, which, predictably, Titulesou rejected on two points, namely,
B ”r"'''Sovi©t ~pS ' for a Soviet-Rumwi^ hon-aggression pact, July"5,1952- 
ÎOT m *  ig. pps. 397-399*
17, Telegram from the Gonualssar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the HI0), 
July 5,1932. Ibid*,^ . ppa.396-397.
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18reference In the preahhle and the first article to territorial disputes# "
A further project, this time proposed by Poland, was unacceptable to the 
19Soviet Union as was yet another proposal, this time emanating from Rumania,
though handed to Litvinov at Geneva by a French mediator in the absence of
direct Soviet-Rumanian contacts# On this last occasion Litvinov did use the
opportunity to remind the Frenchman that the negotiations with Poland and
Rumania began in connection with the Franco-Soviet pact whose fate at this
moment, however, was obscure in Moscow# Despite the great desire in Russia to
progress further with the French paot, the bait of a promised answer on that
pact by Herriot in the near future would not induce Litvinov to agree that
reference in any Soviet-Rumanian pact to disputed questions could be eliminated,!
his only concession being that "the Soviet-French pact undoubtedly will increase
20
for us the value of the Rumanian pact#"
This stage in^ h^istory of the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations was ooncluded
with the receipt by Litvinov of another Polish-inspired project in which that
part of the opening preamble, so objectionable to Rumania, was omitted, in other
21respects it being similar to the Soviet project# * It was to prove unacceptable 
to the Soviet Government but of this later# The fate of the Rumanian pact and 
its very aignifioanoe in Soviet eyes obviously did not hinge on Rumania and
Russia alone# France and Poland were intimately involved in the complex wrangl-
on
ings and it is te these countries that attention must now be concentrated#
2# The Tardieu-Herriot Governments#
The ostensible reason for the delay in the signature of their respective
18, Tâegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to the
July 10,1932* DVP Vol#15. pps# 404-405#
19# Telegram from theComraisaar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to the NKD,
July 14, 1932# Ibid#, pps. 405-406.
20# Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to the NKD,
July 16, 1932. Ibid., pps# 410-411#
21# New project for a Soviet-Rumanian pact handed by Shetsel to Litvinov,
July 22, 1932. Ibid.. p#785, Note 206,
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paots with the Soviet Union given by both the French and Polish Governments 
was the abaenoe of a signed Soviet-Eumanian pact. In accordance with this reas­
oning the Tardieu Government whioh had aocepted power in France on February 21, 
1932 should have made every attempt to persuade the Bucharest Government to 
adopt a conciliatory policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in order that France's 
initialled pact might quickly be signed. Indeed, such a policy could weH have 
been expected from an anti-German and avowed supporter of the Versailles system 
such as Monsieur Andre Tardieu# There was yet another side to the conservative 
French Premier* s character, however; he was strongly anti-Soviet, had opposed = 
the non-aggression paot with the USSR in Laval's last government and any co-op­
eration with communist Russia was to him anat^ma#^^*
Rumania, as a member of the Little Entente, was allied with France. It 
might seem sound policy that the latter state should seek to minimise its chance 
of invoiyaent as a result of trouble on the unstable goviet-Rumanian frontier,
a policy which could only be furthered by the signature between the lattdr two
23
states of a non-aggression pact* If France refused to sign its paot until 
Rumania had done likewise, this mi^t act as a kind of blackmail against the 
Soviet Government to reach an accommodation with Bucharest, given its earnest 
wish to sign the Franco-Soviet pact. There was a second aide, however, to this 
affair# Some politically powerful forces within France favoured the signature 
of the Franco-Soviet pact, forces #loh Tardieu could not simply answer by a 
blank refusal to comply# Vdiat better excuse could such a man as Tardieu have 
for postponing this signature than the plea of loyalty to France's small ally 
whioh would be isolated if it alone had no paot with the UBSR# He could with 
ease invoke the blackmail argument as enunciated above in order to justify the 
soundness of his delaying tactics* Knowing the immense problems which had to be 
surmounted before Rumania would join Soviet Russia in a non-aggression paot and
22." Gri^orev "'and''W0nevI'^ 'Borba^ sWR"''sa
23. Although France was not committed to defend the Rumanian frontier with 
Russia by the Franco-Rumanian treaiy bf 1926 it wasjiâdireotly bound by 
its alliance with Poland* Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 
mi# 1# p.22#
the lack of enthusiasm in Rumanian ruling circles for such a paot, Tardieu 
merely had to insist on this pre-condition in order to shelve indefinitely
the Franco-Soviet paot#^^*
&"
French involyment in the Rumanian-Soviet paot negotiations during the 
spring and summer has already been examined above and It is significant that 
French mediation was of a very secondary importance to that of Poland during 
Tardieu*3 Government# Only with the appointment of Herriot to the Premiership 
on June 4 did the French Government, stimulated by Poland's growing desire to 
sign its non-aggression pact with the USSR, once more actively become engaged 
in assisting a Soviet-Rumanian agreement. ■.
During Tardieu's spell of office Franco-Soviet relations languished, The 
Soviet Government was under few illusions as to Its French counterpart's att­
itude towards the initialled pact# In the middle of February, three days before < 
the new French Government was formed, Berthelot had answered Dovgalevsky's 
assertion that the immediate signing of the Franco-Soviet pact was the only 
path which would lead to the rapid conclusion of the Soviet-Polish and Soviet- 
Rumanian pacts, by stating that he himself was beginning to incline towards this 
opinion but that everything depended on the new eabinet*^^* Shortly after 
Tardieu*3 appointment Zaleski had infomed Litvinov of the improbability of 
the new French Government signing the Franco-Soviet paot since in the previous 
Laval cabinet Tardieu had opposed this measure# Litvinov himself suspected
that Tardieu might encourage Rumania to refrain from reaching agreement with 
26Russia# * The following ; month he wrote that after a conversation with the
"24%'""MourinZ "Les 'routions Fmnc'o-8ovieti'quësZ^ . 'P#172# Z^eslci ' told'^ the
British Ambassador in Warsaw that Tardieu actively opposed the signing of a 
Rumanian-Boviet pact# British Ambassador in Pol0nd,Erskine,to the Foreign 
Office, August 22,1932# Public Record Office. FÛ N5103/25/63#
25# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Dovgalevsky,to the NKD,
February 18,1932# DVP, Vol.15# p#120. According to the Rumanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs,even Berthelot,seemingly a consistent supporter of good 
relations with the UBSR,had no illusions about the real value of a Franco- 
Soviet paot and was satisfied with the merely initialled pact. British 
Minister in Rumania,Polairet,to the Foreign Office,March 16,1932# Public 
Record Office, FO N183^25/63*
26# Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the NKD,
February 26,1932# DVP Vol.15, p#141#
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French Premier he gained the impression that "improved relations with the 
ÎBSR do not at all enter into his immediate oaloulations and tasks." Although 
Tardieu spoke of his readiness to promote the elimination of the Rumanian ohst- 
aole and to assist in the working out of a suitable formula to cover disputed - 
Soviet-Rumanian questions, Litvinov saw in this merely an attempt hy Tardieu 
to portray himself as Brinnd's suooessor, pursuing a peace policy in readiness 
for the approaching French elections in which it would he impossible to gain, a 
majority operating exclusively on rightist p a r t i e s . Again in April, Litvinov ■ 
suspected Tardieu*s involvment in the Rumanian issue as being "only a manoeuvre 
from Tardieu* s side so as to protect himself at Geneva and especially at the 
time of the pre-election campaign in France against reproaches of consciously 
wrecking 'the business of .the -pae^ ification of eastern Europe' begun by Briahd^  * 
Franco-Soviet dislike and distrust was not entirely due to Tardieu's 
Premiership, however; other factors intruded on to the scene whioh strengthened 
and affirmed this personal antagonism* On May 6 the President of the French 
Republic, Doumer, was assassinated by Gorgulov, a Russian emigre. ?Mlst GorgUlo% 
was a self-declared Russian national fascist who oommltted the crime "in order
PQ
to compel France to make war on the Soviets," * it created the most extreme
reaction in both France and the Soviet Union. An editorial in "L© Temps,” with
which Tardieu was. closely connected, stated?
There dw certain governments that imagine they can bring the Soviets^ ''--' 
into their own design against other powers, without any danger to them­
selves, Instead, they are in reality serving the Soviet power and contr­
ibuting to tîie development of its influence in the world. 30.
The Soviet press responded violently to such French press oomiaent, a typical
Soviet headline being "Tardieu inspires campaign against
Russia resented Tardieu's plans for economio reconstruction in the D##e
'■ ""—I"" I».. ............................I  IIÉlililillMiill»ilMl.llimillllllMllil«>IIÉl.#liiilli»llil'illlilllliÉillM>*IIÉlt#É«IIIIWIIf.f,!WIIW»|lll'|ll'.»l«»'W«<iW'1iP'*  9
27. Letter from'the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, to the MKS,Soviet ■- 
Charge ,d'Affaires in France, Rosenberg, Maroh 29,1952» SEJ2Êâ#i5#PP:®*
/ 213-214.
28. Letter from a member of the Gollegium of the RED,Stomonyakov, to the Soviet 
Minister in Roland,Antonov-Ovseenko.Aprll 22,1932. Ibid..pps.273-274»
29* Quoted in-Joffe, Tnshnvayg nolitika Sovetskogo_Soum. p.234.
30. Le Temps,’May 9,1932. Quoted in Scott, Alliance Against Hitlei^ *, p.37.
31. Pravdg. May 12,1932.
basin in which Its participation, was not solicited and which was therefore 
seen as being a means of creating an anti-Soviet bloc in south-eastern Europe# * 
A third source of friction was the continued Soviet opposition to French 
disarmament plans at Geneva. The basic French theme remained constant; that a 
system of security must be organised before any substantial reduction of French 
armaments could take place* On February 5, Tardieu, then French Minister of War 
and leader of the French delegation at the Disarmament Conference, presented the 
French plan at Geneva* In essence, ha proposed that an international force be 
created under the control of the League of Nations, that air forces be placed 
at the League's disposal, that compulsory arbitration be introduced and iàm a 
definition of "aggressor" be decided upon* This plan caused a sensation at 
Geneva and was resisted not only by Germany, but by the Americans and the 
British, among other»* :^ itvinov's speech on February 11 reiterated the usual 
Soviet theme that security could only be obtained by total disarmament* In 
particular the Gommissar oritioised the proposal to create an international 
force?
First and foremost it, must be stated that, from the point of view of 
the reduction hf armaments, the French proposals scarcely bring us 
nearer to our aim, in'-as much as they are preliminaiy conditions re­
quiring to be accepted before any sort of reduction of armaments is 
to be made on the part of F r a n c e *^ 4»
The Soviets were once again side by side with Germany against France, In add­
ition, Litvinov used the Geneva forum on this occasion to castigate France, 
Poland and especially Rumania as regards the Soviet proposal of non-aggression 
pacts
When such a proposal is not immediately accepted but considered for 
years, and evén after the first letter of the signature has been app­
ended to it a period of meditation ensues, and the completion of the 
signature is postponed, there is naturally less feeling of confidence*
But still more serious doubts of a peaceful spirit arise v/ith regard to 
states which categorioally reject propoi^ ala for the conclusion of a pact 
of non-aggression, either on some excuse or other, or wilhout giving any 
excuse* 3b*
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33* Eurvey international Affairs for 1932# edited by A*J .Toynbee (London 1933
PP»* 197-199*
34* The Soviet Union and the Path to Peace* (London 1936), p#60*
33# And Japan*
36. Ibid.. pps* 64-65*
These Geneva debates were echoed, though in a more vi^oious fashion,
in the Soviet and French press. On February 7, on article in Isvestiia was
headed, "France uses Geneva Conference to consolidate its hegemony In Europe"
and three days later an editorial castigated the capitalist world and revealed
its lies concerning any genuine intention to disarm,Radek used his pen to
back Germany against the fiendish French?
Armed to the teeth, France watches with deep anxiety the growing hatred 
of disarmed Germany, It was forbidden to re-arm but a great people ha# 
tremendous powers of resistance which will appear when patience is 
exhausÉed.39.
1*0 Temps answered Litvinov's speech in a similar tone?
(The Soviets) need external peace in order to try to consolidate their 
power. But their bolshevik passion, their hatred of so-called capitalist 
civilisation, their revolutionary imperialism remained the same as 
before, and there is a grave danger for all nations that they may be 
taken in by certain appearances which Moscow tries to oreate,40.
Such hostility engendered at Geneva was unlikely tofurther the cause of polit­
ical rapprochement between the two states, though there was to be a sharp Soviet 
change of policy as regards its Geneva stance whose significance can,bo judged 
in the light of the hitherto totally contradictory viewpoint of both countries 
on disarmament#
The fourth factor which prompted idadta; distrust in Franco-Soviet relations 
was the increasiJ^ly strident French support for Japanese policy in Manchuida.
As the Japanese threat grew with its occupation of northern Manchuria and the 
proclamation of a puppet government of Manchukuo on March 1, 1932, French policy 
began to be even more prominently pro-Japanese, especially as the United States : 
was now becoming less willing to oounte^nanoe Japanese actions# Throughout the 
spring of 1932 editorials in the semi-official Le Temps argued that the param­
ount Japanese political interest in Manchuria should be recognised as a desir­
able force end on May 13 a Franoo-Japanese treaty of commerce was signed deal­
ing with Indo-Ghina,^* The Russians could only be alarmed at the policies of a
37* Izvestiia, February 7> 1932#
38. Ibid.. February 10, 1932.
39# iWA",
40, Le Temps, February 13,1932. Quoted in Scott, Alliance Against Hitler.p.AO,
41. Ibid., 0,42.
185.
Tardieu Government which refused to sign the initialled non-aggression pact
with the ÎIBSR and simultaneously evinced support for Japanese expansion on the
Soviet border. Pravda had already noted at the end of January the complete
contact between French and Japanese iraperia3J.sm.^* In March an article in
"Communist International" spoke of a Franco-Japanese alliance which had extended
the French alliance system from Europe to the whole world and pursued the aim»
of "embracing the Soviet Union in a pincer*like attack from east and west.
"Bolshevik" considered Japanese imperialism the gendarme of the Versailles
hk.
system in the east as French imperialism was in Europe. * ?/hilst Tardieu* s 
pro-Japanese policy strengthened dislike in Moscow for a France under his rule, 
it must also have demonstrated, if such a demonstration was needed, yet a 
further advantage which a rapprochement with France and firstly the signature 
of the initialled non^aggression pact, would bring the USBE, that is, a red­
uction of its isolation in the Far East.
If Tardieu* s tenure of the Premiership had scarcely been distinguished 
for Soviet-French r elutions, Harriot's succession to this position could just­
ifiably be expected to breed new optimism in Moscow. Edouard Herriot, himself 
the leader of the Radicals, formed his Radical-Socialist Cabinet on June 4,
1952. In 1924 it had been a French Government led by Herriot which had recog­
nised the Soviet Union though of late he ha,d become some^ diat disillusioned by 
Soviet propaganda aotlvlties.^^*
Herriot differed from his predecessor not only by his more favourable 
attitude towards the UBSR, however, but also by his less hysterical approach 
4^r'% a y k .''Jan................... .. ......
45# "Feace is slipping into a World Imperialist War," Communist International 
m A J f J b f e . March 15, 1932, p.l09*
44. "Kriais Kapitaliama 1 opasnost voiny," Bolshevik N4.February 29#1932,p.2*
45* Herriot complained to the Soviet Ambassador about the alliance of the French 
Communist Party with the UBSR in the 1928 elections and emphasised that he 
had suffered in France because of his friendly relations with the USSR* 
Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsky, to the NKD, June 
8,1932. DVP Vol. 15. p.352.On the other hand, Litvinov recalled that Herriot 
was always personally friendly despite the Commissar's sharp attacks against 
French resolutions at the Disarmament Conference. Telegram from the Commiss­
ar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the NKD, July 24,1932. 3tbid..p.454>
towards Germany. There had been no slowing down in the growth of extremism in 
the latter country, indeed^ i during the winter of 1931-1932 Nazi and communist 
activity had grown. îlindenburg was compelled to fight two campaigns before he 
succeeded in the presidential elections in April, 1932. Hitler more than doubl*, 
iiig the number of votes polled for his party in September 1930. Yet perhaps 
this very increasing danger posed by Germany, in ooajuotion with Herriot*» 
radical view and France's own growing economic difficulties, inclined the new 
French Premier to make a further attempt at placating the reasonable elements 
within the V/eimar Republic. In addition, tlie Bruning Government in Germeny had 
fallen at the end of May and in June Hindenburg chose Franz von Papen as 
Chancellor. Papen had long advocated improved relations witli France and ident­
ified himself with pro-French elements in Germany*^*
The opporunity for these two new leaders to meet presented itself on June 
16 when the Lausanne Conference convened to examine once again the thorny prob­
lem of German reparations. As the events of the following days showed, however, 
Papen intended to discuss considerably more than the reparations issue* In 
return for the cancellation of reparations and the recognition of Germany's 
right to equality in armaments, he offered Herriot a Customs Union and a 
Consultative Paot. Within this offer, Papen proposed a military understanding 
backed by contacts between -the French and German general staffs?
We were ready for a customs union with France which could bring both 
countries great advantages, and in the field of security we could give 
no greater proof of our sincerity, in wy opinion, than that we were 
thinking of an entente between the French and German Armies. This 
entente must have no aggressive tendency at all directed against any­
one but would simply make possible m  exchange of views and information 
between the General Staffs, and would bring a feeling of security about 
the present situation. 47*
SVcnch suspicion of these military proposals, nationalist opposition to 
them within Germany and British opposition sufficed to crush any likelihood of
46. A.Franoois-Pomoet, The Fateful Years; Memoirs of a French Ambassador in 
Berlin. 1931-1938 (London 19W), p.24.
47# Memorandum by Chancellor von Papen on a conversation with tlie Franch
Premier Herriot, June 29,1932. Documents on Germyi Foreign Policy 1^ -3:^ 1918- 
19t9 Sarloa C Vol.l. JmuaCT 30-Ôotober lL.193? (London 1997). p.91. 
footnote 2. (Hereafter, German Doo.)
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a Franco-German accord. These events hoTfever did have an influence on the
Soviet Union of a two-folKd characters firstly, rumours of a military "alliance"
whioh began to reach Russia later in the year naturally alarmed the Soviet
Government which was the most obvious objective of any Franco-German military
48*agreement and underlined its still insecure position; * secondly, Harriot's
attention was centred on Lausanne rather than on the state of Franco-Soviet
relations with his resulting imperviousness to Soviet pressure directed at
49.gaining the French signature of the Franco-Soviet non-aggression paot.
Despite Herriot*s Lausanne sojourn during June and July some improvemmt 
did occur in Franco-Soviet relations* French diplomacy, following Tardieu*s 
defeat, began to show more interest in assisting a Rumanian-Soviet agreement, 
partly stimulated by events in Warsaw.Zaleski told Litvinov that according 
to his information the reason for Rumania's more reasonable attitude of late to­
wards the pact negotiations was explained by Herriot*s influence. The new French 
Premier had personally informed Zaleski of the desirability of concluding the 
series of non-aggression paots with the Soviet Union.Progress on the Franco- 
Soviet pact itself, however, did not materialise and the Soviet Government 
seemed in some doubt as to Herriot*s attitude towards it, Litvinov several 
times during July attempting to clarify this point.Whatever opinions Herriot 
and his Government did hold on the subject of the pact were significantly aff­
ected at the end of July by the unilateral action of the Polish Government in 
signing its non-aggression paot with the Soviet Union.
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49* Harriot told Dovgalevsky that he was only superficially acquainted with 
the Franco-Soviet pact history and asked him to postpone a detailed talk 
on the subject until after his retum from Lausanne and Geneva. Telegram 
from the Soviet Ambassador in France, Dovgalevsky, to the NKD, June 8,
1932. DVP Vol.15. p.352#
50. See below.
51. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the NKD,
June 23, 1932. Ibid.. p.380.
52. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the NKD,
July 10, 1932. jtbld.. p.405. Telegram from the Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, Litvinov, to the NKD, July 16,1932* Ibid.. p,411.
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3. The Polish Signature#
Vfhen the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact had been initialled in 
January, 1952, the Polish Government had made its eventual signature of the 
paot conditional on the signature by all the other Soviet western frontier
KTt
states of their analogous pacts with the USSR* * Since the Finnish and Latvian ■ 
pacts were signed by early Febmary and the Estonian paot a little later, at 
the beginning of May, the only obstacle still remaining was the deadlock in the 
Soviet-Rumanian negotiations*
The Polish Government, in its mediatory efforts to resolve this deadlock, 
in contrast to the Tardieu Government, exhibited an earnest desire fo fulfil 
its established pre-condition in order that it might sign its own paot, a 
desire whioh increased as the spring and summer developed. Initially, the 
Narkomindel appears to have been sceptical of Poland's foreign policy aims, 
believing that Pilsudski "did not want and does not want a paot." It wrongly 
suspected that Poland had negotiated the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact only 
under French pressure and saw Pilsudski's influence behind Rumania's unwilling­
ness to make concessions as regards its pact with Ru s s i a . W i t h  this Polish 
intransigence in mind, Antonov-Ovseenîco was instructed not to force the concl­
usion of the Polish paot but in conversations with leaders of Polisla society 
and foreign diplomats to stress that the series of pacts had not been conclud­
ed because of the other states involved "and especially because of Poland's 
attitude#
In March Soviet-Poliah relations were clouded by the attempted murder of 
the Counsellor of the German Embassy in Moscow, von Tvardovsky. The accused,
according to the Soviet authorities, was a member of a terrorist group acting
53#" 'see ' above,' ''p%Ï%îr''   '■""'-i- t  ,n t  t  ,r —  t  i I n - r . . . . . . .
3k* The Soviet Government continued to suspect Poland of welcoming Japanese
imperialist moves Manchuria, According to Fischer, v/ho was told by Eadek, 
Stalin feared a simultaneous Japanese-Pollsh attack. L.Fischer, Russians 
Road from Peace to War. Soviet Foreign Relations. 1917-1941 (New York 19&9)
p#222*
55# Letter from a member of the Collegium of the NKD, Stomonyakov, to the 
Soviet Minister in Poland, Antonov-Ovseenko, March 5# 1932. Sov-Pol Docs.
p.329*
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on behalf of “foreign oitiaens" with the aim of aggravating Soviet-German
56
relations and thus promoting a worsening of Russia's international position. *
An Izvestiia editorial claimed that "from the camp of the enemies of the USSR,
who are trying by all means and any provocations to wreck our peaceful building,
recently have been made new attempts to create complications between the USSR
57and foreign states," in a very pro-German article. * Poland was named as the 
instigator of this anti-Soviet terrorist act throughout the proceedings whioh 
culminated in April with the trial of the accused.
This outburst of anti-Polish xenophobia in Moscow was possibly staged in 
order to intimidate the Polish Government and thereby create stronger pressure 
in Warsaw for the signature of the Soviet-Polish pact, pressure which Moscow 
considered was lacking. At any rate, this does appear to have been the conse­
quence#^^* The Narkomindel noted Poland's "meekness" in connection with the 
Tvardovsky affair and its general peaoe-lovingness in relation to the USSR in 
a letter to the Soviet Ambassador towards the end of April. It explained this 
meekness by Poland's difficult and complex internal and international positions 
at that time, suggesting that "Poland has grown quiet, pricked up its ears and 
is waiting for the development of events," especially in relation to the forth­
coming German and French elections* Only when the international situation be­
came clarified would Poland again conduct an active policy in relation to the 
USSR, the direction of this policy depending on the international situation 
which took shape. This perceptive document then analysed Polish policy as for 
the time being keeping all options open, neither aggravating relations with the 
USSR nor making a serious rapprochement, but being ready to conduct talks on 
secondary themes and even to conclude technical agreements such as the recent 
frontier agreement of April 10. The Russians had in fact already agreed, in
' MarOh''5% ^ ' 1932 . r.1'.....' r -T im r.- | i ï - . . i i r i
57* Izvestiia. March 8, 1952.
58. Tags Report, March 11,1952* DVP Vol.15. pps. 176-177* Dirksen states that 
he did not believe the truth of the Soviet assertion that the attempt was 
contrived by Poland in the hope of embroiling the Soviet Union in a conflict 
with Germany. Dirksep, Moscow Tokyo London, p. 109*
59. Budurpwycz, Polish-Soviet Relations« p.15.
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answer to an unofficial Polish probe, to conclude a series of technical 
agreements independently pf the development of the pact negotiations. For 
their part, the Russians attempted to avoid the further aggravation of relat­
ions with Poland and did not expect any new developments as regards the non- 
aggression pact before the results of the French elections, the victory of the 
radicals and socialists threatening a weakening of Polish-French ties and a 
consequent impetus towards a Polish signature of its paot with the
Poland was indeed very concerned about events in Germany and France. 
Tension on the Polish-German frontier continued to increase end by June the 
situation was serious, especially in Danzig. The German National-Socialist 
party's strength continued to grow and its views on Poland were not difficult 
to comprehend. Polish-French relations also were deteriorating, a move acceler­
ated by Polish dissatisfaction at France's Danubien plans, undertaken without 
any consultation.vdth Warsaw and contrary to Polish interests. This deterior­
ation was so marked that in May the Soviet Government informed its Ambassador 
in Warsaw "to take into account the probability of the Polish aotiviaation in 
the near future of negotiations concerning the Polish-Soviet and Rumanian- 
Soviet pacts.Laroche, the French Ambassador in Warsaw, noted the malaise 
in Franoo-Polish relations and in May drew his government's attention to it, 
reporting Polish fears concerning a Franco#^German rapprochement and its effect 
on France's assessment of Polish international significance. Polish fears were 
further accentuated by certain articles in the French press favourable to the 
revision of the Polish-German frontier.
Polish anxiety about possible isolation and the consequent need for more 
solid relations with the USSR certainly seems to have increased during May. 
Polish mediation in the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations became wore active and 
Pilsudski repeatedly threatened Rumania with a Polish Anilatoral signature 
of its pact in the event of further Rumanian procrastination.
-59* Budurowveg. Poliah-Soviet Relations. 0.15*
60. Letter from a Member of the Collegium of the NKD,Stomonyakov,to the Soviet 
Minister in Poland,Antonov-Ovaeenko,April 22.1952 .J^ P^ ITol *15.PPa.272-273*
61. Letter from a Member of the Collegium of the NKD,Stomonyakov,to the Soviet 
Minister in Poland,Antonov-Ovaeenko,May 7,1932. Ibid..p .307.
62. Laroche, La Pologne de Pilsudski. p.109#
63. Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the Polish Foreign Minister,Zaleski,May 24.1932.DVP Vol.15. p.330.
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Zaleski told the British representative in the Baltic that his government 
had notified the Latvian, Estonian and Finnish Governments that it proposed 
to wait until June 15, after which date it would ratify the Soviet non- 
aggression paot without waiting longer for an agreement between the Soviet 
Union and R u m a n i a T h i s  Polish impatience and anxiety was increased by 
events in June* Herriot's suoeess in the French elections reduced the already 
failing Polish faith in Frenoh support against a resurgent Germany, a faith
vdiioh the Herriot-Papen talks at Lausanne only further diminished* Yet still
G
the Polish Government shrank from signing its Soviet pact and instead made :
further attempts to achieve success in the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations* This
was apparently a result of French pressure on Poland to maintain solidarity
with France and Rumania* Budurowycz states that while the Rumanian Government
assured Poland that it had no objections to the conclusion of a Soviot-Polish
paot, at the same time it attempted to gain French support in delaying the
Polish s i g n a t u r e T h e  British Minister in Bucharest reported that after
discussions with the French and Rumanian Governments the Polish Government
decided to postpone further the ratification of its pact with the USSR.^^* Yet
it was clear that the Poles would not delay much longer, especially in the face
67
of the Latvian ratification of its pact on June 21 and Finnish ratification
on July 7,^^' moves whioh threatened Poland's role as loader of the Baltic ;
gi^up unless it followed suit. On June 30, Zalosld promised Litvinov that he
would telegraph the latter's proposal for the immediate signature of the Soviet-
69
Polish pact to Warsaw an affirmative reply being given to the Commissar five !
days l a t e r * A t  this stage, however, further delay occurred compelliiig Litvinoi!
&r'BMti8h Representative ^  the FoïS^^ËÏSoei^ ?
Mfiy 30.1932 ,Publip Record Office.FO N342C/2%/63 *Presumably he meant sign 
and not ratify.
65. Buduroi^cjs, Polish-Soviet Relations, p.16.
66. British Minister in Rumania,Palairet,to the Foreign Office,June 21,1932. !
Public Record Office.FO N3859/25/63.Again, the report must mean signature ,
and not ratification.
67. The USSR ratified on July 11 and ratification instruments were exchanged i 
in Moscow On July 28,1932.
68. The USSR ratified on July 11 and ratification instruments were exchanged 
in MOSCOW on August 9,1932.
69. Telegram from Gommisaar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the NKD,June 30, 
1932. DVP,vol.15. p.393.
70. Telegram from Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the NKD,July 5,
1932. #id.. p.396.
to ask Zaleski why Patek had not signed the paot in Moscow "despite the 
instructions whioh he had received, about which Zaleski had told me," The
71
Polish Foreign Minister replied that he did not Icnow the reason for the delay; ' 
Presumably it was a last attempt by France to prevent Poland's action. Finally 
on July 25, after the' last attempt at mediation in the Soviet-Rumanian negot­
iations had failed and despite a last minute appeal by the Rumanian Govemmmt 
72.
to Pilsudski, * the Soviet-Polish paot of non-aggression was signed In Moscow
73
by Patek and Krestinsky ^ though the Polish Government affirmed that it would 
not be ratified until Soviet-Rumanian paot had been concluded.
Pravda greeted this event as "a serious success for the peaceful policy 
of the USSR” in a fairly subdued editorial; for Izvestiia it was ”a step forward 
in the mutual relations of both countries,whilst in Poland it was generally 
regarded as an important contribution to a relaxation of European tension.^^* 
Zaleski was careful to minimise the extent to which Poland could be accused of 
adopting a radical and dangerous course in signing a non-aggression paot with 
communist Russia by describing it as a development of the Kellogg Pact, an 
adaptation related to the specific and regional conditions of eastern Europe*
He was also quick to as sauge French and Rumanian anger at Poland's unilateral 
act by stressing that the Polish-Rumanian alliance, far from being harmed, would
be reinforced by this fresh instrument # 10se sole object was to render normal
Polish-Soviet relations* * Such verbal gymnastics could not negate the fact
that Poland had been forced by grave seourity considerations to breach the
^^ 7'" Tàlegraiïï'''from "'the^ for Foreign Âffairs%î<ïtvin6v
July 14, 1932. DVP Vol. 15. p*406,
72. Budurowycs, Polish-Soviet Relations. p. 16. Beck states that finally Poland 
was forced to ask Bucharest "yes or no" whether it intended to oonolude a 
pact with the USSR# The Rumanian reply was in the negative but raised no 
objections to the Polish conclusion of its pact with the Soviet Union.
Beck, Final Report, p.9*
73* Text in D W  Vol.l^. pps* 436*439«Identical text to that initialled, see 
above, pps.150-151, I60.
74. Scott, Alliance Against Hitler, p.57#
75* Pravda. July 30. 19^# I July 30,1932.
76, For Polish press comment see Budurowycz, Polish-Soviet Relations, pps,18-19.
77. Interview given to Chicago Daily News* Reported by British Representative 
in Poland, Vereker, to the Foreign Office, August 3,1932. Public Record 
Office* FO N464y25/63*
united front whioh it had, albeit unwillingly, maintained with Iranoe and 
Rumania* The growing threat from Germany could not be, ignored. A Soviet willing- 
nesa to sign the initialled paot in a situation of growing danger on Poland's 
western frontier, could not be spumed any longer* Diplomatic promises seldom 
long outlive a change in the international environment when such a change 
renders them obsolete* Although Poland had promised Rumania it would not take 
this step until the Bucharest Governmmt had itself joined Russia in a similar 
paot it had retreated from this position; now it was ratification which would 
await the oonolusion of a Soviet-Rumanian pact. Soviet diploimoy had never con­
cealed its aspiration to the signature of its initialled paot with Poland but 
it could do little other than remind that state of this desire while it waited 
for events beyond its control, especially in the realm of Polish-German and 
Polish-French relations, to mature* This was a passive Soviet policy which paid 
dividends*
Latvia's ratification of its non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union
was influenced, as the British representative reported, by the approaching
commercial negotiations with the USSR which were to begin in August, Latvia
being especially dependent on the Soviet eoonony# According to this report the
Polish Government did attempt to delay ratification in order to gain time for
an agreement between Rumania and the USSR but the Latvian Foreign Minister was
78
anxious to finalise the pact* * Soviet-Finnish relations continued to improve 
following the January signature of the non-aggression paot and trade negotiat­
ions began in the spring, again underlining the importance of economic factors
79*in the political decisions of these small Baltic states* Despite Soviet
economio pressure, the faot that these two small states, hitherto rather depend
(bat on Poland in the foreign policy sphere, ratified their pacts before Poland
had even signed its pact is symptomatic of the new international environment
which was beginning to emerge* ÎSider the impetus of growing European instability
each state was increasingly looking to its own immediate security interests
78* The^ 'iritish" RepïSSïït3ive''in Latvia,Kne%'oKbi^ 'Sfcie "Foreign
Office, June 28, 1932. Public Record Office* FO N3966/25/63.
79* Izvestiia. April 15, 1932. ...........
rather than its traditional alignment* The situation of the Baltic states 
at the best of times was a precarious one, wedged between Poland and the Soviet 
Union, hardly viable eoonomioally, defenceless unless on good relations with at 
least one of these great neighbours* Historioal and ideological barriers had 
handicapped these small states in their relations with Russia and hence they 
were forced to seek Poland's assistance in the 1920's* Yet such Polish support 
would have been of little use against a determined Soviet onslaught* By the 
1930's these states had realised that non-aggression pacts with the USSR off­
ered the beat, if even then all too flimsy, gauarantee of their independence; 
by resisting any longer Soviet calls for such paots they not only implied their 
pursuit of aggressive imperialist aims subordinated to Poland and France but 
deprived themselves of economic assets which good relations with Russia would 
bring* By 1932 the Baltic states preferred to pay the price of Polish^anger 
rather than reject Soviet overtures in their direction*
4* Towards a French signature.
By the end of July the French Government's policy in relation to the 
Soviet Union vms beginning to re-shape* Pressure for its signature of the non­
aggression pact with the USSR was increasing as relations with Germany once 
again deteriorated following the desultory Papen-Horriot talks at Lausanne and 
the signature of the Soviet-Polish paot* Herriot himself seems to have been 
steadily moving towards the position already reached by Poland, that in the 
circumstances a rapprochement with Soviet Russia was essential for his country*s 
security. Yet this did not signify that all opposition to such a policy had 
collapsed. Within France there could always be organised a powerful resistance 
,against any rapprochement with the "Bolsheviks" and such influential opponents 
could marshal certain facts to their aid. Many Frenchmen demanded loyalty to 
their ally, Rumania; any paot with Russia before the Bucharest Government had 
negotiated a similar paot would seem to be betrayal. Herriot, however, was be­
coming increasingly disillusioned by the stubborn Rumanian resistance to French,
FoXish and Soviet proaauy<e*.Xn eonvex^sation with Bovgalevalgr he spoke "very 
disapprovingly^^ of the Baaanlana and several times repeated angrily# "oh* X 
know how diffionlt it 1$ to talk witli/these people#"^^*Xhe French Premier was 
prepared to treatj^umsnih sharply hut neverth^ess could not ignore the p o l i t W  ;
opposition tô this policy within France. # e  Soviet Government for its part
steadfastly refused to acknowledge any connection hetween its Rumanian negot*
dations and the initialled French pact. In its opinion the signature of the
Boviet'^Pollsh(pact had removed the final obstacle to a French signature since*
as Dovgalesvshy told Herrlot# neither Berth^ot nor Briand at any time had est*
ahliahed any connection between the French and Rumanian pacts# hut only with 
Ô1
the Polish one*
A second?'factor mitigating against the French signature was the failure 
of the economic negotiations in 1951 Un the q^ uestion of loans and credits which 
weakened the position of the supporters of a rapprochement with Russia. The 
desire to achieve an economic agreement had been a powerful motive in beginn­
ing the political negotiations in early 1951. If an economic settlement advan* 
tageous to French industry could ha secured then the signature of the non* 
aggression pact would he that much easier for t!ie French Government. With this i 
end in view, Harriot suggested the resumption of trade negotiations and eventu* ■ 
ally the simultaneous signature of a trade agreement, an agreement on orders i 
and the non-aggression pact. The Soviets, however, resolutely opposed this
Sbri&isSxSm ' Ambassador'^' 'SaSSejBovgdlev^ July
26.1952. BVP Vol.l^* p.440. Herriot al^ ao told Dovgalevshy a few days later 
that he had been very sharp with Titul^cu in answer to the letter's tear­
ful plea that France should not sign its pact with the H3SH before Rumania 
took such a step. He promised the Soviet Ambassador that he would atten^t 
to exert pressure on Rumania. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France# 
Bovgalevsky, to the MB# August 2,1932. Ibid.. p.449*
81. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France#Bovgalevsky, to the NKB#duly
26.1952. Ijbid.. p.440. Initially the French had not even made any reference 
to the signature of the Polish pact as a pre-condition for their signature, 
this only being communicated to the Russians in September 1951* See above, 
pps. 133-134* They had onüy referred to the necessity for a Rumanian pact 
in January 1932* See above, pp8.167*168.
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aa they had in 1951# * They had no ohJ action to th© aoonomio negotiation»
being activated one© again hut were aa anxious as th© Froneh to roach agroemont#
arduous
fearing only that ihoy would he ardeue# a Justifiable conclusion when their 
history was considered* The Soviet position was clear| any linking of political 
and economic issues would merely delay the signature of the non-aggression paolt
The immediate effect of the Polish signature on french opinion would
appear to have been a negative one rather than it providing an example to be
imitated by Fronce* A certain amount of resentment was expressed at Poland's
high-handed policy and the semi-official "Bulletin du Jour" of I»e Temps warned#
France, as far as she is concerned, has constantly subordinated 
any pact of non-aggression with the Soviets to the guarantee of 
the security of Poland and Rumania. #* It Is known that the Fr§noo-
Eusflian pact is still in the state of a project having been the
object of preliminary discussions but not yet having been submitted 
to the scrutiny of the Govdmmmts and, therefore, in no way binding 
their responsibility.^^'#
In fact a large section of the French press mounted a furious attack on Polish 
policy.
It was in this situation that Herriot spoke to hitvinov on several occas­
ions in July about resuming negotiations. The Commissar was quite prepared to
sign the pact but resisted Harriot's insinuation that the initialled text might 
86
require amendment, * The French Premier was anxious to gain time in order to
assess the internal French political climate and therefore excused any decision
87
until he had acquainted himself with the details of the pact's history#
In early August Herriot placed the question of the Franco-Soviet pact 
negotiations, trade relations and the pact negotiations between th© Soviet 
Union and its western' border states before his cabinet which unanimously in­
structed him and the Minister of $rade to resume negotiations and to conclude
IB2T''Telegram' from!'the"^ 'o%'et'''Amba '"îËD,July
26,1952# BVP Vol.lS. pps.440-441#
85# Telegram frOm the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,hitvinov,to the NKB,Ju3y
24,1932, Ibid.. p.4541
84. he Temps, July 27,1952# Quoted in Scott, Alliance Against Hitler, p.58#
85# In his autobiography Beck recounts how the Fivnch^  him "a
traitor to Europe." Beok.Final Heoort. p.l9*
86# Telegram from the Oomraissar for Foreign Affair » ,hitvinov, to th© MKB,
July 24,1932. S L M i M *  PPa. 453-454#
87. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France ,Dovgalevaky, to the NKB,
July 26, 1952» Ibid.. p.440.
both the economic and political agreements# This instruction was someMiat 
offset in Soviet eyes by the cabinet's expression of the desirability of con­
cluding a Soviet-Rumanian pact without which not only parliament but even the 
foreign affairs commission would not give their approval to the Franco-Soviet 
pact* It was decided that trade negotiations should be resumed in the middle of 
September after the French summer holidays and the Foreign Ministry was instr­
ucted to give its opinion as to whether any changes should be made to the text 
of the initialled pact, an act in which Herriot asked for a Soviet expert to 
participate# The French leader promised that when final agreement had been 
reached on the text, he would report to the council of ministers after which it 
could be signed# Meanwhile he would tiy to help in achieving a Rumanian-8otiet 
agreement.
Harriot's personal responsibility for this progress in Franco-Soviet 
relations should not be under-estimated; within the country as a whole oppos­
ition remained strong. Bovgalevsky was told by Reger, a high official in the 
French Foreign Ministry, that initially the present French cabinet doubted the 
expediency of continuing the previous year's negotiations but under Harriot's 
prompting resolved to resume them and conclude the agreements. Yet despite the 
cabinet's sincere wish to sign the pact immediately it was compelled to delay 
until a Soviet-Rumanian pact had been concluded. Reger said that if such a pact
were signed or if the Rumanians adopted an irreconcilable position, then the
89
French Government would be able to sign. He obviously did not consider that 
Rumania had yet reached such a deadlock position. The fate of the Franco-Soviet 
pact therefore still depended on the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations as well as oa 
a final agreement as regards the final text. The situation was gradually chang­
ing, however, since the French Government now was more anxious to see a Soviet- 
Rumanian pact concluded instead of usipg the latter as a useful excuse for 
delay* Agreement on the text of the Franco-Soviet pact was soon achieved.
88. Telegr^ from the Soviet Ambassador in FrSej^DovgkLevsky, to the NKD,^
August 6, 1932. BVF Vol.15. ppa.491-452.
89. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsky, to the MB,
August 10, 1952. Ibid.. pps.462-463.
Bovgalevsly was authorised to inform Herriot that in the event of his agreement
to the signature there would he no obstacle to his proposed new amendments.
A supplementary'' telegram makes it clear that the Soviet Government was anxious
to deprive France of an excuse for further delay on this issue even if it meant
91*malting some concessions on the text#
As regards the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations, France now joined Poland in 
a combined attempt to settle the outstanding Bessarabian problem# The Rumanian 
Government itself seemed somewhat better disposed to this attempt than to prev­
ious ones. Its premier, 'Faida-V’oivod, stated that as long ago aa 1928 his coun­
try had expressed a desire to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet 
Union and had in fact signed the Litvinov protocol in the following year which, 
according to Stirason's recent statement, had the character and significance of 
a genuine non-aggression pact. Voivod emphasised that Rumania was prepared to
sign a pact with the Ü3SH but that it demanded that its interests be taken into 
92.account.
The French Government novr proposed a new formula for a Rumanian agreement,
hoping to succeed vdxere all previous attempts had failed. Loger proposed to
Dovgalevsky the following compromiseî any mention of disputes and territory
situated under the sovereignty or authority of either party to be eliminated
from the pact; a concluding protocol to be added stating that "the present
pact cannot serve any other aims, namely, the settlement of disputed questions
which exist between both countries at the time of the signature of the pact;"
at the signing, the Russians were to make a declaration in a strong form on
the Bessarabian question. Bovgalevsky agreed to put these proposals before his 
93.Government.
Litvinov did not object to the transference of reference to Soviet-
907 T&eg%m 'from The 'commissar for Fore 'Af#airs,'Litvin6v, to ' tEe Soviet
Ambassador in France, August 20,1932* BVP Vol.19# p.481.
91. Supplementary telegram from the Commissar for Foreign Affair a,Litvinov,
to the Soviet Ambassador in France, Boggalevsîîy,August 20,1932.%bi§. ,p.791, 
Hote 231.
92. Fravda# August 20,1932*
93. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsky, to the HKD, 
August 10,1932. BVP yol.15. p.463.
Buraaniau conflicts from the actual pact to a conoludlng protocol and there­
fore accepted this proposal as a basis for agreement and on August 20,J>oVgal- 
evsky was authorised to meet Titulescu in order to secure a final agreement, 
though if possible the phrase "which disputes the present pact does not affêct"
95
was to be added to the concluding protocol of the French proposal. Despite 
this apparent(progress, in a letter to Litvinov, Dovgalevaky oummed up his 
recent meetings with Herriot and Loger and concluded that "at the present 
stage of the Soviet-Eumanian negotiations an immediatesigning of the Franco- 
Soviet pact cannot be counted upon*" He deduced from the fact that the t?/o 
Frenchmen attempted repeatedly to get rid of him on holiday that they did not 
expect the negotiations to move forward before the end of the holiday period, 
that is the end of September*
A few dayh later, on August 24, Herriot informed Bovgalevsky that he and 
his government vmre determined to sigh the pact and then Immediately to ratify 
it since he was an enemy of half-measures* Therefore he must first prepafe the 
ground for ratification after which hW would agree on final texts for the pact 
and the conciliation convention, secure the council of ministerài approval, 
sign the non-aggression pact and introduce it into parliament for oonfirmation, : 
all of which Èè hoped to have completed before his meeting with Litvinov at ' • * 
Geneva on September 20* Harriot repeatedly stressed that he was an enemy of j
delay, that his decision was firm and that Dovgalevslqr must not look for any ?
I
premeditated delay* Although the French Premier had no intention of subordin­
ating the Franco-Soviet pact to a Soviet-Eumanian pact he had to make m  attempt
to help in the conclusion of the latter and was confident of success in elimin­
ating their differences in order that the French pact should be signed before 
the Gmeva m e e t i n g . , !
§4%''Teiegram"%^ G o S i S s ^ r ! ! l S r ' o  the Soviet 
Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsky, August W *  1932*BVP....Vol^ li* p.481*
95* Leger rejected this foiwula on-August 23,1952* lb.id#j.' p*791*Hôtê 231* .
96* Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsky, to thé I#m#issar 
####%#ign Affairs,Litvinov, August 20,1952* Ibi^*.P*483*
97* Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsky,to the IDHCD,
- August 24,1932* Ibid* .000*488-489*
fhlle this was not a completely honest account of Herrlèt's intentions,
* I
aa events were to prove, it did mark a veiy significant change in French 
policy* By the end of August the French Government had reached the conclusion 
that it must sign shortly its non^aggresaion pact even if Rumania remained 
obdurate* Scott datés this change of mood someidiat later, by the end of Sept­
ember and quotes Loger as oonfidentially statâng at the end of August that
"the French Government had no intention of signing (the Franco-Soviet pact)#.*
98
until the Soviet-Eumanian pact had been signed*" * Herriot*s revelation to
DovgaûLevsky on August 24 does seem more reliable, however, and is corroborated
by several other documents# On August 30, Leger and Bovgalevsky agreed on a
oonoluding formula for the Soviet-Eumanlan treaty, reading?
The present pact, #ioh contains the undertaking for each party to 
abstain from any aggression against the other, will be interpreted 
as that no disputed question, territorial or other, which exists 
between the two parties can restrict the mentioned undertaking and 
cannot serve as a motive for either contracting parties or give them 
the freedom to complete acts which oontradiot the undertaking of aggress­
ion as established in the present pact* It is also to be understood 
that this pact cannot serve for any other aim and speoifioally it can­
not be interpreted as a settlement of the noted disputed questions 
whioh exist between the two parties at the time of the signing of the 
present paot whioh questions are not affected by its conclusion#
This agreement between Paris and Moscow was an important point since a Rumanian
rejection of this proposal might well provide “thë French Government with the
chance to brand Rumania before the French public as adopting an irreconcilable
line and so allow it to sign ihe Franoo-SOviet paot*
I
In an important document sent by Herriot to Fuaux, the Frenph Minister
in Bucharest, on September 1, the latter was instructed to acquaint the
Rumanian Government with the current French position# This report emphasised
the French Government's loyally to Rumania throu^out its lengthy and arduous
negotiations with the Soviet Union, noting French pressure exerted on the Polish
Government, firstly to delay its signature and then its ratification of the
Soviet-Follsh paot, in order to guarantee the Rumanian negotiations sufficient
'98.'''donverSation''oF L§ger'%th'%e "27,"
1932* Quoted in Soott, Ajlianoe .,Again.8%,.Mtlert p*58*
99* Telegram from the Boviet Ambassador in irance,Lovgalevsky, to the NKB,
August 50.1932# BVP #1*15* 0*499*
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time* This action, however, had encountered growing impatience on the part 
of the Polish Government. Despite the Polish signature and the political 
advantage whioh an immediate signature of the Franco-Soviet pact would present, 
the French Government had throu^out impressed on the Russian negotiators that 
although the conclusion of the Franoo^Soviet pact had never been officially 
subordinated to a Rumanian-Soviet pact, it would in fact be suspended while 
negotiations for the latter were paralysed by unreasonable requirements which 
could not be imputed to Rumania alone. This French position could not be maint­
ained indefinitely, however, and implied that the Rumanian Government must 
justify the confidence which the French Government had placed in it and must 
begin negotiations with the USSR as quickly as possible and certainly not later 
than September 20. Furthermore, it must renounce all conditions which the 
Soviet Government could not reasonably be expected to accept, that is, all 
formulae which tended to sanotiiy-, directly or indirectly, the Soviet recogn­
ition of the Bessarabian annexation. The French Government wanted any Soviet- 
Rumanian pact to benefit both parties and not merely one of them. In such a 
case, Herriot would do his best to secure Soviet agreement. He concluded by 
stressing the importance which the French Government attached to the prompt 
conclusion of the Franco-Soviet paot and the impossibility of adjourning this 
beyond a reasonable delay and in any case beyond any checkmate or adjournment 
of the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations for which the Soviet Government could not.; 
be held responsible. The French Government could be forced, like the Polish 
Government, to sign its paot whilst trying to refrain from its ratification 
for aa lo^ as possible to assist the Rumanian negotiations,^^^*
On September 4 a French politician interested in Soviet affairs, do Monijo,
told #10 Soviet Charge d'Affaires that "Rumania cannot now stop the signing of
101,
the Soviet-French pact and that the signing is now a question of the day,"
''The 'French 'Fôreâgh'ttSi^^ .French Minister in' RiuaSS,*
Puaux,September 1,1952.French Doos,Vol,l,ppa,245-247, Here Herriot did 
contradict his statement of August 24 to Bovgalevsky in that he now spoke 
of delaying ratification even after the signature of the Franco-Soviet 
paot. See above, p,l97*
101, Telegram from the Soviet Charge d*Affaires in France,Rosenborg,to the MB, 
September 4,1932, BVF Vol.lQ, p.303# Rosenberg was later to become
Soviet Ambassador in Spain,193o-1937#
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By the end of August the French Government was anxious to sign its 
initialled paot with the Soviet Union and to this end was exerting a hitherto 
unknown pressure on Bucharest to obtain a reasonable response to its mediatory 
efforts in the Soviet-Rumanian negotiations* %less such a response was forth­
coming a unilatéral French signature, if not ratification, now seemed a reel 
and imminent possibility. What had prompted this urgency? Several factors, one 
by one, were assembling in France which finally puWied its Government to the 
brink of signature. Herriot's replacement of Tardieu had removed one strong 
obstacle to a Franco-Soviet rapprochement but at first the new radical Premier 
made little more than gestures towards Moscow* Internal opposition to any such 
rapprochement was powerful and in any case Herriot for a time held the slim 
possibility of securing a reduction of the German threat, especially Wien von 
Fapen became Chancellor, thus reducing the urgaat French need for an ally in 
the east* The failure of this attempt in addition to the partial defection of 
Poland from France's side ly its signature of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression 
pact increased the pressure for signature on the French Government. The possib­
ility of a more favourable Soviet response to the envisaged economic negotiat­
ions in the event of France signing the political pact also helped to win supp­
ort for a new policy within France. Yet the most significant factor was Germany* 
If France required a stronger diplomatic position on the European continent it 
was because of the German threat. If factor could induce French opinion to 
sanction a rapprochement with communist Russia it was a resurgence of Germany.
3* The threat from Germany*
Germany's failure to achieve the right of equality in armaments at the 
July talks with France in Lausanne exposed Papon's Government to criticism 
within Germany, especialiy from the nationalists. At Geneva,Hadolny, the 
German chief representative at the Disarmament Conference, had expressed his 
country's attitude towards disarmament?
#The German Government is prepared to continue its oollaboration
in the work of the Disarmament Oonferenoe so as to contribute to 
# e  greatest possible extent to the efforts made with a view to a 
really decisive step towax'ds general disarament*».Nevertheless its 
collaboration is only possible if the subsequent work of the Confer­
ence is based on a clear and definite recognition of the equality of 
rights between nations...
(T)he German Government must point out at once that it cannot 
undertake to continue its ooHaboration if a satisfactory solution 
on this point, which for Germany is a decisive one, is not reached 
by the time the Conference resumes its work. 102.
A few days later General von Schleicher, German Minister of Defence,
whose influence in the cabinet was thought to be very strong, issued the first
broadside in a now campaign for equality of rights in armaments organised by
the Papen Government. In a broadcast on July 26 Schleicher,in a considerably
more provocative declaration than Ngdolny's, contrasted a disarmed Germany
with France and claimed the German right to equal treatment. He expressed
Germany's desire to re-organise the Reichawehr, a desire whioh was received
l05
in France with considerable anxiety. An aide-memoire setting out iixese 
claims was handed to the French Government on August 29 and produced an un­
favourable impression on the latter. Finally, in September, on the refusal of 
France to accept f. ©quality of rights, the German Government notified the 
Bureau of the Disarmament Conference that its delegation would not attend the 
meeting on September 20.
Within Germany extremism continued to prosper in the face of economic 
collapse. In the general election of July 31 the Nasis and Communists both 
increased their votes significantly and an outbreak of political terror by the 
Nasi stalwarts ensued* The rabid speeches of the extreme right, the glorific­
ation of military virtues and the gradual disintegration of German society did 
not fail to influence the French Government's policy formulation. In particular, 
a Stahlhelm rally held by 150,000 men on September 2-4 in Berlin had a profound 
effect on French opinion. Herriot told some American diplomats that any state 
which could produce such a demonstration of disciplined men only lacked the 
arms to make them a menace to Europe. France at that moment was more disturbed 
with reference to Germany's activity and state of opinion than for mepyyears
102^ ' Survey' oF' .for' 193Ë'I.w's*
103. pp*. 258-2^9.
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and he thought these fears justified*^^^* Le Temps wrote of "this offensive 
return of the elements responsible for the catastrophe of 1914, this slipp­
ing of an entire people into the worst nationalistic passions, these art» signs 
that no-one oan mistake," a line i&ioh was echoed by many other French papers,
Mona^ told the Soviet Charge that "a rapprochement with us must occur under
lo6the influence pf the common German threat to both countries." *
The French motivation for a rapprochement with the Soviet IMion was not 
merely to strengthen actively its diplomatie position against Germany but to 
weaken Soviet-German relations and especially military collaboration of #ich 
it was aware hhd tended at times to exaggerate*^^'* Leger told the British 
Charge d*Affaires in Paris that the French Government's policy was in favour 
of the conclusion of non-aggression pacts by the USSR and saw a certain advent^ 
age in them, especially in that thqjr would attenuate the potential menace of a 
Russo-German combination arising from open or secret engagements and this was 
doubtless the reason for German opposition to their oonolusion*^^^’ The belli­
cose attitude of the German Government and the violence within Germany contin­
ued to exert pressure on the French Government throughout September and maint­
ained it on its course towards agreement with the UBSH#
France was not the only state to be alarmed by German, developments# In 
Poland the events of the summer created perhaps even more anxiety #ioh the
104# Conversation betwéêh the French Premier,Herriot and a groUp of American 
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107# The French Minister of the Interior wrote to Herriot about the presence of 
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manoeuvres,stating that one of the Russian's objectives was to re-assm^ 
the German command of the Soviets' continued policy of Soviet-German 
military collaboration despite the non-aggression pact signed with Poland* 
Tukhaohevaky's presence proved that Moscow had not renounced its co-ordin­
ation of military action with that of Germany in the eventuality of an 
armed conflict in Eu^pe. The French Minister of the Interior,Ohautemps, 
to the French Premier,Herriot,September 28.1932 .French ;pObitVpl .1 »p.393# 
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signature of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression paot at the end of July only 
partially allayed*
The Soviet l3hion itself was no more reassured by the instability and 
revisionism whioh were su obviously developing apace in what was to be Weimar 
Germany's last year* The damage wrought to 3oviet-German relations by the pacts 
negotiated by the Soviet Union with its western border states and especially 
Poland at the beginning of 1932 had dealt a blow from #ich they never recov­
ered. It was becoming apparent that the Soviet leadership was seeking .re­
insurance against the increasingly unbalanced German foreign policy which none
i.
but a wildly reckless gambler could now rely upon.
The occasion of. the tenth anniversary of Happllo in April 1932 provided 
the improbable setting for one of the interminable wrangles which now punct­
uated relations between the two states# Bruning, the German Chancellor, invited 
Litvinov to a celebration luncheon to commemorate the occasion but declined to 
make any speech or issue any m^itten statement so as not to attract too much 
attention at a time when it was intended to place before the Reichstag the
ratification of the Protocol extending the Berlin treaty and also in view of
109
relations with third countries, as Bulow informed Shtein* ■ * Despite this snub,
Litvinov attended the luncheon and then in an interview with the German press,-
whilst mmtioning the advantages vdiich Rapallo had brought both states, added
that it illustrated that other states could have settled claims with the U3SR
110by similar means, it serving as an example to other states. * lavestila, 
commenting on the anniversary, saw the primary importance of the Rapallo treaty 
as a model of how relations should be established between two countries having 
opposing social-political systems but with common economic and foreign policy 
interests. This statement must have provided food for thought in the German 
Foreign Ministry; were Roland and France such countries as could effectively 
follow this model? Whilst I%vestiia*a article thought it possible to say with
109# Telegram from the Commissar for foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the MD,
April 14,1932* S E LMalS» P'239*
110, Litvinov to the Foreign press, April 16,1932# Quoted in ,Xzy.est|j,a* 
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confidence that Soviet-Geman relations would he consolidated and would 
continue to develop on the basis of the Rapallo prlnoiples, it nevertheless 
mentioned that the Rapallo policy h #  recently run up against "serious diff­
iculties from some groups in Germany," Rapallo was seen, not as a turning 
point in Soviet-German relations specifically but as"a turning point in the 
relations between the Soviet Republic and the capitalist countries*;Thus 
both Litvinov's speech and this lavestiia article dwelt on the example Rapallo 
provided to other capitalist states of a profitable collaboration with the 
USSR# so much had the "spirit of Rapallo" waned* Rravda merely stressed the 
advantages whioh Germany had reaped from its eastern orientation and its fail­
ures to obtain oonoessions from France, the moral here for Germany being evid-
Of course relations between the two states did not suddenly collapse* 
Especially in the military and economio spheres collaboration continued. In 
early May banking agreements were signed^^^* and on June 15 a credit agreemeni^*- 
which the organ of the Soviet trade agency in Germany described as opening "a 
new phase in the development of Soviet-German relations*
Bruning*s resignation as Ghanoellor in June 1932 and the accession to 
power of Frans von Papen, however, was a fateful blow to these relations*
Soviet concern with Bruning's government had been largely centred on its un­
certain life eapemtanoy and the fears induced by the unknown aw regards the 
make-up of the government which would supercede it# These fears, for Moscow, 
were now fully justified* Papen had long been associated with anti’-Soviet aims* : 
iKveatiia quoted several Geman papers which echoed this view*^^* The Soviet 
Government adopted # position of caution, hoping that Papen's Govemmmt would 
not long survive, yet would its successor be any more acceptable? With, the
£cl
continued refusal of Poland and France to sign their initiaR,^  pacts with the
lill'''IZVeSMia Anriil 16*1932'* '............... i ,T - r - 'W - .m r r . r T r , r , . ; i  -M-nirr
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USSR It oould not afford to adopt too exacting an attitude towards the new 
government* On June 25 Khinohuk reported that "up until now the Fapen Govern­
ment has not taken any steps nor made any official statements whioh provide
evidence that in relation to the USSR it occupies a more hostile position than
117
the Bruning Government*" * Humours of just such a step* however, soon began 
to reach Soviet ears# Fapen* s meeting with Herriot at the reparations confer­
ence in June has already been referred to above* The German suggestion of a 
military accord with FWice could leave few in doubt as to its objective and
certainly none in Moscow* In fact, according to Herriot*0 notes, Papen alluded
H 8
to an "accord directed against communism, in fact against Hussia*" ‘Although 
this proposal did not materialise nevertheless rumours did begin to reach 
Moscow, especially in the autumn and in any case the mere fact of a meeting 
between the French and German leaders, given Papon's pro-western orientation, 
could not but alarm the Soviet Government* Khinohuk, during a conversation with 
Schleicher, only two days after his dispatch to Krestinsky, told the former 
that "now, besides him there were no responsible members of the cabinet*" He 
noted that in it were persons of a well-known western orientation, including 
the GhanooHbr* Schleicher replied by assuring the Soviet Ambassador of the 
highly extremely frimd3.y relations between the Heichswehr and the USSR and 
energetically stated that the whole cabinet desired to preserve friendly relat­
ions with it, The Soviet Government, he continued, must not disturb itself with 
the so-called western orientation of von Papen* The negotiations whioh were 
being conducted with the French had as their basis the liquidation of reparat- * 
ions payments that would enhande the financial and economic situation of 
Germany and thus g|vo it a greater possibility of collaboration with the ÜSsS.f^ ’ 
In ^iscussion with Heurath, the German Foreign Minister, some weeks later 
Khinohuk w»s once again assured that as regards the reparations talks there was
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no front against th© Soviet Uhion* Khinohuk then asked directly whether
there was any, talk at Lausanne of a front or campaign against the USSR to
which Heurath: replied in the negative, emphasising that the whole German
cabinet supported the continuation and development of friendly relations
with the UBSR;.?^  ^■ .
All these assurances did not convince the Soviet Government that Papen
121 •had not offered the French an anti-Soviet alliance# The yearly account of 
the Soviet Embassy in Germany for 1932 sums up the anxiety felt in the Narkon- 
indelt
(T)here is no doubt that he (Papen) has made, especially at Lausanne 
and in connection with it, direct attempts In the Rechberg spirit 
to achieve on agreement with France, the price of lühich would be the 
creation of a military alliance including in it Poland for a "struggle 
with Bolshevism#" Thus never before has the Idea of a "crusade" against 
the USSR taken on such seriousness as in the epoch of Papon's cabinet, 
so that it cannot but influence Soviet-German relations #5-23 •
Such fears of isolation added yet further fuel to the Soviet desire to see its
non-aggression pacts with France and its western neighbours signed and ratified#i
Certainly little reliance could be placed on the continued friendship of a
Germany under its present government and might not its successor be a Nasi one?
An arena of collaboration for many years now experienced the first clashes
u
between the Rapallo partners which was to become increasingly serios during th© : 
following months, The Soviet and German delegations at both the Preparatory 
Commission on Disarmament and the Disarmament Conference itself had always 
voted together in opposition to the "victor powers" and th# hated Versailles 
system. This collaboration had been firm despite the somewhat different motiv­
ating factors, Germany desiring the right to equality of armaments with its 
conquerors of 1918 whether by their disarmament or the renunciation of the
120# Note of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinohuk 
mà the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Neurath,July 15,1932*
DVP V0l#15. p#409.
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Charge d'Affaires in France,Rosenberg, to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs 
Litvinov, October 17,1932. P#378#
122# Rechberg was a German Industrialist who propagandised the idea of a Franco- 
German military alliance, .
123, Yearly Account of the Soviet Embassy in Germany for 1932. j|^ ||.,p#78G,
Not© 188.
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Versailles diaaaàaaroent clauses, whilst the Soviet Union urged disarmament 
as hoth a means of increasing its security and a usef\il propaganda weapon.
It was in the early summer of 1932 that this oollahoration began to crumble.
The first clash between the two delegations occurred in A p r i l . I n  May 
Litvinov, when asked by an official of the German Foreign Ministry whether he 
was oollaborating with the German delegation replied "that I had not noted my 
collaboration or even attempt at collaboration, that the German delegation 
sometimes enters against us and that the relations between the two delegations 
differs sharply from the relations whioh were established between Ryself and 
Count Bernstorff at the Preparatory Commission:" the follov/ing day LitVinov 
gave the same reply to a similar question from Dlrksen.^ ^^ *
The reason for this divergence was two-fold. Within Genmny the clamour 
for the removal of the iniquitous disarmament clauses of the Versaillea treaty 
was growing and the German Government could not, even had it wished, ignore it. 
The German delegation at Geneva became more strident in its demands for equal 
treatment and placed less emphasis on the disarmament of other great powers to 
bring them down to the German level. It was this ve%y disarmament T/diioh the 
Russians desired, a desire which was not weakened by the growing extremism > 
within Germany. As the German demands became giore vociferous, Soviet willing­
ness to support them was .reduced. A second consideration was that continued 
Soviet support for these expanding Geman claims would only alienate further 
the Versailles powers, especially Poland and France. At a time when the Russians
were trying to conclude non-aggression pacts with these states and when relat­
ions with Germany were deteriorating, was it wise or possible for the Soviet 
Union to support unequivocally a German demand which would increase its milit­
ary strength. The Soviet Government appears to have been both frightened of 
the new German foreign policy approach of which its disarmament plans at Geneva
l%r'Ko%mr'%ussia^ 'Renubli6. n ' . ' & 3 r " •
125. Letter from 'the Gcmiasar for^  Affairs,Litvinov, to ^embers of the ■
Collegium of the MB, May 3,1932. pVF Vol.15, p.76$, Note 142.Note of a
conversation between the Oommissar rOrFoSd^ Affairs,Litvinov and the 
German Ambassador in the U33R, Birksen,May 4*1932. Ibid*.p.298.
were a part and slowly realising the additional 'bonus which a less enthusias­
tic support for Germany would reap in relations with France and Poland# In 
early March Dovgalevsl^  had reported on Tardieu's transparent hint which could 
he understood; as meaning that the latter* s further disposition on the paot
126question would depend on the behaviour of the Soviet delegation at Geneva# ‘ 
In July Bones suhmitted a resolution to the Disarmament Oonferenoe whioh 
attempted to express the vi%w-polnt made during the last two weeks# Although 
Germany and the Soviet Union alone voted against it, their reasons were indic­
ative of %e growing estrangement, not only at Geneva, hut in general* The 
German delegation's major point was that it would continue to oollahorate in 
the conference's work only if the equality of rights between states was defin­
itely recognised# The Soviet delegation, however, voted against the resolution 
because it was not sufficiently stringent in its disarmament terms#^ ^^ * Th© 
stage had not yet been reached when the Soviets would support French-sponsored, 
proposals# An Xsvestiia editorial summed up the five and a half years of work 
at Geneva as having accomplished nothing and accused French lraperiaî.ism, in 
particular, of a refusal to agree on any limitation of armaments# Yet it did 
add that Germany, in view of it being the least armed of all the imperialist 
states, had insisted on parity in the event of no agreement being reached on 
an arms limitation, contrasting even this approach with that of the Soviet
128
Union, whioh alone presented a clear and exact disarmament programme* *
Soviet concern at political developments within Germoaiy cmtinued unab- 
129#ated# Increasingly strained relations were accompanied by minor irritants
such as the Soviet complaint about police violation of its consulate's extra-
1^0
territoriality at Stettin, a similar occurrence at Konlgsberg and dlsenoh-
Î 26'.'''''S©p6rt'ly'^he'soÆet''ïSacsaà6r ’ïn'îaSnoe^
with the French Fremter,Tardieu,March 4,1932* DW. Yol.*.3.5* p*l6l#
127. Suiyey of Ihternational Affairs for 1932, ppG#254-*255*
128. iCTftmia. July 26.1952.
129* For example, during July md August I&vestiia was full of articles on this 
theme.
130. Note from the Soviet Embassy in Germany to the German Foreign, Ministry, 
August 12, 1932. BVF irol«15* pps.464*465* Note from the Soviet Embassy in 
Germany to the German Foreign Ministry, August 15,1932# Ibid.,pp3*47t-472«
15Xaniment as concerns the adverse trade balance. * Attempts by officials of 
the German Foreign Ministry to reassure the Narkomindel had little effect#^ ^^ * 
It was notewoiëthy that I&vestiia, inita editorial comment foUoî/ing the sig­
nature of the Boviet-Poliish non-aggression pact, wrote that "the Soviet Union 
gave proof of its peaceful policy, concluding the Rapallo treaty with Germany 
whioh became the model for relations between the USSR and other powers* ’
Poland had been the major link in the chain which joined Germany to Soviet 
Russia since the early 1920'sj now the Soviet Union compared its new Poli^ 
pacts with Rapallo, It is in this environment that the continued Soviet negot­
iations with Prance I Poland and Rumania must be seen since it was in large part 
to counter the growing threat which Germany posed that the Soviets were anxious 
to consolidate their diplomatic penetrations into the group of status quo 
powers. Neither Germany nor the Soviet Union had illusions about the possible 
outcome of these negotiations for their future relations. The Soviet Ambass­
ador in Turkey reported that someone close to the Poles had informed him that 
after the signature of the Soviet-Polish pact, Germany had increased its intr­
igues in Rumania against the letter's proposed pact with the USSR, thus hoping 
to block the new Soviet foreign policy orientation, information whioh he 
thought to be genuine rather than a Polish intrigueNevertheless, the 
Soviet Government was detemined to press ahead.
6. France signs and Poland ratifies.
The French Government, having decided that it must sign the Franco- 
Soviet non-aggression pact in the near future, mad© a last intense effort, 
together with Poland, in the autumn of .1952 to achieve a simultaneous 
Note'’o f 00^ ^ beSwn %e'' So%% A#
and the State n^eoretary of the German Foreign Ministry, Bulow, August 25,
1952. SSJMbàS* pps* 491*494.
132. For example, Bulow* s conversation with Khinohuk in which he said that 
Papen had no intention of changing the Rapallo policy. Note of a conver­
sation between the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Khindiwk and the State 
Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry,Bulow,August 17,1932* ^i4*.P*476* 
133* Isveatiia. July 30, 1932.
134. Telegram from tiie Soviet Ambassador in Turkey, Surits,to the NK9, August
27,1932. DVP Vol.15. p.496.
conclusion of a Soviet-Rumanian Poland's mediately role during
August had been somewhat overshadowed by France but on September 13 Patdk
informed Mtvinov that he had spoken in Warsaw to gale ski and Cadere, the
Rumanian Minister in Poland# On the basis of #is talk he proposed onoe again
his good offices, suggesting yet another formula for a concluding protocols
The High Oontracting Parties agree that the present paot cannot 
in any event be interpreted as restricting or cancelling the under­
takings ensuing from the treaty signed in Paris on August 26,1926*
It has no other aim besides non-aggression and cannot be interpreted 
for other aims, not damaging the position of either party in disputes 
between themselves*
Fatek also handed Litvinov a new project for the paot as a whole, a move idiioh
the latter characterised as "two steps backwards":
After nine months of negotiations and disputes, almost a H  on one
point, when it seemed that all the remaining points had been agreed 
upon, a new basis for negotiations is proposed to us*#.This confirms 
our doubts as to the sincerity and seriousness of Rumania's intensions? ‘
This proposal, whioh the Rumanians termed a large concession, was also agreeable
to the French Government but not to the Russians# Rosenberg informed Leger that
it was the same proposal as Litvinov had already rejected and it was no more 
acceptable now than before since it contained no direct reference to the exist­
ence of territorial disputes#^^^” Neverth^ess, Litvinov agreed to meet Cadere 
whilst en route for Geneva on condition that the latter received authorisation 
from his government to return to the previous basis of negotiations# * This 
meeting did take place and agreement was reached that negotiations should be
ïjfTBstwSalÉïtSSeirïtrpaot^lSrS
later and ratification instruments were exchanged in Tallin on August 18,
1932* BVF V0I.I5. p*298* This left only the French, Polish and Rumanian
pacts uncompleted*
136* Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinoy
and the Polish Minister in the tl3SR,Patek,September 13,1932#IMâ,,,pps*526'^ - 
527* The project agreed between French end Soviet Representatives at the en 
of August (See above,p.196) for a Soviet-Huraanian pact had been rejected 
by Rumania,presumably because it referred to territorial disputes between 
th© two ptatOG.
137# A Foiish proposal handed to Litvinov on July 22 * 1932 *Ibid# ,pps* 785*786,
’ Note 206.Telegram from the Soviet Gharge d'Affaires in France,Rosenberg, 
to the Commissar for Foreign Affair s, Litvinov, September 13.1932 * Ibid# # p #329 
Litvinov told the French Ambassador that Patek's new formula would be açcép 
able if the words "territorial and others whioh exist between them" were 
inserted# Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Litvinov and # e  French Ambassador in France,Dejean,September 14,1932* 
Ibid*, p*S32*
138* Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and th© Polish Minister in the USSE,Patek,September 14#1932*Ibid».0*530*
au*
continued in Geneva, Litvinov arguing that they could only he conducted on 
the old hasis*^^^*
These talks “began in Geneva, according to Scott, around September 23 
end made some progress*^^* Both the French and Polish Governments were now 
exerting strong pressure on Rumania to adopt a reasonable position"^ yet 
agreement^ still eluded the negotiators. After a few meetings agreement was 
reached on the entire pact with the exception of one point, reference to exist­
ing disputes, on which, however, disagreement m s  much narrower than in previous
Tt.O
negotiations. * A significant break through occurred on October 3 at a time
when it seemed that deadlock had been reached* Gadore proposed the following
formula for a concluding protocols
The parties have agreed that the pact only has the aim of safeguarding 
the existing peace by a mutual understanding of non-aggression and can­
not be interpreted for any other aims, nor to decide before hand present 
and future disputes between them.
Litvinov considered this formula acceptable and asked for t he Soviet Govern­
ment's consent to reach agreement on it if and it was a big "if" Cadere could 
obtain the support of his own Government for his proposal, for which puipose he
I I X "
intended to return to Bucharest; on October 5* The following day kârakhan 
informed Litvinov that the Soviet Government considered Cadere's formula accept­
able and inatructed him to si# the treaty,"^* but on the same day Cadere
139^'"Telegr%m'3%m'''''@e'com3Ls@Z''%   ! '
September 17,1932. BVF V0I.I5.bna*539-540 #
140. Scott, Alliance Against Hitler.p.65#
141* Herriot instructed his Minister in Bucharest to impress very strongly on 
the Rumanian Government the political interest which the French Government 
continued to attach to any interference in the conclusion of the Franco- 
Soviet paot*French support would be dependent on Rumania being reasonable* 
The French Foreign Minister,Herriot, to the French Minister in Rumania, 
Fuaux,September 18.1932*French Boo *Yo3^ * 1 * pps*345-346*
142. Press statement by Litvinov,lavestiia,October 16,1932.Quoted in Degras, 
Soviet Dooumenta on Foreign Polipv Vol*2.p*54B*
143# Telegram from the Commissar for Forei# ^ affairs,Litvinov,to Stalin,
October 3,1932. DYP Yol.15* pps.554-555* Full text of the Soviet-Bumanian 
pact agreed upon by Litvinov and Cadere, Ibid. .pps*535-557*
144, Telegram from the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Kar®khan,to the 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,October 4,1932. Ibid* *n*538.This 
formula represented a certain Soviet concession since although it referred 
to present disputes rather more deoisivoly than did Patek's proposal (See 
above,210) which the Russians rejected,it did not specifically refer to 
"territorial" disputes,a condition which the Russians had hitherto demanded*
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iïifômed the Commissar that his Government would not aooept the proposal.
Unfortunately for the negotiators, at this stag© Rumanian internal 
poXitioal events made certain that this limited breakthrough would have no 
ohanoe of suopess, at least for the time being. On September 28, Titulesou, 
on© of Rumania* s, leading political figures, resigned from his post aa Ambass­
ador to Britain and delegate to the League of Nations in which latter post he
had been involved in the Soviet-Eumanian negotiations* Tituleseu had stead- - 
the
fastly opposed^Taida-'Yoivod Government's attempts, weak as they had been, to 
oonolud© the pact; his appointment as Foreign Minister on October 10 sealed 
the fate of the non-aggression pact and the erstwhile negotiations were term­
inated in early October without success, TJhilst Titulesou stated that he was 
"a resolute supporter of the policy of rapprochement between th© USSR and 
Rumania" and that negotiations would again be resumed on October 17* he also 
said that slgnifiomt changes must be made in the text as agreed upon so farv^* 
The presënt Rumanian Government fell and the appointment of its successor, 
with Titulesou retaining his post, was seen as a victory for the opponents of 
a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union,
France had been anxious for some time to sign its initialled pact with 
the USSR. This brealc of Soviet-Rumanian negotiations and the accession of an 
anti-Soviet Government in Bucharest reduced the chances of their successful 
conclusion almost to nil, France now must either abandon Rumania, as it had
threatened, or delay indefinitely the signature of its pact. On October 17 
Herriot informed Rosenberg that he would definitely sign th© pact, a move 
simplified by Titulesou's statemmt to Herriot that he was favourable to the
145. W%i6t''s '%po%'’' t o FÏSch^'Oom 
1932. Quoted in Isvestiia.October 21,1932.
146. Titulesou's statement published in "République"* Quoted Ibid#. October I6,
1932.
147. Telegram from the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in France,. Rozenberg, to the
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, October 17*1932, DVP Vol. 15.
P.578,
signature of the Franco-Soviet non-aggression Poland was even
more exasperated hy Rumania's diplomatic manoeuvres and the pressure within
that oountiy for the ratification of its .Soviet paot, regardless of Rumanian
\
or French actions,, was reaching an Irresihtihle level* Isvestiia, on October 
20, quoted extracts from the Polish press whioh were urging the signature of 
a Soviet-Humahian pact. An article in "Slovo Polskie" criticised Tituleshu'a 
policy and ad%edi that "we are also convinced that our Government in the inter- 
eat of peace #11 propose the ratification of the Polish-Soviet non-aggresaion 
pact at the session of the Sejm which is soon to he convoked. At the end 
of October, Zaléski; in an interview given to the French press said that recent­
ly Polish-Soviet relations had undergone a favourable evolution, of whioh the 
signed pact wan a symptom* Several days later he was replaced as Polish 
Foreign Minister hy his deputy, Josef Book, who informed the Soviet Minister- 
on November 14 that Polish policy remained the same as before, his Government^ 
attaching great significance to the development of good-neighbourly relations 
with the USSR and especially the conclusion of the non-aggression paot. He
stated that Patek would be instructed immediately to begin negotiations for a
IBl
conciliation convention.
The firm resolve of the Polish Government to complete its diplomatic
rapprochement vjith the ÎÏBSH was given practical application lAen it informed
the Euraenian Government that it would not mediate any further between Rumania
and the Soviet Union and apparently also said that it had undertaken to put
the question of the Polish-Soviet pact's ratification before the present
ltS T ‘TitS©scU^s'‘'ctaS©mS  '"Senubliaue". ' QtS^  ^ ■
October 16, 1932*Telegram from the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in France, 
Rosenberg, to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,October 17,1932. 
BVF V0I.I5. p.580. Titttleaou's statement was probably inspired by a desire 
to ' minimise the extent to which France had abandoned Rumania by giving his 
approval to the by now unavoifeble French signature. In addition, since he 
was 80 fimXy opposed to a non-aggression pact with the USSR, he probably 
hoped that once France had signed, the Boviet-Rtnaanien negotiations would 
be allowed to fade into the background.
349* "Slovo Polskie". Quoted in Izvestiia.October 22,1932.
150. Quoted Ibid.. October 30.1932.
151, Note of a conversation between the Soviet Minister in Poland,Antonov- 
Ovseenko and the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs,Beck,November 14^1932* 
DVP Vol.15. pps. 608-609*
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session of the 8ejmè ‘ Thlo Polish refusal to mediate was oqoasioned by
yet another attempt on the part of Rumania to re-open negotiations with the
USSR. Tltulescu had informed the French Minister in Bucharest of his readiness
to resume them in Geneva on November 2 on a text Wkich, as Dovgalevsl^ y told .
Berthelot, was oompletely unacceptable to the Soviets,Titulescu's motive
for taking this step could hardly have been a genuine desire to achieve a last
minute agreement* His new text would never gain Soviet support and in fact . ■
Ealeski told the British Ambassador that Titulesou had recently informed ■ •
Herriot that he had no intention of concluding a Rumanian-Soviet paot but ■
Tfould continue negotiations until the opportunity arose to place the onus of
rupture on the Soviet GovernmentIf this is correct nevertheless it did
not deter Herriot from offering French mediation onCe more. On November 4
Berthelot told Rosenberg of the French Government's desire to see the Rumanian-
1*35
Soviet negotiations resumed. * The reason for Herriot's patience was most
probably that given to Bovgalevsky by Berthelot; although the Franco-Soviet
paot had supporters in France it also had strong opponents and therefore the
Premier wanted to escape their attacks, an objective which a Soviet-Rumanian 
156pact would assist* * The French Government was by now determined on signing
but a last attempt had to be made to secure a Rumanian pact. Even if this
attempt failed, Herriot oould claim to the French electorate that he had done
a3.1 in his power to secure a successful outcome. The Soviet Government in
reply stated that it was ready to give the Rumanian Government the opportunity
to sign the pact whioh had been agreed upon by Litvinov and Gadere in early
October, this offer remaining open for four months and confirmed its adherence
'the'' 3iunianian press. '#uQied''ïn "5ve# '
Austrian Telegraph Agency. Quoted Ibid*.November 3*1932*
153* Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsky,to the Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs,Mtvinov,October 27.1932.DYF Vol.15.ODS.591-592* 
Rumanian Telegraph Agency, November 1.1932.Quoted in Xgvegtiia.November 3*
1932,
/154. British Ambassador in Poland,Hrskine,to the Foreign Office,October 31,1932. 
Public Record Office. FO N6313/25/63.
155. Telegram from the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Franoe,Rozenberg,to the 
NKD November 4,1932. DYP Yo1.15.p.600.
156. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in France,Bovgalevsky,to the Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs,Mtvinov,October 27.1932.Ibid. .0.592*
to the policy of refraining from the use of violence in the settlement of 
disputed questions
On NoVemb.er 21 Herriot instructed his Minister in Bucharest in an 
"extremely urgent" communication to warn Titulesou immediately that he would 
make a last approach to Bovgalevsky.Despite these desperate French efforts, 
however, no agreement between Moscèw end Bucharest was achieved. Two days later 
Titulesou ennoupoed in the Rumanian parliament that the Soviet-Eumanian negot­
iations had been broken off and would not be resumed by Rumania since it was 
the Soviet Government which had interrupted them. Rumania had to reject the 
Soviet proposal, he said, whioh defined the Bessarabian problem as a disputed 
question, Its acceptance would signify that Rumania v/ould open the door to the 
aspirations of other neighbouring countries directed at t he revision of exist­
ing international treaties. Only if the Soviet Government invited Rumania to 
enter into negotiations could they be r e s u m e d . O n  the same day a Convention 
on Conciliation Procedure v;aw signed between the USSR and Poland which Beck 
greeted "with great satisfaction.Events were now moving rapidly. On the 
evening of November 23 the French Council of Ministers approved the text of 
the non-aggression pact and the Convention on Conciliation Procedure and agreed
161
that trade negotiations should begin once again. *Xn Warsaw the Polish
President ratified the Soviet-Polish Fact of Hon-Aggression and Conciliation
16P
Convention on#ovember 27, it being simultaneously ratified in Moscow*
finally, the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed by Herriot and
157# Communication from the Soviet Embassy in Paris to the French President, 
November,9*1932. french Docs ITol.l. p.681.
158. Herriot, the French Foreign Minister,to Puaux, the French Minister in
Rumania,November 21,1932. DQcmmt8_Diploi%t$Qqes français, 1932#939, . ■ ■
' let.$erjes^ , Volume 2, li. .N^ember^^ (Paids 1966 Xp.31-* -
159* Iqvestlia. November 30,1932. . ,
160. Interview with Tass,November 26,1932. Ibid..November 27,1932. Text of 
Polish-Soviet Conciliation Convention, DYP YoX.li^. pps.622-625.
161. lavestiia. November 27,1932.The trade .negotiations immediately ran into 
difficulties and Krestinsky said he did not expect their quick end but 
thought it best to remain silent on the difficulties in order to assist 
their passage in France .Letter from Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, - 
Kras tin sky, to the Soviet Ambassador in France,DOvgalevsky,November 29, 
1932. DYP Vol. 15. p.644*
l6t. BUdurowvcs.Polish-Soviet relation s. P. 23. Ratification instruments were 
exchanged on December 23,1932*
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DovgaloTG&y in Paris on November 29* * Its text was very similar to that
initialled in August 1931, the major difference being the addition of an 
article recognising that the undertakings of the pact oould not affeot rights 
and obligations which resulted from previously concluded agreements#
lavestiia enthusiast!oalXy greetedihe ratification of the Polish paot, 
describing it as successfully completing "the struggle of many years which 
the Soviet Gove.mment has conducted for t he strengthening of the guarantee 
of peace in the relations between the USSR and the largest of Its neighbours 
in the west#"^^^* The "Gaseta Polska" was equally warm in its comments, bel­
ieving that while general pacts for general peace may be little more than bits 
of paper, tîîerewâs no place for scepticism as regards agreements between 
individual states which arose from real political conditions existing on a 
definite territory and especially as regards treaties which regulated neigh­
bourly relations* It regretted Rumania's failure to obtain a paot %hl^%mph-
asised that the Polish defensive alliance obligations towards Rumania would 
l65remain in force# Beck privately evaluated the pact as serving a distinctly 
useful purpose even though he realised that the Soviet Government would only 
adhere to it so long aa it suited it to do so,|He said that while he was dis­
appointed at the failure of the Rumanian-Soviet negotiations, at least they 
had not been without some value in that Litvinov had given a written assuranoe 
to Poland that the' USSR would observe its obligations under the Kellogg Pact 
and would not attempt to the Bessarabian question by force. He added that 
clause 4 of the Soviet-Folish pact safeguarded the Polish-Eumanian alliahoeî*^^ * 
The Soviet response,to the French pact was more subdued, Although
S f  * " 'i S t '~în ^ D W  ' 'ir^ ‘ ‘    '.' *
164* Xgvestiia* November 28, 1932*
165* Gaaeta Fdlska* Quoted k id, # November 30,1932* ; ; . ■
166. British Imbassador in poland,Brskine,.to 3imon,Peoember 7#1932*R B #  Yol*Æ#
. pps.284-283* Clause 4 stated that the obligations of the present pact could 
not alter the international rights and obligations which arose for each 
party from agreements concluded before the present pact was introduced 
into force, in so far as these agreements did not contain any aggressive, ? 
elements.
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Bovgalevsky on the occasion of the actual signature expressed confidence 
that it would "promote the strengthening of general peace, establish closer 
and inspire more confidant relations between France and the USSR" and spoke 
of the "greati political and moral significance" which the Soviet Union gave
167,
it, * I&vestiia was not quite so fulsome in praise# Its editorial on the 
pact recalled the French struggle against the Soviet Union and noted that it 
could not erase those alliances whioh France had created a^ter the war. Whilst 
welcoming the clause relating to economic non-aggression and the banning of 
hostile organisations and recognising that the implementation of the pact's 
obligations would unquestionably improve the relations between the French Rep­
ublic and the USSR,^ it observed that the right and nationMist French press 
showed that influential French circles gave a hostile reception to its sign- 
ature.^^^‘ The French press's response was indeed mixed. As lavestiia had noted, 
the conservative and nationalist sections, whilst alarmed at the growth of 
German nationalism, were not convinced that a pact with Russia was the answer; 
the socialists were not over-enthusiastic whilst the radicals greeted it waliSy* 
The most pessimistic Soviet-inspired assessments on the new pacts came, 
peihaps understandably, from the journals of the Comintern. "Communist Inter­
national" reminded its readers that they had been concluded with countries 
untü raceptly the most aggressive towards the Soviet Union and warned that 
the danger of an anti-Soviet intervention had not been reduced in the least^^^* 
"Imprecoor", commenting on the Franco-Soviet pact, called it "a new great 
victory of the peaceful policy of the S^oviet Government", vhilst warning that 
"no class-conscious proletarian, however, will have any illusions as to what 
such public undertakings on the part of the capitalist governments mean." It 
then gave its own interesting analysis of French motives and the significance 
of the pact;
187.' GpGeGh'by''%Ke"8o%eTAml3ass3w^ ,,
BVP Vol.15. p.643.
168. lCTe_3t.aa. Hovembar 30,1932.
169. Scott, Alliance Against Hitler, p.70.
170. "An new Victory of the Peaceful Policy of the USBR-A new success of the 
Vfcrld Proletariat." Oommunist International.Vol.9.N,20. December 1.1932.
If French imperialism undertakes^ even if only in wordsj to 
cease its criminal machinations and is compelled to adopt a fresh 
mask in order to hide it® interventionist coimtenanoe, this means 
that the class forces standing "behind It have been thrown into 
confusion by the blows of the world eoonomio oflsis, It means that 
the capitalist powers are hopelessly entangled in a net of imperial­
ist antagonisms and complications. It means that the hea^e of Nations 
is more and more displaying its impotency to conceal effectively the 
imperialist war preparations and to clear away the obstacles preventing 
the formation of the anti-Soviet united front. It means that oapitalifl», 
weakened by Its crises and by its Inner antagonisms, by the sharpening 
of the class struggle, is obliged to resort to new means in order to 
pursue its imperialist aims.171* .
The other state, closely involved in these November events was Germany*
The official ^Deutsche Diplomatioch-Politisohe Korrespondens** adopted, as' on 
past occasions, on optimistic tone, calling the Franco-Soviet pact a "remarkable 
political success for the Soviet Nnion" and emphasised that it in no way violat­
ed Soviet-German relationsî
Germany has neithdr an economic nor a political monopoly on relations , 
between the Soviet Dnion and the states which surround it. Therefore a 
more active participation of the TBSE in the concert of powers, Germany 
can only welcome...To expect that the conclusion of the pact will lead^Y# 
to a change of Soviet policy in relation to Germany would be Incorrect.
Other German papers, however, were not so complacent. The "Kolnitsohe Zedtung*^  '
agreed that "In general Germany has no ground for special anxiety because of
the conclusion of a pact with France" but added that "all the same Germany
must follow with some attention Franco-Soviet relations in order to counteract
possible attempts by France to damage German interests#** The **Franlcfurter
Seitung" saw the pact as a balancing by the Soviet Union of its relations with
east and west in the same way as the German balancing policy epitomised by the •
treaty of Berlin.^ "^ "^ The "Deutsche Aligemeine Zeitung" in a leading article
noted with sorrow that compared with the Brockdorff-Hantsauaac era a change had
occurred in Soviet relations towards Versailles and blamed this on German
policy which had let slip the chances for a closer development of both economic
17k.
and political relations with Russia.
In the last year non-aggression pacts had been signed and ratified with
■  ^ , . . . , ..  ^ '  ,   I . I I ■ /  , v  : ■ . . . -.............................. ... .
171. Xj.F. Boross,"The Importance of the Non-Aggression Pact Between Franco 
and the Soviet Union." International Press 0orrespondence.Vol.12#N.35# 
December 8,1932, p#W78. ...........
172. Quoted in i^veptiia. November 38, 1932#
173. Quoted Ibid.
1/4. Quoted Ibid.. December 2,1932#
61)),
Poland, Finland, Bstonia and latirla and the long-standing initialled French 
paot had been signed if not yet ratified. The small Baltic states were comp­
elled by political and économie factors to treat their large eastern neighbour 
with respect, yet their ratification of the non-aggression pacts with the 
Soviet Union was indicative of a growing Soviet international prestige as well- 
as the deepening Buropean insecurity# By 1932 thesb small states found it wiser 
to oonelude pacts which the USSR had long desired despite the consequent risk- 
of the lutteras economic and political penetration rather than remain at odds
*1 "7k
with the communist state, * Poland* s signature and ratification of its pact 
was of even greater significance as an indication of the changing balance in - ■:
European power politics* Not only had these two inveterate enemies concluded 
a paot but the former had been compelled to do so against France's oposition 
rather than with its encouragement. In August Harriot told the Polish Ambass­
ador in France that it was very important for France to preserve a united front 
with the other interested states so as not to give the Soviets a trump card in 
the diplomatic game and said that he was anxious that Poland should not ratify 
the Soviet-Folish pact until Rumania had signed a similar pact. In reply the 
Pole succinctly pointed out that his country's position was different from that 
of France:
I added that if the paot ?dth the Soviets had a considerable theor­
etical significance for France, in relation to Poland, which has a 
frontier of more than 1,000 kilometres, the situation is completely 
different mid whether the pact will be concluded or not can have a . 
serious influence on the further state of our relations with R u s s i a . 2»7o.
The growing threat from Germany made an agreement with either Germany itself
or Russia imperative for Poland even if Franco he3,d back and Rumania made no
progress in its relations with the USSR. Poland had throughout its negotiations
with the Soviet Union insisted that it would not ratify its pact until the other
175. For example, Hugéssen reported that he was inclined to .think that the 
Estonian Goveiviment attached some importance to the pact and that for the 
time being it gave it a feeling of security. The British Minister In Batviâj 
Knatchbull-Hugensen, to the foreign Office, June 22,1932* Public Record 
Office. FO N401C/23/^3#
176. Report of the Polish Ambassador in Paris to the Polish Miniate# of Foreign 
Affairs, August 13,1932' 337-538*
2%0,
border states had also taken this step. This condition was fulfilled by
November 1932 v/ith the exception of Rumania# Poland's desire to see its nm
venture with Russia set on course was proven by its genuine endeavour to obtain
a Soviet-Rumanian pact and ultimately its refusal to allow even this failure to
prevent either its own signature or ratification# Its security considerations
were too pressing to allow any call for loyalty towards its weaker ally to
delay more than briefly its rapprochement with the Soviet Union# Even France's
persuasion had failed to obtain anything more than a very temporary Polish
177postponement of its plans#
Franco had Itself been a more reluctant actor in this particular scene# ■
Of course, psychologically Horriot was more favourable to a rapprochement with
the Soviet Union than had been his predecessor and the French Government did
expect certain tangible gains from the signature of the pact# A note from the
Foreign Ministry summed them up as follows# Firstly, the paot would remove the
grounds for Soviet propaganda against France which represented it both at the
Disarmament Conference and Inside Russia as organising a military or economic
bloG against the TJSSR* Secondly, the Moscow Government would be prevented from
adopting serious measures prejudicial to the French economy# Thirdly, it would
serve as a coimtèr-balance to the Soviet-German treaty of 1926# It could not
but help to di,sslpate the German illusion concerning the revision of the
178#Versailles treaty with Soviet help.and would ease Poland's position* *Tet
despite these attributes the report stated that the pact's consequences must
not be exaggerated# The French Foreign Ministiy saw it as being for Russia a
177 *"TSr3ot nSS''t^ ' French ' attempt "to ' delay piSiS' ''ratification "on  .
Rumania's behalf had encountered growing impatience on the part of the 
Polish Government which for internal and external reasons did not seem 
able to suspend the aotivisation of its paot much longer. The French 
Foreign Minister,Horriot,to the French Minister in Rumania,Fwaux,September
1,1932. French Poos Vol.l# p#245*
178. Reger told the British Charge in Paris that the Franco-Soviet paot did
have a certain psyoholitgical value, esppoially in the sense that it would 
attenuate the menace of a Russo-German combination. The British Charge d' 
Affairs in France,Campbell,to Simon, September 27,1932# DBFf^  VOl#7#P.245# 
It could well be that the French also hoped to weaken Soviet-German 
collaboration at Geneva wliich was already beginning to crumble.
means of preserving its freedom of neutrality between France and Germany and
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not a re-aXignment of alXianoes. * France was not so exposed to aggression 
as was Poland and though advantages would accrue to it from the conclusion of 
a paot there was a margin for debate.as to their exact nature. Given the more 
democratic governmental system in France, inevitably there was much less unan­
imity on the desirability of a paot with the USSR than had been the case in 
Poland. Only after Herrlot had made every effort to secure a Humanian-Boviet
agreement and in circumstances of mounting German nationalism and the Polish
180signature could he face his opponents with a signed pact*
How did the Soviet decision-malcers perceive the international situation
at the close of 19327 Naturally they welcomed the series of ratified and signed
non-aggression pacta* Only the French ratification remained outstanding since
the chief signifioanoe of a pact with Rumania was its removal of any excuse for
delay on the part of France and Poland rather than its own intrinsic worth
During the summer of 1932 Soviet diplomacy had been compelled to pursue a some-
what passive policy as regards its non-aggression pacts since their further
progress could only be achieved by the actions of the other partners, not the
Soviet Union* It was prepared to sign and ratify those pacts when the other
countries involved gave tlieir agreement* tet by its promptings and because the
international■situation had swung in its favour, its foreign policy position
was now considerably stronger then twelve months before# Of course, there was
a debit side to these proceedings but one which the Soviet Government was
prepared to take# Krestinslqv noted that the new pacts could not but call forth
anxiety in German political circles whose effect was uncertain# He expressed
1^ 9*"'Note"W~lïS'''SepSSàit'’f0^ '^resident ' of ''the''''GoumS^  #
French Docs Vol.2. pps.55"*57#
180. The French Ambassador in London, in conversation with Sir John Simon on . . 
September 28, said that the Polish Government had urged the French Govern­
ment to complete its negotiations as soon as possible and that Herrlot's 
Government was being increasingly pressurised from the Left to take this 
step# Sir John Simon to Lord Tyrrel,British Ambassador in Franco,October
6,1932. BBFP Vol.7. p»248#
181. Litvinov told the British Ambassador that a pact was of more interest to 
Rumania than to Russia. The British Ambassador in the USSR, Ovey, 
to Simon, March 28,1932# Ibid.. p.237*
oûïifldenoe that the signature of the Franco-Soviet paot would now compel the
German Government to begin seriously to consider the mpid ratification of the
Extension protocol of the Berlin t r e a t y * O n  the other hand these pacts
might further alienate German opinion and deter the German Government from
pursuing a prb-Soviet course in foreign policy. In any Case, Russia itself waS .
far from being complacent about Germany and its future. The Soviet Government
attempted to keep all channels open by greeting the new pacts enthusiastically
whilst denying that they indicated any new foreign policy orientation, in
particular away from Germany. Denying the rumours which had appeared in the
"international bourgeois press" regarding such a new orientation, lavestiia
in an editorial devoted to the Polish ratification categorically stated:
Soviet foreign policy was never based on any other "orientation" 
than an orientation on its own forces, an orientation on the increased 
striving of the popular masses for peace* We offered our hand, propos­
ing a policy of peace to all states and if one has given a friendly 
answer before another, it Is only possible to speak of their re­
orientation* The Soviet Union has no need to change its policy. We want 
to live in peace and to collaborate with all states on the basis of 
mutual advantages, regardless of their existing systems and to fight 
only against those who fight against us, who are preparing war against 
US.183*
Pravda adopted a similar line, stating that "if anyone has changed its orient­
ation it is not us but other capitalist countries which have been compelled to 
take into account the growing position of our country."^^* This viewpoint was 
expressed yet more specifically on the occasion of the signature of the Franco- 
Soviet pacts
(w)e welcome the fact that the majority of German papers rebuff 
tendencies which attempt to represent this pact as a step which 
will separate the Soviet Union from the German people* In the same 
way as the signing by Germany at Locarno of a similar pact did not 
alienate those interests on which friendly relations between the 
German people and the Soviet Union had developed, so the policy of 
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and France should not damage 
these interests,185*
Not only the Soviet papers but Soviet diplomats also denied m y  anti-German
1@6
orientation in the recent diplomatic events* * These denials held an element
182. Letter from the Deputy Oommissar for Foreign Âffairs,Rreétinsky,to the 
Soviet Ambassador in Germa):^,Khinchuk,Deoember 1.1932.DVP Vq1.15.p.660.
183, Igyestiig. November 26,1932.
184# Pravda* November 30^1952#
185. Isveatiia. November 30, 1932.
186# Note of a conversation between Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov and
Italian Ambassador in the tBSR,December 1,1932.DVP Vol. 15.p.653«See also
conversation between Stomonyakov and Lithuanian Minister,October 4,1932#
Ibid.. p.560.
Of truth, at least from a subjective angle# Soviet diplomacy most probably 
did not apeoifioally attribute any anti-German motives to its new pacts and 
continued to desire improved relations with all states though it certainly was 
not blind to any opportunity afforded it to play off one capitalist state 
against another if #  its own advantage. But objectively these pacts could not 
but harm the old Soviet-German relationship which had so withered in the last 
few years, a oonolusion which oould not have escaped the Soviet Government# 
Whilst the ratification of a non-aggression paot with Poland and the signature 
of a similar pact with France might compel Germany to court Soviet favour for 
a time (and even this was by no means certain), as Germany's signature of the 
Locarno treaty had produced the Berlin treaty,nevertheless the Soviet Govern­
ment should remember that the former treaty had in fact sown the seeds of Soviet* 
German distrust; Germany had not succeeded in balancing between east and west. 
The series of non-aggression pacts which Russia was so avidly oonstructing with 
countries which feared Germany's resurgent nationalism,in the long term oould 
only severely weaken the still-eaistiag Soviet-German ties.^^^* As Germany 
adopted a more and more extreme position and its enemies reacted in kind, the 
Soviet Union would increasingly find it difficult to maintain its desired seat 
on the diplomatic fence.
187. It should not be forgotten that' the Soviet-Geriaan non-aggression pact, 
the Berlin treaty, had expired in June 1931 and the Extension protocol 
had not yet been ratified by the Reiohstag; thus at a time idien the 
Soviet Union was concluding pacts with other states, Germany technically 
had no such pact, a fact which created considerable suspicion in Moscow*
Chapter 6: The New Course»
1, HapalXo under Hitler*
On January 30# 1933# Adolf Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor of 
Germany, though only three Hasls held government posts* In the March elections 
the Nationalist- Socialist party polled 43*9 per cent of the votes and on %rch 
23 Hitler pushed an enabling bill through the Reichstag which gave the Govern­
ment power to issue decrees independently of the Reichstag or the President. 
Within a Very short time Hitler had established his dictatorship over every 
aspect of German life*
The advent of Hitler to power in Germany cannot fully explain the deter­
ioration of Soviet-^German relations; indeed, the precoeding chapters have sought 
to recount the stages of Rapallo's decay which, by the end of 1932, had reached 
an advanced level# Furthermore, the Nasi victory did not produce an immediate 
change in these relations. Yet within a few months of assuming his hipest 
office. Hitler's influence on world politics had drastically altered not only 
Soviet relations with the Third Reich but Soviet foreign policy as a vAiole# 
Hitler had made no secret of his foreign policy goals in Mein Kampf, a 
book which many western statesmen ignored even after its author's rise to 
intemational infamy but which Russian decision-makers had read with little 
disinterest#^* He intended to extend German power towards the east* Russia 
and its vassal border states were to provide the lebensraum for this new 
Germany# His accession to power did not alter his views as expressed in the 
1920's* In February 1933 he said to a group of high-ranking officers:
How should political power be used, once it has been won? Not yet 
possible to say# Perhaps the winning of new export possibilities, 
peïhaps - and, indeed preferably - conquest of new living space in 
the east and ruthless Germanisation of the latter#
1. '~G.Hil#;er"and 'AlGrMever.The . incompatible (New Y w k  1953)# P.252 #..
2. Hitler to a group of officers,Februery 3,1933# Notes by Lt*Gen.Liebmarm. 
Quoted in Hoott, Alliance Against Hitler* p#80#
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The Russian Government had been warned of the posed by Hitler
if he ever assumed power not only by his writings but by its own diplomats, 
Khinohuk on several occasions during 1932 warned hisGovemment in a very re­
strained tone, almost as if the news would be unwelcome, of these dangers# In 
one letter he noted a strong tendency of the Nazis to steal into power and i
thought that sooner or later they could succeed in this# Whilst he cautiously 
admitted that his opinion, based as it was on probings and journalists' 
opinions, in the absence of direct relations with the Nazis, oould be incorrect, 
he noted:
But it is impossible to ignore Hitler's interview given to foreign 
journalists* In this interview and in countless other statements,
Hitler has definitely stated his task of struggle with the USSR*
Germany is not Italy and Hitler is not Mussolini# I note this, not 
with the intention of creating panics but only to highlight the task i
of a deeper study and probing of the local fascist movement so as to 
have the possibility of correctly talking into account all the real i
factors in Germany# 3»
1
Again, several months later, Khinohuk reported that although the Nazis did not 
express their general political line in relation to the USSR, they were making 
sharper and sharper attacks on the present German trade policy in relation to 
the HSSR*^* In November he warned that "it is absolutely clear that with the 
National-Bociallatrat the head of the cabinet, fascist terror against the
c
communist party will begin #ioh will drive it under ground#" The tone of 
these letters suggests that his Government may not have treated the growing 
Nazi party with sufficient seriousness despite the ample warnings of its prob­
able policies in the event of it gaining power# Certainly the Comintern's 
analysis of events within Germany welcomed the growth of counter-revolutionary 
forces since ''the unfolding of the revolutionary upsurge and the ripening of , 
the revolutionary crisis cannot develop in any other w«y#" * Not only its
3#^ ^^ Siî"'ïiS''^ tlie Soviet IBassîB^ 6épu^ Commissar
for Foreign Affairs, Krestinsky,April 28,1932* WfB Vol#15.ppa*287*288# Not 
known to which interview he was referring*
4# Letter from #ie Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinohuk,to the Deputy Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs,Krestinsky, June 23,1932# ÿbid# *pps*387-389»
5# Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinohuk,to the Deputy Commissar 
for foreign Affairs,Krestinsky, November 20,1932* Ibid*.0*621.
6. Speech by Gusev to the Twelfth Plmum of ECCI, September 8,1932* Eudin and 
Slusser, Soviet foreign Poliov Vol*2* p#474*
22G.
analysis but its actual policies udiich had as their objective the defeat 
of the German Socialist party rather than the Nasi party seem strange #en
contrasted with the opinion of Russia's chief diplomatic representative in
v
Germany. The first few months of 1933 were sufficient to convince the most 
unperoeptive onlooker in Moscow that Nazi policy warranted close attention.
Russia had greeted "with relief and faint hope" the collapse of Papen's 
Government and Schleicher's appointment as Chancellor in December 1932, esp­
ecially since the new Government promised that steps would be taken immédiat- 
ely to ratify the protoool for the Extension of the Berlin treaty* * On 
December 19 Litvinov assured the German Foreign Minister, von Neurath, that 
the Soviet Ikiion considered the good relations with Germany to be the basic 
factor in its foreign policy.^’ A mere week before Hitler became Chancellor, 
Molotov, in his report to the Central Executive Committee said:
Gomany occupies a special place in our foreign relations* Of all 
the countries maintaining diplomatic relations with us, we have had 
and now have the strongest economic connections with Germany* That is 
no accident* It arises from the interests of the two countries.10•
On January 23, an Isvestiia editorial entitled "Soviet Foreign Policy", ref­
erring to Soviet-German relations merely stated that the situation "remained 
stable",
This stable situation was shaken by the events in Berlin at the end of 
January culminating in Schleicher's replacement as Chancellor by Hitler* 
Dirksen reported to Below on January 31 that "the retirement of Schleicher, 
in whom they had much confidence here respecting his attitude toward Russia, 
and the summoning of the Hitler-Papen Cabinet has caused great uneasiness 
here." Papen was still distrusted and the National-Socialist par^ considered
7* The contrast in 1932 and early 1933 between Soviet Foreign Policy consid­
erations and Comintern policy is fascinating but outside the scope of this 
thesis* For a brief survey see chapter 1*
8* Dyok, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, p.234* Hope was generated because 
of Schleicher's connections with the Reiohswehr, hitherto a pro-Soviet 
force in Germany*
9* German Archives* Quoted in Korbel, Poland Between East and West* p*277* 
lO.Molotov's report to the Central Executive Com 1933*
Quoted in Isvestiia. January 24, 1933»
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XX»to bo strongly anti-Soviet, * This Soviet anxiety was carefully controlled
as regards the mass media. For example, Isvestiia*s article on Hitler's first
the
steps merely reported the formation of his government and a response to it in 
12third countries. ’ Dirksen in his memoirs states that the Soviet press during
the first few months of Hitler's rule refrained from all diatribe. Yet the
former German Ambassador also recalls that "the anxiety and scepticism shich
was felt in the inner circle, however, became apparent in all my conversations
with leading Soviet politicians... (#0 ) were extremely sceptical of Hitler's
intentions. Molotov, addressing a conference of, collective farm workers in
February, issued a warning which was not very subtly directed at Gemany;
We know that our country is surrounded by hostile bourgeois states 
fdiioh dream of the early downfall of the Soviet Government...that does 
not worry us...But the position in capitalist countries is getting 
worse so rapidly that any kind of advosturists who force their way into 
power are liable to unleash new wars and a new intervention against the 
Soviet Union.14.
The German Foreign Office was anxious to dispel these Soviet fears, oon-
T C
sidering them to be groundless. * Neurath instructed Dirksen to enter into a
discussion with the Soviet authorities on the general situation in order to
clarify the Russian attitude, though "naturally this must not be done in such
a way as to give the impression that we are anxiously pursuing the Russians.
Acting on those instructions, Dirksen met Krestinsky at the end of February.
This interview clearly reveals that the further deterioration in Soviet-German
relations consequent on Hitler's accession to power was not generated only by
Soviet distrust of the Nazis but also by German anxiety about the course of
Soviet foreign policy. The German Ambassador assured the Russian that the new
political line of the Soviet Government, which was expressed in the conclusion
11 • The 'Go mmS  ' Sbisissador "ic '"the ira'SR,"'Dirksen Beor%ta%y,BuKw ’
January 31,1933• German Docs. p.l4. Papen was Vioe-Ohancellor in the new 
Government.
12. Isvestiia. February 1, 1933.
13* Dirksen, Moscow Tokyo London. p.ll9*
14. Speech by Molotov to a conference of collective farm workers, Isvestiia. 
February 21, 1933*
13* The German Foreign Ministry officials were perhaps less perceptive than 
their Russian counterparts.Bulow wrote that he thought the Russians were 
over-estimating the importance of the German change of government and that 
when the National-Socielists had responsibility they would change their 
policies. State Secretary,Bulow,to the ^ erman Ambassador in the USSR, 
Dirksen,February 6,1933* German Docs, p.21.
16. The German Foreign Minister,Neuratn,to the Embassy in the USSR,February 22, 
1933. Ibid.. P.72.
of a series of non-aggreesion pacts, met with general, imderstandlng and
sympathy from the German Government which had taken all measures in order
to ensure that the German press and publie opinion would calmly accept these
pacts# Further, the German Government considered #at the conclusion of pacts
with France and Poland in no way changed the old relations between the tSSH
end Germany* In the last few weeks, however, it had shown some doubt as to
whether or not Soviet foreign policy had a new orientation in the sense of
being directed towards France# SUch doubt was occasioned by Litvinov’s speeches
at the Disarmament Ooaference, Herrlot’s press oanpaign, the press report on
the plan for the exchange of military attaches between France and the US3E and
17
reports on the arrival in France of a Soviet commission for military purohasesi* 
Whilst the German Foreign Ministry realised that the initiative for the rappr­
ochement came predowiaantly from the French side and appreciated the natural 
reaction of the USSR not to reject friendly actions from that side, neverthe­
less, it did appear that the initiative also came from the Soviet side# Dirksen 
then pointed out, in reassurance to the Soviet Government, that the German 
Government’s struggle with communism within Germany oould go hand in hand with 
the preservation of good foreign policy relations with the USSR as in the case 
of Turkish cuad Italian relations with the t®SR# Further, the Soviet Government 
should consider the fact that collaboration, especially economic, between 
Russia and Germany had continued in the last few months as before# Lastly, 
leading members of the German Government had repeatedly stated to responsible 
Soviet representatives that the German Government’s policy in relation to the 
USSR would be completely maintained and continued# All these factors, accord­
ing to Dirksen, must reduce Soviet anxiety about its relations W.th Germany#
As concerned the Extension protocol of the Berlin treaty, which still awaited
ratification, the delay could be eaqplained fully by the fact that during tlie
10#
last one and a half years the Reichstag had been completely unworkable#
lyrideelielowr'' 'W^ T„,T,nTi.- -Trrr-nTT.-Tm#n«n#«m,.m
18. Dirksen again makes this point in his memoirs, stating that the Russians 
were incapable of grasping that the delay was simply due to deficiencies 
in the German constitutional apparatus#Dirksea#Mosoow^To^o Lon^on#P#122.
229. '
Dirksen was able to report that Hitler, in conversation with Neurath, had 
stated that a sharp line must he drawn between internal measures taken against 
communism in Goraany and policy in relation to the Soviet tkiion; the Chancell­
or did not want to introduce any changes in the foreign policy and in the 
economic-political relations with the USSR. In reply to these statements 
Krestinsky stated that the Soviet Ikiion did not want to introduce nor was intro­
ducing any changes in its policy towards Germany but it could not but be anx­
ious about the proposals which von Papen had made to Harriot concerning a 
militaiy aHianoe during 1952, proposèls #ioh were widely reported in the 
press. In such a situation, private statements of friendship made by members 
of the German Government to members of the Soviet Government which remained 
unknown to Soviet, German and world opinion, were not sufficient* Of such a 
nature was Hitler’s statement made to Neurath and reported just now by Dirksen.
This conversation was terminated by mutual complaints about press attacks on
19
their respective countries. *
Such was the state of the Rapallo partnership. Neither country any longer 
trusted the other though each still tried to convince its partner that it, at 
least, remained Isyal to the old spirit of collaboration. In Germany the new 
Nasi leaders had scant sympathy for the Soviet Uhion; only short-term polit­
ical neomessity would prompt them to collaborate with the communists in the 
east, as happened in 1959# The German Foreign Office officials and diplomats 
in the main still saw considerable value in continuing collaboration with 
Russia for the old reasons, a means of balancing between east and west, of 
extracting concessions from the latter. But the Nazis had other methods in 
mind for gaining such concessions. Even these officials were becoming dis­
illusioned at the apparent movement of Russia towards a Franoo-Folish align­
ment. From the Soviet side, little trust could be placed in the new German 
leadership and what trust did exist was soon dissipated by the latter* s
19. Note ' of '‘a oonveriwktï^  " betwew'"the Depuÿ Goiimid^ 'for 'Forel^ 'Mf airs, 
Krestinsky and the German Ambassador in the USSR,Dirksen, February 27,1953# 
DVP Vol.16 (Moscow 1970), pps. 117-121. Abbreviated version in the Ambass- 
ador in " liie Soviet tkiion to the German Foreign Ministry,February 28,1953# 
German Docs.n.87.
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policies. Certainly no-one in Moscow was likely to alow down, let alone 
reverse, the new course of non-aggression pacts whilst Hitler remained 
Chancellor.
In conversation with Litvinov on March 1 Neurath repeated the assurance 
that German-Soviet relations remained unchanged end also referrdd to the rec­
ently concluded agreement on credits as proof of the German Government's 
20
friendliness. * It was true that economic negotiations undertaken between 
October 1952 and January 1953 had, after considerable difficulty,reached 
agreement on January 17 when the German Govexnment made available credits,
00
supplemented on February 23 by a second agreement on further credits* ' Yet 
the results of these negotiations wore overshadowed by the growing acrimonious 
dispute between the two countries concerning press attacks and German anti­
communist actions. Litvinov had spdken of the measures taken against communists 
in Berlin during his conversation with Neurath which, the Commissar said, had 
created considerable alarm in the Russian press and in Moscow. Khinohuk, idio 
was also present, then mentioned the measures taken against Soviet institut­
ions in Berlin and against members of the Russian trade delegation. Neurath 
replied that in the light of the Reichstag fire revelations, the police should 
regard foreign members of the Gcmmunist party with suspicion* He hoped that the 
Russian Government would not find itself obliged to change its attitude as a 
result of such measures. Neurath noted Litvinov’s confirmation of this "but it
was evident from the wey he expressed himself that he was uneasy about the
23steps taken by the Geman Government against German communism."
The Soviet uneasiness continued to grow throughout the next few months,
2or'Note''o?''’a”oonversatïon’''betweS'"the
and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs,Neurath,Maroh 1,1933• PVP Vol. 16 
p.155# Also Geyman Doo% pps.92-93*
21. See letter from the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinohuk,to the Depute 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Krestinsty,Deoember 2.1932*DVF Vol.^5.P.652. 
Memoraddum of the Soviet Embassy iu Germany to the German Chancellor, 
Schleicher,December 21,1932* XW^,p*690*
22* Concluding protocol of the Soviet-German negotiations,January 17,1933.
I)VP Vol. 16.PPS.31-35*Protocol of the concluding session on credit negotiat- 
ions,February 25.1933.Ibid.. pps.112-114*
23* Memorandum by the German Foreign Minister,Neurath,March 1,1933* German.Dogs, 
pps. 92-95#
Soviet officiais continually oOm#alning about attacks on their citizens.
Such incidents were bound to occur between countries with such wid^y diver­
ging ideologies but that they were the subject of such extensive diplomatic 
exchanges was a clear sign of the tense relations vhich existed between them.
As early as February 25, Krestinsky was instructing the Embassy in Berlin to 
draw the German Forei^ Ministx^' s attention to the systematic persecution 
of the Soviet Government which was being conducted in the Nazi official paper, 
îdiioh could not but provoke a response in the Soviet press*^* Such a response 
was produced not only by the German press but by speeches of the Nasi leaders 
which frequently expressed extremely hostile sentiments towards the Soviet 
Union. On March 2, Hitler himself launched an attack on that country’s inter­
nal policies in the Berlin sportpalast v%ich evoked a shaxp and resolute state­
ment from Khinohuk, Neurath weakly attempting to justify the speech as being 
presented not by Hitler as Chancellor but simply as a party member*^^*
Such incidents increasingly plagued Soviet-German relations# The Soviet 
press, always a sound indicator of official Government views, now dwelt at 
length on the hostile attitude of the new German Government towards the Soviet 
state which provoked a German ban on the importation of Pravda and Isvestiia
into Germany for a time, this in turn #iciting a further Soviet diplomatic 
27
protest# Radek contributed an article to Isvestiia entitled, "Where is
'S. f eli^iS fJS Iffiw S the
Goviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinohuk,February 2S.1953.DVF Yol#l6.P#H6.
23. Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinchuk,to the NKP, March
5,1933. Ibi^.# p#140. Speech reported in Isye^ t;%^ a,March 4,1933.This was 
followed on March ? by an official Soviet protest to Neurath at Wbioh the 
latter again assured Khinohuk of Hitler’s intention to maintain the prev­
ious policy towards the USSR# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Germanyi 
Khinchdk,to the NKp, March 7,1953. BVP Yol#l6. pps.149-150.
26# for example, fravda. March 15,1933, contained a front page article on 
Rosenberg’s latest anti-Soviet speech*
27# Note of a conversation between the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Germany, 
Aleksandrovsky and the Head of the Fourtb Department of the German foreign 
Ministry, Mever.Maroh 2C.1933.DVP Vol.l6.ona#177-178# S.B.Aleksandrovsky, 
Head of the Central European Dept# of the NK3), 1924^1923$Soviet Minister 
in Lithuania,1923-192?fMinister in Finland,1927-1929îNK3) Representative at 
the Ukrainian Soviet Government,1929-1931iCounsellor at the Embassy in 
Geraany,1931-1933;Mlnister in Csechoslevakia,1933-1939.
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Germany going?" In it he discussed the Brest-Xdtovslc treaty on its fifteenth 
anniversary although noting that Soviet society unwillingly returned to the 
Brest theme, considering it "pointless to recall old wrongs when talking of 
the first great power with which the Soviet Union established diplomatic rel­
ations, relations which for maiQr years have developed favourably and have passed 
not just one teat." Nevertheless, this year such memories suggested themselves 
"for at the head of %e German republic are found people who in their official 
organ recently wrote that 'Versailles is finished but Breat-Litovak will live*’" 
Radek then recalled the eastern policy of Mein Kampf and wded by saying that 
"in the sphere of relations between two countries such a situation where a 
hostile foreign policy programme of one state remained unanswered by the other 
is i m p o s s i b l e Press attacks were not the only growing source of contention 
between the two States. Khinohuk complained to Bulow about German interference
in the operations of the Soviet oil agency, Derop and this was not an isolated
29
complaint but only one instance of numerous Soviet protests.
In this worsening situation the German Foreign Ministxy and especially 
its Ambassador in Moscow atten^ted to repair the damage which the Nasi viotozy 
in Germany was inflicting on relations between the two states but the task was 
an uphill one. The Extension protocol still had not been ratified despite 
German repeated promises that this would occur and Hitler had not yet even 
received the Soviet Ambassador. In the present situation, as Krestinsky told 
Dirksen, "at length", the Soviet public was very uneasy about the future att­
itude of the Reich Government towards the USSR.^^* This type of Soviet response 
to German policy seemed to have some effect in Berlin for on March 25 Hitler, 
in a speech to the Reichstag, adopted a more conciliatory line:
, %roh' 22.1933* See ''aiao''S a Æ i S a r ^  
attacking HltlQ^ r’s Germany.
29. Telegrewa from the Soviet Ambassador in Goraw^r,Khinohuk to the NKD,March 16, 
1953* WF YoXél^ * prnXJl* See also, for example, telegram from the Soviet . 
Charge d’Affaizis in Gemany# Al^ &ssndrovslgr, to the Deputy Commissar for 
Foreign Aff airs,Krestinsky, March 20,1953* Ibid**n»175*
50. German Ambassador in the tîBSR, Dirksen, to the German Foreign Ministry,
March 20,1953. German Docs, pps.189-190*
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Toward the Soviet Union the Eelch Government intends to cultivate 
friendly relations, advantageous to both parties. It is preoisely 
the Government of the national revolution that finds itself in a 
position to pursue such a, positive policy toward Soviet Russia. The 
fight on communism in Germany is our internal affair, in which we 
shall never tolerate interference from the put side. Political relat­
ions v/ith other powers with which we are linked by important interests 
in common are not affected thereby* 31»
This speech did not produce quite the salutozy effect in Moscow that had been
expected in Berlin. An editorial in Isvestiia did welcome any German policy
which would establish and strengthen good-neighbourly relations with the USSR
but in general it was fairly hostile and sarcastic towards Germany, harping on
the theme of its Interference with Soviet economic organisations in that country
and especially Derop. It took care, however, to deny any hostility on Russia’s
parts
The Soviet Union does not take sides in the struggle between
capitalist powers, it stands for the equality of all peoples, 
big and small and therefore it can in equal measure desire normal 
relations with them all. Hostile relations between the USSR and 
other powers can arise only as a result of the hostile policy of 
these powers towards the USSR*..In the absence of such actions 
(from the German side) German-Soviet relations will have a character 
which will answer the interests of both sides.32*
Such an absence of hostile actions was not to be forthcoming. In the
following day’s issue, the paper carried a report of a police search at the
Soviet General Qonsulate in Hamburg and commented that this sort of behaviour
threw significant light on the real meaning of Hitler’s speech and his desire
for a positive policy towards the Litvinov himself took up this theme
of German molestation with Dirksen, interpreting the campaign against Soviet
institutions and especially Derop as being fully organised, directed from a
single centre and not merely local, isolated phenomena. He left the Geiman in
no doubt as to the "extreme seriousness" with which the Soviet Government
treated these events, shaking as they did its confidence in the assurances
given by ilitler, Neurath and Dirksen as to the German Government* s desire to
preserve friendly relations with the Ü3SE and casting doubt not only on mutual
economic but also political relations;
31. Quoted in German Docs.footnote 3* P»190.
32. lavestlla. Haron' 28.1933.
33. 'ibid.. March 29,1933.Further articles on the hawrase harassment of Derop 
appeared on March 30 and April 2.
(W)e really were alarmed, at the oemlng to power in Germany of ' 
people, the politieel oreed of idiioh oould not inepire us with 
optimism m  oonoeme the fate of our mutual relatione* Naturally 
we had waited for official oommmt# and statementa from the head 
of the new government# T M» comment, however, had taken place in 
a situation of anti-Soviet actions by the German authorities*
Litvinov’s harangue certainly had a profound effect on Dirksen, who considered
that it reflected the great agitation which had seised the Soviet Government
and public* He feared that the persistence of incidents against Soviet oitisens
and ooonomio organisations in Germany was giving rise to fears that the trends *
within Germany opposed, to good relations with Russia were gaining the upper
hands ,
It is my oonviotion that a serious crisis has been reached in our 
mutual relations# If it should not be possible to eliminate it, the 
Soviet Government wül, with its oharaoteristic restlessness, draw 
its conclusions for the entire area of our mutual relations and reverse 
its économie and military polioies also# The economic consequences of 
such a reversal by our largest customer and debtor are obvious* Revers­
als may also be expected in foriega and military policy in view of the 
present attitude of France and Poland* After mature consideration, I 
consider it urgently necessary to report to Your Exoellenoy personally 
at once conceming the situation that has arisen here and the results 
that might ensue#54#
Dirksen's great anxiety is further underlined in a letter written on the follow­
ing day to the German State Secretary which described the "very serious crisis" 
which had developed in the past few days:
You know that I am not in the habit of getting into a panic, and that 
I have in general judged the situation in the Soviet Union oorreotly*
You will therefore believe me when I say that the situation is very 
serious and that X consider a trip to Berlin for the purpose of report­
ing urgently necessary*
He was certain that if a settlement was not reached then "we must expect a
oonfliot with the Soviet Government, the oonsequenoes of which will be very
35*
severe in a political and economic respect*"
'^r'N ote'0?"a"'co S S S alïS ’''^ %%een'''t&e ëo ''fS"9oreign'M&irs%'SR3Sov
and the German Ambassador In the #8R,Dirksen,April 3*1933# DVP Vol*l6* 
pps# 210-215# German Ambassador in the Ü3GH to the German Foreign Ministry, 
April 4*3.933# Gprman Dcfcs# pps*241*^ 242* It is noteworthy that the day after 
this meeting Krestinsky urged on Khinohuk the necessity for action against 
the outrages of storm-trcopers and police against Soviet citizens and 
institutions which had reached a crescendo* Letter from the Deputy Gomaisaar 
for Foreign Affalrs,Krestlnsky,to the Soviet Ambassador in Germany, Khinohuk, 
April 4*1933* D #  Vol*l6# p#2l6*
35* Ambassador Dirksm to State Secretary Bulow, April 4,1933* Gei^an J qcs# 
pps* 246-247#
The German Foreign Miïiiatiy’s reaetioa to its Ambassador's report was 
oonoiXiatory* Dirksen was instructed to inform the Soviet Government that the 
Reich Govenment was now in a position to ratify the Extension protoool, that 
it undertook to examine all oases in #ich Soviet oitlzens had been molested 
and that it would ensure that Soviet business organisations in Germany were 
permitted to work without intoiference* On the other hand. It asserted that 
the Soviet Government was not without blame for the present disturbance in 
relations and told Dizksen to mention Soviet radio propaganda and the communist 
aotivitios of Derop employees, 85 per cent of whom belonged to the Communist 
party# It maintained that Soviet business organisations must sever all conn­
ections of any kind with the ÎÎPD#^ *^
This conciliatory tone was an admission, at least on the part of the 
permanent Foreign Office officials, that Germany's policy of alienating Russia 
at a time when it liad other friends emerging on the international scene,,was 
dangerous# Soviet fears must be calmed for Germany still had need of a friend 
in the east and who could this be but the Extracts from the minutes
of the Coaaferèaoe of Ministers show* the important place which Russia stiH 
occupied in the Ministry of Foreign Affair## plans# Neurath stated that Germ­
any's position in the east was particularly exposed and defmoe against Poland 
was possible only if Russian support was assured*
We cannot do without Russia's cover for our rear with respect to 
Poland# Russia has beoOme ihe largest buyer of German iadustrlol 
products## .The fight against communism in Germany does not,as Italy's 
example shows, need in the long run to affect adversely our relations 
with Russia.
German Docs.oos.252-253. #ilst Litvinov welcomed the German assurances, 
he maintained that Soviet organisations had held aloof from all communist 
activities and that they could not control the pzdvat© activities of their 
en^loyees# Dirksen gained the impression that Soviet anger was subsiding 
but this would oontinue only if fuz'ther molestation did not occur. Note of 
a conversation between the Gomiaisaar for Foreign Aff airs,Litvinov and the 
German Ambassador,April 8,1933* DV3^  Vol.l6.oos.221-222. Bee also Dirksw's 
report to his Foreign Ministry, German Docs, pps.271-272.
37* These officials were not radioal nor unscrupulous enough to think of 
Hitler's way out of this dileWsa, a temporary entente with Poland. They 
were to learn in 1934.
He also noted, that "at the present moment it is uncertain whether this can 
38.
be counted on." The increasingly strident demands of the nationalist 
parties within Germany for a revision of the Versailles treaty had adversely 
affected Soviet-German relations even before Hitler became Ghanoellor, espec­
ially in view of the former’s growing rapprochement wi# France and Poland.
This rapprochement especially with France, was accelerated by the Nasi viotozy, 
fed by both countries’ fears of Hitler's foreign policy objectives* The Soviet 
Government had less reason to accept German provooatory policies directed at it 
now that Its international position was becoming stronger, in tjie same way as 
Gemany had been less prepared to accept increasingly revolutionary propaganda 
from Russia in the late twenties. addition, growing Soviet economic trade 
with other countries, for example the United States, was reducing Germai^ r's 
economic value. It was inevitable that Moscow should distrust a Germany led 
by the author of Mein Kampf. M im  this distrust was more then justified by the 
new German Government's anti-Soviet policies, the likelihood.of further collf 
aboration was further mduoed. Though the German Foreign Ministry might see 
Germany’s security as being threatened by the isolation which Hitler’s aggress­
ive, at least verbally, policy was producing, its influence on Hitler was not 
overwhelming. German foreign policy in the era of the Third Reich would not 
alwcy» follow the course recommended by that Ministry. %less the German Gover­
nment ended its internal anti-8oviet policies and so long as it fostered Franco- 
Soviet relations, then all its diplomats’ efforts would be in vain# Dirksen
himself noted that he was afraid the impending exchange of ratification instr-
39
uments would prove politically ineffective rniloss police incidents ceased*
Iconoÿic relations which had strongly united the two states since the
early twenties were now foundering. In April, Khinohuk and the Soviet trade
representative in Germany, Veytser, saw Bulow, demanded an immediate return
to normal activity for Derop and complained that in the last few months Soviet
3'Sr*fxîraote''from''''lSo’'mïnïïtes"'Tf'''îîîë"''G^
German Poos, pps* 259#
39. Ambassador Dirksen to the German Foreign Ministry, April 14,1933* Ibid. * 
p.290.
237.
exporta had fallen "oat&stropWLoally," The Gorman agreed that It was necessary 
to change the situation quickly in the interests of both countries and that 
measures were being taken to normalise Berop’s situation.Khinohuk expressed 
Soviet disappointment at the recent credit agreement which had been expected to 
signify a German readiness to help Russia expend its exports to the 1932 level 
in order to reduce # e  passivity of the Soviet trade balance whereas in fact # 
worsening had occurred#^^
It was in this situation that the German Chancellor received the Soviet 
Ambassador for the first time* Khinohuk used # e  opportunity in order to under­
line that "the confidence of my Government in the future of om^ mutual-relate?. 
ions has of late often been subjected to great stress owing to the actions of 
the official and non-official Gcvemment organs all over Germany la regard to 
the interests of the UBSH." He then outlined a number of measures which the • 
Soviet Government thought necessary so as to maintain previous relations, 
firstly, the protocol for the Extension of the Berlin treaty should be ratified 
at once. Seeoadly, the domestic re-organisation of Germany should not affect 
the foreign policy needs of the two states. Thirdly, the Germn press shouldvbe 
provided with infcrmation designed to inform its readership of the views ex­
pressed by the Reich Government toward the USSR# Fourthly, methods for creating 
a balance of trade should be studied jointly once more and Derop should be 
given the opportunity to operate freely* in reply, Hitler stated that he thor­
oughly shared the opiiition that no change must occur in the friendly relations 
between both countries and that independently of the differences in world out­
look mutual interests of a lo%-term character linked them in both the economic 
and political'■■spheres, each having common difficulties and enemies. The-Soviets,
40.'''Telegram" ' 'A&assidor' i n ' W e ''the ''MKB,'' April
19,1933. BVP Vol.16. p.829,Note 105* Memorandum by the State Secretary, 
Bulow, Aora.1 ~ 19*1933.-,German. Docs, pps.304*305.
41. Note of a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Germany,Khinchuk, 
and the German State Secretary, Bulow, April 22,1933* BW...7ol..^ 6^.pps.256% 
259# Khinohuk also told Neurath that "the internal politioal and eoonomio 
measures of the German Government*..strongly threaten our trade work about 
which we have repeatedly stated." Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in 
Germany, Khinohuk, to the NKD, April 26,1933. Ibid.. p.266.
32B.
for example, must worzy about their western frontier, Germany about its
internal
©astern frontier. Neither state should interfere in the imtemetienel affairs 
of the other. Hitler also instructed Neurath to deal with the Derop affair and
LO
trade relations in general. *
As Hitler had promised at this meeting, on Hey 5 the Extension protocol 
was finally ratified by Gomany. Although this had long been a Soviet demand, 
its response was far from rapturous and must have shazply disillusioned any 
German who considered that this long-delayed move would make up for the diplo­
matic events of the last few years which had witnessed the growing estrange­
ment of Germany and the USSH, let alone any hopes that it would block the 
Soviet rapprochement with Franc© and Poland*^^* Isvestiia recognised that the 
Rapallo and Berlin treaties had "served to strengthen the ooonomio and polit­
ical relations of Germany and the Soviet Union" but then added that "they have 
not hindered either side from striving to strengthen its relations with other 
powers." The editorial, dispelling the last German hopes, #en frankly stated 
that these treaties with Germany had not prevented the Soviet Government from 
concluding non-aggression pacts with France and Poland, "the best possible proof 
that the Rapallo policy was not directed against these powers." At one time 
Germany had been Soviet Russia’s only Important, frimd in international society. 
During the last few years Russia’s international position had boon strength­
ened but the signature of non*aggression pacts with other states had still 
evoked Soviet assurances that relations with Germany were not thereby adversely 
affected. Now, in 1933» a Soviet-German treaty produced a Soviet assurance to 
France and Poland that it was in no way directed against them. The editorial 
commented on tendencies within Germany irtiich favoured a deal with France at 
Russia’s expmsé but triumphantly noted that Franco-Soviet relations had been
Report of the ëb^eÿ_'Ambassad^...............................
pps.271-274. Memorandum by the German Fofoign Mlnister,April 28,1933#
German Docs, pps.355*338# The Soviet version gives a. fuller account of 
Hitler’s speech.
43# Dirksen reports that although "the supporters of Russo-German understanding, 
such as Krestinsky,wore frankly delighted", Litvinov himself "oould not 
suppress his aorosenese and increAulitv#"Dirksen.Mo»cow Tokyo London.p*122.
etrengthened to such m  extent that the Idea of a military alliance directed
against the ÏÏ80B found m  response from the French Government# The eâltoriel
ended on a warning note: -
Whilst welcoming the extension of tho Berlin treaty, Soviet public 
opinion is fully aware that the treaty wiH have that significance 
#%ich is given to it by the concrete actions of bo# parties which • 
concluded it#.«Friendly attitudes will evoke a friendly response,
hostile actions will call forth the appropriate rebuff.44#
Such was the Soviet- comment On the treaty which once again activated the ■■ ■ 
Boviet-German non-aggression pact, initially signed in 1926 and the first of'.- 
the important Boviet pacts, hitherto a model for all others# The Soviet Union 
now had other pacts with countries which were becoming increasingly more rel­
iable thm% Germany#
Dirksen, at least, quickly shed any fallacious belief he might have enter- 
tained that this ratification would repair thé damage of the last few years# In 
§ despatch sent to Berlin on the same day as the ratification he recalled 
Krestinsky’s recent comment that it would take months before the old relations 
were restored# Hé reported that "a certain aloofhess from the foreign political 
aims and basic ideas heretofore pursued jo^tly with Gemany Is beginning to 
appear in the press and public here*" Versailles was no longer opposed without 
reservations and the view that the revision meant war was beginning to be acc­
epted# Soviet relations with France and Poland had improved markedly and were 
having their effect on Soviet-German relations. The common policy pursued in 
disarmament questions had been so much reversed that Isvestiia’s correspondent, 
according to this report, had completely falsified the German delegation’s 
attitude on the question of the definition of "aggressor." As regards the 
hitherto highly important military collaboration, Dirksen now reported that 
"the adverse and tricky attitude on various questions of military policy is to
1 e
be regarded as m  extremely si#ifi#nt further* touch."
The Soviet reaction to the new. Nasi leadership in Germany has so far been
treated in isolation but the full ramifications for the Soviet foreign policy
, . , ; ' .  ^ '     ^ . : ■ , , ,  ^ -
45# GéxroS Ambassador, -Dirksen, to the foreign Mini © t r y , 3,1933#
' German Poos, pps#308-389#
as a whole û m  only be seen, in the context of the general European reaction 
to these events* Before Hitler entered-the Chancellorship, resurgent German 
nationaliam had convinced France and Poland of the necessity for reinsurance 
and directed their attention, even if somewhat reluctantly, towards Russia*
The same motiye produced a positive response from the TBSE«- It is not surpr^ , - 
ising that the emergence of the most extreme nationalist pariy's leader as 
German Chancellor in January 1913 induced these states to travel further on 
the already chosen course#
2. Polish-Soviet relations under the Nasi threat#
If Mein Kampf's message had been ill-received in Moscow, it certainly 
was no more welcome in Warsaw* Any German Government which opposed the Vers­
ailles territor3.al settlement was a threat to Poland hut a Nasi one was the 
most repugnant* Even before Hitler’s political elevation Soviet-Polish rel­
ations, following the ratification of the noneaggression pact i%i November 1932, 
had further improved, partly as a response, on the Polish side, to a desire for 
better economic relations but largely as a result of Poland’s growing fear#- : 
concerning Germany* After Januaiy 1953» tension tnoreased on the Polish-German 
frontier and this at a time W%en Poland was becoming more uncertain as to its 
French ally’s reliability* It was essential to secure at least one frontier*
In Germany a virulent nationalist and avowed anti-Blav had become Chancellor; 
with the Soviet thion a non-aggression paot had just been ratified and greeted 
warmly in Moscow* Poland’s ohoioe seemed obvious* During a Sejm debate in. 
January most of the Polish deputies agreed that the pacification of Poland’s 
enmtem frontier was the best possible answer to the potential German danger 
in the west* Book outlined Poland’s policy towards the USSR as being the 
strict application of the principles embodied in the non-aggression pact and 
the lasting improvement of relations between the two states whilst simultan­
eously maintaining ,a wariness as concerns Russia’s political schemes which - ■
M *  Buduromo#. Pdlish-Bbviet Relatidhs. b#26,
47v-'Beek-r-'Pinal Report*
Could domplioat© Poland’s situationPoland was anxious to consolidâto 
its newly-improved relations with Russia but its distrust cultivated over 
centuries could not be assuaged by one treaty*
The Soviet Government also expressed a readiness to reciprocate, based 
on the German and Japanese threats though again, its trusts of the not-too-long
since christened "Vanguard of imperialist anti-Soviet intervention" was not ■ > I
4.8 '
absolute# '* Litvinov expressed the hope to Lukasiewicz, the new Polish Minister
in Moscow, that the rapprochement between their countries would be further adv- ‘ 
anced and that the ÎJBBE would take a firm line for the further strengthening- of ; 
relations with Poland#^* Of course, 'the Soviets were careful not to exaggerate j 
their own difficulties with Germany# Litvinov,, in a later conversation with the | 
Polish Minister, hastily assured him that relations with Germany were unchanged î 
despite the newspaper polemio, though he did concede that his Government could 
not ignore thé well-known positions and frames of mind of certain of that coun- ; 
try’s new loaders* Ho refused to admit any deterioration of relations with - = 
Germany, merely stating that they would "1:1 no way hinder our further rapprooh- 
ement with France and Poland#" The ÜSSE was tzying to remove "those small ■ ■ 
splinters" which had remained for so long in Sovlet-Folish relations so as to 
make possible an unimpeded realisation of the intentions which lay at the basis
:m,". ,„r,n„3 n,       " ,
48# Dirksen repor^d wat Polish support for the Boviet Government was of vital 
importance in a period of growing BoviOt-Japanese tension# Ambassador 
Dirksen to the German Foreign Ministry, May 5,1933# German Boos#o*388# Al­
though he presumably sought to minimise the anti-Gerrnmomtmt of the 
Polish-Soviet rapprochement, hia observation was correct# Despite the res­
umption of diplomatlo relations between the USSR and China on December 12, 
1932, by the end of that year the Soviet position in the far Bast h#ê and 
specifically its relations with Japan showed few signs of improving# In 
early 1933, iu an attempt to reduce friction, the Soviet Government decided 
to negotiate the sale of the GïtiE to Japan, but this was to prove a complex 
task, only being concluded in March 1935*
49# Note of a conversation between the Gommissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, 
and the Polish Minister in the USSR,Lukaslewics,January 29,1953# 
p#67# Patek completed his term as Polish Minister in Moscow on December 15, 
1952 to take up his appointment as Polish Ambassador in Mie United States#
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of the A certain Improvement did Indeed ooour in
Boviet-FoXish relations In the spring of 3,935. In March a Soviet art ealilh- 
Itlon was. hold In Warsaw and in April Mledzinakl, editor of the "Gazeta 
Polska" and a prominent Polish figure, visited Moscow with Pilsudski’s -blessing 
for informal talks with the Soviet leadership.^* ' . ■
Despite this relaxation of tension, however, the extent of any detente 
must he measured oautihusly. Mutual distrust still remained; the two oountrios - 
had been inveterate enemies since Poland had gained its independenoe from the . 
shattered Russian erapire and had attacked the fledgling Boviot state In 1920.' 
Both ooimtriew seemed more intent on parading their superficial rapprochement - 
before the German Government than on developing a genuine friendship which 
perhaps was impossible for the rival neighbours, in spite of the German threat# 
Their non-aggroasion paot had real significance in that it strengthened their 
bargaining power with third states and to an extent increased their security# - ^ 
lot future events in the thirties were to demonstrate its basic shallowness.
During 1955* however* both Governments were anxious to stress their improved -
relations# The Russians, whilst recognising Poland’s increased desire for a 
rapprochement in the face of Hitler’s triumph in Germany and the offensive of 
the revisionist elements in Europe* discerned in addition a Polish desire to 
exaggerate before the outside world the improvement of FoXlsh-Bovlet relations* 
even encouraging rumours concerning the formation of a united, front against 
Hitler# They were quite prepared to accede to this Polish deception since "it
does not contradict our Interests and can provide a highly useful Influence on
the _ . .  . .... ^...  . . - . .   ■-.-.■•■ -
SO# Note of a conversation between the Oommlssàr for Foreign Aff lire* Litvinov 
and the Polish Minister in the UB3H, Lukaslewlcs* March 23 #1933#DVP Vol*M » 
pps.182-185# It is interesting to note Litvinov’s prognosis of future 
Geraan-Folish relations* He thought that . Hitler would probably seek vict- 
. ories in the direction of Danzig or Austria and posited that Poland prob­
ably would not oppose m  ansohluss because this ..would attract German att«?. 
entlon away from the east# 3Ebid#
51* Budurosyos* Polish^Boviet Relations^. p#27.
the Berman Bovemraent's polloy.»52* end, the Soviet Government
attempted to acoomodate Polish proposals #hai possible on all current
questions and not only to strengthen relations vlitii tliat country but to
parade this improvement before the v/orld#^ *^
This admission throvm iaterestiïig light on the intentions of the Soviet
Government# Its basic foreign policy goal was the passive one of increasing
its security in the face of a hostile environment^ hostile not only because
of the ideological prism through which the actions of the capitalist states
were per-oeived in Moscow# but imminently so in the form of the Japanese threat
in the east and the potential German thi'oat in the west# To achieve security
it sought to keep all diplomatic doors open ratiier than forming conventional*^
alliances, Whilst it encouraged Poland*s eacaggsration of the Foliah’^Soviet
rapprochement as a means of demonstrating to its potential enemies the strength»-
m o d  Goviet diplomatic position it also hoped in this way to produce a response
in Germany, If Berlin saw Polmni and Russia drawing oloser together# might it
not be more anxious once more to court Soviet favour? Whilst the German foreign
Ministry personnel may have reacted in this wey# as was mentioned above Hitler
did not necessarily draw the same conclusions* In fact# as hindsight reveals,
he favoured initially an agreement with Poland rather than Russia. Poland's
leader also was not beyond playing such a two-sided game. As a part of his pro-
Soviet policy, Pilaudski received the Soviet Ambassador in a private audience
on May 1, Stomonyakov saw this as being evidence of Poland's desire to show to
tiJie world its new friendship with Russia but Buduroiwyo# finds it significant
'b2r''heltîsr^fîÏÏÎ™a''mcSÏ''lîf "Se'ooïï
Minister in Poland# Antonov-Ovseenko, April h. 1915.DVP Vol,l6, nos.218-219, 
The Russians only refused to support Polish rumours concerning any special 
arrangement between the tîSSR and Poland over the Baltic states and directed 
against Germany since this would further Polish aspirations with regard to 
a Poliah-Baltlo bloc. Ibid*, p.219.
53* Letter from a Member of the Collegium of the MKB#Stomonyakov# to the Soviet 
Minister in Poland# Mtonov-Ovsoenko,April 19,1933* Ibid*.dps»252-235* In 
this letter Stomonyakov noted the probability that the Poles would exagger­
ate the significance of an intended visit to Warsaw by a Soviet economic 
delegation (which arrived in Warsaw on May l) which# of course,the Russians 
must not hinder, "its effect in germany being especially useful”»
that this reoeptloA obouyr# on thb ovo pf tho Polish Mlnlstor's j^torvlo*
with Hitler and thWss It probahX© that this fiEdendly gesture towards Hussia 
was oaloulate| to Impmas Berlin rather than Moscow*
Whatever the motives behind these subtle diplomatic manoeuvres# however# 
it remains true that Boviet-Poll^^i relations were improving. The Increasingly 
aggravated Pollsh-Geman relations# whilst they might have prompted a long- 
shot by Warsaw to reverse their direction by hints directed at Berlin# cert­
ainly also stimulated the rapprochement with Moscow which the latter encour­
aged# Even if the Soviet Government was usigg this rapprochement in part to 
pressure GermO# hack into the lapallo partnership# this in itself is evidence ■ 
of both a hotter Soviet relationship with Poland and a much worsened one with 
Germs#'. According to the Gorman Ambassador in Moscow# worsening relations with 
Germany had prompted some Polish "private individuals” to approach Antonov- 
Ovseenko so as to find out the Soviet attitude in the event of a Polish-German
ec
war* * The German Minister in Warsaw thought that everything indicated a _ 
Polish resolution to ©,iq)lolt actively the opportunitiea resulting from any 
deterioration in Soviet-German relations#^* Bl#oen noted Hadek's proposed 
trip to that part of Poland received from Germany at Versailles# the importance 
of which ley "not only in tact the fact that a man of Badek's literary stature 
inclines to the Polish thesis# hut rather indirectly in the fact that the 
political world might and would have to infer fzom those olrcuastanoes a com­
plete devaluation of the political relations between Germany and the Soviet 
Union*”" ■ * Poland had always been the litmus test of Soviet-German relations# 
The very raison d'etre of Germany's eastern policy had been an overwhelming 
desire to prepare for the return of its territories seised Poland under the
Budufowyos# .Polish-Spiet. .BeXatic^ ns* p*28# footnote 9*Hitler mentioned to ■
Wisooki# the Pplish Minister# at this interview on May 2 their countries' 
commoni danger from the Soviet #ion and pointed out their community of 
' intefestsiS.Mackiewica# Oolonel Beck and His Policy (London 1944)#p.l7*
53# Ambassador Dirksen to the GeriiiS fOr ##1933# German
M M È* F#36A#
The Goman Minister in Poland to the German Poreign Ministry,March 8.1933.
m m * ,
37# Ambassador Dirksen to Director Meyer#May 2,1935 » Ibid. 373.
Vereaillea treaty by scouring a neutral# if not rni allied# Russia* That
Moscow m s  n m  linked to Warsaw by a non-sggresslon pact idillst its relations 
with Berlin were hec.oming ■unrooognisahla even when compared with the days of 
Bronittg's Ghmoellorohip was a clear pointer to the changing diplomatic m p  • < 
of the European'continent end within it# Russia' s c m  etill-germinhting new
foreign policy».
3# The franoorSoviet pact is ratified,'
, France# the most, powerful of the European continental states after the 
peace settlement in 1918#■ naturally was not a mere observer of these diplomatic 
re- shufflings;:'Which were in the process of cry stall! satlon, More hesitantly ■ - 
than Poland and against greater internal opposition# the French Government bad r ^ 
faced the reality of Germany's resurgent clamour by signing its negotiated non- 
aggression pact with the USSR in November 1932, It atltl refused to taka 'the - -' 
final plunge Of ratification# however, postponing such a course until a similar 
agreement had been concluded between Russia and Rumania, The olevation of the 
Has! leader to the highest position in fermahy had no less an effect in Paris 
than it did in Warsaw or Moscow, fhe sedate pace of the Franco-Soviet rapprooh-.--^  
ement now was stimulated by an external injection whose effect# especially on
the hitherto ambivalent French society# was significant, Faul-Boncour# the new
58
French Foreign Minister^ ' has stated that the task was now dear; to fortify . 
existing alliances and to s eek new Ones, To this end# it appeared necessary to 
conclude ah alliance with Russia sc that Poland and Rumania would not fed them- 
selyes menaced from i^o rear if they united with France in a concerted aotion,^^* 
The first move in any further Franco^Soviet rapprochement was the ratifie*^ 
ation of the ncn-aggression pact, Steps in this direction were already underway
■■ieiwiwehWWiW#^^
30T In # p c B
39, J.Faul-Boncour# Entre deux giicrres|..Souvenirs sur ,1a .llle République. Vol,2,
Les I^ndem^s de layictorSiSew fork ÏSbj
note' thaï"'''at a T S  upheavals in the ÎÎS5E many eminent
French leaders placed more importance on the assurance of Soviet neutrality. 
in any future war with Gcrroaiiy than on actual Soviet military help# the 
Soviet armed forces being rated fairly poorly# - ■ - ■ -
- #
before the collapse of the Schleicher Government# On January 17# .Pierre Got#
U n^& r-56C f"o fd rY  a f f o r  pàre|f/^  A f f 4
the then French ■Fereign-lflnleter# promised Povgalevsîiy to press the question
Faul-
of ratification at the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs «^Bonoour 
had also made the same promise and hoped that It could take place the follow-, : 
ing week If the commission did not oppose the method of mtlfioatlon by pres-r  ^
idential decree; otherwise he would introduce a bill into parliament to achieve 
this end*^^* A presidential decree had the advantage o f speed whilst ratific­
ation by parliament had the advantage of greater political significance# Xn
P m /h
fact# ratification did not occur as quickly as^onoour had hoped but on Fobruaiy 
6 he informed^ Litvinov in Geneva that the cabinet as well as the Palace of 
Deputies had decided to propose this step and that it could be esipected at the 
end of the waek#^^* Herriot# now president of the chamber's commissim on 
foreign affairs# expressed to that body the great signifloance which he gave 
to the rapprochement of French and Soviet democracy for the struggle w3.th > . 
fascism# adding that obstacles should not be put in the way of ratification 
by presidential decree although he would prefer it by parliamentary means# He 
also mmounoed the forthcoming exchange of military attaches# an act of some 
signifioanoe #^^ *
On February 11 the French President ratified the Franco-Soviet non-
aggression pact# the Soviet Praesidium of the Gentral Ezeoutlve Oommittee
following suit three days later and ratification instruments were exchanged
on February 15 #1933* Oonsidering the long drawn out negotiations which had
begun in the spring of 1951 the ratification once decided upon was completed
relatively quiokly; the international situation had changed in the last two
years# Xsvestiia greeted this act as the completion of a whole episode in thé
development of Franco-Boviet relations and of great significance*^^* Pravda
60# Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Franoe#Dovgalevsl^# to the HkO# 
Januaiy 19,1933, DVP Vol,l6# p#39#
61* Telegram from the Opmmisoar for Foreign Affairs# Litvinov# to the KKI), 
February 6#1933« Xbid,# p.%*
62* Telegram from the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in France#Eosonberg# to the liKD# 
February 9#1933# # i d * » p###
63. Xsvestiia# February 18# 1933#
noted that worsening relations with Germany and the United States had 
compelled Franco to evaluate the role and significance of the great and 
powerful UB3H in intemationetl relations.
Like Poland# under the pressure of a revisionist Germany# France had 
abandoned its ally Rumania and gone ahead with the aotivisation of its pact 
with Russia# the old French ally# against Germany* The ve%y fact that the 
pact had eventually been ratified after so much delay was a vital indication 
of the changes vdiioh were taking place in the European balance of power# Of 
course# the Soviet l&iion hod long expressed its desire to maintain good rel­
ations with all states# hut no government widerstood Letter than the one in 
Moscow the imposslhility of fulfilling this aim# given the contradictions 
which it so vividly perceived amongst the capitalist states. The basic split 
between the status quo supporters of the Versailles lystem and its revisionist 
opponents allowed no room for a third state wishing to maintain amicable 
relations with both groups# France and Germany epitomised these two European 
cas%*s* The Soviet ïMion# if reluctantly, had to choose between them* In its 
early history such a choice had been obviated by France's overt hostility, 
Germany# weak itself# was only too anxious to secure diplomatic support from 
the despised communist government* But the changes within Germany cos^eXXed 
France to reconsider its hostility towards the tBSE whilst at the some time 
weakening the Soviet-German ties and therefore leaving Russia more amenable 
to this new French attitude* The Soviet leaders realised that any approach 
towards France and Poland would be distrusted in Germany but their concern at 
the future course of the Rapallo partnership rather than the fallacious desire 
to be on good terms with all states, compelled tiiem to encourage and cultivate 
the growing readiness of the status quo powers to court the hitherto outcast 
great power of Eastern Europe. This is to simplify Soviet policy slightlyj as 
was mentioned above# the Russians maintained the hope that improved relations 
with Poland and France might tempt Germany back to its old policy of close
collaboration with the UB3E, but this hope could not have been a dominant one,
'    ""     .
it offering only a fairly remote chanoe of sucoess* The Boviot Government 
was not so short-sighted as to abandon deliberately its options on Germany 
in so far as there obuld be retained at the same time as a new series of non- 
aggression pacts Were ponoluded# But that these pacts were required as insur- 
anoe. against the potential threat, from # e  Third Reich on its western frontier 
and the real lapanesé/threat in the east there eould be ho doubt# German sus- 
oeptibilities were hot allowed to prejudice Russian aiplom&tio efforts 'in - 
Warsaw and Paris, - The German ibabasaador himself understood the dominent role ; 
which his eomtry had played in the reoeat evrnits# He noted the reoiprooal 
effect of ferman-Fï^oh and German**Soviet relatlpa» which had already so W l -
\v .-
uenoed the course of Franoo-Boviet pact negotiations end which now had apparw 
ently (0,so had a deoisive effect on the recent ratification#^ it occurring -Fat 
a moment of increased tension in German-French relations and growing instabil­
ity in German-Soviet relations,” Birksen considered that his analysis made in 
Hovember 1928 still applied# that is# French economic and political concessions 
would tempt the Soviet Government but only if it were no longer sure of Germany 
since collaboration with Germany was the most logical and coveted combination 
for the tISSE, He thought that recently the trend within Russia had been swinging 
unmistakably towards France and that further developments would be decisively 
influenced by the Soviet judgement of Germany'» future attitude, Dirksen ended 
his report by stressing the vital importance for Germany of its immediate rat­
ification of the Extension protocol# though he added that its value would have
ge
been greater had it occurred before the French pact's ratification. As was
noted above# by the time Gèrmap' played its ratifio.atiorioerd the diplomatic game
%
was too far advanced; ' it is - possible that Hitler never placed much reliance on 
it anyway.
The German Ambassador again took up this theme in conversation with Litvinov
some weeks later. He pointed outjthat the German Government had always understood
the Soviet pact policy even though the open rapprochement with France and
"SgT'The^GeSSrAmBas % h e " Foreign'' 'llllniet^ '-#
February 20#1955* German Docs, pps, 62*6#,
Poland had caused a strain in relations# but recently doubts had arisen 
about Soviet intentions since it seemed as though the Soviet Union wanted to 
ro-orientate its foreign policy in the direotion of a closer rapprochement 
with France* Germany had always assumed that the initiative for the Franco- 
Soviet rapprochement had come largely from the French side but it was now ,, 
apparent that "the initiative,.-came in a large measure also from the Soviet bil§5 
In reply, Litvinov# whilst assuring Dirksm that his apparent support of France 
at the DisarWmént Oonferenoe was by no means as real as. the Fmnch press had 
claimed, did not conceal his Government's anxieties îln regard to the cmtinu- | 
anco of Germai^ r * s policy towards Russia, which, he said, were "very grave and 
well-founded*” Birksen summarised the Gommisaar' s concluding statements as 
follows:
fhe Soviet Government had no desire to change Its foreign policy 
and especially its relations to Germany* But it considered a German- 
French alliance as contrary to its interests and would seek to prevent 
it* But while the Soviet Government had sought to prevent a German- 
French alliance in the past by bringing influmce to bear on the German 
side, it would now endeavotw to attain the same objective through closer 
relations with France*
Litvinov, in reply to further probing, stated that "the Soviet Government
would never enter into any alliance with France and in any way confirm the
Treaty of Versaillesj it would merely seek to develop its relations viith
3?rance*” Birksen summarised his observations with the comment, "the development
of Soviet-French relations will be corr^ated with that of German-Soviet
relations; the greater the cooling toward Germany, the greater the disposition
67*
to cordiality toward France*"
4# A new Soviet foreign policy orientation*
Though the Soviets vdheaent3y denied that their foreign policy had undez^
gone any new orientation, it is difficult to support this contention* Germany
was no longer Russia's major supporter in international society but increasingly
*S?TA^"'slHar"'i^ 'byïlïScïï'toISS^  See'"
above, pps* 227-228*
67* Ambassador Birksen to the German Foreign Ministry, Marchll,1933* Germm 
pooq. pps *141-145#
250.
its oïiQtty* France and Poland, the most recaXoitrent of the Imperialist 
powers, were signatories of non-aggression pacts with thé USSR directed 
largely agalast the threat of demon aggression* In most spheres of inter­
national relations the Soviet position was undergoing a rè-assessment. Through­
out the Preparatory Disarmament Qommissioh and the actual ■ Disarmament Oonfêr-- 
one© the Soviet delegation had steadfastly opposed all French schemes for die- ■ 
armament ajrtd especially the recent concept of an international force under the 
control of the League of Hâtions» The hasio French coatwntion that security 
must precede disarmament had received no support from Moscow* This remained ■
tl%e case although in 1932 the first signs of a weakening of Soviet-German
68
collaboration at Geneva could be discerned* ^
A new french plan vms put before the assembled delegates in 1933 which 
agaia envisaged an iî^ternational foroe providing the security in which dis­
armament alone could be undertaken* On February 6, Litvinov, on behalf of the 
Soviet delegation, presented M s  views on this project* The french scheme, he 
said, meant once again putting the question of disarmament into the background 
and in fact was no advancement on the position reached five years previously. 
The Soviet delegation had always been convinced and remained so, that the best, 
if not the only, guarantee of security for all states was total Msarmament or 
at least the maximum possible in the shortest time* After these preliminaries, 
however, his speech than strikingly departed from its ‘predictable courses
But apparently there is no escape from this problem (of security), 
if only because it has been raised by a great and powerful state 
whose representatives have declared that until it is solved they 
cannot undertake any obligations whatsoever with regard to the 
reduction of armaments* If, therefore, we want to advance and not 
just to go round and round we shall have to bonsider with All ser#» 
iousness the French proposals and mok© up our müids whether thmre 
is any possibilily of reaching m  international agreement based upon 
these and other proposals which may be made on security by other 
delegations, prooedding subsequently to questions of disarmament, or 
whether such an agreement will prove impossible*
Litvinov also suggested a definition of "aggressor” which, he insisted, was
"not meant to compete wilii or be a substitute for the French proposals but is
their logical ©xteausion*"^^*
69* Speech of the Ohairman of the Soviet Delegàtion,Lltvinov,February 6,1933, 
M L M s J é t  PP8* 7>03.
This Soviet statement represented a dramatio ohnnge from the earlier
pro-German to a pro-Fronoh stance end was reoognised as such# Whilst the
french delegate, Paul-Donoour, thanked Litvinov for His speech, the Gorman
response wqs far from enthusiastic. Neumth,for example, noted the unusually
friendly reception which Litvinov's Geneva statements had received in the
frenoh press and considered that they reflected more far-reaching political
71
intentions than the suhjeot of disarmament# Litvinov himself could have
held few illusions as to the probhhlo German rohponse to his spoaoh and indeed,
he noted that Hadolny, the German delegate, had expressed satisfaction which
72
"hardly was sincere.” * Buoh a change of tactics by the Soviet TMion could 
not have been imdertaken purely on taehnloal grounds and undoubtedly had pol­
itical. aims, moat probably a demonstration to tlxe French Government of Soviet 
support on the eve of the B?enoh ratification of tii© Franco-Soviet non-aggrews-
75
ion pact. Vet Litvinov valiantly attempted to keep d l  his iron» in the fire< 
In conversation with the German Foreign Minister, he assured M m  that his Gov- 
omment occupied the same position as tîxe German Government on the majoriiy of 
disarmament questions. He excused his speech by olalming that it was better to 
discuss and eventually reject the French security plan so as to advance matters 
rather than to argue for months with 3?rance, expressing surprise that the 
German tactics were apparently aimed at prolonging the conference's work when 
Germany ought to be interested in the moat rapid exposure of the French posit­
ion. Litvinov, perhaps somewhat stretching von Heurath's gullibility, would 
only admit that "of course, because of tlie changed relations with France, the 
tone of my speeches was more courteous and friendly than in the Preparatory
'&e''0o3is8ar''f^
February 6,1933. B W  Vol#X6. p.84.
71. German Foreign Minister Meurath to the Bmbaaay in the UB3E, February 22,
1933. âfflîaJSSS» p. 71.
72* Telegram from the Gommissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, to the NKB, 
February 6,1935. BVP Vol*:^^# p.%.
75. As Scott points out, it is unlikely that the speech was a reaction to 
Hitler, it being made so shortly after the letter's appointment as 
Ohcnoallor, but it was still a definite pro-Fronch move* Scott, A13.ianoe 
p.108, footnote 27.
Gommlsoion# " There could be 11% tie doubt that this signifie mit Soviet 
shift of emphasis as regards the question of disarmament was hoHi a cause 
and a consoquoiice of the new orientation which Russian, foreign policy was
oxperienoing# At the end of April, Pravda carried a headline which would have -
75seemed astounding only a f m  months earlier; "Isolation of German delegation#”
In May Litvinov further developed this new Soviet policy by suggesting 
that the disarmament Ooaference be transformed into a permanent and regularly 
assembling conference of peace which would work out and perfect measures for 
strengthening security and should afford aid "whether such be moral, economic, 
financial or otherwise” to threatened states» More surprisingly, Litvinov's 
comments on the League of Mations, hitherto the detested instrument of world 
imperialism, were almost unrecognisable* Mia proposed conference was to cont­
inue as m  organ of the League with wMch it would maintain the closest contact* 
The .Soviet Government m s  prepared to make its contribution to measures aimed 
at safeguarding universal p©ao#”and the co-operation of the Soviet Government 
in an international cause, or with ajJiy international organisation, brought 
witii it the tremendous moral force of an increasingly powerful state of 170 
millions
This more favourable response to the League of Mations and international
8
co-operation in general was acoompeuaied by m  equally stai'tling change as regard 
the Soviet attitude towards the Versailles settlement and the question of the 
statua quo versus reviaioniam as a whole* The Soviet Government had stead­
fastly criticised the Versailles treaty and sided with the defeated powers, 
especially Germany, against the victors who had imposed this invidious instr­
ument as a means of furthering their imperialist plans* In the twenties such 
a Soviet policy had been advantageous both as regards improving relations with 
the Weimar Republic and as a propaganda weapon# Any revision had seemed
74* Mote of a conversation between the Gommissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov 
and the German foreign Minister, Mcurath, March 1,1935* J^-.J'ol*M#ppa • 
134-135.
75* Pravda# April 30,1933*
75* Litvinov to the Pisariaament Gonference, May 29,1933* Quoted in D*l,
Businkai, "3oviet*^Lea^ue Relations#1919-1959$A Survey and Analysis”.
Mew York Univermty, Hi*D* thesis, 19o4, pps*lK ...........
unlrlkoly ctid In any oane no threat to the USSR whereas the opportunity 
this policy afforded for Irritating the oontracHottons hetwcon the capitalist 
powers# of vAioh the split between victors end vanquished was the most ohviom^# 
could not he missed# In recent months# under the strain of deteriorating :col- 
ations with Germany and the pact negotiations with France and Poland, the two 
major protagonists of the Versail.les treaty, the Soviet line had somewhat mell­
owed and whilst Versailles was not praised as such, the call for its revision 
became somewhat muted. The succession of a National-3ooiaJist Government to 
power in Germany# as well as the continued improvement of relations with France 
and Poland, oast doubt on the wisdom of Russia maintaining any policy of support 
for treaty revision now that it seemed a much more real possibility. Was it 
wise to support revision when Germany# the major bonefioiary# had as its leader 
a man who had published extreme claims for territorial seizures in eastern 
Europe? A more rational, policy might weZI. be to join the ranks of the status 
quo powers. After all# the Soviet tfeion itself had no immediate oxp^usionaiy 
aims; it would be lunacy to support Hitler's schemes in the face of Frenoh 
opposition when this suocess could moan disaster for Russia. The reversal of 
policy which.this new appreciation of the changed international situation dem­
anded caused little trouble for the Govemment :ln Moscow# e^gerienced in the 
art of contradicting yesterday's statements by today's. That the Soviet Gov- 
animent was becoming more sensitive to the instability and wax’ danger result- 
:î.ng from any treaty revision was given tangible expression by an editorial in 
Isvostiia. It reflected âœt a new Soviet concern at the growing demand for the
revision of the Versailles treaty and. a realisation that Japaxxese aggression
77in Manchuria, threatened the Washington treaty. * The real volt© face#however# 
was left to Karl Radok* s pen. Whilst he willingly conceded that the Versailles 
peace could not provide a basis for the development of peoples nor even fox’ the 
dovelopment of capitalism, he argued that the peace which would replace 
Versailles as a resu3.t of a victory by another impexdalist coalition would be 
"a world-wide prison# sliaokling the suffering popular masses.” Revision was
'W .' ~
another name for a now world war and therefore it waa not «urprislng 
that one of the basio demands of the revisionist» was the demand for the right 
to those arms which the VersaiHe» treaty denied them; "the mere faot that the 
revision of the treaty is bound up with the viotozy of fascism shows how little 
this revision oould be considered in the national interests of the masses of 
the nations designated by the faaoista as inferior#” Whilst the international 
proletariat continued to be an enemy of Versailles # it opposed its revision by 
those imperialist powers which aspired to re-divide the world amid the conflag­
ration of a new imperialist war# If this was not a sufficiently clear statement 
of the Soviet Government*» response to the new Germany# Badek became ev«i more 
exqïlioltî
This programme of seeking the revision of the Versailles treaty on 
the path of re-establisliing the still-worse Brest peace is the foreign 
polic|ï progi*amm© of German fftsolsm##*(But) the times of Brest have long 
since past a^d any attempt to "revise” the Versailles treaty at the e%- 
pense of the USSR would call into question the vezy existence of those 
capitalist powers which tried to realise such a programme#78*
A second article by Hadefc some months later repeated this view:
Versailles treaty cannot be a basis for good relations between 
peoples# but the peace vdiioh would be foisted upon humanity by vict­
orious fascist vikings would undoubtedly be still worse than the sit­
uation which exists at pr©sent#79*
This new policy inevitably further weakened relations with Geziaony and
80
strengthened them with France and Boland# * Dirksen had ended his depressing 
report on the ratification of the Extension protocol with a plea for continued 
Soviet-German collaboration since although the USSR# in the throes of collect­
ivisation and industrialisation# was not a powerful factor at present# its 
importance for Germany had always laid and would continue to lay in its pot­
ential strength; "even to-day# therefore# for Germany the same reasons which
in 1922 led to the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty# and in 1986 to the conol-
81
usion of the Berlin Treaty# are alive and operative*” * On May I4# he admitted#
MaylLO# 193^
79# Igvestlla* August 9# 1933#
80# Dirksen called Radek's article of May 10 ”a malicious article vsiy imfav- 
ourable to Germany and her demands for revision#” The /Ambassador in the 
USSR# Dirksen#to the Foreign Ministry#Moy 14#1933* German Boca# p#419#
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the formerly "excellent” military relatione, already deteriorating, had now
"prooeeded further toward dissolution", when the Buéalans released themselve»
otill more plainly from the previous form of their joint military oo-operatioif *
Military oollahoration oeaaed in the summer of 1955* On August 24 the Gorman - -
Charge d* Affaires in Mo soot: ooafimed that "the chapter of (military) op^opor^
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ation on the basis of strong mutual oonfidmo© must he regarded as dosed»" - -
The Soviet Government could hardly maintain military eollahoration with ' 
a ooutttxy which increasingly appeared in the role of a potential aggressor* The ■' 
rumours which reached Moscow concerning the Papen-Herriot talks of June 1952- •*
in which the former offered France a military entente oould hardly have re­
assured the Soviets as to the wisdom of supplying Germany with military infor­
mation. Further, although military relations had functioned normally during 
bouts of political depression they oould not withstand the prolonged crisis 
qhich appeared in 1955$ On the German side. Hitler's readiness to flout the 
Versailles restrictions on armaments reduced the need for secret training 
grounds and construction# sites in Russia.
Had Soviet foreign policy undergone a re-orientation? Despite the cornel-- 
usion of non^aggression pacts with the western border states in France, the 
sharp deterioration o f relations with Germany and the termination of its long-■ 
standing military collaboration, the new Soviet position vis-a-vis the 
Versailles treaty and disarmament, a certain caution must he exercised in cate- , 
goriaing this foreign policy. Undoubtedly the pacts with France and Poland in 
particular were of great significance for Russian foreign policy when taken' 
together with the ending of the Bapsllo partnership* Yet this should not be 
interpreted as representing a complete transference of allegiance by the Soviet 
Government, il though relations with both France and Poland had greatly improved 
and BovietGPolish relations were never better than in 1955, distrust still 
existed# Military attaches had been exchanged between France and the ÜSSE in
8i^ Atta$e i S S n  IbîSign^ S i S S y ^
June 28,1955# German Docs# p#609#_
87, Memorandum by the German Oharge d*Affaires in the IBBE, August 24,1955*
a a * .  P'768.
April gmd May; Fronoh and Polish officers began to arrive in Russia on the 
heels of the departiîîg Reiohswehr officers. Erickson has pointed out, however, 
that France did not extend its military interest so far a» to consider Eua»ia 
a potential millitazy ally in any future war, being more interested in ending 
Boviet-Germn military collaboration which so threatened Poland* Whilst > 
political relations with Franoe vmre progressing, the economic negotiations 
to which botli sides attached considerable importance, with persistance resisted 
any settlement. No agreement oould be reached on French government-backed 
credits tiithout which Soviet orders oould not be placed* Another sphere of 
Franco-Soviet, as well as German-Soviet, disagreement in the summer of 1955 was 
provided by the Four Power Pact proposal, from which the USSR was to be esEoluded 
and therefore which it suspected of being at least passively anti-Soviet*
Soviet Russia's highly significaxit aooomplishaents on its western frontier 
and in Paris were offset by a natural concern at the direotion in which future 
diplomatic relations would develop Litvinov expressed this Soviet apprehen­
sion whilst discussing the Four Power Pact wili: he jeon* The latter had assured 
Litvinov tîiat French participation in this pact would be a guarantee against 
any possible anti-Soviet decisions, to which the Commissar retorted that "the 
Soviet-French rapprochement which is projected is an expression of the policy 
of the parties which at present are in povjer in France and tliat it is imposs­
ible to guarantee the continuation of this policy in the event of the rightist
91.
parties coming to power* ” In Soviet eyes this instability which was inherent 
in the western democratic system was a great handicap to any deep collaborat­
ion* Despite the very real deterioration in Soviet-^German relations the Soviet 
Government did not abandon Nasi Germany completely but sought to cling to the
S o v i e t -  n-,,, u-..nn.T,n„r,»
09* See, for example, telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in AVanoejDovgalevaî^y, 
to the mm, January 19,1933* D W  Tol.16* o*40*lavestiia.April 13,1953* 
Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador in Franco,Dovgalevsky,to the M®,
April 12,1953* i)VP Vol.16* pps.227-288*
90* Soviet fears as regards Polish policy was soon to be justified In the 
Polish rapprochement with Germany.The history of the late 1950* a and thé 
Nazsl-Soviet pact of 1959 may be seen in the context of continuing Franco- 
, Soviet mutual distrust*
91. Note of a conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov, 
and the French Ambassador in the USSR,Dejean,April 10.1935>Ibid.»pps.223-226.
shreds of the Rapallo policy in so far as Germany's ruler and its own Frenoh 
policy permitted* Krestinslty assured Dirkaen that "the greater and more influ­
ential portion of the Soviet politioal puhlio and the Soviet Government itself 
•«•desired a continuation of the present positive poliey with respeot to 
Germany." Russia was still fighting the Versailles treaty and had not turned to 
France in place of Germany*On August 4, Molotov told Dirksen that further 
relations with Germany would depend exclusively on the position adopted by the 
latter* Such assurances, however, were more Indicative of Soviet reluctance 
to hum a single diplomatic bridge than of any meaningful collaboration* By the 
summer of 1935 Soviet-German relations were unrecognisable from those of the 
middle twenties*
In his speech to the Central Executive Committee on the previous year's
foreign policy, Litvinov in December 1933 «aid, "if it is possible to speak of
diplomatic eras, then we are now without doubt standing at the junction of two 
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eras." * Soviet foreign policy, tentatively, only partially by its own inclin­
ations, was entering on a new course which was to lead to membership of the 
League of Nations, a mutual assistance pact with France, the era of collective 
security and popular fronts# Any halting place in a historical study inevitably 
is to a greater or lesser degree arbitra## The summer of 1933 did not witness 
the end of this Soviet foreign policy development# In the next few years it was 
to progress much further towards the west European states whilst its detente 
with Poland was to be shattered# The histozy of the non-aggression pact also 
was not quite completed with the ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact* In 
September 1933 such a pact was concluded with Italy and tentative talks took 
place in that year on the theme of a Soviet-Cseoh pact but with no results# 
Nevertheless, by early 1933 there could be no doubt that Soviet foreign policy 
had entered on a new course#
W7''lübassador Dirksen to' the 'German Fbrsjign MÜïster,N '3,1933*'
German Poos# p*322# Krestinsky himself was pro-German#
93# Note of a conversation between Molotov,Chairman of the Council of People's 
Commissars,and the German Ambassador in the USSR,Dirksen,August 4,1933#
PVP Vol#l6, p *480.
94# The Commissar for Foreign Affairs,Litvinov,to the OEC,December 29,1933# 
Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy Vol#3«(London 1933)p#40*
Conclusion#
From its inception the Soviet state was faced with one overwhelmingly 
important foreign policy consideration, the vital need to bolster its security 
against foreign intervention* Security measures the absence of external threats 
to acquired values and whilst all states are concerned with security, neverthe­
less it is a value of Wiich a state can have more or less and which it can desire 
to have in a greater or leaser degree, as Arnold Wolf era rightly argues. * It 
also has an objective and a subjective aspect* Objectively the new Russian state 
was under great threat and its security level very low. Initially the advancing 
German troops threatened; after the Brest-Litovsk peace allied intervention for 
a time became a reality, then Poland launched its armies eastward. The termin­
ation of fighting on Russian soil did not signify the abandonment of anti-Soviet 
sentiments in the capitalist world which surrounded the Soviet island; influen­
tial political and military leaders openly discussed the prospects of an anti- 
Soviet intervention. This histozy of intervention and ample evidence of contin­
uing hostility in the outside world would have provided any leadership in Moscow 
with concern for the future of its state* When this leadership happened to 
function in an Ideological environment in which all capitalist states were 
perceived as being its deadly enemies, restrained only by their contradictions 
from mounting a holocaust against the Bolshevik strong-hold, the subjective 
aspect of security, that is the absence of fear that its acquired values would 
be attacked, was inevitably even lower than the objective situation warranted.
If security was by necessity to be the major objective of Soviet foreign 
policy, it had a wide range of instruments by which to achieve it. Initially 
great hopes had been centred on international communism and its organisational 
personification, the Comintern. If world capitalism could bo smashed by the 
actions of the world proletariat, aided by Soviet power, Russia then would 
1. X.WolfezTs". ' DisGoidlBnd'Goïïaboi^ )L p.150»..........  .7
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become merely one part of a eooialtst globe. States would no longer exist; 
©onsequeatly the concept of security along with foreign policy itself would 
be banished from all but the historians* vocabulary. Such illusions did not 
long persist, at least in the highest echelons of the Soviet Government and 
by the early twenties, following the Comintern's failures, it was realised 
that at least for the forcseable future, the Soviet state would have to co­
exist in an international system dominated by imperialist states. If Soviet i
Russia was to survive then diplomacy must be utilised, even by revolution­
aries* Further, if the diplomatic game was to be played then at least some of 
its rules had to be observed. The Narkomindel quickly adjusted to the demands 
of traditional diplomacy. Genuine contradictions existed between the capitalist 
states which Marxist ideology was well equipped to detect and exploit; diplo- j 
matio bargaining soon reaped rich rewards to the weak state badly in need of 
friends.
Security being their over-riding oonoefn, it was in this sphere that the 
Soviet diplomats produced an original addition to the traditional diplomatic 
tools. It was perceived that if the Soviet frontiers were to be given some 
protection against hostile incursions, if the great powers of the world were 
to be enticed from their anti-Soviet schemes, then some instrument must be 
employed to register and define these countries' relations with the UBSR* The 
traditional method of giving tangible form to a diplomatic understanding was 
the alliance yet this carried connotations of aggression and capitalist consp­
iracy. Even within bourgeois societies the reaction against the First World 
War had included a certain distrust of the traditional alliance which was seen 
as having been a contributor to that shattering upheaval. The Bolsheviks were 
anxious to demonstrate their peaoe-lovingness by concluding treaties which 
would merely bind the signatories to non-aggression one against the other and 
to neutrality in the event of either being involved in a war with a third state. 
For this purpose the non-aggression pact was admirable; its veiy title was 
enough to demonstrate the Soviet rejection of war and its desire to live in
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peace with all states. The Soviet state was too weak and beset by internal, 
problems to consider external militazy adventures, certainly after its early 
failure in Poland and therefore had no need for alliances whereby the parties 
undertook to prepare for any aggressive designs. The maüor weakness of the non- 
aggression pact was th<a absence of any defensive committment in case of an 
attack by third parties other than neutrality but it is unlikely that any 
worthwhile guarantee would have been given to the pariah communist state^. Xn 
any case, the Soviet plan was to secure undertakings of non-aggression from 
all its neighbours thus overcoming this danger. Farther, whilst the Soviet 
leaders were compelled to accept the validity of a capitalist statèâ signature 
to a diplomatic document without which relations with the outside world could 
not have been consolidated, its faith in such dooumaits was limited and any 
agreement irtïioh promised more than simple non-aggression and neutrality was 
probably, considered of minimal value. The non-aggression pact as developed by 
the tBSR had two further oharacteristios* Firstly, its terms were extended be­
yond the narrow confines vhioh its title suggested to include articles relating 
to propaganda, economic nonëaggression, etc. as suited the interests of the 
particular states involved, making the pact of greater benefit to the signat­
ories* Secondly, the Russians insisted that their pacts must be bilateral and 
not multilateral so as to avoid an over-involvemont in the intrigues of capit­
alist states and to maximise their influence in any agreement which would have 
been diluted with the addition of third states.
B^om the middle twenties the non-aggression pact became a prominent 
factor in Soviet diplomacy but its early successes were limited. While it 
achieved its aims along the southern border and with one great power, Germany, 
itself an outcast from international society and to idiioh Soviet friendship 
oould offer special advantages, it failed to consolidate either its western 
or eastern frontier or to attract any other great power into such a pact.
This was despite considerable Russian effort in this direction; the USSR was 
willing to negotiate non-aggression pacts with all states so long as tho terms
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were reasonable; it was the reluotanoe of the eapitalist states to deal 
with Bolshevik Russia which proved the obstacle, a reluotonoe based on real 
ideological and historical fears of their giant neighbour.
The era of the Soviet non-aggression pact really emerged in the early 
1950's. Jh the Qourse of two years five such pacts were successfully negot­
iated, two of them with states of considerable stature in the international 
system, hitherto deadly enemies of the Ü33R, Fraa^ oe and Poland* Furthermore, 
this series of pacts marked a more fundamental shift in the whole Soviet 
foreign policy orientation, in part a cause of tho pacts, in part a consequence 
of them* Why did this change occur at this particular time? The reasons are 
various and related. At # e  end of the twenties the oapitolist world was plunged 
into economic chaos by the world economic depression. The international diraate 
darkened; new threats loomed against idiioh the pervasive fear of Bolshevism 
now seemed less significant. The capitalist world had a great need for economic 
markets at a time when the Soviet Union, itself mounting a massive industrial­
isation and agricultural collectivisation, was able to provide such a market.
The small Baltic states, especially, found it increasingly difficult to resist 
the economic reality of oollaboratlon with their eastern neighbour* Even a 
state such as France faced growing internal pressure to improve economic relati­
ons with the D33H shioh had been artificially shattered by the "anti-dumping” 
campaign* A second factor i«hioh aided Russia was the "domino" effect; if one 
large state signed a pact with the US3E then the pressure on the other assoc­
iated states to follow suit was increased. Even France became influenced by 
Poland’s example once negotiations between the latter and the USSR overtook 
France’s own negotiations* Tot the major factor which influenced both the pact 
series and the new Soviet foreign policy orientation was the changes which were 
now taking place within the great power of central Europe, the ogrew of 1914, 
Germany. Despite its defeat^l9l8, the victor powers, especially those situated 
on the European continent, ever watched with anxiety for any signs of its res­
urgence. The old order remained entrenched in the Weimar Republic and was now
joined by frightening new nationalist growths, exemplified by the National- 
Socialist party; The world economic crisis had a disastrous effect on the 
German economy, unemployment mushroomed and in its wake political extremism, 
both of the left and ri^t. The danger of a German rectification of the Ver- 
saHlwes peace settlement, never accepted even by the moderate political int­
erests within the Republic, was now greatly increased. Poland and France, the 
two most obvious victims of an aggressive Germany, became more and more alarmed.f 
How could this threat be met? The Soviet Ihiion provided one answer, or partial 
answer. Poland’s eastern border could only be safeguarded in case of a German 
attack by m  agreement with Russia* In addition, Russia was Germany’s major 
"friend" in the international system. Their military collaboration was an open 
secret, rumours of a military alliance even circulated. If Prance and Polmd, 
and in their wake the Baltic states and Rumania signed pacts with Russia,
Germany would be weakened. Economic advantages would also accrue from any pol­
itical settlement. Lastly, Russia itself was desirous of achieving such pacts. 
The answer to the Versailles powers’ predicament seems so obvious that it might i 
be thought amasing that it was only seised upon in the early thirties. Only in 
this hour of danger, however, could the old enmities be discarded. Only in the 
face of a re-awakening Germany could the Bolsheviks be dealt with on the diplo- , 
matio level. In the 1920’s negotiations had broken down between France, Poland • 
the Baltics and the USSR. In this new international environmmt they were to 
succeed.
On the surface the Soviet decision to negotiate these new non-sggrheslon 
pacts which it had long desired seems an obvious one. If more undertakings of 
non-aggression could be solicited then Soviet security was thereby enhanced. 
France and Poland were perceived in Moscow as the major protagonists of an 
anti-Soviet interventim; Rumania had a territorial dispute with Russia on their 
common border. The Soviet decision was not so simple, however, because the inter­
national environment was not favouspable to this Soviet desire to maintain good 
relations with all states. Since 1910 it had been split into at least two camps,
the victors and the vanquished from the last war. The Soviet docision-iaakers 
least of all could have boon unaware of this "basic capitalist contradiction, 
nor that it was growing as extremism and call a for the revision of Versailles 
developed within Germany. Indeed the veiy opportunity which was afforded 
Russia to negotiate pacts with Poland, the Baltics and Prance was provided "by 
the deepening of this split, for Germany the major political motivation behind 
the Rapallo partnership was its effect on Poland* A Russia friendly with Germahy 
would have to be hostile towards Poland, thus preventing the latter from concen­
trating a H  its attention on its western frontier with Germany* If Russia now 
negotiated non-aggression pacts with Germany’s main foes, what was the use of 
Rapallo. The Narkomindel well understood this basic contradiction in its policy 
once negotiations for the new pacts were begun, a contradiction which was not 
really assauged by its endeavours to reassure Germany that its foreign policy 
remained as before. Despite such denials, a new alignment gradually emerged.
If Russia was given the opportunity to improve relations with France and 
Poland it was not prepared to reject it for the sake of German susceptibilities# 
The vezy forces in Germany which were alarming the political leaders in Paris 
and Warsaw also alarmed them in Moscow simply because all three perceived their 
interests as being beat served by maintaining the status quo. In the past 
Moscow had denied this but then there seemed no danger of it being overthrown. 
The growth of political instabllHy in the Weimar Republic, however, raised 
doubts amongst the Soviet leadership as to the course of future events. Could 
the USSR rely solely ona Germany whose future seemed at best uncertain andsfc 
worst leading towards a Rail Goveminent. The internal upheavals within Russia 
left it temporarily more eaqposed to external attack than before* The Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria raised a very real threat to the long Soviet eastern 
frontier and convinced the Soviet Government of the need to hasten its already- 
begun negotiations in the west. IVhilst the attempt had to be made to placate 
Germany, in the final analysis, if a choice had to be made, the pacts with 
France and the western border states were given greater priority than German
ausoéptibilities* Husoia might atill have avoided a pro-weatem orientation 
had tho professional German diplomats continued to control their country’ a 
foreign policy# If Russia was drawn towards the Versailles powers, Germany 
might have accepted the former’s reduced commitment as inevitable once Russia 
was given the; chance to play off France against Germaiy# Berlin’s preferent­
ial position as regards Russia had only been secured because the latter had 
no other options available# How Germany would have to accept the reality of 
the new situation* It was the advent of a Hasi Government nhich prevented any 
such solution* Ideological hostility was early cemented by Hitler’s anti- 
Soviet policies within Germany. German revanchist alms lay in the east and 
ultimately threatened the existence of the Soviet state* The events of 1939 
showed that a short term agreement could surmount this underlying clash of 
interests but in 1933 Hitler desired no such settlement* The logic of the sit­
uation forced Russia to turn Increasingly toward the Versailles powers* By the 
summer of 1933 the Soviets were no longer attacking the Versailles treaty, no 
longer attacking Frenoh disarmament plans* Military collaboration with Hitler 
had ended and the Rapallo partnership dissolved* The roots of these changes had 
formed beftre Hitler ever became Chancellor; they were bred by the more posit­
ive advantages vhich France and Its allies offered to Soviet security than did 
the disintegrating Weimar Republic; Hitler’s accession to power merely brought 
matters to a head*
The question must finally be raised as to whether the Soviet quest for 
security had achieved anything by 1933, Five more non-aggression pacts had been 
negotiated and only the long Japanese-threat^aed far eastern frontier and the 
south-west Rumanian frontier remained uncloaked by such pacts. Yet the old 
Soviet-German partnership lay in ruins and in its stead existed a growing ten­
sion. One set of "friends" had been gained but an old one lost. The Soviet 
diplomatic standing in international society was greater than five yeqrs prev­
iously but its level of security probably no higher* In this it vrns not alone, 
however, for the thirties’ era allowed few countries to look with confidence
towarâs security: If Soviet dlplomcy by X935 hud mvAXy imintaluod 
its oow^tsy’s security level thou it could not bo Judged too harshly. For 
suoooss in aomé eoàtlitlou» must be measured geueroucly- m à  in ths chunging 
iutemmtional oyotea of thdt ora moooso might- well be orodited to tho## 
whoso effort# staved o ff tho approaohifig àimntotm
Appondix; A Bibliogzai^loal Note.
The major source of âocumontatiou for this thesis was provided by the 
current series of volumes being published by thé Soviet authorities, Dokumehti 
vnesiniey politiki, which contains much valuable and hitherto unpublished 
material. Uhilst it is inevitable that factors other than W.storical relevance 
were involved in the selection of the documents published, nevertheless their 
actual contents have been compared with British, French and German sources 
idiere this was possible and have passed the test of authenticity. This source 
has been supported by other collections of Soviet doouw«ats, British, French, 
German and Polish documents and the Soviet press, itself at times an illumin­
ating source of official government information in a state where the press is 
so closely controlled by the central authorities*
Reference has been made to numerous secondary sources which can be divided 
into two categories. Firstly, the general books on Soviet foreign policy usumkly 
dealing with a long time period. They treat the period 1930-1933 In a very 
cursory fashion either because of lack of material, space, an under-estimation 
of its importance in the general trend of inter-war Soviet foreign relations 
or a combination of these three. Esqjhasis is usually preserved for the more 
dramatic and better Imown period from 1935 until 1939* Examples are L,Fischer, 
"Russia’s Road from Peace to War"; 01am, "Expansion and Go-existence." The 
much greater availability of material, Soviet and other, which has relatively 
recently become available has rendered such books as Beloff’s, "The Foreign 
Polioy of Soviet Russia", out of date.
A second category deals with a more limited time period in greater 
detail but oonoentrates on the Soviet Onion’s bilateral foreign relations 
with one other state and in doing so fails to present an integrated picture of 
Soviet foreign policy. A fault of this type of book for the Soviet specialist 
is that frequently it places more emphasis, both bibliographicoUy and in cont­
ent, on the second state involved rather than the Soviet tkiion, either because
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of the greater'pûaoiiy of Soviet material compared irith that of many other 
atates, the major aphore of interest of the wrltei* or an unfamlliarity with 
the Busaian language* Soviet-German relatione* at least until the end of 
1992, are quite well covered from the German side in such hooks as Dyck*» 
"Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia", Koohan*s "Russia and the ?/oimar Eepuhlio.?^  
Budurowyo«*s "Polish-Soviet Relations" is an excellent work hut only deals 
with pre-1933 events in outline*
Soviet authors oan he found in hoth categories, their work hoing of 
varying quality. Contemporary hooks of the period in general have proved 
disappointing* the Stalinist era not being the most productive one for Russian 
history# Of more recent works, Joffe*» "Vheshnyaya politika SSSR" was the most 
interesting hut his source material was usually either available at first hand 
or else, if arohival, of little relevance, at least in this study#
Periodicals have not proved vejy illuminating, current Soviet journals 
•specially containing little on this topic. Certain 1990IS publications such 
OS "Bolshevik" and the Comintern journos proved of some v^ue. A few journals
\ ^ h o x ] ù ^ s f v o  f M'uroV'ayet
Of this period such as "*Cirovoge-î3io«iaietwaHP-Mirevey-F^iti^^ and 
Meshdunarodnaiai 2hisn" have not been located but it is unlikely that they 
would have radically altered the conclusions reached*
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